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ABSTRACT 
This study demonstrates that, in the post Cold War era, US leadership becomes more 
crucial than ever. Through the adoption of a classical approach; a thorough case study 
of diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis Albania coupled with America's response to the crisis in 
Bosnia, highlights the weakness of US policy in the former and its outright failure in the 
case of the latter. Historical analysis demonstrates that recent violent nationalism in the 
Balkans did not suddenly erupt into violence. Instead, it remains dormant until such time 
that power vacuums, the result of power politics, are created. Indeed, the work seeks to 
show the history of Western, especially US, policy failure and short-sightedness in the 
region and how past trends have invoked present failures and crises which have yet to be 
remedied. The examination of US relations with Albania, shows that much more is 
required in America's efforts to ensure that democracy succeeds in Albania, and that a 
deeper analysis demonstrates the need for greater mutual understanding between the US 
and Albania. The Bosnian crisis is an example of American and Western failure which 
should not be repeated elsewhere in the region. By reviewing the tenets of American 
foreign policy, the study seeks to shed light upon the theories which have dominated 
current debate. The aim of such a review is to examine the trend, or trends, which have 
surfaced from the foreign policy debate and, specifically, whether or not these indicate 
the direction American foreign policy towards the region should be taking in the post- 
Cold War era. 
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Hostile to any foreign overlord, the Albanians developed their defense technique by forming 
half-wild bands in the least accessible parts of their country. Brigandage became an honorable 
profession, glorified in legends, ballads, andfolklore. The rifle became the Albanian's most 
reliableffiend. I 
It is more than a happy accident that the most grimly memorable wisecrack of the war in 1991 
was made by Bosnia-Hercegovina's President Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim. Having to choose 
Presidents Tudfman of Croatia and Mflosevic of Serbia, he remarked, is like havdng to decide 
between leukaemia and a brain tumour. 2 
A leadership role, once undertaken and firmly established, is difficult, if not 
impossible, to forsake. Indeed leadership, by its very nature, entails more than simply 
responsibility. It imposes a duty of care which invokes a willingness to act when decisive 
leadership becomes necessary. Such is the case of the United States and its position in 
the post Cold War era. Its resources; military, economic, past experience, and political 
influence, all signify that no other nation today is more ideally suited to assume such a 
task. And, more importantly, America's interests and her cultural links with Europe 
indicate that this should remain an area where US leadership is needed. And yet, as the 
crisis in the Balkans has demonstrated, America appears to have done the inadvisable. It 
has forsaken that which it did so much to build, its leadership responsibility. 3 
This failure, by the US, and to a large degree by her European allies, is not solely 
concentrated on her abortive efforts in Bosnia. What remains of that worn-torn republic, 
sadly, is no longer salvageable. State-building efforts in Bosnia are, most likely, no 
longer feasible. A write-off, however, is not the answer. What emerges from the rubble 
of the ex-Yugoslavia offers the US yet another chance to assume that which she has 
forsaken, her leadership role. The existence of some sort of quasi-Greater Serbia, once 
the conflict ends signals danger that the US should not disregard. 
It is here that Albania represents the focus of this study. Containing potential 
regional hegemons requires a proactive approach on America's part. Democracy- 
building means more than the distribution of foreign aid and credit. It requires that 
which is most tenuous and unnerving for the region, security threats, be dealt with in a 
manner which allows for democracy and market capitalism to thrive and prosper. This 
means that, from the United States, diplomacy is necessary. Diplomacy, rather than 
1 Joseph S. Roucck, Balkan Politics. - Internafional Relafions in No Man's Land (Westport Connecticut: 
Green wood Press, 1948): p. 13 1. 2 Mark Thompson, A EgRer I-louse: The En&gg of Yugoslavia (London: Vintage, 1992): p. 95. 
3 This point explained more fully in, Gus Xhudo, 'Bosnia Offers Kick-off for New American Goals" 
7he Scotsman 5 January, 1995 p. 11. 
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crisis management, or lack thereof, would represent a concerted and determined effort 
on the part of America to see to it that the Balkans, part of Europe, and therefore of 
strategic interest to the US, should not be forsaken. To do so, would be worse than 
simply condemning nations such as Albania to; engrained security fears, deteriorating 
regional relations, possible future conflict, and creating an environment which would 
allow for streaks of authoritarianism. All these remain possibilities without the security 
guarantees that only the US could provide. A worse scenario for failure could be the 
creation of disgruntled refugees which aim for revenge against the West. 4 
This is not aimed at invoking a 'shock value' effect. It instead seeks to 
demonstrate that the need for US leadership remains greater than ever in today's world. 
The Clinton administration has recently understood that the possibility of deteriorating 
regional relations remains high and has dispatched its diplomatic corps to Greece and 
Albania in an attempt to ease relations between the former and the latter. Continuing 
polemics between; Greece and Albania, Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria and Turkey, 
Serbia and Albania, Macedonia and Greece etc., only highlight the inadequacy of policy 
formulation. The Balkans is an area without a homogeneous state. The rights of 
minorities, and the guarantee that they will not resort to violence in the promotion of 
their cause or plight, requires more than the facade of democracy. It requires, internally, 
the institutionalisation of democracy, something achieved only through time and trial and 
error. Externally, it obligates those nations which have an interest to see to it that time, 
without the hindrance of security threats, both internal and external, is provided to the 
democratising nations. Albania represents one of these nations while the United States 
represents the guarantor. This is not to imply that the latter assume a 'policeman of the 
world' role. It cannot. It does signify, however, that the US should not forsake the 
leadership role it did so much to build over the past forty-plus years in Europe, 
particularly in a region which represents a potential threat to those interests. Albania is 
but one place to start. 
When embarking upon this task, two thoughts immediately came to mind. First, 
simply was, 'Am I mad? ' Friends, acquaintances, colleagues and others all gave a similar 
reply when I responded with, US-Albanian relations ..; 'I didn't know there were any. ' 
'Exactly', said I. The work seeks to contribute to the field by offering more than 
description. It aims to provide a framework which addresses, the needfor .... Second, a 
topic which includes a major crisis, still under way, normally comes under the dictionary 
4 This type of possibility already exists among the Bosnian Muslim extremists who, it appears, are 
developing strong ties with Middle East terrorist groups such as Hezbollah. Their purpose, while not 
fully developed, will likely involve exacting revenge against those the extremists feel are responsible for 
their suffering, the West. This possibility and the existence of these links has been explored fully in; 
Dr. Magnus Ranstorp and Gus Xhudo, "A Threat to Europe? Middle East Ties with the Balkans and the 
Possibility for Terrorist Activity Throughout the Region", Terrorism and Political Violence vol. 6 #2 
(Summer, 1994) 
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heading, 'ten-foot pole. ' It becomes easy to fall victim to current events. Again, it is 
hoped that the theme of the work is what shines through. Current events are important 
and do matter, yet, one should not become a slave to them. The thorough examination 
of diplomatic efforts [with Albania], and the response to a crisis situation, [Bosnia], 
demonstrate more than the failure. Hopefully they provide a look into the need for a 
more concerted effort. 
During the course of this work perhaps the most interesting aspect was the data 
collection from the sources themselves. Upon reflection I have considered myself 
fortunate that personal contacts have afforded me the opportunity to acquire first-hand 
knowledge that I have put to use in several side projects relative to my topic. Of course, 
fhends, and to some extent, I also have expressed reservations about some of my antics 
during the 'past two-plus years vis-a-vis information gathering. However, my enthusiasm 
for the pursuit of knowledge, [or simply my stupidity. I am still debating which it is], has 
made the work exhilarating. I feel it is time to offer the reader a glimpse into some of 
these exploits, the sheer insanity of their pursuit, and the fruit they bore. First, newsbrief 
clippings do not, unfortunately, provide crucial facets of information such as motivation, 
intent and the like. This can only be acquired through direct contact. Upon a trip to a 
European capital, aftiend of thefamily who, beholden to family members offered their 
services to the author in direct contact, as it were, with parties who, shall I say, operate 
within the grey area of legality. A variety of reports from the Balkans tell tales of 
organised elements engaged in an activities such as drugs and arms smuggling. More 
disturbing, however, were reports that some of these elements had links with 
counterparts in the Middle East. Relating this information to the family fiiend, the latter 
suggested I direct my inquiries to those parties involved in such activities. What 
happened next can only be described as life imitating art, specifically, any chapter from a 
Tom Clancy novel. Risking grievous bodily harm, I had the overwhelming feeling that 
none of my previous levels of education have prepared me for this. At a baser level, I felt 
like an idiot, and for the first time, actually missed the drab, overcast, and unspectacular 
view from Leuchars station. The meeting itself went off without a hitch, despite some 
difficulty with the participants as to the exact purpose of my inquiries. These men, whose 
profiles would offer Mario Puzo another trilogy of novels decided in the end that I was 
nothing more than an ambitious, if completely stupid, postgraduate student. My return to 
Scotland invoked two immediate responses from me. First, in a papal manner 1, on my 
knees, blessed Leuchars station for its drabness. Second, and more importantly, the trip 
produced two publications of which I am proud. 5 
5 The aforementioned piece, Ranstorp and Xhudo (Summer, 1994), pp. cit. and, Gus Nhudo, 
"Macedonia: The Trouble From Within", Terrorism and Political Violence vol. 5 #4 (Winter, 1993) 
pp. 311-335. 
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My trip to Albania also produced stimulating exploits. As a neorealist, I have 
expressed throughout this work that history teaches by example. Yet, like the proverbial 
moth drawn to the flame, I again found myself in interesting circumstances. Sitting at a 
roadside cafe with ex-government employees under the hot Balkan sun drinking raki, a 
potent spirit, or furniture varnish if you wish, conjured up images in me of those stories 
of pre-World War I Balkan intrigue I had read as a child. These ex-employees; with 
their rolled up cigarettes, hawk-stares, and slight leans forward when imparting 
information, have personalities which would have made Freud delight. Nonetheless, I 
listened with interest and replied, in kind, with a deliberate vagueness. They, somehow 
aware of my every move, seemed keen on my visit and went out of their way to assist 
me. As I travelled throughout the country I became aware of various police checkpoints 
set up for the dual purpose of keeping these men employed and to perhaps discourage 
criminal elements. My interest during one particular period was to acquire information 
regarding such criminal activity, as well as other relevant information. I related this 
desire to my relatives who, as they happen to know both current and former government 
employees replied that they would gladly help and accompany me. Interesting thing 
about travel in the Balkans; clear demarcations as to where one country ends and another 
begins are not present. Perhaps that is why so many territorial disputes arise since border 
checkpoints do not vary from ordinary internal checkpoints. In any case, my meetings 
proved fruitful. These are but two examples of the path my work has occasionally taken 
me to. I strongly believe that, while perhaps against the better judgement of my fiiends 
and supervisor, only such experiences can provide the work with a certain uniqueness 
unattainable through conventional methods of research gathering. When asked by one of 
my close fiiends; 'what have these experiences taught youT, I replied; 'Four things; one, 
common sense. Two, always carry dollars or deutschemarks east of Vienna. Three, dont 
forget to bring clean socks and four, make sure your life insurance policy is paid up and 
your beneficiary is clearly stated! 
The completion of this work would not have been possible without 
acknowledging those which have made the task so worthwhile. First, and foremost, I 
would like to extend my deepest thanks to Professor Paul Wilkinson. His constant 
encouragement, pointed insight and offering me the opportunity to pursue this degree 
when things looked bleak have turned my life around. For that I am continuously in his 
debt. To the 'guys in the department'; John, Mike, Guy, Gabe etc. for the levity offered 
when the scope of the work, which they too are suffering through, becomes unbearable. 
As for the department itself, a special thanks to Mrs. Gina Wilson for putting up with my 
continued mental deterioration and having to listen to the 'weirdest' conversations in 
Albanian over the past two-plus years. Also a special thanks to Myles Robertson for 
both his friendship and presence when I needed someone to bounce ideas off of To Dr. 
Bruce Hoffinann, my sincere thanks. Although I have not known him long, he has 
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offered me fiiendship and positive encouragement. As for Dr. Magnus Ranstorp 
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she remains my fiiend and has not yet plunged a scimitar into my back. 8 For this, she has 
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during the days of Ottoman occupation. In keeping with the spirit of the thesis, I felt that scimitar was 
more appropriate. 
9P. S. "Whose better than you? I" 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
World events since 1989 increase the significance of the above statement . 
From the end of World War II the United States and her allies engaged the Soviet 
Union and her surrogates in what was to be emphatically labelled a 'Cold War. 
This war, which, although not directly involving the two powers at large, did 
initiate an 'intense military competition and erupted into hot wars in Korea and 
Vietnam, as well as dozens of smaller engagements from the Bay of Pigs to 
Afghanist&. 1 To the US, its historic isolationist tendencies were cast aside to 
prevent the Soviets from extending their influence and form of government across 
the globe. The war, though it may not have directly involved, immediate threats to 
American interests became a war rooted in one form of ideology over another. To 
preserve principles of freedom and democracy from falling prey to repressive 
totalitarianism, the expenditure of resources and very cause of countering the 
Soviets itself became a justifiable necessity of the Cold War. When circumstances 
brought the world to the brink of nuclear destruction, during the Cuban Nfissile 
Crisis, not even its eventual avoidance resulted in calls for an abandoning of 
America's leadership role during the Cold War. 
Today, nearly five decades after President Harry Truman addressed a joint 
session of Congress asking that the US send aid to Greece and Turkey to allay 
possible communist take-over in those two countries, the Cold War is over. Yet, 
after all the sacrifice in human lives and resources, the end of the Cold War and 
break-up of the Soviet Union has not produced the expected euphoria following 
victory. Indeed, as Richard Nixon so aptly states, 'the end of the Cold War 
produced only a sense of exhaustion and anticlimax!. 2 A simple question of 'why' 
produces a myriad of answers often more confusing in their complexity than in 
their clarity. Yet perhaps the answer lies in the state of world events itself, 
particularly following the break-up of the USSR in December, 199 1. Those that 
had hoped for a world of co-operative, peace-loving states to now take centre 
stage and for non-violent measures to resolve disputes through the United Nations 
were as wrong today as, sadly, they were at the time of the UN's inception. 3 A 
* [You know how to win Hannibal, but not how to utilise your victory] Geza Jeszenszky, "The 
Lessons of Appeasement", Defence and International Secu? l vol. 139 #1 (February, 1994): p. 6. 
I Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace (New York, New York: Random House, 1994): p. 13. 
2 Nixon (1994), pp_. cit.: p. 7. 
3 These 'Neo-Wilsonians! want equilibrium between national self-sufficiency and global institutions. 
Even during the period after W. W. 11, they were criticised for their assumptions. ' The most serious 
fault of past US policy formulation lies in reliance upon legalisfic-morafisfic approach to international 
problems and the belief that it should be possible to surpress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of 
host of messy, and especially bloody conflicts across the globe gave notice that the 
end of the Cold War has not meant the end of war. Others that may have believed 
that the US should command presence by reasserting itself and its mission to 
preserve peace and democracy were drowned out and, more importantly, drubbed 
out in the 1992 elections by those which felt the time had come for America to cure 
its domestic ills and abandon its over assertive world leadership role. Both sides, 
unfortunately, still appear to be wrestling over what America! s role should be. 
1.1 Objectives 
In the wake of the end of the Cold War the once communist states of Eastern 
Europe now find themselves struggling to democratise and revamp their societies 
after decades of repressive counter-productive regimes which drained their land 
and people. The fate of these nations has become inextricably intertwined with 
America! s new role and its place in the world today and for the foreseeable future. 
It is this which brings us to the purpose of this study. In an examination of US- 
Albanian relations one will witness two states that could not be further apart, in 
historical experiences, culture, political beliefs, economic systems ... etc. From the 
period immediately following the Second World War the United States became 
engaged in the Cold War against the Soviet Union and her allies. For Albania, a 
brief stop within the Soviet camp preceded decades of isolation from the outside 
world and instilled within Albanian society a 'siege mentality' and inherent distrust 
for the outside world given Albania's historical experiences. 
With the end of the Cold War the nations throughout Eastern and South- 
eastern Europe now find themselves attempting large scale reform of both their 
economies and political systems. With reform has come aid from the West, 
particularly from the United States as it seeks the transformation of these former 
communist societies into, eventually, fully-functioning democracies. Aid into the 
area, however, represents more than simply a desire by the US to see that these 
states achieve their objectives. The attempted transformation of these societies and 
their relations with the United States will test the capacity of the US to transform 
its international role to adapt to the needs of the twenty-first century. Relations 
with the democratising nations of Eastern Europe represent a new chapter to the 
Atlantic Alliance. The expansion of democracy eastward signals an entirely 
different stage in American foreign policy; specifically, that Europe, divided for 
nearly five decades, is now attempting to establish itself as a continent dominated 
governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints. 
See, George F. Kennan, American Diplomagy 1900-1950 (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 
1951): p. 95., and Stanley Hoffmann, Pfimacv or World Order: Amepican Foreign Polia since the 
Cold War (New York, New York: McGraw Hill and Co., 1978): p. 95. 
by democratic societies fully integrated with the West. 4 For the US, faure to 
adopt a coherent strategy which addresses the problems and security concerns of 
the region may do more than doom efforts at reform; failure may result in 
heightened regional tensions, protracted low intensity conflict, and terrorism, and a 
reversion to authoritarian systems. Such a possibility should not be easily 
disregarded. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is a tragic demonstration of 
how things can go horribly wrong. In its efforts to adopt a new post Cold War 
strategy the US may want to consider that how its handles regional relations of a 
bilateral nature which in turn may affect its efforts to formulate new policy. 5 
Grand strategy often means a general idea rather than specific measures, yet it 
is the nature of bilateral relations which offer the specifics of policy and contribute 
as the building-blocks of a greater vision. For the United States, how it handle's its 
bilateral relations with the newly democratising nations of Europe, such as Albania, 
will explain more than whether or not the US is on the right track. Such relations 
will aid in the formulation of coherent strategy in times of uncertainty. The end of 
the Cold War has unfortunately not removed threats to national security. Problems 
ranging from regional warfare, and terrorism, to nuclear proliferation and 
conventional arms buildups, continue to pose threats to US interests across the 
globe. 6 The Clinton administration came to power on a platform aimed at curing 
the domestic problems of America. However, the host of foreign policy crises 
which have plagued the Clinton team have served notice that foreign policy can be 
neither abandoned nor placed upon the back-burner of US concern. Clinton and 
his staff, ironically enough, have repeatedly expressed their belief that today's world 
has become increasingly interdependent and appear to adhere, as Neo-Wilsonians 
do, to visions of 'collectiveness' and 'multilateralism' . However, in what appears as 
a contradiction, they fail to stress the importance of 'linkage' from foreign policy to 
domestic and vice-versa. 7 The United States is not a nation which can simply 
4 This point was reiterated by US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher at the NATO Foreign 
Ministees Meeting of 9 June, 1994 in Istanbul; 'The United States is committed to greater integration 
among European democracies, East and West. We are determined to extend to the East the benefits- 
and obligations- of the same liberal trading and security order that have been pillars of strength for the 
West. That is the best way to secure the gains of democracy in the East. ', in, Foreto Poligy Bulletin 
vol. 5 #1 (July/August, 1994): p. 48. 
5 This position was expressed even during the Cold War by Kaplan; '-policy not adjusted to regional 
circumstances may and likely will be counter-productive, however, policy that is adjusted to regional 
circumstances without consideration of and careful attention to, the impact of that policy on other 
regions and on the general framework of global policy is at best unwise, at worst potentially 
catastrophic! See, Morton A. Kaplan, (ed. ) Global Policy: Challenge of the 8 (Washington DC: 
institute for Values in Public Policy, 1984): p. 10. 
6 Paul H. Nitze, "Grand Strategies Then and Now: NSC-68 and Its Lessons for the Future", Strategic 
Review vol 22 #I (Winter, 1994): p. 17. 
7 See, James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area", in James N. Rosenau, (ed) Domesfic 
Sources offoreign Poli (New York, New York: Free Press, 1967): 'Stressing important foreign 
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isolate itself from international events. Its place upon the world stage is secure 
given its power, resources, military and its influence. Voluntary isolation is not an 
option. Power entails responsibility and more so in the case of the US. As Henry 
Kissinger put it; 'A nation assumes responsibility not only because it has resources 
but because it has a certain view of its own destiny. " While there are many critics 
who question the variety of missions relative to US foreign policy, its mission 
relative to scope cannot be anything but global in nature. America's role in world 
affairs during the twentieth century and especially following World War II ensured 
its destiny as a nation which must commit itself to an international role. This is the 
reality that the Clinton administration has had to try to come to terms with. 
Whatever our intentions or policies, the fact that the United States disposes of the greatest single 
aggregate of material power is inescapable. A new international order is inconceivable without a 
significant American contribution. 9 
The emphasis upon domestic policy is not improper, yet it is vital to understand 
and recognise the interdependency between domestic and foreign policy and be 
willing to act upon it. Failure to understand the links and importance foreign 
policy plays on domestic policy will almost certainly lead to a negation of success 
in the field of the latter by blunders and inept handling of crises in the arena of the 
former as Bosnia demonstrates. 'Clintons real choice is not between foreign and 
domestic agenda. If he cannot do both, he will fail in both. His administration must 
respond to the existing vacuum or doom the US to increasing irrelevance and the 
world to growing instability. 10 
In its relations with Europe, the United States built upon principles of 
commonality to promote the advancement of democracy and market capitalism 
following World War II. The bedrock of this foundation became a Western 
alliance which confronted, the former Soviet Union both directly and indirectly, 
over a period of nearly fifty years. Today, as the Clinton team oversees the 
dismantling of the Berlin Brigade and of a large scale disengagement in Europe it 
appears to fail to comprehend that; 'it is reversing the entire trend of one of the 
most creative periods of American diplomacy. " The simultaneous voicing of 
policy requires linkage and depends upon intensity of the issues in the foreign policy arena. ' pp. 11 - 
50. 
8 Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Poligy 3rd ed (New York, New York: W. W. Norton, 1968): 
p. 71. 
9 Kissinger (1968), Qp. cit.: p. 57.; These beliefs were reiterated by Dr. Kissinger recently when he 
stated that despite a scaling back of the military by the present Clinton administration, only the US 
maintains the ability to engage itself militarily in several areas across the globe simultaneously. 
Statements made by Dr. Kissinger at the "Republican National Committee Forum on American 
Foreign Policy", (Washington DC: 27 July, 1994): broadcast by C-Span-2. 
10 Kissinger, "At Sea in a New World", Newsweek (6 June, 1994): p. 6 
11 Kissinger (June, 1994), pp. cit.: p. 8. 
principles such as enlargement within Eastern Europe, moreover, appear outright 
contradictory as the US scales back in both resources and presence in Western 
Europe. It is these principles, however, which bring us back to the purpose of this 
study. 
In its relations with the East, US-Albanian relations represent a microcosm of 
US foreign policy. The success or failure of bilateral relations between the US and 
Albania will not likely affect vital US interests. However, measurement of success 
or failure should not examined by conventional methods. Moreover, it is believed 
that by an individual case study, a better understanding of US foreign 
policymaker's challenges and options in relations with Southeast Europe Will be 
achieved. 12 For the US, success in relations with Albania would provide a healthy 
and stable democracy and likely preclude the possibility of another Yugoslavia type 
situation in the near future. 13 Success may also serve as the basis necessary in the 
formulation of new purpose within American foreign policy in the Balkans. For 
Albania, a directed and less haphazard foreign policy oriented towards the US and 
the West would ensure its eventual transformation into a fully functioning market 
economy and democratic society. Such success with its bilateral relations with the 
United States would likely remove it from the chaotic state of backwardness and 
endemic violence historically associated with the Balkans. 
In a brief look at the underlying foundations of both the US and Albania! s 
foreign policy from the end of World War 11 up until the end of the Cold War, one 
can witness a certain level of consistency. The end of the Cold War and the arrival 
of democracy has destroyed this consistency for both states. And so, the state of 
flux that exists for both nations as each seeks to define a role for foreign policy 
carries over and becomes an integral part of their bilateral relations towards one 
another. This is why this study uses a three-pronged approach to examine US- 
Albanian relations and takes into account the US policy toward the Bosnian crisis. 
First, in examining the background to the Balkans by the US and Allied policy from 
12 This appeared to work during the Cold War as a'systemic approach! demonstrated. As Haas has 
stated; 'Policy is incremental. It is made by moving from package deal to package deal without much 
thought for an overall scheme! Such a scheme is required in policy formulation. See, Ernst B. Haas, 
The Web ofInkrftendence , 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1970): p. 32., and 
some theorists believe that by individual case study, policymakcrs will avoid the pitfalls associated 
with systems analysis which tends to generalisc areas and apply overreaching policy decisions to each 
state. Case study, it is believed, provides the 'building blocks' for credible theory and policy 
formulation. See George Andreopoulos, "Studying American Grand Strategy: Facets in the 
Exceptionalist Tradition", Diplomya and Statecra vol. 42 47 (July, 1991): p. 226. 
13 Point was expressed in a country profile of Albania by Dr. Kees ZijIstra, "International Secretariat 
of the North Atlantic Assembly Draft Special Report", NATO (May, 1994): '.... significant aid above 
current levels from international financial organisations as well as a stronger private donor 
commitment should be sought ..... Albania appears to be on the verge of turning back the past and becoming a strategically important partner to Europe and the rest of the world. This opportunity 
should not be lost. ', at p. 13. 
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the period during and immediately following the Second World War, the study 
aims to demonstrate the status of relations with the area generally and Albania 
specifically. Historically, the region ranked low among the affairs of Europe's great 
powers, often part of their competing interests in maintaining the balance of power 
in Europe. The first prong of the study offers historical analysis in an effort to 
demonstrate that most often, present day complexities are grounded in the past. 
As Kissinger points out; 'The study of history offers no manual of instructions that 
can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, 'shedding light on the 
likely consequences of comparable situatione. 14 The extent of US policy in the 
area prior to World War 11 was negligible at best. In deferring to the Europeans, 
and especially the British, the US stayed out of Balkan politics. By the eve of the 
Second World War the level of US interest in the region became apparent. 'Most 
of the Balkans came under the Division of European Affairs at the State 
Department .... The representatives 
in the field were well aware of the marginal 
interest of the US in their region. 15 With the outbreak of war, the US again 
deferred policy to the British given their historic role in the zone. The overriding 
concern of defeating the Axis despite the political consequences demonstrated the 
realist policy choices being made by the US even before the advent of the Cold 
War. The geostrategic importance of the region prompted US efforts after the war 
to see to it that Greece and Turkey remain within the Western orbit. 
In offering a look into the policies that dominated the era the hope is that such 
historical analysis will clear up why these choices were made and their immediate 
consequences. More importantly, a historic glance provides for the opportunity to 
see how such policy choices affected the states of the region over the long term by 
specifically looking at the results in Albania. Again, the past does not offer miffor- 
type scenarios and answers. lEstory teaches by example and analogy. 
Understanding present day difficulties requires analysis of the past, extracting those 
bits of importance and applying what is learned. This is accomplished three ways. 
First, an examination of the history of the region generally offers a look into the 
problems faced by previous powers in their efforts to formulate policy towards the 
area. While the main focus of the study remains Albania, a microscopic view limits 
the applicability of policy. Often, the history of the Balkans transcends the history 
of one individual state or people. The wide variety of ethnic groups throughout the 
region and the non-homogeneous status of most states results in an intertwining of 
14 H. Kissinger, Diploma (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994): p. 27. 
15 Peter B. Lane, The United States and the Balkan Crisis of 1940-1941 (New York, New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1988): p. 15., On how negligible such interest was; 'Economically, the US 
ranked well behind other continental European powers in trade with the Balkan nations. During the 
late thirties the overall value of trade between the Balkans and the US was only about one hundred 
million dollars., at pp. 12-13. 
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history. It is this which has all too often served as the base for conflict in the 
Balkans. This is why an examination of Albania must include periodic analysis of 
the region, especially with Albania! s immediate neighbours, Greece and the former 
Yugoslavia. The inextricable links which exist between these states are evident 
even today which is why they are also examined. Second, a look itself into the 
historic situation in Albania seeks to provide what exactly Western policy was 
towards Albania during the war. A look at the history of the nation from this 
period on hopes to provide the basis for which we can later examine the status of 
US-Albanian relations. Moreover, an examination of the rise of the Albanian state 
requires a brief, yet thorough review of nationalism. Given the recent trend, one in 
which ethno-nationalist aspirations and expressions are displaying themselves, 
especially in the Balkans, the study of Balkan and Albanian nationalism is 
necessary. Such a review will demonstrate whether or not the phenomenon of 
nationalism itself is destructive or constructive to the relationship between the US 
and the region generally and Albania specifically. The break-up and warfare in the 
former Yugoslavia underlies this premise and again shows the link between Albania 
and the region. 16 It is not possible to simply remove Albania from events around it 
in the Balkans and study its relations with the US. Conversely, it is equally difficult 
to examine US policy towards Albania without scrutiny of US policy in the area, 
especially towards the ex-Yugoslavia. An overview of policy with regards to this 
crisis shows the state of US policy in the post Cold War era in the region and how 
it likely affects bilateral relations with Albania, Third, by looking at Albanian 
history, specifically its foreign policy after the war and up until 1989, the study 
seeks to demonstrate a pattern of consistency. Albania! s foreign policy during this 
period was always grounded in the notion of allying with those it felt would secure 
Albania! s integrity. The near destruction of the Albanian state on several occasions 
over the course of its history has instilled upon the Albanian psyche and political 
conscious an inherent distrust for outsiders. The relevance of this becomes clear 
when examining a case study in US-Albanian relations. Moreover, given its 
position in the Balkans and the always present potential for instability to arise, a 
review of Albanian foreign policy during the period may provide the background 
necessary to help assess options for US foreign policyrnakers in relations with 
Albania and with the Balkans generally. 
The second prong of the study examines the present day status of Albania as it 
attempts reform following its long bout of self-imposed isolation from external 
16 Secretary of State Christopher made this point at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Istanbul; 
'The war in Bosnia remains a grave threat to our goal of an integrated Europe. It threatens to draw 
other fragile democracies into a wider war. And violent nationalism undermines the security of all 
European nations! Foreto Polia Bulletin (July/August, 1994): p. 48. 
influences. The collapse of communism and the subsequent outbreak of warfare in 
the region have brought the Balkans from the margins of US interest to a more 
prominent rank on the US foreign policy agenda. Adopting a series of bilateral 
policies also means adopting a general policy for the entire region. To do so, 
however, the US must understand the complexities of recent trends in the Balkans. 
This is where the second prong of this study proposes to shed light upon such 
developments. The status of reform and of present Albanian foreign policy, 
especially in its regional relations, highlights the problems and security concerns of 
Albania and the region as it attempts to fashion a coherent strategy in its foreign 
policy. As the second prong demonstrates, Albania and the US are currently 
suffering from the same problem, the inability to formulate a clear direction in their 
respective foreign policies. The second branch of the study also, by examining 
present developments, provides insight into the status of reform. The level of 
success or failure will become apparent when compared to the third prong. A 
study of US-Albanian relations could not be complete without a look into recent 
developments. How else can the success of reform be measured? More 
importantly, by looking at relations from the Albanian perspective, as well as, later, 
the American viewpoint, the study hopes to highlight the concerns, interests, and 
direction both parties appear to be taking. 
The third prong of the study examines recent trends in American foreign policy 
in the post Cold War era. Moreover, by highlighting both the successes and 
failures of US policy and alternatives presented by various analysts, policyrnakers 
and politicians over the past few years, it is hoped that some useful lessons can be 
drawn. Again, attention is paid to US policy since the outbreak of the Yugoslav 
crisis. The reasons for this are evident. United States relations with Albania have 
been practically non-existent for over forty years. As the region democratises and 
sheds its communist past, much of what will come in the future, be it success or 
failure will be inevitably linked with how the US responds to crises in the region. 
Albania! s history has been one interwoven with that of the South Slavs, be they 
Serbs or Croats. Whether they like it or not, they must accept that they are part of 
Europe and, further, that Europe represents interests to the United States which 
transcend the mere economic into the common bounds of 'culture and civilisation'. 
This being the case, violence in the Balkans represents more than issues of 
humanitarian concerns, it becomes a 'direct threat to Western interests. 17 At the 
outset of the crisis, the Bush administration was wary over policy pronouncements 
17 Nixon (1994), pp. cit.: pp. 84-87. Nixon aptly states the case; 'Even the agony in the former 
Yugoslavia is covered as though it were an obscure disaster in a faraway place where we have only a 
humanitarian interest. Yet Europe is just as important to the United States as ever ... 
Its political 
stability, its economic health, our access to its markets, are all vital American interests. ' , at p. 83. 
which might return to haunt them with the presidential elections only seven months 
away. This perhaps was also the reason why the US was quick to defer to the 
Europeans in handling the crisis. Is However, the US was perhaps too quick to 
discount the problem in the former Yugoslavia and downgrade the importance its 
role played in the maintenance of European stability for nearly five decades. 
Despite its aversion to the terminology, America's role in preserving a 'balance of 
power' in Europe rested firmly upon its commitment to institutions such as the 
Atlantic Alliance. Post-war American and European leaders were able to recognise 
that; 'unless America was organically involved in Europe, it would be obliged to 
involve itself later under circumstances far less favourable to both sides of the 
Atlantic. That is even more true today. '19 Humanitarian concerns became part of 
the bedrock with which US foreign policy is imbued with morality. This does not 
mean that they should now become moot. However, neither does it imply that 
humanitarian concerns alone should guide policy decisions to act or not to act, 
especially in Europe. Convincing European allies of a continued US presence and 
interest on the continent involves an awareness by both sides that neither, alone, 
can sufficiently maintain the equilibrium required to achieve; peace and 
prosperity,, 20 access to new marketS, 21 avoidance of refugee spillover22 and 
deterrence to protracted low intensity conflict, perhaps through a new role for 
NATO. 23 'America will need partners to preserve equilibrium in several regions of 
the world'24, and the Balkans represents one of these regions. This also becomes 
the primary reason why a study into the relations between Albania and the United 
States, and particularly when examining US foreign policy, must also review US 
18 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short Histo (London: MacMillan, 1994): pp. 23 9-240. 
19 Kissinger (1994), 2p. ot.: pp. 821-822. 
20 'American leadership is indispensable. No other nation has our power or strategic position. Above 
all, we have the ability to rally others to a good cause... ' Nixon (1994), pp. cit.: p. 92. 
21 Former President Nixon believed that the key to the further integration of Europe meant a common 
economic and foreign policy which, with violence in the Balkans, has been'derailed'. Nixon (1994), 
gp&it.: p. 85. 
22 'Europeans are deeply concerned about refugees from Eastern Europe and economic migration 
from North Africa. Both have triggered xenophobic reactions in Europe. Violence in the Balkans is a 
threat to Western interests. ' Nixon (1994), 2p. cit- p. 87. . _L, 23 'Uncertainties in Central and Eastern Europe, war in the Balkans, and instability in Russia make 
NATO's existence a source of comfort in Western Europe .... 
The key is an expanded NATO rather 
than a weakened one, with a strong US presence and a new mission. For the United States, NATO is 
our principle link to Europe, and one we must not break. ' Nixon (1994), Qp. citý p. 86. 
24 Kissinger (1994), on. cit.: pp. 810-81 I., Kissinger goes on to affirm the strong ties between the US 
and its European allies; 'Disagreements with Europe have the grating character of family squabbles. 
Yet, on nearly every key issue, there has been far more co-operation from Europe than from any other 
area... In the post Cold War world, Europe may not be able to rally itself to a new Atlantic policy, but 
America owes it to itself not to abandon the policies of three generations in the hour of victory. ' at 
p. 820. 
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policy to this particular crisis as an auxiliary consideration. The links are simply too 
strong to either disregard or brush aside with only a glance. 
From the outset of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the US and the West 
Europeans foolishly believed that diplomacy alone could solve the problems of that 
multiethnic state. Bosnia has epitomised the Western failure and has shown that 
regional 'chaos' continues to be considered of minimal geopolitical importance. 25 
The examination of a brief history of Yugoslavia, with particular reference to 
Bosnia demonstrates that linkage does matter when areas which are not clearly 
delineated within one sphere of influence or the other, either the West's or 
Russia's, become the focal point of perhaps a new East-West divide, and more 
importantly, may accelerate the deterioration of relations between the US and its 
European allies. As some observers may have correctly pointed out, Bosnia should 
be remembered as a 'bipartisan, multinational failure of epic proportions. "26 The 
examination of it relative to US foreign policy indicates that where it has failed in 
Bosnia, US policy may be able to succeed elsewhere, such as in Albania, if it takes 
it upon itself to develop a coherent strategy to see to it that democracy does more 
than simply take hold. It must be nurtured and secured, free from regional 
conflagrations which threaten stability. Moreover, the study of Bosnia as an 
ancillary, yet fundamental, concern to US policy will show that despite its efforts 
through the Contact Group, failure by the US and Russia may perhaps be attributed 
to both sides spending valuable time competing for influence in Bosnia rather than 
in co-ordinating their efforts properly to achieve a settlement of hostilities. 27 
The underlying premise throughout, however, is one which believes that a 
strong and dynamic policy by the US will secure both regional and American 
interests over the long term. The end of the Cold War seems to have brought a 
variety of cries calling for the abandonment of Cold War realpolitik. 28 The men 
which practised ideas of power politics, stability and balance of power, it has been 
25 Chaos, as referred to here means; 'what you get when government breaks down ... We [the West] 
still perceive most chaos as of limited geopolitical significance- we can live with it. We think it 
requires chiefly a humanitarian and multilateral response- two words by which we distance ourselves 
from direct responsibility' See, Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Overstate the Chaos, Undermine the Help" 
The International Herald Dibune 26-27 November, 1994 
26 Jim Hoagland, "In Sum, Powerful Democracies Looked Evil in the Eye and Blinked" The 
International Herald T? Ibune I December, 1994; .. the moral pettifogging that has enveloped the Western leadership can undermine NATO if it continues. ' 
271nterview by Ralph Wenge with Sergei Goraychev, Russian journalist for Ostankino on CN7V World 
News 28 November, 1994 
28 Some such as Nfichael Howard are clear in their rejection of such principles. In reviewing Henry 
Kissinger's Diplomacy, Howard states; 'We would not be wise to regard that limited slice of world 
history as a universally applicable norm and try to project its values onto the far more diverse yet 
interdependent world of tomorrow. Howard, however, offers little in terms of alternatives which 
have any chance of succeeding as equally. See, M. Howard, "The World According to Henry", 
Foreign A flairS vol. 73 #3 (May/Junc, 1994): p. 138. 
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argued, are now as outdated and inapplicable as the concepts they upheld for five 
decades. The realist tradition ingrained upon the US foreign policy establishment is 
being more than simply swept away by waves of 'triumphant liberalism"29 it is 
being slandered as 'not practical! in today's world and its achievements are negated 
and/or reversed. Kissinger correctly stated years ago that; 'the central task of 
American foreign policy is to analyse anew the current international environment 
and to develop some concepts which will enable us to contribute to the emergence 
of a stable ordee. 30 To fully appreciate the importance of concepts which 
dominated the era of the Cold War and understand how and why they are still 
relevant today, these terms themselves require explanation. 31 
1.2 Definition of Terms 
In looking at US foreign policy options and bilateral relations in the Balkans 
with states such as Albania, it should be recognised that democratic liberalism will 
not come easy to an area with little historic experience of it. Promotion of 
principles such as stability, and balance of power should not be discounted as 
outdated, inapplicable, or contrary to the promotion of democracy and market 
capitalism. These realist traditions are not only applicable in the post Cold War 
era, they are necessary to ensure that the transition of societies, such as Albania, 
from authoritarian systems to democracies proceeds forward. 32 Indeed, following 
the Second World War the United States responded to the reconstruction of war- 
torn Europe as a way to prevent possible communist expansion in the West. The 
I general agreement in the American government was that communism thrived on 
chaos and poverty; the way to respond to it was to promote stability and prosperity 
through economic aid'. 33 At the time, the US understood that principles such as 
stability and balance of power mattered, even if they publicly denounced them as 
perverted European machinations. Such principles became particularly vital to 
economic progress and moves toward democracy. During this period the US took 
it upon itself to *advance a plan for global economic recovery based solely upon its 
29 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: IMPLlications. 
Reconsiderations. Provocation (New York, New York: Oxford Press, 1992): p. 192. 
30 Kissinger (1968), pp. cit. - p. 9 1. 
31 'Unless we are able to give operational meaning to terms such as superloilty or stability, 
negotiations will lack criteria by which to judge progress'. See, Kissinger (1968), pp. cit,: p. 63. 
32 'We have sought to extend economic institutions to the East because we understand that the quest 
for security in Europe cannot rely on security institutions alone. It also must rely on the political and 
economic reconstruction of newly democratic nations. ' Warren Christopher (May/June, 1993), QP. cit.: 
p. 48. 
33 Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: Amepican Foreigm Policy Since 1938 4th ed. (New York, 
NewYork: Penguin, 1985): p. 81. 
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own resources'. 34Now, as the US stands at the cross-roads of a new era in foreign 
policy, it should not be so quick to discard those principles which provided for a 
general sustained success for nearly five decades. The US can still provide for 
recovery and stability to those which are transforming themselves. It should, 
however, temper its judgement to provide for those which fall within the realm of 
its interests. After World War II this was achieved by aligning power with 
commitment in order to create policy. Today such commitment requires a 
'selectivity' in policy and interest formulation. 35 It is the contention of this study 
that Albania falls within such US interests. As such, principles such as stability 
promotion and containment represent the fundamentals necessary and proper to 
achieve a transition to democracy and lay the foundation for positive bilateral 
relations. 
During the course of the Cold War, strategists tended to view situations in 
absolute terms. Zero-sum strategy during an era of bipolarity presented 
perspective which made gain for one automatically equate to loss for the other and 
'every issue seemed to involve a question of survival'. 36 Granted, such strategy has 
little relevance today without an overriding threat akin to the Soviet Union. Yet, 
America! s foreign policy purpose is as imbued with moral purpose today as it was 
forty years ago, perhaps even moreSo. 37Government should take greater notice of 
the maxims, 'idealism without realism is naive and dangerous. Realism without 
idealism is cynical and meaningless'. 38 This is why some 'outdated' principles still 
hold relevance. They would provide the congruence and balance necessary in 
fashioning new policy. 
When we examine containment, for example, we see that its original purpose 
was to 'bring about the domestic transformation of the US SR1.39 During the late 
1940s and throughout the 1950s, realists in America led by Walter Lippman 
believed that doctrines such as containment would entangle America in security 
arrangements that would unnecessarily drain US resources and weaken American 
34 Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on Containment", Foreign Agairs vol. 73 #3 (May/June, 1994): 
P. 119. 
35 This notion arose out of US global commitment after W. W. H. During this period realists such as 
Walter Lippmann stated; 'policy can be formed when power and commitment can be brought into 
balance! See, Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policv. - Shield of the REPublic (Boston, Mass: Little 
Brown and Co., 1943): pp. 100-108. The 'restoration of our selectivity in our commitment to national 
objectives in view of their essentiality and the possibility to attain them', found such pundits during 
the 1960s when it appeared the US was losing direction. See, Hans I Morgenthau, A New Foreign 
Polia for the United States (New York, New York: Praeger Press, 1969): p, 14, 
36 Kissinger (1968), gp. cit.: p. 56. 
37 At that time the US understood the responsibility it had. As Dean Acheson states; 'The task of 
leadership is one of heavy cost and responsibility! See, Dean Acheson, Power and DipLomqcv 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958): p. 69. 
39 Acheson (1958), 2p. cit.: p. 192. 
39 Kissinger (1968), 2p. cit. - p. 86. 
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resolve. Containment, according to Lippman, 'permitted the Soviet Union to 
choose the points of discomfiture for the US while retaining the diplomatic, and 
even military initiative'. 40 Critics today, such as Patrick Buchanan reiterate 
Lippman in calling for America to abandon ideological crusades and bolstering 
security institutions which drain American resources when no paramount threat 
exists. These critics, however, miss the point. Containment's applicability goes 
beyond the Soviet threat. It became instituted as a 'passive diplomacy' at a time 
when America was at its greatest power. It was a doctrine which was as 'idealistic' 
as it was realistic, yet, it should be duly emphasised, was 'abstract in its 
prescriptions'. 41 It accomplished what it set out to do, realising that it would take 
both time and resources. A superpower threat does not confront the US as it did 
during the Cold War. However, threats have and will arise to American interests 
regionally from powers that do not subscribe to principles of democracy and 
liberalism. Though regional despots may not have the global reach, [one 
paramount reason why they are discounted by critics as not vital to US interests], 
today's world has shown that several nations with strong anti-US sentiments have 
been attempting to aggrandise military power, both conventional and nuclear. 
Allowing for these states to accomplish their programs would upset regional 
balances of power, hinder economic development as other nations must either live 
in fear or spend large sums on building up their military, and threaten pro-US states 
in vital areas that serve as actual or potential markets for US products. Hence, 
containment and transformation of regimes hostile to the US and her interests 
remains of primary importance. Even after warfare has ended in the Balkans, the 
potential for violence remains high as a volatile ethnic mix exists in the region. 
History has shown that Serbia has been, and will likely continue to be a strong 
power in the Balkans. The likelihood for such an occurrence increases as, peace 
settlements notwithstanding, Serbs throughout the area seek to unify. The 
probability that Serbia will embrace pro-Western principles of democracy is limited 
in the near future. As such, it threatens not only nations seeking to democratise in 
the region, such as Albania, but upsets the balance of power necessary to ensure 
that a powerful, authoritarian and anti-West Serbia does not, somewhere soon, 
dominate the region. 42 In fostering bilateral relations with Albania, the US must be 
40 Kissinger (May, l994), Qp. cit.;,. p. l23., and Ambrose (1985), 2p. cit. -p. 128., and Lippmann(1943), 
pp. cit. * p. 8. 
41 Kissinger (1994), 22. cit. - pp. 470-471. 
42 Such concerns are especially high among Bosnian Muslims. Prior to the May, 1994 vote in the US 
Senate on whether or not to lift the arms embargo, Bosnian Muslim Prime Minister sent a letter to 
Senators Bob Dole [R-Kan] and Sen. Joe Lieberman P-CTI; 'We want peace but peace is not 
possible without a balance of power. Without securing a balance of power, that is, arming the 
Bosnians,, there can be no peace. ' See, "News From US Senator Bob Dole: Bosnia Arms Embargo 
Update" (Washington DC: II May, 1994): "letter from Prime Minister Haris Silajdic" 
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able to secure the stability of the area itself. Sanctions alone are not enough. The 
isolation of rogue states requires principles of containment which go beyond 
sanctions and international condemnations to carefully planned and concerted 
efforts to influence the domestic political scene so that they will not harm or 
endanger our interests and allies in the region. 
A present day operational meaning for balance ofpawer, however, requires 
that it be examined within its Cold War context. Writing during the era of 
bipolarity, Kissinger aptly stated; 
Side by side with the physical balance of power, there exists a psychological balance based on 
intangibles of value and belief. The presuppositions of the physical equilibrium have changed 
drastically; those of the psychological balance remain to be discovered. 43 
Perhaps, we have reached the threshold today. Achieving balances of power, or a 
notion thereof, appears as archaic as Metternich or Castlereagh. Yet, their 
applicability may remain as witnessed by the Gulf War. A combination of states led 
by the US sought to curb the expansionist tendencies of a ruler in a region which is 
of vital interest to many within the alliance due to its energy supplies. During the 
1980s, many within the US became alarmed at the growing economic power of 
Japan and saw it as a threat to the US. These alarmists, exemplified in 1992 
through Ross Perot, believed that America must counter this growing power and 
achieve a consistency and hegemony it had years before. However, the growth of 
power, be it economic or military, will continue across the globe and at various 
speeds. This should not imply that balance is necessary. 44 It became so at specific 
times when certain states threatened to control vast territory and/or resources to 
the detriment of others, thus the necessity to counter growing power and achieve 
balance. Power, in and of itself, is not the problem. How it is used, though, is. 
Following the Second World War, the US emerged as the greatest power. Its 
productivity base and military were unrivalled. The US foreign policy 
establishment believed sincerely that their unparalleled position granted them 
license to influence, directly or indirectly, all foreign policy decisions. This belief 
43 Kissinger (1968), Qp. cit. - p. 85., and, Kissinger (1994), Qp. cit., 'The balance of power system did 
not purport to avoid crises or even wars. When working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability 
of states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as stability and 
moderation. By definition, a balance of power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the 
international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which 
the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order. ', at p. 2 1. 
44 'More often balance of power is associated with a policy which simply reflects active concern with 
the power situation: This policy usage corresponds to the situational usage which identifies any given 
configuration of power. ' See, Inis L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations (New York, New 
York: Random House, 1965): p. 19. 
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became known as the arrogance ofpower. 45Yet, US power at the time was not 
seen as detrimental to other states. Indeed, it was seen as necessary and vital to 
ensure that democracies could rebuild and, once this had been accomplished, to 
protect them from overriding security threats. Balance therefore is relative to the 
international setting and circumstance. 46By the 1960s, critics and liberals alike 
began to criticise America! s use of its power. Some of these critics also contend 
that notions of power balance will not hold up in a world that becomes increasingly 
democratic. 47Deterring threats to US interests means understanding principles of 
power and the ability to exercise it effectively to gain equilibrium. From the time 
ofVietnam, Americans have denounced ideas of power politics as 'crude, 
European perversions'. 411 This may be why there has been aversion since the end of 
the Cold War to project American power unilaterally. Even in the Gulf War, where 
US vital interests were at stake, America felt compelled to pursue a multi-lateral 
solution rather than understanding and applying principles of power pofitiCS. 49 To 
reject power and adhere to notions of decline is dangerous. 50 Such a rejection may 
result in a 'nihilistic perfectionism which disdains the gradual and seeks to destroy 
what does not conform to its notion of utopia!. 51 Kissinger qualifies his remark by 
stating that 'power does not automatically confer influence. 52 Large levels of 
development assistance, however, do, or rather, should. The exercise of power, 
however, becomes a necessity when seeking to carry out policy as difficult as the 
45 Coined by then Senator William Fulbright. See, Stephen Ambrose (1985), qp. cit.: p. 110., and J. 
William Fulbright, The Arrogance offowe (New York, New York: Random House, 1966) 
46 Regarding the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, US Senate Minority Leader, Bob Dole 
recently stated his belief vis-a-vis military balance by commenting on the Senate floor-, 'History has 
shown us that a stable peace can be achieved when there is a balance on the battlefield. Our own 
history of negotiations with the Soviets taught us that negotiating ftom a position of strength produced 
the best results. ' See, "News From US Senator Bob Dole; Lift Bosnia Arms Embargo" (Washington 
DC: 24 June, 1994): remarks made on Senate floor gpproximately. 9: 55 AM 
47 'The model for the conduct of international relations that he holds up for our admiration had 
simply ceased to work by the beginning of this century, not because of unskilled statecraft but because 
the hermetic system in which it had been effective ceased to wdst. The more democratic societies 
became, the less possible it was for the systcm to survive'. M. Howard (May, 1994), 2p.. cit. - p. 139. 
48 Howard (May, 1994), 9D. cit. - p. 133. 
49 Kissinger feels this particularly characteristic of the Clinton administration; 'the convictions of 
many of the top officials of the administration were formed in opposition to the Cold War and 
ironically are now even more outdated. These include a distrust of America! s power, a preference for 
multilateral solutions and a reluctance to think in terms of national interest! See, Kissinger (June, 
1994), 2RLcit., p. 7. 
50 As Morgenthau had stated in his seminal work; 'All politically active nations are by definition 
engaged in a competition for power ..... See, 
H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Amone 2vations 3rd ed (New 
York, New York: Knopf, 1960): p. 396., and Norman A. Graeber, America as a MorldPower. - A 
Realist JpRraisel from Wilson to Reagan (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984): 
Graeber believes that the US ability to address threats is steadily decreasing. This, then, signifies 
decline., at pp. 288-290. 
51 Kissinger (1968), 2p. cit- p. 96, 
52 Kissinger (1968), 2p. cit. - p. 60. 
16 
promotion of democracy. Following World War II the Balkans had been an area 
'rich in human and industrial resources and strategically vital to both sides, either 
to Russia as a buffer against the West, or to Germany and France as the gateway 
for an invasion of Russia!. 53 Today, balance of power in the Balkans entails more 
than a collection of democratic, free market states. It means the prevention of an 
aggrandisement of power which would endanger others and risk upsetting the 
process of reform. This in turn would only lead to a multiplicity of military 
programs throughout the region. The focus on military spending would delay 
economic progress, and increase want. The viscous circle would require strong, 
and likely undemocratic rule to maintain power. To allay increasing depravity, 
those in power would seek scapegoats for their nation's ills. In the Balkans, these 
are all to available as history has demonstrated. To preclude this possibility, the 
US must strengthen regional bilateral relations, lessen security threats, and prevent 
potential imbalances in the regional power structure through an exercise of 
influence and power. 
The Cold War process of influence meant a strengthening of the countries 
'already on its [the US] side of the dividing line'. 54During the war, the US 
denounced doctrines of spheres of inj7uence as dangerous, and undemocratic 
European power politics. However, even FDR! s belief in a collective security 
arrangement such as the UN encompassed his conviction that it would be 
dominated and influenced by his 'Four Policemen' . He never fully rejected, 
therefore, notions of spheres of influence. 55 The dividing line today is not between 
East and West but rather between freedom and enslavement, between prosperity 
and poverty, between chaos and stability. The exercise of power in the post Cold 
War era requires that democracy promotion carry with it attempts to influence 
nations that seek democracy. 
Such endeavours, however, necessitate the promotion of stability. During the 
Cold War 'stability has always presupposed the existence of an equilibrium of 
power which prevented one state from imposing its will on the others'. 56 Not much 
appears to have changed since an increasingly interdependent world brings with it 
greater degrees of interaction. With such interaction, 'cross-cutting loyalties that 
induce hostility' are likely to emerge. 57 As nations perceive threats to themselves 
from rivals, the potential for instability rises. In the Balkans, where deep-seated 
hostilities prevail, and where, in an era of post Cold War uncertainty, co-operation, 
53 Ambrose (1985), gp. cit.: p. 55. 
54 Kissinger (May, 1994), 2p. cit., p. 122. 
55 Ambrose (1985), LDR. cit.: p. 34. 
56 Kissinger (1968), 2p. cit.. p. 60. 
57 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Themies ofInternational Relations 
3rd ed (New York, New York: Harper Collins, 1990): p, 158. 
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trust and interaction is required, the capacity for instability remains high. Lofty 
principles such as enlargement demand relation to practice. Democracy cannot 
succeed where instability reigns. While the enlargement of democracy may still be 
the way forward, it still leaves too many questions unanswered; 'what precisely 
does enlargement mean? Whom does it imply we should support? With what 
means? Over what period of time and at what risk? '58 Moreover, should not the 
operational bedrock upon which it rests be those principles which aided in 
advancing US grand vision for forty-plus years? Granted, stability itself may not be 
an end to be pursued. However, the promotion of democracy and fostering of 
stable and healthy bilateral relations begs the question; 'should it not be but one 
mean towards a greater end [enlargement]? ' The answer most probably is yes. 
1.3 AeoreticalFoundationsfor Policy 
For nearly five decades the US conducted bilateral relations within the 
framework of the Cold War. In an examination of US policy and relations with 
Albania, it becomes necessary to highlight this framework. After the Second 
World War, the US was in a position of power unparalleled by its closest 
competitor, the Soviet Union. President Truman faced a Congress dominated by 
Republicans, many of which, were now calling on the US to step back from 
international affairs and return to the isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s. Several 
gifted members of the foreign policy establishment, however, thought otherwise. It 
was to be their vision and understanding that America stood on the threshold of a 
new era which was to propel US foreign policy into the international arena. 
Realising that the US must, with its own resources, help in the reconstruction of 
post-war Europe and simultaneously contain the USSR, the groundwork was laid 
for the establishment of US foreign policy which would guide it for nearly five 
decades. Among its characteristics were; 
: ... a certain manipulativcncss and pragmatism, a conviction that the normal pattern of 
international relations was harmonious, a reluctance to think in structural terms, a belief in final 
answers- all qualities which reflect a sense of self-sufficiency not far removed from a sense of 
omnipotencc. 59 
When George Kennan wrote his famous X article in 1947 the US had already 
begun wrestling with what its post-war role would be. 60 The foreign policy 
58 Kissinger (June, 1994), ov. cit.: p. 7. 
59 Kissinger (1968), gp. cit.: p. 79. 
60 'Kcnnan! s recommendations were not immediately accepted by the Truman Administration, which 
was still hoping for a co-operativc relationship with Moscow. Paul Nitze, 2p. cit. - p. 13., and on the 
impact Kennan made see, Kissinger (1994), ov. cit.: pp. 446-472, and Kissinger (May, 1994), 2gcit. * 
'It was surely the ultimate expression of America's national optimism and unimpaired sense of self- 
is 
establishment in Washington set out to implement Kennan's recommendations. The 
result became NSC-68. As its creator, Paul Nitze stated, NSC-68 should provide; 
guidance as America attempts to formulate a new national security strategy to 
meet with the challenges of the post Cold War world, especially in clarifying the 
objectives of a new strategy appropriate for this new and changed world'. 61 Nitze 
and his contemporaries understood that as a doctrine, communism saw itself 
destined for eventual triumph. The contest, therefore, became not over particular 
interests, but rather a struggle between ideologies. 62 It was this struggle, however, 
which manifested itself through various interests across the globe. By 1947, the 
British informed the US that it could no longer support anti-Communist forces in 
Greece and Turkey. In addressing a joint session of Congress, Truman spoke of the 
dangers to US interests if both states were allowed to fall to communist regimes, 
The challenge posed by the Truman Doctrine had been America's 'moral gauntlet' 
cast down to the Soviets, This became the type of realpolitik Stalin best 
understood63, and the type of hard-nosed politics Truman knew well from his days 
of machine-ward politics in St. Louis. The doctrine of containment and its role in 
Europe became one which recognised each side's sphere of influence and sought to 
maintain the balance. The US failure to respond in Hungary in 195664 or 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 epitomises this recognition. The emergence of these 
spheres were traceable immediately after the Second World War. In Europe the 
delineation of these spheres was clear despite Moscow's attempts to disrupt 
Western consolidation by fomenting guerrilla warfare in Greece, and spurring 
unrest among the West European communist parties in France and Italy. 65 Even 
America's aversion to 'spheres of interest' did not allay its need to consolidate 
these very same spheres under a guise of 'positions of strength'. This was apparent 
by the creation of NATO which, although not claimed by President Truman or his 
staff as a traditional military alliance meant to protect the balance of power in 
Europe, was precisely designed for such a purpose. 66 Delineating the competing 
spheres of influence, however, highlighted the inconsistencies with containment and 
confidence that as sophisticated an observer as George Kennan could have assigned his society a role 
so global, so stem and, at the same time, so reactive'., at p. 12 1. 
61 P. Nitze, M. cit. - p. 17. 
62 IBID. 
63 Kissinger (May, 1994), M. cit., p. 118. 
64 'Hungary was a more complex case, for it would have required the application of its power in some 
form. Yet America's leaders were not willing to risk American lives for a cause which, however, 
offensive to their consciences, involved no direct American security interest. Principle permits no 
ambiguity and no gradations'. Kissinger (1994), 2p. cit. - p. 556. 
65 Kissinger (1994), 2p. cit.: p. 447. 
66 Kissinger (1994), 2p. cit.. - pp. 457-458. 
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the balance of power doctrine. 67 In Asia, for example, the US had to face the 
realisation that Korea would fall to communist forces. By 1949, the US had 
removed its troops from the area and declared Korea outside the defence 
perimeter. This move, though, provided the onus for communist forces to strike 
since they assumed that Korea was not considered, by the US, to fall within it 
sphere of influence. 
The communists in Moscow and Pyongyang had taken at face value the pronouncements of 
leading Americans that had placed Korea outside the American defence perimeter. They 
assumed that America would not resist a communist takc-over of half Korea after having 
acquiesced to a communist victory in China, a bigger prize .... [however] Truman's decision to 
resist in Korea had a solid foundation in traditional concepts of national interest as well. 
Expansionist communism had been escalating its challenge with each post-war year. it had 
gained a foothold in Eastern Europe in 1945 as a by-product of occupation by the Red Army. 
It had prevailed in Czechoslovakia by means of a domestic coup in 1948. It had taken over 
China in a civil war in IN o 68 
Today, however, it has been argued that the only dividing fines within Europe 
are perhaps between rich and poor nations. This may hold some truth but does not 
explain why artificial distinctions between East and West remain. The promotion 
of stability and containment of problems before they blow out of proportion should 
precede attempts to democratise and continue while democracy and free markets 
are nurtured. No where is the US better suited for this task than in Europe. 'We 
are in an excellent position to encourage and facilitate the peaceful resolution of 
nationalist tensions, containing and terminating conflicts quickly before they can 
develop into civil or cross-border warfare. '69 For several decades, the Atlantic 
Alliance went beyond a mere formal obligation bound by various treaties, it was a 
relationship founded upon shared interests7O including the advancement of 
democracy and free markets. The Marshall Plan and NATO initiated an era when 
America held military, political and economic dominance over Europe. 71 Yet this 
relationship was not one which the US sought to exploit for personal gain. The 
advancement of economic and political progress in Europe after the war did serve 
US national security interests by preventing for the possible expansion of 
67 'Having proclaimed a universal mission, it was inevitable that America would encounter gaps 
between its principles and its national interests. The confluence of Suez and Hungary was one such 
occasion. America's great dream had always been a foreign policy which carries all before it by the 
compelling and universal nature of its maxims. ' Kissinger (1994), gp cit.. - p. 565., and James Chace, 
The Consequences ofPeace. - 7be New Internationalism andAmefican Foreign Poft (New York, 
New York: Oxford Press, 1992): 'Where the tines were clearly drawn, as they were in Europe, the risk 
of conflict was minimal .... In regions where the lines were not drawn- in Korea, in Vietnam, in 
Southeast Asia- proxy wars were fought... ', at pp. 183-184. 
68 Kissinger (1994), Qp. ciL- pp. 475476. 
69 NitZe, qp. Cit - p. 18. 
70 Kissinger (1968), gp. cit.: p. 75. 
71 Ambrose (1985), pp. cit., p. 104. 
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communism westward. 72 Yet, such an alliance also allowed for the progression of 
Western Europe from its war-tornruins and historical animosities into an area 
today which thrives with democracies and free markets. 
In the East, the US after W. W. II realised that Stalin had earned the right to 
have a major say in the politics of the region. Although not willing to abandon 
Eastern Europe altogether, Russia! s security concerns coupled with American 
preoccupation with the West gave Stalin the sphere of influence he demanded. 73 
Today, the East plods forward in efforts to democratise and the US again seems 
reluctant to act with conviction. During the Cold War Kissinger time and again re- 
emphasised the moral obligations imbued within ýAmerican foreign policy. 74 lEs 
premise on the conflict between East and West recognised that where ideological 
conflict exists, 'political loyalties no longer coincide with political boundaries. '75 In 
the post Cold War world doctrines such as enlargement should perhaps take note 
of Kissinger's statement. The ideological conflict that exists today pits those that 
seek the expansion of democracy against those that oppose it and continue to cling 
to command economies and political repression as a means of maintaining power. 
Loyalty is a relative term to apply to the present day ideological conflict. A more 
apt term appears to be influence and, if we were to apply it accordingly, we would 
find that interdependency makes influence also not coincide with political 
boundaries. The notion of democracy should not be limited to a select few. 
Procedurally, democracy may not succeed in the majority of nations it is attempted 
due to, as sociologists, political scientists, and analysts alike state, historical/socio- 
economic/cultural experiences. Yet, substantively, democracy, as an idea cuts 
across boundaries and even in a few regimes where it is actively surpressed, it can 
never be wholly extinguished. This existence, regardless of its extent, creates 
influence. 
The truth of this influence was not lost on the US after World War 11. US 
power, unrivalled as it was, combined with confidence and moral purpose to create 
policy. 76 The ideological underpinnings of containment and NSC-68 demanded a 
radical departure from past policy. The National Security Act of 1947 set America 
72 As one of the architects of US policy after W. W. 11, Kennan believed that political societies 
themselves do not conduct foreign relations as their sole purpose, yet that political societies must 
conduct it in order to live... See, George F. Kerman, Realities ofAmerican Foreign Poli (New 
York, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1966): pA 
73 Kcnnan, gp. cit.: p. 56. 
74 Kissinger, "Moral Purpose and Policy Choices", in Samuel Hendcl, (ed. ) Basic Issues ofAmerican 
Democra 8th ed (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976): pp. 343-353. 
75 Kissinger (1968), 2p. cit.. p. 55. 
76 Senator Fulbright aptly warns of the problem when this sense of purpose is lost; 'When a nation is 
very powerful but lacking self-confidence, it is likely to behave in a manner dangerous to itself and to 
others. See, Fulbright, Qp. cit. - p. 22. 
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out on its radical new poliCy. 77 Immediately following the war, Truman and others 
on his staff hoped to get the UN up and running, meanwhile lay out methods to 
collaborate with Stalin to ensure that the UN would run smoothly. Truman had 
also hoped that the British could be counted on to deal with the ensuing 'chaos and 
trouble spots'that would arise in Europe. 71 The inability to negotiate with 
Moscow coupled with Britain's justified focus on rebuilding itself made Truman 
rethink his posture towards the US international role. When the British signalled 
that they could no longer aid anti-Communists in Greece and Turkey Truman was 
convinced that America should undertake the effort. As the Cold War progressed, 
the 'geographical position of the Balkans once again thrust it into the mainstream 
of world power politiCS, '79 British withdrawal from the Balkans perhaps also 
demonstrated to the US the seriousness of the situation. For Britain, the area had 
been within its scope of influence and part of European power politics for years. 
Even during the war, the US recognised the importance with which the British held 
for the region. As British concerns increased, so to did American ones. 80 
Churchill had, during the war, repeatedly called for an Allied invasion of the 
Balkans. By late 1944, however, the US military was not 'keen on such a prospect! 
A strong post-war position in the area was not as vital to the US as it was to the 
British. 81 After the war, the primary objective became ensuring the security of pro- 
Western Greece and Turkey, historic enemies under a common security umbrella. 
The threat today comes from not outside the region but from within. Ethnic 
tensions threaten stability and prosperity and again, as forty years ago, it appears 
the US can pick up the security slack. The joint efforts by the West Europeans in 
economic recovery do not go far enough as aid often carries stringent conditions 
and markets remain closed to goods from the East and South. It is unlikely the 
European Union can guarantee regional security while it wrestles with its own 
common security and defence policies. This task can only be achieved by the US, a 
nation the Balkan states looked to during the war as the 'champion of self- 
determination. '82 
The task America undertook after World War 11 rejected the arguments of 
Lippman and the realists. The latter felt that general principles were contrary to 
77 The act established the Department of Defence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an independent Air Force 
and created the Central Intelligence Agency. NSC-68, a modified and updated version of NSC20/4, 
written by Kennan in 1948, called on greater conventional military buildups. It was approved by 
Truman in September, 1950 after North Korea attacked South Korea. See, Nitze, qp. cit.: pp. 14-16. 
78 Nitze, Qp. cit.: p. 12. 
79 Lane, 2a. Cit. - p. 305. 
80 Lane, M. cit, 1 p. 28. 
81 Ambrose (1985), Qp. cit.., p. 28. 
92 Lane, g2. Cit - p. 10. 
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America's interests. These should instead be defined by a case-by case approach. 83 
The argument could not hold merit during the Cold War as the US sadly witnessed 
in Vietnam. Even case-study analysis, while it may limit American involvement, 
would not guarantee American influence nor success. 84 Power alone, regardless 
of how vast, cannot impose will. This became true even during the Cold War. As 
Kissinger noted; 'Weaker allies have good reason to believe that their defence is in 
the overwhelming interest of their senior partner. Hence, they see no need to 
purchase its support by acquiescence in its policies. '85 Today, however, these 
I weaker allies', especially among the democratising nations, must come to realise 
that while this may have held true during the era of bipolarity, without an 
overriding threat akin to the USSR, the United States is able to use discretion and 
aid those which will allow for both the promotion of policy and protection of 
interests. US relations with Albania present such an opportunity. Problems are 
bound to appear, yet the US must accept that, 'new world orders never emerge 
automatically, their birth pangs are marked by instability and tunnoij. '86 Managing 
this turmoil becomes the primary task of foreign poliCy. 87 
1.4 Literature Review 
The difficulty in approaching such a study begins first and foremost with the 
available source material. For nearly five decades, Albania had been in a state of 
self imposed isolation from the outside world. Much of the available literature on 
the nation came from the pre-war days when King Zogu I ruled Albania. The level 
of analysis of these sources was limited as many concentrated primarily on the 
people themselves rather than on domestic or foreign politics. Serving as nothing 
more than 'travel guidee, these early works may have provided for a glimpse into 
life in primitive Albania, but it offered very little more. After the war, dmigr6s and 
those that managed to get out before the communists consolidated power, began to 
realise the need for more comprehensive studies on Albania. Some Western 
scholars also began to engage in early analysis of communisms progress in Albania. 
Many of these early post-war articles found their way to the pages of Survey or 
East Europe. They offered reports, many of which, relied on over inflated figures 
released by the Albanian Press Agency. Stavro Skendi's Albatzia, 88 presented an 
83 Kissinger (May, 1994), pp. cit. - p. 124. 
84 Ambrose (1985), op. cit.: p. 65. 
85 Kissinger (1968), pp. cit.. p. 56. 
86 Kissinger (June, 1994), i)p. cit.: p. 6. 
87 The United States must also accept that; 'change requires a modification of our principles and 
methods. ' See, Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Settine ofAmefican Foreien Poli 
(New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 1968): p. 73. 
88 Stavro Skendi, Albania (Boston, Mass: Little Brown, 1956) 
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early comprehensive look into Albania, its history, both ancient and modem. 
However, the inability to provide for accuracy led many of these early works to 
serve as nothing more than descriptive guides. The natural bias many emigres had 
for the communist regime often coloured their analysis. 
Yhe People's Republic ofAlbania'9 offers better insight into the outside players 
involved in Albania! s history, however, not much by way of analysis is made. The 
impact, repercussions and consequence such history has had on Albania, and its 
relations with outsiders gives way instead to perhaps too much emphasis on 
agricultural and productivity statistics that are grossly exaggerated. Pano's study 
also suffers from a common problem many of the works on Albania since the 
Second World War have, it does not adequately portray events during and 
immediately after the war, a crucial time in Albania! s history. Both Skendi and 
Pano refer to the 'fierce, independent mountain clans! in Northern Albania yet offer 
little as to their role, or lack of it during the war. What comes across to many 
therefore is that the Albanian Communist Party was able to consolidate power 
quickly and faced little opposition, and that it was a unified force like so many 
other partisan forces throughout the region. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. Yet, many of these early works suffer from inadequate portrayals and factual 
inconsistencies which colour later accounts. 
Marmallaku's Albania and the Albanians9O often presents overstated claims. 
Its insight into the social structures of Albanian fife remains unparalleled to this 
day. However, background into the formation of the Albanian state, the problems it 
encountered, and how it overcame these, appears, even to the novice, a bit 
overzealous as to the role Albania and the Albanians. The role of outside players is 
neatly summed up in brief passages and overall fails to present the considerations 
of power politics that were conducted, particularly after the First World War. 
Logoreci's Yhe Albani=01 tempers the role played by the Albanians themselves. 
Its strength lies in its ability to explain Albanian foreign policy after the war. While 
Skendi offers little insight into Albanian nationalism, and Pano fails to discuss its 
importance, Logoreci's study properly links Albanian nationalism with Hoxha! s 
brand of communism and correctly indicates that Albania! s foreign policy was 
primarily motivated by nationalism. This would explain the excessive references to 
Logoreci in the section on Albanian nationalism. The only shortcoming of 7he 
Albanians appears to be in its treatment of Albania! s wartime experience. More 
emphasis is spent on the eventual victors, Hoxha and his communists, while little is 
99 Nicola Pano, The People's RgMbfic qfA lbania (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins, 1968) 
90 Ramadan Marmallaku, Albania and the Albanians (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1975) 
91 Anton Logoreci, 7he A lbanians. - Europe's Forgotten Survivors (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 
1977) 
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submitted on the other groups seeking to gain power during this critical period. 
The analysis, however, is coherent, lucid and tempered, in spite Logoreci's obvious 
staunch anti-Communist posture. 
Subsequent works such as Yhe History ofAlbania, by Stefanaq Pollo and 
Arben PUto92' presented the history of Albania, both ancient and modern with one 
recurring theme, that Albania was a nation constantly under siege, always 
threatened by neighbours. While many of these claims hold validity, some works 
tend to exaggerate the scope of such claims. Much of the wartime history of 
Albania is found in several works by British authors, most of which served during 
the war in Albania as British Liaison Officers [BLOs]. As explained more fiilly in 
chapter one, these works often spend more time bashing, implying and in some 
cases explicitly implicating fellow BLOs. The charges by them against their fellow 
officers and against Albanians they encountered for being spies, communists and 
collaborators permeates much of the work. As the author can attest to, after 
having met several surviving BLOs, as well as personally knowing the members of 
the various Albanian families involved in these studies, animosity, pride and even 
notions of revenge continue to fester after all this time, on both sides. This is why 
only by thorough examination of all sides of Albanian wartime history can some 
semblance of the truth emerge. 
The vast supply of works from Albania, most penned by Enver Hoxha, suffer 
an obvious flaw. HoxVs cult of personality was matched only by his paranoia as 
evident in all of his works. Denouncing all around him as spies, saboteurs, 
collaborators, imperialists or revisionists, Hoxha's works received their just due as 
the recent government has decided to destroy and recycle tens of thousands of his 
volumes to make new educational books. Only his work, Yhe Titoites93' offers 
some verifiable accounts of his many conversations with Tito over the years. The 
main themes of many of these meetings were highlighted several years earlier by 
Auty's biography on Marshall Tito94' yet Hoxha's work has naturally put him on the 
side of righteousness in every instance. Their limited use is quite apparent given 
their present regard by the Albanian government. 
Biberaj's A lbania: A Socialist Maverick95, offers the best overall look into 
Albanian politics and history. Concise, clear and not overly biased, the study 
unfortunately is the only able guide in studying Albania, hence the unavoidable 
reliance upon it throughout this work. Biberaj is correct in his criticisms towards 
92 S. Pollo and X Puto, The Historv ofAlbania: From Its 01! Vns to the Present DaT (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 198 1) 
93 Enver Hoxha, Vie Thoites (London: Worker's Publishing, 1982) 
94 Phyllis Auty, 7-Ito (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin, 1974) 
95 Elez Biberaj, Albania: A Socialist Mavefick (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990) 
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the Hoxha regime without simply engaging in communist-bashing rhetoric. His 
analysis of the wartime period of Albania! s history aptly depicts the various factions 
within Albania, where their alliances stood, and the overall considerations by the 
British and Americans. Perhaps the only criticism of Bibera's study is its lack of 
prognosis. It is a very capable piece of descriptive analysis yet, does not present 
very much analysis into Albania! s future or recommendations as such. This 
shortcoming, however, is made up by the variety ofjournal articles Biberaj and 
others have contributed over the years. 
Since the loosening of control by the central government beginning in 1990, 
many of the more both factual and in-depth pieces of analysis have come by journal 
and newspaper articles. The ability to travel freely in Albania has allowed 
researchers the opportunity to examine Albania first-hand. Yet, even many of 
these articles suffer from inconsistency or a one-sided bias. It appears communist 
rhetoric has given way to pro-democracy rhetoric. The Democratic Party controls 
much of the press releases and conferences conducted since their arrival to power 
in 1992. The statements made by other parties are often discounted or quickly 
brushed aside as childish polemics. Western press reports of the situation in 
Albania also appears to reflect a cosmopolitan view. That is, many of the reports 
which come from Tirana, the capital, are written without much field work done, 
usually relying on information of the outlying areas, and their developments, from 
source material in Tirana. Democratic Party Chair Eduard Selami was critical of 
this type of reporting when he stated; 'People think they know all there is to know 
about Albania by staying in Tirana. They come here, check into the Hotel Dajti and 
write about developments without seeing them firsthand. 96 Yet, the many press 
reports and journal articles represent the only up-to date analysis of political 
developments in Albania. The journals and periodicals emanating from Albania are 
naturally skewed since each one is sponsored by a particular party. Many of these 
dailies spend more ink space attacking the other political parties then reporting the 
news, despite US efforts to send specialists in the news field to teach Albania 
Western news techniques. The recent work on Albania by Derek Hall of the 
University of Exeter97 offers the most recent comprehensive account of 
developments in Albania. His extensive account of Albanian domestic politics 
includes even a look into the variety of mountain tourist sites, and the revenue, 
both potential and actual, that they bring in. The myriad of statistics are current 
and most likely much more accurate than figures submitted during the communist 
reign. However, most of the background material on Albanian history and politics 
96 Interview with Mi. Selami, Democratic Party Headquarters Tirana June, 1993 
97 Derek Hall, Albania and the Albanians (London: Pinter, 1994) 
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relies on many of the aforementioned studies and therefore is subject to similar 
shortcomings. Hall's work offers a good thorough account of recent domestic 
trends spattered with foreign developments, yet does not significantly contribute to 
the study of international relations. Specifically, how these developments and 
trends affect or may affect regional relations, their context to adjoining areas, and 
issues of particular relevance to the field of international relations such as security 
and conflict studies. By not providing a thorough account of these linkages, Hall's 
work offers little more that a compilation of facts and figures. 
From the other side of the study, that which deals with an examination of 
American foreign policy in the post Cold War era, the availability of resources 
presented no problems whatsoever. With the collapse of communism journals such 
as Foreign Affairs and dailies such as the New York Times and Washington Post 
have been replete with articles and editorials on the end of the Cold War and the 
direction of US foreign policy in this era. From Ambrose's 771e Rise to Globalism 
to Nixods Seize the Moment and Kissinger's Diplomacy, the underlying theme has 
been one of realism. The significance of these studies is in their ability to imbue 
present purpose and direction with the lessons of the past. The reliance on history 
to make their point and case for an activist US foreign policy is perhaps best 
expressed by Gaddie The United States and the End of the Cold War. 98 Gaddis 
spends a large portion of his study on the beginnings of the Cold War, as well as 
US policy trends at the turn of the century. Indeed, he does not specifically discuss 
the end of the Cold War and its implications until the very end of his work. This 
does not detract, however, from the insight Gaddis provides for US policy. The 
overabundance of literature on US foreign policy since 1989 ranges from 
predictions of the triumph of liberalism, 99 to the ideological crusades now under 
way in the name of democracy. 100 Many of these works, however, highlight hopes 
and/or beliefs rather than presenting calculative analysis and insight. As 
demonstrated in chapter four, the multiplicity of schools of thought which have 
arisen come with ample source material to make their case. It is the realist' 
approach, though. which offer the most level-headed analysis akin to the classical 
approach to international relations study. In an overview of the Balkans the area is 
one which has been the subject of European power politics for centuries. 101 
Democratisation notwithstanding, who better to provide analysis into interest 
98 John Lewis Gaddis (1992), pp. cit. 
99 Francis Fukuyama, The End oflfistoa and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992) 
100 Ben I Wattenbcrg, The First Universal Nation (New York, New York: MacNfillan & Co., 
199 1): and, Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democra (Washington DC: AEl Press, 1992) 
101 For examples see, Barbara Jelavich, I-fistorv ofthe Balkans: Twentieth Centy voL2(Cambridge: 
University Press, 1991): and, Ferdinand Schevill, A flistoCE of the Balkans: From Earliest Times to 
the Present D (New York, New York: Dorset Press, 199 1) 
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evaluation towards the area and its component parts than realist theory and 
literature? 
As for the material on Bosnia, given the nature of the war, and the fact that it 
still needs to be resolved, heavy reliance is placed upon tertiary source material 
such as newspaper, daily and journal articles. These have, however, provided ample 
source material and should not be discounted as to their relevance. As for 
specifics, five particular sources have proven most valuable. First, John Zametica's 
Me Yugoslav Conflict, 102although aj oumal article, and now slightly dated, still 
provides a thorough examination of events during the crucial period, 1989-1991. - 
For an equally good account of events on the ground during the critical 1990-1992 
period, Misha Glenny's, The Fall of Yugoslavia'03offers a firsthand account of the 
situation from the author as he travelled across the republics meeting with many of 
the players in the conflict and offering a thorough firsthand look at them and their 
objectives. Nationalism andFederalism in Yugoslavia'04by Sabrina Ramet looks 
at the nation as it existed in the post World War II era. It correctly highlights the 
inter-ethnic relations of the republics and examines how nationalism became, was 
and still is, a force in Yugoslavia. While it examines the role that Tito played as the 
'ultimate arbiter' of conflict among the republics, 105 it does not cover the true 
significance of Tito's death with the same scope as Branka Magas' Yhe 
Destruction of Yugoslavia. 106Magas provides the reader with a detailed account 
of the situation, not simply among the republics, but among the players themselves 
following Tito's death. Coupled with documentation such as memorandum from 
the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences during the 1986-1988 period, the reader 
is left with a better understanding of how resurgent Serb nationalism was taking 
hold and, more importantly, how it was manipulated during this period by 
Slobodan Milosevic. While the above sources adequately cover the situation in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the perhaps best overall coverage is, and will likely remain, 
Noel Malcolm's Bosnia, A Short History. 107Malcolm presents the background of 
Bosnia from the ancient kingdom of the C 12th BC, up to present day, 1994. Yet, 
the work offers itself as more than merely a history book. Malcolm succeeds in 
dispelling several myths regarding Bosnia, such as its immediate conversion and 
acquiescence to Islam once the Ottomans arrived. Moreover, it correctly highlights 
102 John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict", Adelphi Pare #270 published by Brassey's for the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies London (Summer, 1992) 
103Misha Glenny, 7he Fall of Yugoslavia: Thf Third Balkan War London: Penguin, 1992) 
104 Sabrina P. Ramet, Arationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia. 1962-1991 2nd ed (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992) 
105 Ramet (1992), gp. cit.., p. xvi. 
106Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia. - Tracking the Breakup 1980-92 (London: Verso, 
1993) 
107Noel Malcolm (1994), qp. cit. 
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the interwar years of Yugoslavia aa precursor for trouble presently and equally 
demonstrates the failure by the West, especially the Europeans and their ineptitude 
at handling the crisis once it began. Given its slant, yet not obsession for detail, 
Malcolm's work represents the best of recent work on the subject. This accounts 
for the repeated referrals to it in this work. 
1.5 Methodology 
Robert Keohane stated; 'political realism is deeply embedded in Western 
thought. Without understanding it, we can neither understand nor criticise our own 
tradition of thinking about international relations. "08 The approach which 
underlies the study is one which relies heavily upon the principles of political 
realism and neo-realist maxims. The soundness of these principles rests upon their 
historical antecedents and attempts to use these as the basis for policy projections 
and evaluations. This should not mean, however, as the study states, that such 
foundations are without error. As Gaddis correctly points out; 
We tend to think about the future by projecting past patterns forward; these patterns, in turn 
are the means by which we try to make sense out of present and past realities. We too often 
fail, though, to allow for the effects of change on the patterns we create in our minds. Despite 
the obvious fact change- sometimes dramatic and sudden change- is what history is all about, 
when we use history to think about the future we generally resort to a static version of it. 109 
The statement holds merit when applied to the current events of the study. 
Following the collapse of communism, the process of democratisation and the 
beginning of dissolution and violence throughout the Balkans, much of the current 
analysis and projections of the situation erroneously depicted events as following 
the same path they did at the turn of the century. Violence was easily portrayed as 
endemic due to 'deep-seated hatreds'. All these portrayals did contain kernels of 
truth rooted in historical case analysis. Yet, many failed to understand that modem 
complexities varied events despite their facade of familiarity. The 'effects of 
change, indeed, were not accounted for. This is why when studies of this nature 
are begun, both analyst and practitioner alike, must remain sceptical. The maxims 
used in historical analysis should be taken seriously, yet one must endeavour 
towards critical analysis. ' 10 
The application of realist principles, therefore, seeks to develop a working 
theory for the study, one which will cope with events under such critical analysis. 
108 Robert 0. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Robert Keohane, 
(ed. ) Neorealism and its Critics (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): pA 
109 Gaddis (1992), 2p. cit.: p. 153. 
1 IORobert Keohane, m. cit, 'if the nwims apply only under certain conditions, or if the theory 
underlying them is fundamentally erroneous in its understanding of the forces affecting 
co-operation and discord, peace and war, they will be dangerously misleading. ', at p. 3. 
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The examination of international relations, and more importantly, the 'complexities 
of world politi&, necessitates the use of theory. As the study demonstrates, 
however, events are indeed examined on the basis of historical relevance, yet, are 
also incorporated into modem maxims that account for the relationship between 
events, their importance and how they affect outcomes. "' It is for this reason that 
neo-realist principles are given more credence throughout the study than classic 
realist beliefs. Neorealism seeks to refine classical realism by developing a working 
relationship between the two. By endeavouring to integrate the two, 'a 
contemporary framework can be established based upon comparative analysis. 1112 
In the current exan-dnation, such analysis provides insight into the nature of US- 
Albanian relations and must, therefore be relied upon, since the status of relations 
between the two does not offer much. This does not, nor should it, discount the 
importance of historical examination. Such methods, especially in the present 
study, aid in comparative analysis. 
A study which focuses on US foreign policy during times of vast change would 
be remiss if it did not rely upon principles of realism. In an area such as the 
Balkans, traditions of liberalism remain low and practically non-existent. Security 
concerns, democratisation and other issues which affect the region adhere not to 
liberal maxims extolling the virtues of man and modern achievements but instead 
rest firmly upon the tenets of realism. After World War 11, the US moved away 
American political tradition and adopted the values of realism which sought to 
explain power politics and the players within a system which had undergone 
widespread and fundamental change. As Keohane states; jrealism] sought to 
reorient United States foreign policy so that American policymakers could cope 
with Soviet attempts at domination without either lapsing into passive 
unwillingness to use force or engaging in destructive and quixotic crusades to make 
the world safe for democracy. " 13 Recent focus upon enlargement has brought 
criticism and comparison to the latter fears of 'visionary crusadee. Yet as realism 
permeated US foreign policy, the need for examination of the key and underlying 
concepts which dominated policy, became apparent. Power, balance of power and 
national interests continued to remain an integral part of theory, however, 
distinguishing between ends and means and how these concepts affected existing 
Keohane, pp-. cit., p. 4. 
112 R Pfaltzgraff, pp. cit.: p. 119. 
113 Keohane, pp. cit., p. 9., 'This shift was particularly rapid in America, since the collapse of the 
European balance of power meant that the United States, no longer, merely an observer of European 
foibles, had accepted the burdens, along with the heady privileges, of becoming a hegemonic: power- 
one with both the willingness and the ability to make and maintain the rules for world politics! 
30 
political relationships required a modification of realist axioms. This is where 
neorealism. took hold. ' 14 
In times of great systems change, that has occurred with the downfall of 
communism, neorealism offers both analysts and policymakers firm principles 
which best explain the behaviour of states as actors within the international setting 
without adopting the determinist position classical realism held to. Rejecting 
declinist positions as too determinist, the study holds one preconceived notion, that 
the US has emerged from the upheavals of 1989 still a great power. The study 
accepts that classical realism views great power status by placing larger emphasis 
upon the tangible rather than intangible factors used to measure power. 
Neorealism recognises the multiplicity of power centres and seeks to relate power 
to the larger social relationships within the international context. Neorealism, as it 
pertains to the present study adheres to Kenneth WaltA definition of 'great power' 
and accepts its applicability to the current international setting. 
A great power that is one among many learns how to manipulate allies as well as adversaries. 
Great powers have to accommodate some of their number in order to gain strength vis-a-vis 
others. In dealing with near equals, they design their policies to influence the actions of 
others. In a crowded field, those who play the great-power game well flourish; those who do 
not risk falling by the wayside. 115 
The Clinton administration and its reliance upon the tenets of liberalism 
championed by Wilson appears to have little in common with the values of realism 
and neorealism. Its apparent position on these liberal traditions make it difficult to 
apply their lessons upon crises situations and, more importantly, to relations with 
nations, and regions, where the maxims of the former two continue to dominate. 
Their failure to, 'articulate an operational theory and to relate individual events and 
crisis to it"116 has done more than limit administration policy, it has perhaps served 
notice that reliance upon the values of neorealism continue to hold merit. Though 
not perfect and not meant to be, neorealism offers the best explanation for 
understanding the concerns and interests of the actors involved, in this case, the 
United States and Albania. The standing of the actors and their relation to the 
international arena represent structural characteristics inherent within studies of 
systems and systems change. 117 Critics will contend that studies such as this 
examine realist paradigms and concepts such as power with methods which do not 
114 pfaltZgraff, pp. Cit.: P-119., and Keohane, gp. cit.., p. 21. 
115 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics", 
in Keohane, 2p. 6t. - p. 333. 
116 Kissinger (June, 1994), pp. cit. - p. 7. 
117 Waltz, M. Cit. ' . p. 
327. 
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offer comprehensive accounts of the 'placement of states within a system. " 18 Yet, 
it should be noted that placement becomes difficult, if not impossible, when the 
dynamics of the system are either static or have undergone wholesale change. As 
Keohane observes, international relations is an 'anarchic rather than hierarchic 
realm, populated by units [states] performing similar functions. " 19 Acceptance that 
these units vary in degrees of power, even if we cannot agree to a proper definition 
of the latter term, makes it even more difficult to place states within a system. 120 
While the units perform the functions of actors within international politics and 
therefore are part of the international structure, determining their position within 
the system cannot be achieved when the system undergoes change. Should the 
units themselves undergo change, what we are then left with is a situation in which 
the stability of the entire system is compromised. 
Structural changes alter a systems dynamics. Systemic cffects cannot be reconstructed from the 
system's interacting parts since the parts behave differently because they are parts of a system. 
The constraints and incentives of a system, its dynamics, change if its structure changes or is 
transforme& 121 
This appears to be what has happened when viewing the events since the break- 
up of the Soviet Union. The integrity of the system became compromised since 
power relationships no longer functioned as they did during the era of bipolarity. 
With critical theory, the analyst can understand change within the system. By 
examining the dynamics themselves as they too change, the study, by exploring 
changes within a democratising nation such as Albania, and its relations with the 
US, alterations with the system itself are highlighted. 122 Such a case study imbued 
with the principles of political realism, with heavier reliance upon neorealism allows 
for greater applicability in international relations. It is hoped that the study 
presents such applicability as a guide into comprehending both change in the 
system as a whole, [the collapse of bipolarity], and the changing dynamics within 
the system itself, [power relationships in the Balkans], and how these affect the 
relationship between the dominant unit of the former, the United States, and a new 
state-as-regional actor in the latter, Albania. It is accepted, however, as Keohane 
properly observes; 'each proposition of any theory... should be scrutinised carefully 
to ascertain the range of its applicability, its robustness under different conditions, 
and the likelihood of its being overtaken by events'. 123 
I 18 John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist 
Synthesis", in Keohanc, gp. cit.: pp. 135-157. 
119 Keohane, qpxit., p. 14. 
120 Waltz, pp. ýgjt. - p. 329. 121 Waltz, 9g. cit.: p. 342. 122 Waltz, pp. Cit.. 
. p. 33 L, and Keohane, 2p, ýjt.. - p. 19. 123 Keohane, 2r. cit.... p. 5. 
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Chapter One 
THE HISTORICAL DILEMMA 
1.0 BACKGROUND 
The year 1991 was one of marked importance to the United States. After 
successively leading her allies in the Gulf War, America ended the year witnessing the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. With communism in full retreat since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall two years earlier, the dissolution of the USSR, America! s Cold War 
adversary for nearly five decades, it seemed communism acknowledged defeat. 
President George Bush hailed the upcoming era as a possible 'new world order', and it 
appeared many echoed his sentiment. However, events moved quicker than rhetoric. 
The post Cold War euphoria felt by both citizens and policyrnakers alike was gone. 
World wide recession, resurgent hyper-nationalism, irredentist violence, and failing 
programs among the fledgling democracies all helped to destroy hopes of peace and 
prosperity contributing instead, to an increasing 'disorder. 
A glance at the current crisis in the former Yugoslavia and republics of the 
former Soviet Union seems to point the way, not to the original vision for the post 
Cold War world; but a vision of decreased military violence and sweeping multilateral 
co-operation which would perhaps at last fulfil the image and mission intended for such 
organisations such as the United Nations. Instead, escalating warfare in areas such as 
Bosnia appeared to typify the immediate future as all Western nations seemed capable 
of is condemnation of action there and provision of humanitarian assistance while both 
UN and individual nations peace envoys and policy makers shook their heads in 
dismay that yet another cease-fire has not held. Meanwhile, neighbouring countries 
and/or republics desperately tried to contain the spread of violence [as well as 
refugees], while calling for the protection of the rights of the respective ethnic 
minorities which may be located in the war zone. Simultaneously they must battle 
unrest within their borders as food and unemployment lines mount and more 
conservative elements gain force and popularity as the struggle to achieve market style 
capitalism seems to be failing. 
It is the dilemma in the former Yugoslavia however that has caught the 
attention and raised the anxiety level of analysts and politicians alike, as televised 
images of the carnage could no longer be ignored or discounted away as outside the 
realm of interest. A look into the history of the region sheds light upon the problem. 
This particular section of South-Eastern Europe commonly referred to as the Balkans 
[Turkish meaning simply 'mountain'] has had a history steeped in violence and 
bloodshed over territory, widespread political and cultural fragmentation, and one form 
or another of authoritarian rule replete with secretive deals, negotiations and other 
forms of traditional 'power politics'. During the early part of the twentieth century 
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Balkan nations have been both the instigator and forum of at least five wars involving 
the region. 
1.1 Brief Historical Background 
Following the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, Italy began a policy of asserting 
herself territorially in the Mediterranean. Through discreet negotiations the Foreign 
Office at Rome made sure that neither the French nor the British had aims in Tripoli, at 
this time part of the declining Ottoman Empire. Securing general approval Italy 
dispatched troops to Tripoli by September, 1911 initiating the Turko-Italian War. ' 
After centuries of domination in the Balkans, the power of the Ottoman Empire 
was waning rapidly. West European expansion [helped largely by modem means of 
warfare and weaponry] in the Mediterranean coupled with rising nationalism from 
Albanians and Serbs among others exacerbated existing internal problems; 2 radical 
economic changes in the late nineteenth century and the Young Turk revolt of 1908 
forced the Ottomans to negotiate for peace by 18 October 1912. Italy subsequently 
reconstituted Tripoli and the surrounding area into modem day Libya. 
Seizing the opportunity, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro embarked 
upon a course to further purge the Ottoman influence from the Balkans and perhaps 
seize large chunks of territory, especially Macedonia, to which all four 'allies! laid 
claims to. The irony in this alliance was that all four had ill feelings towards the other 
making the likelihood of alliance improbable. The treaties however were negotiated 
between the Spring and Summer of 1912 although the four did not specify how to 
divide the spoils. Nonetheless, the First Balkan War commenced by December 1912. 
In a drive to secure territory both Greece and Bulgaria moved towards 
Macedonia and Saloniki. Serbia moved quickly through Albania to gain access to the 
Adriatic via Valon, Alessio and Durres. The Treaty of London, 30 May 1913 ended 
hostilities but still left the question of the Turkish spoils including, Crete, Epirus, 
Thrace and Macedonia unanswered. As expected, negotiations proved hopeless. The 
resulting Second Balkan War [29 June 1913 - 20 July 1913] included Serbia, Greece 
and Rumania3 against an already militarily spent Bulgaria. Macedonia was divided 
among Serbia and Greece while Kosova was awarded to Serbia, albeit against Albanian 
I Ferdinand Schevill, ov. cit.: pp. 467-469. 
2 These internal problems can be referred to in this context by Paul Kennedys definition of 'imperial 
overstretch'-when interests and obligations of a particular country [in this case empire] become larger 
than that 'empire's'ability to defend them all. see Paul Kennedy, Decline and Fall of the Great 
Powers: Economic Change andAfifitM Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (London: Hyman, 1988): p. 515. 
By this time even Ottoman Tripoli was not defended by the Turks but by Arab tribes which were given 
a large degree of autonomy in return for defence of and deference to the Ottomans. see Schevill, 
2p. cit. - p. 468. 
3 Rumania, though not part of the First Balkan War, sought territory, specifically Bulgarian Dobrudja 
while at the Treaty of London. Seeing the opportunity to obtain more territory they joined the Serbo- 
Greek alliance. Schevill, pp. cit., pp. 475-476. 
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wishes. As for the latter, fearing partition from the victors, especially by Greece's 
claims to 'Northern Epirus'-southern Albania, the Albanians had little recourse on the 
Kosova matter. Instead they were forced to accept the loss of Kosova but did receive 
reaffirmation of their sovereignty and independence by the Great Powers. 4 
No sooner had these conflicts been concluded when the First World War had 
broken out. This war again not only included the Balkan nations of Serbia, 
Montenegro and eventually Greece [ 1917] on the side of the Allies against the 
Ottomans and Bulgaria, it also committed the participants to the more damaging peace 
process, albeit without their best interests or participation in the peace negotiations a 
consideration. This often meant ceding territory and redrawing national boundaries 
irrespective of ethnic, cultural, or finguistic demarcations that have either been in place 
for centuries or in a continual state of flux. Yugoslavia, the land of the 'South Slavs'5 
is but one product of the peace process. World War II did little or nothing to correct 
the problem. If anything it exacerbated it as now most of the region fell into the hands 
of Communist administrations and within the sphere of the Soviet Union. An area with 
a propensity for ethnic conflict now found itself compelled to suppress ethnic identity 
for nearly fifty years as 'nationality' was not compatible with Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. The failure of communism then released the pent up ethnic identification of 
decades and with it; renewed ethnic tension, hatred, fragmentation, nationalist 
aspirations, and resulting violence. This is what the West must contend with. Indeed, 
the events in the former Yugoslavia and the surrounding area should come as no 
surprise to Western politicians. An artificial creation from the outset, Yugoslavia 
demonstrated to the West ethnic rumblings long before its present dissolution. 
Certainly the 1971 Croatian Crisis could have indicated the complexity and signalled 
the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia. By 1971 Croats, fearing a policy of Serb 
assimilation, sponsored a revival of Croatian nationalism which included more 
autonomy for Croats. Fuelled by economic concessions through the early 1960s, 
Croatia began to call for the outright restoration of territory within Bosnia. The 
Croatian Crisis resulted in the severe repression by Tito of Croat nationalism and the 
expulsion, imprisonment, demotion or removal from post of over one thousand 
Croatian Communist Party members, journalists and academics etc. 6 The resulting 
4 The struggle for Albanian independence dates to the ill-fated attempts by the League of Prizren 
[ 18761 and their efforts to free themselves from the Ottomans. Their failure and non-recognition by 
Bismarck at the Congress of Berlin put them on a path towards repeated conflict with their 
neighbours and instilled a deep distrust within the Albanians to the powers of western Europe. see 
Stefanaq Pollo and Arben Puto (1981), pp. cit.., pp. 146-152. 
5 After the First World War, the "Kingdom of Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia" was not officially 
recognised as "Yugoslavia" until 1929. 
6 Interestingly one Croat sentenced to twenty-two years of imprisonment was a historian writing for 
Matica Hrvatska [the Croatian Cultural Organisation], who was in favour of both Croat nationalism 
and the restoration of Bosnian territory to Croatia. He is Franjo Tudjman, the current President of 
Croatia. see Sabrina Ramet (1992), oxit., p. 13 1. 
35 
concessions witnessed by the 1974 constitution solidified the nationalist differences in 
Yugoslavia and sped it on its course towards the present day conflict. 7 
Nor can Western policyrnakers, claim ignorance of history as a defence. Before 
the present outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, a CIA 'leaked' report 
warned of the "break-up" of Yugoslavia followed by possible "civil war". 8 The short- 
sightedness and inaction in policy therefore did not exempt the West from taking, an 
early look at the problem. This failure to act promptly did not alleviate the situation. 
In fact it made it worse as the population saw Western indifference as part and parcel 
of a policy of non-intervention when no vital Western interests are at stake. It was 
only when the conflict risked spreading into a regional conflagration did the West seek 
to end the hostilities. Still, even the negotiated Brioni Accord nor the recent Vance- 
Owen Plan will not work "in a country where deceit is the most common political 
currency". 9 Perhaps though they feign ignorance and shock because they either have 
no clue how to solve the situation or genuinely cannot identify the problem or 
problems. 
To state that nationalism alone is the problem or root of it is a gross 
oversimplification. This explanation does not offer reasons why the conflict has not 
spread to areas such as Slovenia, or why the split between the Czech and Slovaks 
occurred without bloodshed. Nor does this solution reveal why it was a majority of 
ethnic Russians which voted for secession and identify themselves as "citizens of 
Lithuania". To effectively grasp the question in hand nationalism itself must be 
examined. It must be sufficiently defined and applied in context to the area both 
generally and specifically. This entails highlighting the characteristics of nationalism; 
their role in ethnic tension during the Second World War and after; the differences, if 
any, with Western style nationalism; why nationalist tensions appear isolated to select 
"zones of conflict" while surrounding areas, with equal potential for violence, are not 
experiencing separatist tendencies; what Western policy in the region has been and, 
more importantly, what direction such policy should take regarding nationalism if 
mounting pressure in the Balkans is to be alleviated. 
Selecting a point from which to begin is always difficult, particularly when 
dealing with the Balkans. 10 However, to fully appreciate the folly of Western policy in 
7 For a general overview see, John Zamctica, gp. cit.: p. 10., Ramet (1992), pp. cit.: chpt seven pp. 98- 
135., Misha Glenny (1992), pp. ciL 
8 "Civil War Claim" The Times 29 November, 1990, and for a view that despite this prior knowledge 
nothing was done see, Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard (London: Mandarin Press, 1994); 
"Whatever the CIA may have read in the tea leaves, the Administration and especially the State 
Department were unwilling to face up to the prospect of the disintegration of a country into whose 
stability so much effort and so many tax dollars had been put. ", at p. 44. 
9 Glenny (1992), gp. cit., p. 99. 
10 For a comprehensive overview of the area which displays western interest and power policy see 
Schevill, pp. cit. - particularly part three; *The Epoch of Liberation, the 19th century", pp. 293407., 
Felix Gilbert and David C. Large, The End of the European Era: 1890 to Present (New York New 
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the Balkans, it is best to survey the Western or Allied policy at the outbreak, during 
and immediately after the Second World War. Here the West, specifically Churchill 
and Roosevelt, though their intentions may have been otherwise, were predisposed to 
side with anti-fascist rather than anti-Communist elements in the Balkans. The 
consequence being a disregarding of nationalist needs, territorial or otherwise and 
later, open hostility towards [in the wake of the Cold War] the very same regimes the 
West indirectly helped to create with failed policy which even today it does not 
adequately allgn. Understanding the culpability of Western policy towards the Balkans 
is best expressed by Jonathan Eyal who states; 
The Wesfs biggest mistake was to assume that nationalist aspirations could be reasoned away. 
Nationalism remains potent and can be harness by every political ideology precisely because it is not a 
rational feeling. Pleas of economic necessity are useless if only because nationalism feeds on the myth 
of triumph over adversity and sagas of epic struggle. II 
Although writing in reference to the current situation in the former Yugoslavia, Eyal's 
statement properly reflects Western short-sightedness of policy whether used today or 
fifty years ago. This statement does not imply however that circumstances are 
identical, hence outcome is equally clear. Rather, it should be understood that the 
factors which were the cause of warfare in the Balkans this century, nationalist 
ambitions and poor policy, are exhibiting themselves in similar means. They must be 
dealt with therefore with the methods which will account for nationalist and separatist 
needs if they are to be contained, or more precisely, if they are to be prevented from 
developing into violent conflict, as has happened in Bosnia. A review of the history 
will show that the recent debacle is not a new phenomena and, more importantly, 
should have surprised no one in the West. 
1.1.1 Ae Case ofBosnia 
A brief look at the history of Bosnia demonstrates how the aforementioned 
qualities have been perverted and resulted into the present day morass. 'Given the 
march of nationalism elsewhere in Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that the different 
ethnic groups in Bosnia likewise embraced. Each saw his group identity under threat 
from the others. This was not politics, but a preparation for a possible war. ' 12 Since no 
group claimed an outright majority [Muslims-43%, Serbs-32%, Croats-17%], it 
seemed inevitable that Bosnia would degenerate into conflict. 13 The history of the 
York: W. W. Norton, 199 1): Bernard Newman, Balkan Background (London: Travel Club, 1945): 
Patrick Brogan, Eastern Europe 1939-1989: 7he R& Years War (London: Bloomsbury, 1990) 
11 Jonathen Eyal The Independent 17 December, 1992 
12 ZametiCa' pp. Cit-- p. 37. 
13Gramoz Pashko, "The Balkans: Ethnic Identity v. the Modem Nation", Koha e Jone (June, 1993): 
and, Stephen F. Larabee, "Instability and Change in the Balkans", Survival vol. 34 #2 (Summer, 
1992) 
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region has, unfortunately, placed Bosnia in a position, both geographically and, to an 
equal sense, politically, which saw it as a bone of contention between Serbs and 
Croats. 
Historically, the inhabitants of Bosnia trace their ancestry to the Slav invasions 
of the C6th and C7th AD. The Slavs came in large numbers, possibly firom Southern 
Russia and the Caucuses. They were able to displace the earlier inhabitants, the 
Illyrians. The latter were made up of a series of tribes which moved into the Balkans 
well before the Slavs, sometime around 1500 BC. 14 Of the two tribes which settled 
into the region, the Albanoi continued southward once the Slavs arrived, eventually 
settling in present day Kosova and Albania. The other tribe, the Delmatae, moved 
west, towards the Adriatic coastline taking up residence on that strip of coast which 
still bears a variation of the tribe's name, Dalmatia. The Slavs, descendants of latter 
day Serbs and Croats recruited the indigenous tribes for assistance against, first the 
Romans, and later the Byzantines, the latter which launched a series of raids well into 
the C9th AD. Given the terrain and the concerted effort, the Slavs were able to 
dominate the area for several centuries until the arrival of the Ottomans during the 
C 14th and CI 5th. 15 During the interim, Bosnia experienced the only moment of 
kingdom it would have in its long history. The creation and expansion of the medieval 
Bosnian state occurred from the latter part of the C12th until the latter Cl4th. Three 
rulers marked this period when Bosnia was expanded to include the territory to the 
south, Hum [Hercegovina]. 16 
The arrival of the Ottomans was due to their desire to acquire the region, rich 
with minerals and exploit its strategic location both for economic and military 
purposes. Muslim and Arab traders and merchants were no stranger to Bosnia, arriving 
as early as the C9th-17With the growing power of the Hungarian empire to the north, 
it seemed that Bosnia would no longer survive as a medieval state. The Sultan's 
armies conquered most of Hercegovina and Bosnia by the Summer of 1463. King 
Mathias of Hungary, however, was able to drive the Turks south, past present day 
Jajce. The fear, however, of the Slav inhabitants of losing themselves within the 
Hungarian empire made the former not assist Mathias in maintaining his advantage. 
The ottomans continued to pressure the resisting forces and eventually succeeded in 
conquering the Hungarian army in 1527.19 
.. pp. 25 14SChevill' qR! Ljt , -30., and, Nicolas K. Martis, The Falsificafion ofMacedonian History (Athens: University Press, 1984): pp. 14-16. 
15 Dusko Doder, "New War, Old Hatreds", ForeiRn Polia #91 (Summer, 1993): pp. 5-6., and, Brogan 
(1990), qp--cit- . p. 145., and, Peter Prifti, Socialist Albania Since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1978): P. 3. 
16 Malcolm (1994), M-_cit., p. 13., The rulers were; Ban Kulin [1180-12041, Stephen Kotromanic 
[1322-13531, Stephen Tvrtko [1353-13911 
17Malcolm. (1994), pp-. cit-, p-43., and, Schevill, Qp-cit.: pp. 175-177., and, Philip Robins, Turkev an 
the Middle Eas (London: Pinter, 199 1): p. 17. 
18 Malcolm (1994), pp. cit. -I pp. 
43-44., and, Doder, Oxit.. p. 7. 
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Consolidating their gains, the Ottomans set up an administrative system which 
relied heavily upon the local population for oversight and support with coercion, if 
necessary, provided by the Sultan's armies. The treatment afforded the inhabitants of 
Bosnia; land, title, and education of the male youth in the Sultan's service, resulted in a 
gradual Islarnisation of the local population, a process which took perhaps one- 
hundred fifty years and accounts for the present day Muslim Slav population of 
Bosnia. 19 
The Ottoman administration of the region continued for the next two centuries, 
without many disturbances from the Hungarians, up until the early part of the CI 9th. 
With its internal structure showing signs of stress and corruption, especially within the 
military, several of the indigenous peoples of the Balkans began to express desires for 
independence from Ottoman control. The Greek War of Independence was successful 
[ 1823] with British assistance, while Serbs similarly expressed a wish to revive their 
once great C14th Serbian empire of Stefan Dusan. 20 Bosnia also sought to escape the 
control of the Turks but were not as successful as the Greeks and, later, the Serbs 
would be. Action taken by the Sultan against the semi-independent Muslim warlords 
throughout the 1820s and early 1830s saw Mostar, Banja Luka and Sebrenica regularly 
invaded and occupied by the Sultan's troops. 21 While the Greeks had the support of 
Great Britain and the Serbs had the support of Russia, their Orthodox Slav brethren, 
the Bosnian Muslims, unfortunately, had no European power which either, recognised 
their very existence, or felt inclined to sponsor their drives against the Porte. 22 
This position became painfully evident by the Congress of Berlin [1878]. The 
European powers sought to limit Russia's new-found influence in the Balkans and, 
more importantly, to repudiate the earlier Treaty of San Stefano [ 1878] which had 
created a Greater Bulgarian state, and had placed much of Bosnia at the mercy of 
Serbia. 23 Agreeing that minorities, especially Serbs would be protected by legislative 
reform, Bosnia-Hercegovina would remain, according to the Great Powers, part of the 
Ottoman empire yet was to be administered by the Austro-Hungarian empire. The 
latter believed it would be welcomed by the Bosnian Muslims, however, this was not 
to be the case. Baron Joseph Filipovic, a Croat, was sent at the head of an Austro- 
Hungarian army numbering more than 80,000 men. 24 The Croatians became wary of 
19 Malcolm (1994), pp. cit.: pp. 51-60., and, Prifti (1978), W. cit., - pp. 5-6., and, Derek Hall, Qp. cit. - 
pp. 3-5., and, Biberaj (1990), QR. cit. - pp. 10-13. 
20 Stanely Hoffmann "What Will Satisfy Serbia's Nationalists? " The New York Times 4 December, 
1994, and Newman, W-. ci-t, and, Cvic (1991), gp. cit. * p. 66. 
21 Schevill, M. cit. * p. 460., and, Biberaj (1990), pp. cit. - p. 12. 
22 'During the Greek Revolution of 182 1, England interpreted the Tsar's desire to protect the 
Christian population of the collapsing Ottoman Empire as the first stage of Russia's attempt to 
conquer Egypt. With British interests at stake, Castlereagh did not hesitate to appeal to the Tsar... ' 
See, Henry Kissinger (1994), pp. cit., p. 89. 
23 Kissinger (1994), Qp. cit. 1 and, Martis, Qp. cit. - p. 78., and, Gus Xhudo (1993), pp. cit., p. 315. 
24 Malcolm (1994), gp. cit., p. 135. 
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increasing Serb power since the early to mid-C. 19th. The Croats were concerned, with 
good reason, that Serbian dreams of a Greater Serbia included parts of Croatian 
territory and land within Bosnia which the Croats felt was rightfully theirs even if they 
too were administered by the Austro-Hungarians. In an effort to distance themselves 
from the Serbs, and as an opportunity to exercise authority over them, many Croats 
took to military service within the Austro-Hungarian empire. 25 Filipovic was but one 
example. Although the Bosnians put up fierce resistance, they were eventually defeated 
and occupied by October, 1878.26 
Rule within the Austro-Hungarian empire had not been pleasant for the people 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Ruled by a military governor in Sarajevo, the empire was 
required to maintain a force ranging between 15,000 and 20,000 men in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina to put down the periodic outbursts of violence during the latter C 19th 
and early C20th. 27Protesting Austro-Hungarian legislation, Bosnian Muslims found 
themselves hindered in religious practice, heavily taxed, forced into conscription and 
inundated with a heavy bureaucracy and Customs Union which made it difficult for the 
local population to conduct trade. The Austro-Hungarians, however, did recognise the 
importance of agriculture and set up 'model farms' throughout the region, particularly 
in and around Mostar. The success of these farms and their habitation by large 
numbers of Muslims led some local leaders to seize an opportunity at greater 
autonomy. One such leader, Mula Mustafa Dzabic sought, in 1899, the establishment 
of an autonomous Vakuf Assembly. 28 [vakuf was the name given to a small agricultural 
administrative unit within the empire] A series of such assemblies, it was hoped, could 
constitute a Provincial Assembly with delegates from each vakuf Dzabic and other 
local leaders were able to. organise and send delegates to Budapest to plead their case 
by the Summerof 1900.29 
It was at this time that Finance Minister of Bosnia, Benjamin Kallay [ 1882- 
1903], felt that the growing political moves from both Serbs and Croats signalled 
danger for the integrity of Bosnia, even though it technically did not exist, except as a 
minority within the Austro-Hungarian empire. Kallay, along with Dzabic and others, 
including most of the local Muslim clergy, rejected any notion that 'Bosnians' did not 
exist and were in fact nothing but Serbs or Croats. 30 The Austro-Hungarian empire, 
25 Alex Dragnitch, Qp. cit.: p. 2 1. 
26jelaVich, 2p. Cit.: p. 59. 
27, The actual occupation of the provinces was accomplished only with great difficulty ... The military 
occupation was carried through divisions of the Croatian Thirteenth Army Corps, stationed in 
Croatia, under the command of General Josip Filipovic. He set up a provisional government staffed 
largely by Croatian civil servants... 'Ibid, pp. 59-60. 
28 Phyllis Auty, Yugoslavia (New York, New York: Walker Press, 1965): and, Stephen Clissold, (ed. ) 
A Historv of Yugoslavia from Early 7-Imes to 1966 (Cambridge: University Press, 1966) 
29 Malcolm (1994), 2p. cit.., pp. 146-147., and, Jelavich, O&It., p. 61. 
30 'The most controversial aspect of the Hapsburg policy during the Kallay administration was the 
treatment of the national question .... 
With the increasing emphasis on the national origin, the great 
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while not actively supportive of the vakufs and the Muslim clergy, nonetheless made 
little or no attempts to stop them since they sought to counter Serb designs in the 
region and Bulgar ones in the south, both of which Austro-Hungary felt were actively 
sponsored by the czar in St. Petersburg. 31Moreover, the Hungarian governor of 
Croatia recognised the difficulty in governing a land with both Serbs and Croats, both 
of which continued to harbour dreams of ancient kingdoms. The governor 
deliberately set Serbs against Croats and vice-versa through a series of legislation that 
antagonised both. 32 
The Serbs, without an outlet to the sea and bitter over not being able to exploit 
such an opportunity in Bosnia-Hercegovina or Dalmatia, saw relations with Austro- 
Hungary deteriorate in the early C20th, culminating in the 'pig war' of 1906.33With 
their own power perhaps waning, and growing unrest among the large numbers of 
ethnic minorities within their borders, Austro-Hungary decided to consolidate its 
position in the Balkans, at Serbia's intense displeasure. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, Baron von Aehrenthal announced the full annexation of Bosnia on 5 October, 
1908.34 In Belgrade, ultra-nationalists which believed fully in 11ja Garasanin's 
memorandum [Nacertanje], were outraged by Austro-Hungary's move. Garasanin, a 
former Serbian Interior Minister, published Nacertanje in 1844. It called for the re- 
establishment of Greater Serbia, which included Bosnia. 35 The ultra-nationalists 
moved quickly establishing several 'secret societies' which campaigned for a Greater 
Serbia, often through terrorist methods. Two of the more notorious, Narodna 
Odbrana [National Defence] and Crw Ruka [The Black Hand], called on Serbia to 
declare war on Austro-Hungary. 36 The government in Belgrade was tempted, given its 
question in Bosnian politics was the nationality of the Muslims, who were Slavic and Serbo-Croatian 
speaking. Both Serbs and Croats put forth claims to these people', Kallay served from June, 1882 
until 1903 as head of the Bosnian administration for the Hapsburgs with the title of Consul-General 
Jelavich, M. -cit. * p. 
62. 
31"Russia in the Balkans", in Ivo J. Lederer, (ed) Russian Foreign PofiaE: EEOLs in Historical 
Perspective (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1962): pp. 26-28. 
32 Vienna abolished direct control of the Military Frontier [the Krajinal which had a large Serb 
population and incorporated it within Croatia by 188 1. From 1883 to 1903, Count Karoly Khuen- 
Hedervary was ban [governor] of Croatia. He was a Hungarian landowner who, unlike previous bans 
who were anti-Serb, became pro-Serb and anti-Croat. This antagonised relations between Croats and 
Serbs in the Krajina and between Croats and the newly independent Serbian state. See, Jelavich, 
Qp. cit. - pp. 66-68. 
33 Serbia's chief export to Austro-Hungary was pigs. The empire, seeking to restrict Serbia's 
movements after the latter sought alternative markets and was unsuccessful, restricted all livestock 
trade in the latter half of 1905, precipitating a crisis in Belgrade. See, Malcolm (1994), pp_. Cit. -. p. 150. 
34 The Austro-Hungarian and Turkish governments completed the formal agreements in February, 
1909. Austro-Hungary received full Tights over Bosnia and would have to guarantee full freedom of 
religion for Bosnian Muslims and pay 2.5million Turkish pounds to Istanbul. See, Malcolm (1994), 
W. cit. - p. 151 
35 Cvic (1991), pp. citp. 66., and, WL Webb, "Driven Mad by History", NewStatesinan andSocie 
(April, 093): pp. 14-16., and, Malcolm (1994), Qp. cit., p. 127. 
36 'The intensification of Serbian national sentiment prior to World War I had led to the formation of 
two societies. The first the Narodna Odbrana ... was founded in December 1908 at the time of the 
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recent tensions with both Vienna and Budapest, yet was advised against doing so by 
Alexander Izvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister. Russia believed that in the Great 
Power scheme of things it would not be able to assist Serbia and, moreover, would 
likely encounter resistance from Britain and Germany, both of which still remained 
committed to denying Russia or her surrogate Serbia access to the sea. 37 
With full annexation over Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Dual Monarchy sought to 
initiate reform which, it was hoped by Budapest, would allay the nationalist concerns 
of Bosnia's ethnic minorities. This was not to be the case. The Serbs and Croats within 
Bosnia, most likely with assistance from ultra-nationalists in Belgrade, [a situation 
hauntingly all too familiar] set up their own political organisations. The Serbian 
National Organisation [1907] and the Croatian National Organisation [1908], though 
they had their differences, saw a common enemy in the BosnianMUSfiMS. 38Croats too, 
grew to resent control from Budapest and moved into a series of political alliances 
within Bosnia via these cultural/political organisations with aims at creating a common 
Slav state. After 1910, students within Bosnia rallied anti-Hapsburg sentiment into a 
common pro-Yugoslav [south Slav] campaign. It was from these efforts that Mlada 
Bosna [Young Bosnia] was born. 39 
The outbreak of the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-1913] saw many of 
these students volunteer for service in the Serbian Army. Following the outcome of the 
wars, Serbia was nearly doubled in size as Serbs even acquired what they most sought, 
access to the sea, by seizing and holding large tracts of land on the Albanian coastline 
from north near the Montenegrin border south almost to Durres. 40 The Serbs and the 
student volunteers from Mlacla Bosna took the opportunity to kill thousands of 
Albanians, Pomaks [Slav Bulgars] and Turks during these campaigns, something 
Albanians would not forget later during both the First and Second World Wars, when 
retribution would be at hand. 41 The military governor of Bosnia, General Potiorek was, 
annexation crisis. It set up a network of agents in the South Slav lands. The second ... commonly known as the Black Hand, appeared in 1911. Primarily under military direction, it was headed by 
Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, known under the pseudonym Apis .... in 1913 he was chief of intelligence of the Serbian General Staff-The aim was the idea of unification of Serbdom; all Serbs, 
regardless of sex, religion or place of birth, can become members... ' Jelavich, op. cit. - p. 111., and, JF 
Brown, Nationalism. DemoCtqM and SocieN in the Balkans (Aldershot, New York: Dartmouth 
University Press, 1992): pp. 159-162. 
37 Russia was weak following its crushing defeat in the Russo-Japanese War [1904-19051 and faced 
internal problems in the 1905 Uprising. Delzell, W. cit.... and, T. Campbell, "Communist Strategies in 
the Mediterranean", in Lederer (1962), pp. cit., pp. 543-546. 
38 Malcolm (1994), op. cit.: p. 15 1. 
39 Ibid, p. 153. 
40 Biberaj (1990), gpLcit., p. 12., and, Kissinger (1994), 0,.. cit. - p. 199. 
41 'The enemy had armed the Moslem Albanians and placed the policing of the countryside in their 
hands. The Arnauts did not need German encouragement in order to begin at once a pitiless hunt for 
Serbian victims. -There were no illusions as to what a retreat through Albania would mean. It would 
mean disaster. ' 22,000 out of 150,000 eventually made it to Corfu during a forced Winter retreat. See 
RGD Laffan, The Serbs: The Guardians at the Gate (New York, New York: Dorsett Press, 1989): 
pp. 222-223. 
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however, strongly anti-Serb and committed to keeping Serb gains as minimal as 
possible. Following the Treaty of London [30 May, 1913], Austro-Hungary, on 
Potiorek's advice, abjured Serbian gains by instead supporting the claims of Albanian 
statehood, declared on 28 November, 1912, thus denying Belgrade of the prize she 
most wanted and had fought hard for, the Albanian coastline. 42 It was this series of 
events which set the stage for a continued deterioration of Serb-Austro-Hungarian 
relations and for a student leader of Mlada Bosna, Gavro Princip, to assassinate the 
heir to the Hapsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June, 1914.43 By 28 
July, 1914 Austro-Hungary declared war on Serbia and precipitated the First World 
War. 
1.1.2 Yhe First World War and the Peace 
The disruption of the status quo on the Continent, especially in the Balkans, 
drew in alliances which had previously been established for strictly 'defensive 
purposes'. By the beginning of the C20th two such major alliances sought to maintain 
continuity in the Balkans by balancing off competing interests and not caving in to 
ethnic demands unless prudent or no other solution was evident or possible. The Dual 
Alliance incorporated Germany, the strongest military power, and Austro-Hungary. 
The second bloc, the Triple Entente consisted of Russia and France while Britain had 
signed individual treaties with both nations in 1904 and 1907 respectfully. Great 
Britain knew that Russia had long desired access to the sea and saw itself as the 
protector of Orthodox Slavs throughout the Balkans. Britain was concerned, however, 
that by not allying itself with Russia, it would witness the continued growing power of 
Germany threaten British interests in the Lowland countries. Hence it was the invasion 
of neutral Belgium [4 August, 1914] which precipitated Britain's entry into the war 
and confirmed British suspicions of Germany's intentions. 44 Yet, as the period after 
WXII demonstrated, as it too consisted of two power blocs on the Continent, both 
the Alliance and the Entente did not clearly delineate the respective spheres of 
42'The Serbs were less successful in their demand for Albanian territory which would give them direct 
access to the Adriatic Sea. The great powers, meeting with the Balkan nations in London, forced 
Serbia and Montenegro to accept the creation of an independent Albania. Serbia remained cut off 
from the Adriatic. ' See, Felix Gilbert and David Clay Large, The End of the European Era, 1890 to 
Present 4th edifion (New York, New York: WW Norton, 199 1): p. 112. 
43 See, Brogan (1990), gp. cit. - pp. 147-148., and, Paul Kennedy (1988), 2p. cit., - pp. 330-332., and, 
Laffan, pp. cit. - p. 186., and, Jelavich, 2p. clit., p. 95. 
44 'During the critical week before the German violation of Belgian neutrality, the Conservatives had 
favored the participation of Britain because of its ties with France and its interest in maintaining the 
balance of power. ' GilbeM gaxit. - p. 118., and, With the French Navy on the Mediterranean, the 
entire coastline of northern France would be wide open to the German Navy if Great Britain had 
stayed out of the war. See, Kissinger (1994), gp_. cit. * pp. 212-213. 
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influence in present day Yugoslavia, a situation which continues to haunt both the 
West and Russia as they compete for influence in Bosnia. 45 
The military campaigns in the Balkans served as a side-show to the main battles 
being fought on the Continent. With the Great Powers mired in a stalemate along 
northern France's trenches, and the now realisation that the war would continue for 
quite some time, Balkan nations were seen as allies which, though small, might be able 
to tilt the balance. Indeed, the Serbs, well-seasoned fighters from the Balkan Wars 
were able, with Russian assistance, to drive back Austro-Hungarian troops in the latter 
part of 1914, recapturing Belgrade by December, 1914.46 The Serbs, however, 
suffered heavy casualties throughout 1915 and with the Turks in the war on the side of 
the Germans, [November 1915] Allied slipping lanes through the Near East and 
Dardenelles were closed to re-supply ConVoys. 47 The disastrous military campaigns at 
the Dardenelles and Gallipoli hurt the Allied cause and gave Italy, which remained 
neutral, ample opportunity to negotiate for land in present day Yugoslavia, Istria and 
Dalmatia, and Albania, specifically the ports of Sazan and Vlore. 48 The Allies were 
caught in a quandary. Promising Istria and Dalmatia to Italy would deny Serbia, an 
ally, access to the sea. Britain and France, however, began to recognise weakening 
Russian support, the Serbs in full retreat towards Corfu, and losses in the Near East to 
the Turks. Although against Russian wishes, Britain and France promised Italy what 
she wanted. The latter entered the war on the Allied side in May, 19 15.49 
Bulgaria at first remained neutral yet was of strategic importance to both sides. 
Seeking to regain its losses in Macedonia and DobrudJa, and thereby recreate San 
Stefano, they eventually joined Germany by early 1915. In a massive military 
campaign, Serbia's capital Belgrade fell during the Winter of 1915 and Montenegro 
followed by January, 1916.50 The move by Bulgaria swayed the last two neutral 
Balkan countries, Greece5l and Romania52, to enter the war on the Allied side since a 
45 The Russian ambassador to Sofia sent a telegram to Russia stating that if Russia backed down; 'our 
presence in the Slav world and in the Balkans would perish never to return. ' in, Kissinger (1994), 
pp. cit-., - p. 214., and, Scrgci Goraychcv "interview on CNN", pp. cit regarding spheres of influence in 
the region. 
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passage through the DardenelIcs. It failed as both navies lost many ships. See, Jelavich, gp. git.. 
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'Greater Bulgaria' would threaten them both through territorial concessions. Serb 
losses during the winter campaign of 1915 were enormous. They suffered a loss of 
more than forty percent of their military corps as they marched without food or 
supplies through Albania in full retreat. 53Many Albanians saw this as a golden 
opportunity to repay the Serbs for their actions during the First and Second Balkan 
Wars. 54Eventually the Serbs made it to Corfii where they were evacuated by Allied 
ships. The Serbs regrouped and managed to create a govemment-in-exile with Prince 
Regent Alexander and his Premier, Nicola Pasic. 
As for the Bosnians, resentment with Austro-Hungarian rule saw many join the 
Serbian Army before the Winter retreat of 1915. Confusion surrounded the Bosnian 
Muslims, however, as they had no great love for the Serbs. Many more remained loyal 
to the Austro-Hungarians, joining the ranks of the army while Bosnian Croats were 
caught in the same quandary, join the Austro-Hungarians who they disliked, side with 
the Serbs, or remain neutral. 55 In the Balkans, though, history has shown that 
neutrality is usually the worst option and does not guarantee integrity. This 
characteristic has been engrained upon the collective psyche of the local populace who 
feel, and continue to do so today, that it is better to fight and continue fighting for 
what is sought, since neutrality and a cessation of hostilities will most likely lead to an 
imposed settlement which is likely to destroy both integrity and identity. 56 
With the war nearing its end, the Austro-Hungarian crown sought to increase 
the level of autonomy for Bosnia, either within the empire or within a Greater Croatia. 
By the late Spring of 1918, however, such proposals were moot. With the US having 
entered the war and Allied gains reversing losses incurred by the Central Powers, the 
idea of a 'South-Slav state' of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes began to take hold. Muslim 
leaders in Bosnia became bitter over proposals by both sides. They, led by a former 
Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, Mehmed Spaho, felt, however, that the 
creation of a Yugoslav state would at least remove Austro-Hungarian rule and perhaps 
enable Muslims to receive some autonomy. 57 By October, 1918 the National Council 
of Bosnia met with the Croat and Serbian leaders to declare the First National 
Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina [3 November, 1918]. 58 The arrival of the Serbian 
The latter exploited the advantage by signing agreements with Russia for Translyvania and Bukovina 
in exchange for the allowance of goods and supplies from Romania. Charles died in October, 1914. 
His successor, Ferdinand, his nephew, was pro-French making it easier for Romania to join the allies. 
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army to Bosnia, however, was not welcomed with open arms, as many Serbs felt the 
Muslims were, not only historic enemies, but had also assisted Austro-Hungary. At 
Versailles, President Wilson's Fourteen Points believed, 'the aim would be a just peace 
based on self-determination and conciliation between the victor and the vanquished. '59 
This position would suit those defeated since many Allies, including Italy and Greece, 
felt that concessions and secret treaties should now be carried out. While concessions 
were offered, the Allies, especially Wilson, remained committed to the notion of self- 
determination. When the final agreements were signed Romania, for example, received 
Transylvania, Besserabia and Bukovina in the Treaty of Trianon. [1920]60 The 
creation of the Yugoslav state, dominated by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came into 
existence on I December, 1918 in Belgrade. 61 The type of political system was to be 
decided by a secret ballot. The Montenegrin National Council in Paris endorsed the 
idea and even accepted that the Yugoslav state would be a constitutional monarchy 
under the KaradjordJevic dynasty of Prince Regent Alexander, despite the objections of 
the Montenegrin King, Nicolas, who had escaped during the war to Italy. 62 The key 
question became whether the new Yugoslav state would be 'unified and centralised' as 
the Serbian exiled Premier Nicola Pasic had wanted, or would it be a loosely organised 
and decentralised state, as Bosnian Muslim leader Mehmed Spaho wanted. 63 Spaho 
and many of his Muslim supporters found allies in the Bosnian Croats and from Croats 
in Croatia. Both the former, and their leader, Josip Sunaric, and the latter sought a 
confederal Yugoslavia which would give Bosnia 'autonomous unit' status within the 
Slav state and, more importantly, remove power from centralists in Belgrade. 64 
Bosnian Serbs, much like those fighting today, felt that Pan-Serbianism. included a 
central state controlled from Belgrade and believed in the incorporation of Bosnia to 
Serbia. 65 
1.1.3 7heInter-War Years66 
Yugoslavia, like other post-war states in the Balkans, suffered through many 
early problems. 67 The country-wide elections were held on 20 November, 1920. 
Spaho's Yugoslav Muslim Organisation Party won twenty-four seats in the 
59 Jelavich, gp. cit.: p. 122. 
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Constituent Assembly. With Serb, Croat and Slovene political parties all vying for 
dominance and/or influence, Spaho was able to manipulate the situation and receive for 
Muslims, land reform, as well as other rights and concessions from the other Yugoslav 
political parties. 68 However, Spaho and Bosnia had to pay for the concessions. The 
Serbs managed to pass, with Muslim acquiescence, a centralist Constitution through 
Parliament, fittingly for Serbs, on 28 June, 1921, the 532nd year anniversary of the 
Battle of Kosova. Yugoslavia was reorganised into thirty-three administrative units or 
oblasts. 69 Bosnia maintained its territorial identity yet the reorganisation did succeed in 
fomenting unrest between Zagreb and Belgrade, which was to continue throughout the 
inter-war years and during World War II. In the political wrangling which ensued 
between Croatia and Serbia, the Bosnian Muslims usually sided with the Croats, fearful 
of power accumulation and manipulation by Belgrade. Worse still, Bosnians were still 
referred to as either 'Muslim Serbs' or 'Muslim Croats' even though many delegates to 
Parliament willingly accepted such references. 70 
The issue over centralisation and decentralisation would donýinate Yugoslav 
politics throughout the 1920s. Even the government of Monsignor Korosec, a Slovene 
which formed a coalition with Spaho's party, was not enough to dissuade the ever 
growing rift between Zagreb and Belgrade. 71 The centralists, led by Nicola Pasic, 
could not maintain a government coalition and were forced to dissolve when Spaho 
removed his party from the coalition government in 1924. Distrust, mutual suspicion 
and a series of interim governments often in power not long enough to make any 
impact, typified Yugoslav politics during the 1920s and early 1930s. 72 
'Yugoslavia had the most complex internal history of any Balkan nation at this 
time, and its problems illustrate many of the basic difficulties and contradictions in the 
national movements-'73 The Croatians and Slovenes never accepted the centralist 
Constitution passed by Pasic and his Serbian Radical Party. The Serbs had achieved 
dominance within the new Yugoslav state but at a high price. Opposition from the 
Croatian Peasant Party and the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation made it increasingly 
difficult for any future legislation to pass through Parliament without vicious objections 
by non-Serb parties that felt most legislation initiated by Pasic would benefit only 
Serbs. Despite elections in March, 1923, neither Croats nor Serbs were able to attain 
an outright majority. Tensions increased as Pasic, in his position as Premier, had 
68 For a breakdown of the interwar elections see Joseph S Roucek, -Balkan 
Polifics: International 
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Croatian Peasant Party leader Stephen Radic arrested after the latter returned from a 
meeting in Moscow in the Summer of 1924 of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. 
Accused of conspiring with communists, Radic'i arrest only heightened animosity 
between Serbs and Croats, with Muslims and Slovenes caught in the middle. 
The death of Pasic [December, 1926], and of Radic [who was shot in 
Parliament by another W, 28 June, 1928], did not allay tensions. Croatians believed 
that Radic's murder had been a conspiracy to coincide with Vivodvan's Day [28 June]. 
Riots in Zagreb and Croatian delegates walking out of Parliament forced King 
Alexander into drastic action. On 6 June, 1929, he ended Constitutional rule, 
dissolved Parliament, abolished political parties and ruled by decree until his 
assassination in 1934.74The King also reorganised the 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes by first renaming his kingdom Yugoslavia, and second, by redrawing internal 
boundaries. 'Banovinas', a Croat term, were drawn up with a ban, or governor, 
appointed by the King to administer each banovina. 75 Alexander's moves, however, 
did little save confirm Muslim and Croatian suspicions that a Serb conspiracy was 
behind the entire Yugoslav mess. Muslims had little recourse while Croats, led by 
Ante Pavelic, began to mobilise political support. 76 Pavelic left Yugoslavia during the 
early 1930s for Italy and, with Mussolini's assistance, established the Ustashe 
movement, a political organisation which called for the creation of an independent 
Croatian state. 77 From Italy, with Hungarian assistance, Ustashe agents were 
successful in assassinating King Alexander in Marseilles in 1934. 
The regent Prince Paul, acting on behalf of King Peter [then only 11], ended 
rule by decree and called for new elections in 193 5.78 He appointed Milan 
Stojadinovic, a Serb, as Premier. Stojadinovic together with Korosec, the leader of the 
Slovene Catholic People's Party and Spaho formed a coalition which lasted until 
February, 1939, when the latter two withdrew support. Prince Paul then appointed 
Dragisa Cvetkovic in Stojadinovic's place. Cvetkovic and Vlatko Macek, Radic's 
successor, recognised the growing influence of Croats within the new international 
climate. 79 With Hitler's moves into Czechoslovakia (1938], and Pavelic gaining 
increasing support for his Ustashe movement in both Rome and Berlin, Cvetkovic 
knew that Croats would seek greater autonomy. Over the initial objections of Prince 
Paul, negotiations began for a tripartite federal structure of Croats, Serbs and 
Slovenes. Bosnia was to be carved up with only two small banovinas left to signify 
what was once Bosnia. 80 The Sporazurn [Agreement] was concluded by August, 1939. 
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Bosnian Muslims had little recourse. Their champion for equal, or at worse, semi-equal 
status, Mehmed Spaho, died in June, 1939. His replacement, Dzafer Kulenovic, could 
not accomplish much and was ignored by both Croat and Serb leaders. 81 With Hitler 
on the march and Britain committed to maintaining the integrity of Poland, signs on the 
horizon pointed to another massive military showdown on the Continent. The Italian 
invasion of Albania in 1939 did not bode well for Yugoslavia. 82With access to the sea 
denied, Germans on their northern border, and Croats becoming more vocal in their 
demands for outright independence, Yugoslavia was pressured into joining the 
Tripartite Pact led by Germany, and followed Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, which 
alsojoined. The annexation of Austria [1936], invasion of Czechoslovakia [1938], the 
fall of Albania [ 193 9], the surrender of France [ 1940], and the attack upon Greece 
[1940] left Prince Paul little choice but to capitulate to Hitler's demands. Yugoslavia 
officially signed the Pact in March, 1941.83 
2.0 BIG POWER POLICY TOWARD THE BALKANS 
The outbreak of World War II did very little to set a fixed policy towards the 
Balkans. The British called for armed resistance to the Axis powers and their puppet 
regimes established throughout the area. By this time however it was primarily the 
communist groups that were the best equipped and organised to fight both the 
Germans and the Italians. Most of these bands though were not quick to react against 
the Axis, particularly in light of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Certainly, 
COMINTERN activity in the Balkans was an accepted fact throughout most of the 
1920s and 1930s. Ideologically, the pact presented problems. These groups received 
their orders [and a handful of their leaders training] from, Moscow. Now they had to 
reconcile an agreement with a fascist government contrary to Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine. Most accepted Moscows reasoning that such an accord was necessary to 
preserve the USSR and stave off a Nazi attack, giving Moscow time to prepare. 84 
With the attack on the Soviet Union and the United States entry into the war, these 
communist groups received de-facto recognition as anti-fascist guerrillas by the same 
Allies they had earlier condemned. Still receiving their orders from the COMINTERN, 
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these groups were instructed to co-operate with both British and American agents sent 
to mobilise resistance and with other anti-fascist, though be it, non-communist factions. 
Moscow soon learned, however, that interests among Balkan communist groups were 
not always uniform with COMINTERN policy. 
Here the Soviets received their first taste of Balkan politics, for the relationship between Balkan 
Communist parties ... 
in many ways mirrored the comple., dties of traditional Balkan nationalisms ... The difficulty was that Balkan Communists were as divided over nationalist issues as their bourgeois 
foes. 85 
By 1940, British interests in the region were severely compromised. Two years 
earlier they were asked to remove themselves and their claims from Albania. These 
interests in Albania included a share in Albanian oil fields through Anglo-Persian Oil. 
Italy's ties with Albania though were stronger dating throughout the 1920s and 1930s 
during the reign of King Zogu. It was likely then that Albania, in a state of 
backwardness and totally dependent upon Italy, was pressured by the latter into asking 
the British to leave Albania thereby securing Italian predominance and interests in 
Albania. 86 The subsequent Italian invasion of Albania during April, 1939 further 
endangered British interests in neighbouring Greece, which Mussolini invaded via 
Albania in October, 1940. Together with Greek resistance, the British were able to 
repel the Italians. The British stake in the area was lost however as Germany attacked 
Greece in force while, by February 194 1, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia all signed 
the Tripartite Agreement thereby wholly depriving Britain of her oil, chrome and 
copper claims to the area. To the British, Greece remained, throughout the war and 
immediately after, her primary concern. Great Britain's strong partiality towards 
Greece and her determination to preserve Greece at all costs may be due to three 
factors. First and foremost was the historical factor. The Greek War of Independence 
from the Porte [concluded 1832], was due in large part to British support. The latter 
sought to curb Ottoman influence and prevent the Greeks, Orthodox in tradition, from 
perhaps turning to tsarist Russia for assistance. British policy, it must be noted, 
throughout the C19th had been to ensure that Russia secure no land corridor to the 
Mediterranean. Therefore, full support for Greece was forthcoming. The military aid 
given by the British instilled in them, a strong sense of responsibility vis-a-vis Greece. 
With the outbreak of World War II, and Britain still grounded in colonial possessions, 
95 Lederer (1962), pp. cit. * pp. 444-445., Soviet interest in the Balkans was not lessened during the 
Non-Aggression Pact. See on secret negotiations, Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoni 
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this sense of responsibility carried over, as did the traditional balance of power politics 
that dominated the Foreign Office throughout the war. 87 Second, economics played its 
part. Geostrategically Greece, as a historic seafaring nation itself, offered long 
coastlines and easy access to the Aegean, Atlantic and Mediterranean Seas. The British 
have for long managed to rely upon Greece as the vital link to UK interests throughout 
Southeast Europe and North Affica. Lastly, the British elite, specifically the Oxbridge 
elites which dominated the Foreign Office had a natural affinity towards the Greeks. 
Educated on the classics, it was much easier, and more desirable, to identify themselves 
with the civilised historic Greek culture than [to them] the entirely alien culture of 
other ethnic groups in the region, especially the Slavs. 88With Greece in Axis hands 
therefore, 1-fitler would have a free hand throughout the Mediterranean. Of equal 
concern was keeping Turkey pro-British, or at best, neutral. 89 
Aside from Greece, however, the Western Allies still fumbled to define Balkan 
policy. By 194 1, Churchill and Roosevelt had outlined the principles for the Atlantic 
Charter. These called for; (1) opposition to aggrandisement, territorial or otherwise, 
(2) opposition to territorial changes without the freely expressed wishes of the people 
concerned, and (3) support of the right of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they all live. It was these principles which Roosevelt and 
Churchill were accused of violating later, in their concessions to the USSR at Yalta. 90 
Later that same year, British foreign minister Anthony Eden met with his Soviet 
counterpart Molotov in an attempt to witness and report firsthand, Stalin! s demands in 
eastern Europe. 91 
Aside from territorial concems, the Allies [particularly the British] discovered a 
host of new problems arising from their relations with both resistance groups within 
the Balkan nations and with the collection of waiting governments in exile of these 
same nations. The political problems involved in these relationships depended upon 
whether there were important resistance groups inside the occupied home territory 
which challenged the right of the exiled government to represent the occupied nation. 
If there were not any such groups, the resistance presented no political problem. If 
there were challenges to the recognised government then the question of succession, 
87 SCheVill' gp. Cit_... pp. 327-341. 
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restoration, and the big power relations served to complicate the whole situation. 92 In 
nations such as Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania these types of 'problems! were 
commonplace. 
As for the United States, from its entry into W. W. II in 1941 up to 1943, the 
Balkans were primarily looked upon from a strictly military stand-point. The position 
of the President and his staff was that the Balkans and their troubles were outside the 
proper sphere of United States action. Understandings reached at Casablanca in 
January 1943 between the Americans and the British had assigned the eastern 
Mediterranean as an area of primary British activity. 93 Roosevelt was prepared to give 
Churchill a free hand in southeastern Europe as long as the focus remained chiefly 
military. 
[T]he American preference would be to stay out of the political complications that were 
involved in resistance and partisan activities, and let the British take the lead. Two basic 
factors counselled such an attitude; first, the British had been involved in European politics 
for centuries and had acquired skills, attitudes and policies which would justify a 
predominant British political say; second, the numerous European governments-in-Wle were 
located in London, under the British protection and dependent largely on British financial 
support .... The 
American preference, consequently, would be to deal with the various 
resistance movements within the framework of purely military considerations, basing 
decisions on an estimate of the military contribution that a resistance movement might 
make ... 
94 
Military considerations took a backseat, however, to political motives. 
American and British political aims often clashed in areas such as Greece, Yugoslavia 
and Albania, particularly from early 1943 onwards. For example, a US State 
Department memo with respect to Greece, prior to the Cairo Conference stated that 
Great Britain may seek to reimpose the Greek monarch George II. Concern was over 
Greek opposition which the Americans felt, may turn to the Soviets for help rather 
than allow the monarchy to return to Greece. But by the time of the conference in 
December, 1943, the positions had rotated fully. It was the US which now sought to 
install George II while Great Britain sought his abdication. 95 This attitude towards 
King George did not however reduce in the slightest, the British commitment to 
Greece, in keeping it out of both Axis and communist hands. In a telegram to the 
Prime Minister, Anthony Eden reaffirmed Britain' s resolve towards Greece. 
As regards general prospects of a Greek campaign, it is, of course, a gamble to send forces to the 
mainland of Europe to fight Germans at this time. No one can give a guarantee of success, but ... we 
92 Norman Kogan, "American Policies Towards European Resistance Movements", in Procee&nzs of 
the Second International Conference on the HijLoa ofResistance Movements (Milan, Italy: March 
26th-29th, 1961): p. 74. 
93 JBID, p. 90. 
94 IBH), p. 72. 
95 Francis L. Lowenhcim, [et al. eds. ] Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime 
CoMapondence (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1975): p. 61. 
52 
were prepared to run the risk of failure, thinking it better to suffer with the Greeks than to make no 
attempt to help them. This is the conviction we all hold ... 
96 
Such distinctions though between political and military objectives were not made nor 
recognised by the British. Indeed, British Special Operations Executive [SOE], one of 
its wartime intelligence units aimed at aiding guerrilla resistance groups, was intensely 
political. 97 SOE's American counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services [OSS], 
founded in June, 1942 had worked out a division of operations between itself and SOE 
clandestine missions. OSS would supervise all operations in northwest Affica and the 
east coast of Asia while SOE was given free run elsewhere. 98 This division of spheres 
between the US and Great Britain gave to SOE all the problems associated with 
Balkan politics as easily evidenced by SOE operations in Greece. 
The basic problem in Greece was far from simple. Greek politics are notoriously 
complicated ... ELAS and EAM, the political movement that backed it, purported to be 
nationwide groups struggling for a free Greece, and were in fact being used by the KKE, the 
Greek communist party, in an attempt to seize power in the teeth of whatever wishes the bulk 
of the Greek people might have. [Greek army colonel] Zervas movement, EDES, was anti- 
monarchical, but stood a lot further to the political right than EAU EDES was the only one 
of the non-communist dominated Greek resistance armies that managed to stay in the field 
till the Germans left the country; ELAS took care to swallow all the others up, either 
defeating them in the field or subverting them without a battle. SOE was valuable to ELAS 
because it provided arms and money [sovereigns], in the largely mistaken belief that ELAS 
would use the arms against the Germans. SOE was valuable to EDES because, again, it 
provided arms and money; and because there were enough SOE officers with EDES just to 
keep it alive when ELAS launched a major attack on it ... 
99 
While Churchill was a staunch anti-Communist, his primary concern remained 
focused on which group was doing the most damage to the Germans and the Italians in 
the Balkans? If this meant open as well as material support for a group which was 
clearly communist, so be it, hoping to perhaps iron out political considerations at a 
later date. For Greece, however, whether Russia was tsarist or communist, primary 
concern meant denying it access to the Mediterranean. This involved ensuring a non- 
communist Greece at all costs. 
In Yugoslavia the situation was just as complex as in Greece. The regency of 
Prince Paul had been overthrown by 27 March, 1941 by General Dusan Simovic who 
installed the young King Peter to the throne. This move prompted lEtler to invade 
Yugoslavia on April 6th, 1941 and force its capitulation, Peter's abdication to London, 
96 Eden, gpxit.: p. 197., telegram of (21 February, 194 1) 
97 M. R. D. Foot, SOE. - An Outline History ofthe &edal 0 fi Wive I- 946 (London: Z! era Ons Exec 9401 
BBC, 1984): "SOE was a tool for making war, often a sharp tool, sometimes a faulty one; it could not 
help getting entangled in politics as well ... Despite its politics SOE's one primordial rule was it was 
anti-Nazi..., at pp. 148-149. 
98 IBID, p. 150. 
99 Foot, ppcit.. - p. 236. 
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and Yugoslav partition by 17 April, 1941.100 As in Greece and Albania, Yugoslavia 
had its communist resistance group led by Josep Broz Tito, a Croat, and a pro- 
monarchy resistance group led by army colonel [later general], Draza Mihailovic, a 
Serb. Aware that nationalist tendencies were high in Yugoslavia and throughout the 
Balkans, ffitler sought to keep the variety of resistance groups at odds with each other 
thereby diverting their energies away from the Nazis. In Yugoslavia this meant; the 
establishment of a puppet regime incorporating Serbia and part of Montenegro, 
reincorporation of Kosova and most of western Macedonia into a "Greater Albania". 
the rest of Macedonia into Bulgaria, and the creation of an independent state of 
Croatia [Ustasi] under Dr. Ante Pavelic. This policy worked well. Fearful that 
Mihailovic and the King Peter regime represented age old designs for a "Greater 
Serbia", many 'YugoslavsJoined Tito and the Partisans. Others, either pro-monarchy, 
anti-Communist or both sided with Mihailovic and his Cetniks. Still others, especially 
ultra-nationalist Croats, gave support to the Ustasi regime which began a large scale 
Serb eradication campaign. The exact number of Serb deaths is in dispute to this day, 
but has been estimated between 206,000 and 250,000.101 
It was Tito's partisans though that were the best equipped to fight the Germans 
and continuously, the Cetniks. This was due to four reasons. First, the communist 
party of Yugoslavia had received backing and support from the COMINTERN well 
before the outbreak of the war. Establishment of military units from the political cells 
was not very difficult then once the war began. Maintaining communist doctrine could 
be accommodated by the placement of a political commissar within each military unit. 
Second, the bulk of Tito's officer corps were trained directly by Tito himself, many of 
which fought with him in the International Brigades during the civil war in Spain 
several years earlier. This gave Tito an opportunity to solidify his leadership, a leeway 
not enjoyed by other resistance group leaders who were always on alert for internal 
dissension and/or coup attempts. Third and most importantly, partisan focus remained, 
even while warring with Cetniks, in killing the maximum amount of Nazis possible. 
The Cetniks however, while some were pro-Serb, were to a greater degree anti- 
Communist rather than anti-German. This led to their occasional collusion with the 
Germans against the partisans. These actions however did not sit well with the British 
which then had little choice but to back, with arms and money, the partisan 
[communist] forces. As the war reached its conclusion these communist groups 
throughout the Balkans [except for Greece], were in an ideal position to consolidate 
100 Auty (1974), M. cit., pp. 194-195., see also Foot, 2p. cit. for information on Yugoslav resistance 
groups, at p. 239., Winston Churchill, Winston Churchill. - Road to Victoty vol 1/7 1941-1945 (London: 
Heincmann, 1986), Winston Churchill, The Second World War. - Triumph and Trage (London: 
Reprint Society, 1956) 
101 Glenny (1992), gp. cit.: p. 81., figures have even been quoted as high as one million. These figures 
arc from Scrb sources and are subject to scrutiny. 
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their positions of power, destroy all opposition, and reject any return of any 
government in exile. Lastly, although a Croat, Tito did not limit his recruitment along 
ethnic lines. 1-fis call to return to each nationality its rightful pre-war boundaries sat 
well with many Serbs who saw their republic lose Kosova and Macedonia and were 
not willing to fight with the Cetniks who collaborated with Nazis. As the war dragged 
on and Germany was losing ground, many Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins also 
joined Tito in hopes of being on the winning end and keeping their republic's 
boundaries intact. 
Before the full backing of Tito's partisans the Allies, including the Soviets, 
sought a reconciliation between Tito and NIihailovic. Reasons for the failure are 
numerous but can be confined to three arguments. First, simply, Tito saw Mhailovic 
as a collaborator and enemy. 102 Seeing Mihailovic as a threat to his power, Tito 
sought to discredit him at every opportunity not just to King Peter's government but 
more importantly to the British since it was they who were providing material support. 
Second, by late 1942 early 1943 the Western press had turned its earlier wartime 
attention away from Mhailovic's Cetniks and focused the majority of its stories on 
Tito's partisans and their successful campaigns against the Nazis. This led to public 
support and, as reports of Cetnik collusion filtered in, made it more difficult to attempt 
reconciliation. 103 Third, there were allegations that support for the host of Communist 
groups throughout the Balkans was secure due to the pro-Communist leanings present 
within key posts at SOE that were responsible for obtaining and passing information 
102 Clissold (1975), pp. cit.. A large number of correspondence between Tito and the COM[NTERN, 
the Soviets and British and the Yugoslav exiled government from November, 1941 through May, 
1942 all indicate the desire and problems faced in an attempted Tito-Mihailovic reconciliation. 
Moscow asked Tito to unite with Miliailovic against the Germans, 13 November 194 1, at pp. 133-134. 
Tito protested Moscow's radio support of the Cetniks, 25 Nov. 194 1, at p. 132., Yugoslav Prime 
Minister in exile, Jonaovic complained to and called on the Soviets to instruct Tito to cease attacking 
Mihailovic, 16 May 1942, at p. 13 5. A more likely explanation though was perhaps that the Soviets 
had to appear to give support to the British and US sponsored King Peter government before any Tito 
proposed nationalist government. COMINTERN to Tito: April 1942; "it would be politically 
opportune for you to [form a government]... through a general approach to the Yugoslav 
Government..., [at p. 143], World public opinion must first and foremost be mobilised against the 
invaders; unmasking the Cetniks [of collaborationist activity] is secondary", at pp. 145-146. 
103 Reassessment of the press also points out that much of it was too 'lefV if not blatantly pro- 
Communist. This may have perhaps been the reason for a host of later known misinformation of 
events. For example, by early October, 1943 Mihailovic's Cetniks blew up several bridges over the 
Drina River and a vital rail link between Serbia and Bosnia to the Adriatic killing more than 100 
Bulgarian soldiers and were able to capture Visegrad with over 300 Nazi casualties. Such events were 
witnessed by Brigadier C. D. Armstrong, British Liaison Officer [BLO] with Mihailovic. The BBC 
radio reported that it was TiWs forces that accomplished all this. Armstrong radioed SOE Cairo but 
neither were changes made nor reasons given as to why such a radio report was given. see David 
Martin, "Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder: Pre-Cursor to the Yugoslav Tragedy", Journal ofIntelligence 
and Counter-Intelligence vol. 5 #4 (Winter 1991-1992): pp. 422-423., Col. Robert McDowell, chief US 
intelligence mission head verified such testimony after his stint in Yugoslavia, August 1944, that 
most towns in Serbia were liberated by Mihaiovic forces. None of this was heard by the outside world 
especially since by this time, the British were firndy committed to Tito., IBID, p. 428. 
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along to SOE London and eventually the Foreign Office. 104 Although this latter 
explanation sits well with certain BLOs and conspiracy theorists, [even if contains 
partial or whole truths], it certainly cannot provide the causal link as the determining 
factor for policy eventually adopted by the Foreign Office. Indeed rationale for 
supporting Tito was far simpler than most would imagine. To spurn communist help, 
when the principal communist power, Tito's partisans, was gradually grinding the 
Wehrmacht into the mud and dust of the eastern front was not likely to bring the day 
of victory any closer. 105 Brig. Fitzroy MacLean's depiction of events in Yugoslavia 
sums up Britain's attitude towards the resistance groups and who to support. After 
MacLean conveyed his convictions about the politics of Tito's partisans to Churchill he 
was told that as long as the Nazis remained a threat, attention cannot be diverted to 
consideration of long term policy or effects. Upon further expressing his concern that 
the Communist partisans would become the decisive political factor after the war in 
Yugoslavia the Prime Minister chided MacLean; 
'Do you intend, ' he asked, 'to make Yugoslavia your home after the warT 'No Sir, I replied 'Neither 
do I', he said 'And, that being so, the less you and I worry about the form of government they set up, 
the better. That is for them to decide. What interests us is, which of them is doing the most harm to 
the Germans? 106 
2.1 THE SPHERES OFINFLUENCE 
By the end of 1943 and throughout 1944 Churchill came to the realisation that 
there was very little the British could do presently regarding the forms of government 
pursued by the resistance groups in the Balkans. It was by early May, 1944 that he, on 
his own initiative, then contacted the US, wishing to inform them of his intentions. 
These included negotiations with the Soviets in an attempts to stake a claim for the 
West in South-Eastern Europe concerning the respective degrees of leadership. 107 A 
meeting was set between Churchill and Stalin for October of that year in Moscow. 
The Americans, particularly then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull were cautious about 
too readily accepting such an agreement, which they viewed as a deliberate attempt to 
carve up the Balkans into "spheres of influence". Recognising Roosevelt's 
104 For such examples regarding Greece see, Foot, Qp. cit. - The SOE was the "butt of the Foreign 
Office".... that it was muddying the political waters: a complaint that stemmed in part from the 
incompetence of SOE's cipher office in Cairo, where reports from Greece. even with high priorities. 
were sometimes held up for two or three weeks., at p. 237., For Yugoslavia see, IBID, and p. 467, 
footnote two regarding Major J. Klugman, forAlhania see Julian Amery, Approach March (London: 
Hutchinson, 1973), David Smiley, Albanian Assignmen (London: Chatto and Windus, 1984) 
105 Foot, 2p--ciiýt-' pp. 155-156. 
106 IBID, pp. 155-157. 
107 Dclzell, M. cit. - p. 88. 
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apprehension at such an idea, Churchifl began a correspondence with FDR in an 
attempt to allay US doubts-108 
Churchill was a realist. With the war nearing its conclusion, he saw that the 
post-war landscape would place the US and USSR at the head of respective camps. 
The Soviets knew this also. This is why they began by the Spring of 1944 to criticise 
British policy in Greece and came out in open support for the communist led EAM. 
This signalled danger to the British who feared a possible "link-up" of pro-Soviet 
movements in Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. 109 With the fate of the Balkans still 
undecided and Churchill seeking to recapture some influence and power for Britain 
when it appeared its post-war role would be greatly lessened, the proposed meeting 
with Stalin was more than necessary, even if against American wishes. With the Red 
Army on the move, Churchill's concern was to protect Greece at all costs and forestall 
Russian expansion. 110 This was witnessed from the landing of British troops in Greece 
by October 4th, 1944, just as the Moscow Conference was to begin. Roosevelt bowed 
to Churchilrs desire for an agreement with Stalin qualifying it as a three month 
temporary agreement over Hull's objections who did not know of FDR! s approval until 
after it had been given. "' Roosevelt however was aware though that both the British 
and Soviets were likely to pursue their policy of "spheres". This is why he insisted on 
reports from his special envoy to Moscow, Averill Harriman, who kept FDR well 
informed. 
As to the division itself, Britain was keen on retaining whatever pre-war power 
and influence she could, principally in Greece where she would not allow a communist 
108 Lowenheim, gp&it. beginning by 31 May 1944; PM to FDR, 'We do not wish to carve up the 
Balkans into spheres of influence .... and 
in the agreement should make it clear that it only applied to 
war conditions... '[Doc. 369#6871, at pp. 502-503., 10 June 1944 FDR to PM, '.... we acknowledge that 
the military responsible government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by 
military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to 
other than military fields would be strengthened by the type of agreement suggested... ' 
[Doc. 378#557], at pp. 526-527., 11 June 1944 PM to FDR, 'The events will always outstrip the 
changing situation in these Balkan regions. Somebody must have the power to plan and act! 
[Doc. 379#700], at p. 527., 12 June 1944, FDR to PK I am in agreement with your proposal... [but] we 
must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post-war spheres of 
influence. '[Doc. 383#5601, at pp. 531-532. 
109 Eden, 9D. 6t.., p. 459. 
110 Such concerns were evident by the time of the Second Quebec Conference, September, 1944. see, 
Churchill (1956), o12. cit.: vol. Vl., Churchill states by this time the Hungarians would have considered 
surrendering to the British if they arrived in force., at pp. 131-132., see also Kimball, 9p. ci -for fr L ea 
that Stalin would allow Bulgarian territorial gains in Macedonia and Serbia after Bulgaria signed an 
armistice with the Soviets., at p. 350., For an alternate view on Bulgaria and Rumania see, Churchill 
(1956), pp. cit'As the victory of the Grand Alliance became only a matter of time it was natural that 
Russian ambitions should grow ... I never felt that our relations with Rumania and Bulgaria in the past 
called for any special sacrifices from us ...... at p. ISO. III see Stephen G. Xydis, "The Secret Anglo-Sovict Agreement on the Balkans of October 9,1944"; 
For a look into the conflicts and arguments between FDR and the State Department, especially Hull, 
see Barry Ruben, Secrets of State: The State Department Strujule Over US Foreign Poli (Oxford: 
University Press, 1987): pp. 32-40. 
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led take-over at any cost. Churchill knew however that Stalin would seek as much 
territory and influence as possible while FDR would continue to oppose anything other 
than a 'temporary strictly nfilitary' agreement. For this reason the Prime Minister 
continued to play the US off against the Soviets in efforts to secure Britain's interests 
in the Balkans. 112After the agreement was reached Britain sought to play it down to 
the Americans as a 'chance remarle made to Stalin that was turned into a formal 
proposal. Such an explanation though was a lame one indeed as Britain knew exactly 
what she was doing and that the Soviets, especially Stalin would take any such 
territory carving scheme, where he always had designs, seriously. 
Russian interests in the Balkans are long-standing, and the historical links with the past 
seem not to have escaped the supposed novelty of the Communist regime,. Stalin, the prime 
architect of Soviet foreign policy of the time, was a man who had never been outside of 
Russia, and so he fashioned a Russia-centre policy which, despite Communist rhetoric, 
established its roots deep in the past. Stalin, for instance, fully appreciated Peter the Great's 
diplomacy the territories which had belonged to Russia before the Tartar conquest, a policy 
which oriented Russia south ... 
113 
The Russians and the vast majority of peoples in the Balkans share a common Slav 
origin. 11istorically, Russia has always come to the aid of these Slavs and vice-versa. 
Their affinity towards Balkan Slavs does not leave out therefore, the idea of achieving 
Slav unity. Even if the British and Americans however refused to belief this argument 
they should have understood Stalin's objectives. 
in Stalies mind, land was power and power was the ability to promote world revolution, so that 
offence and defense, security and chance, the Russian state and Communist ideology, nationalism and 
internationalism were always linked instead of being mutually exclusive as was often the West's 
perception of Stalin! s aims. 114 
112 At his first meeting with Stalin, Churchill took out a small sheet of paper and wrote on it a series 
of figures that he may or may not have calculated in advance. According to Churchill's proposal, the 
Russians might have a 90% predominance in Rumania, the British the same in Greece. Yugoslavia 
was to be shared on a 50-50 basis, as was Hungary [which Eden later was to offer a 75% split to 
Molotov]. In Bulgaria, the Soviet Union was to have 75% predominance. Stalin took out his pen and 
*ticked an approving mark. see Lowenheim, QpLcit.., p. 584., Eden, qp. ciL p. 462., Kimball, pp. cit. 
p. 175. As for Czechoslovakia, Stalin had already worked out an agreement with Czechoslovak 
President Edvard Benes regarding Ruthenia, known as Carpatho-Ukraine. Well before 1944, Benes 
realised that the USSR would play a dominant role in Central European affairs. To place himself in 
the good graces of Stalin he 'offered! Carpatho-Ukraine to the USSR given its large Ukrainian 
population. Even a Churchill objection over Czechoslovakia would not have meant much since, by 
October 1944, Red Army was in total control of Carpatho-Ukraine. see Robert R. King, Mingfifies 
Under Communism: Nafionalifies as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973): pp. 25-30. 
113 Marilynn G. Hitchens, Ger? nanv. Russia, and the Balkans: Prelude to the Nazi-Soviet Non- 
Jzv_ression Pact (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983): p. 135., Kimball, pp. cit.: 
pp. 200-201., for Stalires literal interpretation see, Lederer (1962), i)p. cit. - 'where the Balkans and all 
southeastern Europe were concerned, there is every reason to believe that toward the end of the war 
Stalin seriously entertained the idea of partition, along the lines of the percentages agreement., at 
p. 449. 
114 Hitchens, m. -cit- * p. 
13 9. 
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More explicitly, the British should have realised that Stalin was all too familiar with the 
role he sought for the USSR after the war. It is unlikely therefore that the percentages 
agreement were anything but a'chance remarle. Rather Stalin was engaging the British 
in a game of power politics, something the latter was all to familiar with in its past, and 
seemed willing to employ once more. Only this time, they were not operating from a 
position of superiority, as they often had. 
With regards to Yugoslavia, Churchill had hoped that an accord could be 
reached between Tito and the King Peter government. In summoning Tito and Peter's 
new Prime Minister Subasic, Churchill was able to get the two sides to agree to a joint 
power sharing formula with the restoration of the monarchy to be left up to public 
referendum. 115 By this time however Tito was paying lip service to Britain as he had 
no desire to share power with anyone. The results of the Moscow Conference left the 
British at a severe disadvantage regarding their position in the Balkans. It was highly 
doubtful that Stalin would pass up any opportunity to exert more than his allotted 
' share', particularly when Red Army was moving in from the east inflicting nearly 
900,000 German casualties. 116 This rationale left Churchill no recourse but to seek 
large scale troop deployment to the Balkans as the best possible way to secure British 
interests in accord with the percentages agreement. After all, diplomatic arrangements 
were a poor substitute for British and American troops in the region. The British 
Prime Minister had become increasingly worried about the political situation in the 
southern Balkans, [particularly in Greece]. 
Even though his advisers warned that the Soviet Union would probably redirect its offensive 
more towards the Balkans if the Allies began major operations there, Churchill remained 
fascinated by the opportunity to put British armies in Yugoslavia and Greece. He had 
already tacitly agreed to a division of British and Russian influence in the Balkans, but the 
presence of British forces would be a far stronger bargaining chip than diplomatic 
agreements. 117 
Churchill however failed to predict the high level of opposition such a troop 
deployment idea would incur from the US. As early as 1943, FDR was disinclined to 
commit US forces in the Balkans. This view was in accordance with his notion that 
southeastern Europe was not within the United States sphere of influence. 118 Of 
115 The Tito-Subasic Agreement [July, 1944], Eden, 2p. cit.: p. 463., see also Delzell, W. cit. on the 50- 
50 split in Yugoslavia, and the 'fusion! of Tito's Anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation 
[AVNOJI and the Regency Council., at p. 98., for US reaction and assessment see memo of US 
Secretary of State E. Stettinus Jr. to President Truman, 13 April 1945, '... [The British] were anidous 
to buttress their position vis-a-vis the United States and Russia-, Lowenheim, gp. cit. - p. 633. 
116 I)elZell, "Russian Power in Central-Eastern European", in Delzcll, QpLcit. - . 85-86. pp 117 Kimball, 2g. Cit.. p. 198. 
119 A correspondence between FDR and Churchill indicates the former's opposition to Balkan troop 
deployment., see Kimball, gp. cit.. -. [FDR to PNfl 'At Teheran we agreed upon a deMte plan of 
attack ... Now that we are 
fully involved. .. history will never forgive us if we lose precious time and lives in indecision and debate ... [over the Balkans]', at p. 223., 'You arc aware of the difficulty of my 
getting involved in any operations in the Balkaw that are not essential to the early defeat of Nazi 
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course the situation by late 1944 indicated to those at the British Foreign Office and 
the US State Department that the Soviets were to become the principal force in 
Eastern Europe and, as such, any troop deployment notion would not prove beneficial 
to future relations with the Kremlin. 119 FDR also realised that with the war still raging 
in the Pacific, all available troops from Europe must be diverted, thereby making it 
impractical for Churchill to carry out his wishes. 
By the time of the Yalta conference it became clear to the Foreign Office that 
the destiny of Eastern Europe was well established. By Yalta, Soviet armies had 
occupied Romania, Bulgaria, most of Poland and were firmly entrenched in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, within one hundred miles of Berlin. Nfilitary reality 
indicated to the British and Americans that there was very little, if anything they could 
have done short of large level troop activity to reverse communist gains in the 
Balkans. 120 
1.1 Yhe Situation in Bosnia 
The creation of a Greater Croatian state by Italy [ 10 April, 194 1 ], saw all of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina incorporated by the Ustashe. 121 Administered by Zagreb, Bosnia- 
Hercegovina was divided between German and Italian military zones. Many Muslims 
did not openly resent the establishment of Croatian rule. 122 The Ustashe, however, 
lacked the political experience to administer effectively since many of the more capable 
Croat leaders were either held, neutralised or remained passive, givingWay instead to 
ultra-nationalists with more zeal for revenge than rule. 
The enlarged Croatian state contained some of the wildest and most remote areas of 
Yugoslavia, places where repeated rebellions had been centered in the past and where 
national antagonisms had always been particularly bitter. Regular administration soon broke 
down, and conditions of complete anarchy followed The situation became worse when the 
new Croatian leadership embarked on a policy of annihilation of the Serbian third of the 
population. Muslims joined with Croats against the Serbs, who were often faced with the 
alternatives of extermination, expulsion, or conversion to Catholicism. 123 
Germany', at p. 490, FDR may also have felt that such action in the Balkans may be seen by Stalin as a 
direct challenge to the Soviet leader requiring a change in strategy that he may not agree to., see 
IBID, p. 198., Delzell, 9p. cit. 
119 Delzell, pp. cit, p. 94., The US especially thought that Stalin did not need any more weight to take 
to the post-war negotiations. Given his shrewd style, he was always quick to use any events or actions 
by Roosevelt and Churchill against them. "When the subject under discussion dealt with an area under 
Soviet control, such as.. the Eastern Balkans, he showed himself to be a master of evasive and 
delaying tactics... ", see "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context For US 
Diplomacy". (US House of Representatives House Committee on Foreign Affairs C. Zablocki [chair] 
Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1979): p. 192. 
120 Delzell, 2p. cit.: p. 97., see also Eden, Qp cit., on the Foreign Office warnings of insurgent activities 
and their clash between long and short term goals., at p. 459., For Churchill's view that he was limited 
on the basis of both knowledge available and immediate military considerations see, Delzell pp. cit,; 
p. 125., Churchill (1956), 9p. cit. - p. 110. 
121 Brogan (1990), gp-. cit. * p. 162. 
122 Malcolm (1994), gp. cit, p. 174. 
123 Jelavich, 2p. cit. - p. 264. 
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The policies of the Ustashe made Bosnian Serbs join the ranks of either the 
Cetniks or Tito's Partisans. 124 The Muslims were seen by Pavelic as a good counter to 
the Serbs within Bosnia. Assured by Zagreb of no infiingement upon their Islamic 
culture and religion, many Muslims had no qualms of conducting anti-Serb activity. 125 
Mihailovich's Cetniks, loyal to the crown, often took in extreme Serb elements who 
felt that the Yugoslav idea was a dead, even if their leader never publicly expressed 
such a notion. Some of his key personnel, including Steven Mo1jevic, a Serb lawyer 
from Banja Luka openly called for the incorporation of Bosnia-Hercegovina to Serbia 
after the war and for a dscenja, or cleansing campaign of all non-Serb lands. 1260ther 
Bosnian Serbs joined Tito's Partisans. The Partisans recruited heavily among the 
Bosnian Serbs, particularly in the Foca [1942], Bihac [194243], and Jajce [late 1943] 
regions. 127 For their part, Bosnian Croats either remained passive, supported the 
Ustashe, or joined the Partisans in small numbers from the Drina Valley area. 
The continued teffor campaigns by the Ustashe shocked even the S S. 128 The 
German commander of the occupation forces, General Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, 
believed the anti-Serb policy only served to strengthen both the Cetniks and Partisans. 
As the war continued, Muslim disillusionment with Zagreb began to increase. With 
Allied victories increasing Muslims began to also worry of being on the losing end, 
particularly following their treatment of Serbs throughout 1941 and early 1943. By the 
Autumn of 1943 the British dropped their support for Mihailovic and fully backed 
Tito's Partisans-129 To the Muslims this signalled a positive development. Tito offered 
Muslims a better opportunity to hold onto some semblance of Bosnia after the war. 
Moreover, Muslims had no delegates representing them in the London based, 
Yugoslav government-in-exile. To the Muslim leaders such as Fehim Spaho 
[Mehmed's brother], this meant only one thing, the dissolution of Bosnia if the Cetniks, 
were victorious. 130 
124 'Mehmed Spaho's brother Fchim, who was Reis ul-ulema [head of the Muslim religious 
community) from 1938 to 1942, was a self-identified Croat who played a leading role in the pro-Croat 
Muslim cultural organisation, the Narodna Uzdanica ... But Fehim 
Spaho was also keen to preserve the 
special identity of the Muslims, which he felt was under threat. ' Malcolm (1994), qp. cit. - p. 185 See 
also, Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo, Struggle for the Balkans (Undon: Merlin Press, 1990) 
125 Doder, QpLc-it.. p. 10. 
126 'The Serbian campaign to cleanse a territory of another ethnic group, while gruesome and tragic, 
is historically speaking neither new nor remarkable. ' See, Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of 
Ethnic Cleansing", Fwign Affairs vol. 72 43 (Summer, 1993): p. 110. 
127 Tempo, 2p. Cit.. . pp. 5-7. 128 'A certain Kurt Waldhcim played a modest role at Koraza [extermination camp] as a junior 
intelligence officer. Ten thousand Serbs, refugees and Partisans, including 4,000 children, were 
captured after Koraza; almost all were slaughtered .... Koraza is 
followed swiftly by Jasenovac... the 
most dreadful Ustasha extermination camp whose facilities were grim even by the standards of Axis 
Europe... ' Glenny, (1992), pp. cit, p. 81. 
129 David Martin, M. cit. - pp. 421-423. 
130 Malcolm (l994), 2R-_6t. * p. 185. 
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As early as August, 1941, a Muslim ceta did join the Partisans. Muslim 
suspicions were confirmed when Cetnik units killed thousands of Muslims during the 
Winter of 194142 and throughout the Summer of 1942 in the Foca-Cajnice region. 131 
Muslims actively sided with Tito throughout 1942-43 from Foca, Zenica and across 
most of Eastern Bosnia and Hercegovina. With this added support, and Britain's role 
in actively backing him, 132 Tito moved quickly throughout Yugoslavia seizing control 
and setting up administrative structures. As for King Peter's government-in-exile, it 
could not attain any power without its chief military arm, the Cetniks of Mihailovic [by 
this time Minister of War, 1944], no longer supported by the Allies; 
The London regime, despite the fact that it held a strong international position, did not have 
an administrative structure within the country. In contrast, Tito was in fact in effective 
control of the state. Wherever the Partisans had occupied a region, they had organized 
committees of peasants to run local affairs and maintain law and order. Even when the 
Partisans lost control of an area, these political auxiliaries remained active. In November 
1942 the Partisan leaders held a conference at Bihac, where they established a central 
authority called the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia 
[AVNOJ]... This organisation, an assembly of fifty-four representatives from different 
sections of the country, was set up on a broad political basis, but the Communist Party was 
the dominating force. The popular front program, which was announced at the conference, 
called for the establishment of a freely elected government after the war, and, most 
important, a federal organization for the state. In November, 1943 a second meeting was held 
in Jajce in Bosnia. AVNOJ was declared to be the government of Yugoslavia; a ministry was 
appointed, and Dr. Ivan Ribar became president. Tito received the title of marshal and 
remained in command of the armed forces .... Most significant, the authority of the 
government-in-exile was mpudiated. -The federal organization was again reaffirmed. 
133 
Although they supported Tito, local Muslims and their leaders quietly 
expressed reservations about what, precisely, their status would be within a federal 
Yugoslavia. 134 Caught between the greater nation ideals of both Serbs and Croats, 
Muslims believed autonomy would be their only salvation. As early as November, 
1942 Muslim leaders appealed directly to Hitler for the dissolvement of Croatian rule 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina and autonomy for themselves. 135 Hitler responded by allowing 
for the formation, in February, 1943 of the Thirteenth SS or Handzar Division. With an 
all Muslim force of nearly 2 1,000 men, the Hanzdar division, after brief training in 
Silesia, returned to Bosnia in March, 1943.136 Although based near Banja Luka and 
Sarajevo, the division was stationed in the north-eastern sections of Bosnia near Tuzla, 
131 Tempo, pp. cit. - p. 6. 
132 Foot, pp. Cit. - . pp. 154-156., and, for claims that over 9,000 were killed in the region see, Malcolm 
(1994), Qp-. cit. ' p. 188., and for a stinging denunciation of British war-time policy in Yugoslavia see, 
Michael Lees, The Rape ofSerbia: The B? Ifish Role in Tito's Grab for Power (London: Harcourt 
Brace, 1990): It was the British who were deceived and arc clearly accountable for helping Tito grab 
power. ', at p. 7. 
133 Jelavich, W. cit.: pp. 270-271. 




Brcko and Zvornik. Here it engaged in a harsh anti-Serb campaign killing 
thousands. 137 As the war progressed and the Germans were being forced back, large 
numbers of Muslims from the division defected to Tito and, eventually, the Hanzdar 
division was officially disbanded by October, 1943.138 
As the war progressed, it became evident that the Germans could no longer 
hold the area alone, especially following the surrender of Italy in 1943. By the 
Summer of 1944, German divisions began to withdraw from the Balkans en masse. 139 
As they did, the Partisans quickly moved into areas vacated by the Wermacht and, with 
their local political committees already in place, Tito swiftly consolidated his position 
placing himself in a favourable spot from which to dictate terms in Yugoslavia. At 
Naples, in August, 1944, Tito met with Churchill, the latter still hoping that some 
reconciliation with King Peter's government was possible. 140 By September Tito, 
unknown to either the British or Americans, flew to Moscow to confer with Stalin. 
The Soviet leader complied and, with help from the Red Army, the Partisans took 
Belgrade fidly, by October, 1944.141 With the end of the war in sight Tito did not have 
to worry so much about external opposition. He took the opportunity to eradicate all 
remnants of military and political opposition throughout the country. This he did with 
a thorough ruthlessness. To add to the injury, neither the British nor the Americans 
did a thing to stop Tito, still foolishly believing he could be manipulated. 
The end of the war was marked with typical Balkan savagery. About 250,000 Croats had fled 
across the border into Austria to escape Tito's avenging sword, but the Western allies refused 
them refuge and sent them back. Thousands were summarily executed, and in the next 
months, there was a general terror throughout Yugoslavia as surviving Ustashis, Cetniks, 
monarchists, and democrats were purged. The exact number of those killed is not known but 
no doubt it ran into tens of thousands. 142 
The Allies believed, without justification or reason, that Tito would because of 
their backing fall quickly into line once the war had ended. Indeed, it was, to some 
extent, that Tito's rise to power was attributed to the Allies. By backing Tito over 
NEhailovic, both the British and the Americans removed the only hope of installing a 
pro-Western government in Yugoslavia. 143 Without any force on the ground 
supporting him and fighting on his behalf, King Peter's government could not be 
137 See, Bell-Fialkoff, Qp--Cit..., pp. 110-112., and, Milos Acin-Koste, Yugoslavia in Our Time 
(Washington DC: Ravnorgosrkivenac, 1991-1992), and, Ante Bejlo, Yugoslavia Genocide: A 
DocumentedAnalyg (Sudbury: Northern Tribune Press, 1985) 
138 Malcolm (1994), gp. cit., p. 19 1. 
139 Peter V. Brojovic-Duro, Yugoslavia in the Second World War (Belgrade, Serbia: Borba, 1977), 
and, Hitchens, qpLc-it. 
140 Noel Malcolm, "How Britain Blundered in the Balkans", The SRectato (I I July, 1992): pp. 9-1 1. 
141 The Partisans required some assistance but the Red Army did not actually occupy Yugoslavia. see, 
jelavich, 9p. cit.. - p. 271., and, Gilbert 9p. cit., p. 358. 
142 Patrick Brogan, gpxit.., p. 156. 
143 Eden, pp. Cit p. 463., and, Delzell, M. cit. - p. 98. 
63 
expected to be in any position to dictate terms in the post-war settlement. This was 
but one 'blunder' by the West in the Balkans. 144There would be many more to follow. 
The repercussions for those sided against the Partisans were high. In Bosnia, Sarajevo 
was liberated by the Partisans on 6 April, 1945, with the rest of Bosnia under Partisan 
control within several weeks. For Muslims, over 75,000 died in the war. 145With most 
of them fighting on a variety of sides, loyalty was questioned and eventually resulted in 
large numbers being eradicated. Even Muslims who fought with the Partisans now 
faced the prospect of a Communist-dominated Yugoslavia, where their status was in 
question, as was the identity of Bosnia-Hercegovina itself. 146 
2.2 Yhe Situation in Albania 
To fully understand the failure of Western policy in the Balkans, one need look 
no further than Albania. For centuries this small mountain country had been under one 
type of foreign domination or another, often relying on outside assistance for its very 
survival. Throughout most of the 1920s and 1930s it had come to dependence on the 
Italians for economic support and the British for material support as well, including a 
British led reorganisation of its Gendarme. It was with the Italians though that 
Albanian King Ahmed Zogu had the most thorough relations. 147 As the Italian 
government pressed for more and more concessions, King Zogu finally protested. Italy 
replied by invading Albania on Good Friday, April 7,1939 and forcing Albanian 
capitulation. Zogu fled to London and the Albanian crown was presented to King 
Victor Emmanuel II of Italy. When news of the Italian invasion reached Britain, 
Chamberlain disn-dssed the incident, refusing to believe that Mussolini had serious 
designs in the Balkans. 148 Because the invasion occurred almost a year before Italy 
formally entered the war, the British were ready to dismiss Albania as part of Britain's 
general policy of appeasement. 
Italian encouragement of its designs in the Mediterranean without fear of 
British reprisals was due to two factors. First, the Anglo-Italian agreements of 1937- 
1938 reinforced the understanding between the two states regarding their respective 
interests in the region. The aim was to maintain some form of status quo in the 
144 Malcolm (1992), gp. cit.: p. I I., and, Ivan Botic, Yugoslavia in 01sis 1949: the _o i cal and 
p Ili 
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145 JelaViCh, pp. Cit. - . p. 272., and, Rouceký 2p. cit. - p. 116. 146 Malcolm (1994), pp. cit.: pp. 192-194. 
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148 According to a report from a junior minister at the Foreign Office upon informing the PM of the 
news; Chamberlain was outside his study feeding the birds and replied, 'Don't be silly. Go home and 
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1971): p. 79., Anton Logoreci, 77ie Albanians: Europe's Forgotten Survivors (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview, 1977): p. 66. 
64 
region. 149 Second, the understanding reached between the British and Mussolini's 
Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, in Rome [January II- 14,193 9], reaffirmed that Italy 
sought in no way to compromise British interests in the area. The British, it appears, 
were ready to accept the Italian version of events which stated that Zogu had asked for 
Italy's assistance against potential Serb aggression from Yugoslavia. Their reluctance 
and confusion over what to do was evidenced even after the invasion took place. In 
his speech to the House of Commons, Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax had stated; 
... that on the 
information then at my disposal it seemed to me that the situation was likely to raise in 
an acute form the whole question of the maintaining of the status quo in the Mediterranean which 
formed, in our opinion, so important an element in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16 last 
year. 150 
While the invasion may have been seen as a disruption in the status quo, the 
British took no official action towards the Italians, even in an official condemnation of 
the action. Instead, Halifax made it clear to the Commons that should any action be 
taken against Rumania or Greece, that this would clearly violate the agreement and 
force the British to support Rumania and Greece with all their power. 151 This was 
perhaps also the most likely reason why Zogu was unable to form a government in 
exile as other European leaders and monarchs had done. 152 When Zogu had requested 
that the British remove themselves and all their interests from Albania in 193 8, [albeit 
at Italy's request], the British severed diplomatic ties with Albania as well. Recognition 
of a Zogu government in exile now would discredit the British on the earlier stance 
they had taken towards Zogu and Albania vis-a-vis Italy. More importantly, Britains 
primary allegiance was to Greece. Recognition of Zogu may have been interpreted by 
Greece as British acquiescence of Albania! s claims to territory the Greeks believed was 
rightfully theirs [Epirus]. Throughout the war then, Britain made well sure that Greece 
was kept strongly pro-British. The best way to ensure this was the continued non- 
recognition of any Albanian government in exile. 
Resistance to the Italians was limited and ineffective as resistance groups were 
poorly organised and scattered throughout the country. Even the communists were 
not fully mobilised by late 1941. With the Italians losing ground in the Balkans and 
eventually retreating, the Albanians had now to contend with German troops within 
their boundaries. The Germans established a puppet regime and, in efforts to sway 
Albanians towards their cause, the Nazis reincorporated parts of western Macedonia 
149 Pollo and Puto (1981), qp. cit.: p. 217. 
150 H. H. E. Craster, (ed) L5&eeches on Forei-en Poficv by Viscount Halifax AlLn 113.1939 (London: 
Oxford University Press): p. 252. 
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and all of Kosova into a Greater Albania. While the British did not recognise such 
boundaries, there were some who felt that enunciating a policy acknowledging certain 
territorial gains would make it easier for BLOs to unify the various resistance groups in 
Albania. 153 With the British committed to Greece and Yugoslavia however, such 
concerns were rejected. 
Within Albania resistance groups lacked effective organisation. The Albanian 
Communist Party [ACP], led by Enver Hoxha, felt that the time had come to unite the 
resistance groups. By 16 September 1942, a meeting was convened in the village of 
Peze near the capital, Tirana. While the meeting was dominated by the communists, 
one non-communist of significance present was Abas Kupi, a member of Zogu's 
Gendarme and a northern tribal chieftain. 154 The Peze Conference resulted in the 
formation of the National Liberation Front [LNC]. The Front held for approximately 
one year and was concentrated in the centre and southern regions of Albania. 
Problems within the LNC over leadership and political leanings led to its disintegration 
as communist and non-communist forces battled each other from the Front's 
inception. 155 
Less than two months after Peze several 'nationalists' sought to gain control of 
the LNC. Unable to do so, and finding themselves pitted against both pro-Zogu and 
pro-Communist forces, they created their own National Front known as the Balli 
Kombetar [BALKOM], founded by What Frasheri and Ali Klissura. 156 It was the 
platform of the Balli Kombetar which was to doom it to failure from the outset. 
153 IBID, on the handicap facing BLOs without prior clear policy towards Albania., at p. 77., on 
territorial unity and the role it played regarding policy formulation., see Halliday, gp. cit.: p. 3 I., 
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BALKOM sought to restore and, maintain after the war, Albania to her ethnic 
boundaries. This included Kosova. While BALKOM was not pro-Zogu, they were 
nationalist and strongly anti-Communist. The Germans took advantage of this. After 
they occupied Albania the Nazi creation of a 'Greater Albania! won it many supporters, 
particularly among BALKOM, of which some openly collaborated with both the Nazis 
and the government in Tirana. By arming these pro-German BALKOM and by 
spreading false information as to how many did collaborate, the Germans were able to 
accomplish two tasks. First, they were able to keep rival groups at odds with each 
other rather than fighting against the Axis. Second, by re-establishing a 'Greater 
Albania! and winning some BALKOM support the Nazis were able to thwart BLOs 
plans to consolidate resistance as Britain would not support anyone they thought was 
guilty of collaboration, even if they were anti-Communist. 
Despite the Peze agreement, by 1943 resistance groups throughout Albania 
were still unorganised and quarrelling amongst each other. With the help of an 
influential yet neutral landowner, Ishan Toptani, BLOs were able to call a meeting of 
the resistance groups on I August 1943 in the village of Mukaje. 157 Among those 
present were representatives from BALKOK the LNC, Abas Kupi and several 
'independent' clan leaders with a stake in the fighting. Other noteworthy 
representatives were Milidan Popovic and Dusan Mugosa, sent by Tito from the 
Yugoslav Communist Party, which had aided the ACP throughout the war. The 
Mukaje Conference aimed to finally create a truly broad based coalition leaving party 
politics aside for the time being. 158 By the following day an accord was reached based 
upon four principles. First, a 'Committee for the Salvation of AlbanW was to be 
created with twelve members [six from the LNC, six from BALKONfl. Second, all 
parties agreed to fight the common enemy. Third, they agreed that the form of 
government in Albania would be decided by the people after the war. Lastly, all 
agreed that the future of Kosova would be determined by Kosovars after the war with 
a national referendum. 159 Less than one week after Mukaje the agreement fell apart. 
While the communists offer reasons ranging from; BALKOM forces violated the truce, 
to problems over allowing 'collaborationists' within a war and/or post-war 
government, to what constitutes ethnic borders, it was the latter reason which most 
likely accounted for Mukaje's failure. 160 Specifically, Tito likely would not allow the 
157 Bihiku, gp. cit.: pp. 545-547., Paqrami, W. cit. - pp. 55-57. 
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future of Kosova, for centuries claimed by both Serbs [who Tito needed for support] 
and Albanians, to be decided by referendum after the war, especially since it was 
predominantly inhabited by ethnic Albanians. Incensed by the decision that Kosova! s 
future should be settled by a post-war plebiscite, the Yugoslav communist party sent 
Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo to Albania for the purpose of getting the communists 
there to renege on this decision. This was promptly done. 161 
The Mukaje collapse led to three events. First, faced with the possibility of no 
definitive fighting force to combat the Germans, BLOs with Hoxha and the LNC 
organised the First Partisan Shock Brigade, led by Mehmet Shehu. With arms and 
supplies from the British, the First Brigade was able to effectively fight both the 
Germans and the anti-Communist forces in Albania, more often the latter rather than 
the former. Second, the breakdown of Mukaje led to Abas Kupi's withdrawal from the 
LNC and taking up the leadership of a pro-Zogu movement known as Legalitati, also 
known as Zogista. 162 Last, and most importantly, the inability to maintain an accord at 
Mukaje resulted in full scale civil war among the ACP led LNC, the BALKOM, 
Legalitati, and the independent clansmen who owed allegiance to none save 
themselves. With BLOs assigned to the various groups the dilemma was in a flood of 
contradictory reports sent from BLOs to SOE headquarters Cairo, later Bari. 163 With 
the British looking for the group most likely capable of killing the most Germans, they 
were drawn to the LNC and with it, the communists. Realising that the British would 
arm any group willing to fight the Nazis, the ACP was disciplined enough to do so, yet 
at the same time combat other groups such as BALKOM and Legalitati, justifying their 
actions to the British as attempts to destroy pro-Axis sympathisers and 
collaborationists. Their actions eventually led to a series of reports from the field 
including a seven-point telegram from Brig. General 'Trotsky' Davies and others, even 
anti-Communists, calling for open support of the LNC. 164 With British backing, the 
161 Logoreci, pp. cit.: p. 75., see also Raymond Hutchings, *Albania! s Inter-War History", in Tom 
Winnifreth, (ed) PeWectives on Albania (London: Macmillan, 1992); '... though Albania could 
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well before Kupi broke with the LNC 
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LNC was able to consolidate its position at the expense of the other groups as 
Albanians saw it was the LNC which was receiving Allied support. , 
The Communists managed to convince the British that they were the only ones ready to fight the 
Germans occupying Albania after Italy's collapse; they received the bulk of the war materials sent to 
Albania by the Allies and with it were able to defeat the nationalists.... 'Me Nationalists, unable to 
recover from the damages suffered during this initial blow [after Mukaje], waged a losing battle ... 
165 
To the Foreign Office as well as to the Americans, the decision to supply the 
LNC did not make either party oblivious to the fact that the LNC was led by the 
communists. In fact, those at FO were aware that they were likely dealing with a 
future potential enemy. To avoid an embarrassing situation, since, even though 
backing LNC the FO still sent limited supplies to Kupi, FO kept many of its agents in 
the field assigned to the non-communist resistance well into 1944.166 SOE 
headquarters, London, gathered information from its BLOs in Albania as well as other 
parts of the Balkans. This information was then passed on to the FO who determined 
which resistance group it would back. 167 In Albania the decision for the FO was one 
which left it very little choice. Whether it was ineffective organisation or combat 
against the Axis forces by those beside the LNC; 168 pro-Communist tendencies at 
SOE, Albanian section; 169 or that the LNC truly was the only potent fighting force 
embracing the general populace, 170 is irrelevant. To the FO, Albania did not merit the 
level of concern afforded Greece or Yugoslavia since its pre-war ties to the country 
were not as extensive as in the latter nations. Therefore, those at the FO were merely 
concerned with'who, was killing the most Germane? Since the ACP was organised, 
[be it loosely], and carrying out the preceding directive, it would receive the bulk of 
support, irrespective at present, of political considerations. 
The lack of interest in Albania from the British is traceable to its wartime 
position. First, was Britain's refusal to recognise King Zogu as the official government 
in exile for Albania. With no set policy towards Albania, Britain was concerned that 
recognition would further alienate the resistance groups and make even an attempt at 
reconciliation impossible. This did not prevent it from recognition of King Peter in , 
Yugoslavia, but again, Britains interest there was higher than in Albania. Second, at 
the LNC did the overwhelming bulk of the fighting against the Axis.. ', at p. 78., see Smiley, gp. cit. for 
a less than flattering assessment of Palmer, at p. 84. 
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the Moscow Conference and the eventual 'percentages split', Albania did not figure in 
the final agreement. It has been asserted that Anthony Eden informed Churchill that 
the LNC would not accept Zogu back in Albania. This mattered little since Britain 
offered no formal recognition. Accordingly, the Prime Minister is said to have replied 
to Eden: 
We did not mention Albania the other night, but personally I think we should insist upon a 
fifty-fifty arrangement with the Soviets. Of course if none of the Kings are allowed to go 
back into any of their respective countries and strike a blow on the Allied side, the 
establishment of Soviet-controlled Republics will be the universal pattern ... As for 'no 
significant group wanting the King bacle, there are very few countries in which 
anybody wants anyone back. 171 
By Moscow however the fate of Albania was sealed. The LNC had 'liberated' 
most of nation, secured its hold and mopped up any anti-Communist resistance which 
still remained. It would, approximately one month after Moscow, march into Tirana, 
establishing provisionally, the People's Republic of Albania, on 28 November 1944. 
To the large number of non-communist resistance groups, especially Legaliteti and the 
fragmented clan chieftains, their belief that theAlfies would not permit communist led 
organisations to take the lead was absurd. Stalin himself at Yalta used Albania as an 
analogy to explain away the belief that the Allies had shed blood to liberate the small 
nations. These nations then should have no say in the post-war settlement. For 
nations such as Albania, the Allies, especially Britain and the US, were handcuffed into 
accepting the reality of the situation where regard was given only if interest was 
paramount and circumstances permitted. 172 
2.3 ALBAATIA, THE COMMUNISTS AAD ALLIED POLICY 
The root of a communist rise to power pre-dates the war itself. Given the 
Albanian social structure and its complexities it was not difficult to see that the 
communists offered an appeal which cuts across family, religious, and more 
importantly, clan lines. The inabifity of the Zogu regime to bring Albania out of state 
of backwardness and his deference to tribal chieftains alienated a large portion of the 
young urban students who formed the base of early support for the various Albanian 
171 Martin Gilbert, gp. cit., p. 1001., see also Eden, gp. cit. - for impressions on Moscow and King Zogu 
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communist groups. From this the COMINTERN sent to Albania, Ali Kelemendi, who 
during the 1930s, attempted to organise communist cells throughout Albania. 173 By 
the time of the Italian invasion these cells, while widespread throughout the centre and 
south were still as of yet centralised into one communist organisation. It was the ties 
with the Yugoslav Communist Party of Tito that allowed for the eventual creation of 
the ACP. The link with the YCP increased after the Italian invasion and was especially 
strong with the group of Kosova Albanian Communists [KOSMET, from the area 
known as Kosova-Metohija]. With no direct contacts with Moscow, even throughout 
the war, the Albanian communists came to rely on both the KOSMET and YCP for the 
co-ordinating of activity and for relaying messages from the COMINTERN. 
Prior to the Peze conference the northern tribal chieftains assembled their own 
meeting in March, 1941 at an area known as Krajhina Bardhe [the White Province]. 
The Bardhe conference aimed at unifying the northern clans together to combat the 
Italian occupiers. The conference failed however for two reasons. First was the 
question of leadership. There were many present who felt that, as a former deputy of 
the Gendarme, Muharrem. BaJraktari should command this unified force. An equal 
number were against the idea either believing he had personal designs or they simply 
favoured themselves. The second reason, linked closely to first, was clan rivalry. [see 
infra, heading on Albanian Nationalism] Clan rivalry and hatred dates back centuries, 
particularly in this part of Albania. Getting these groups together in itself is an 
achievement, however, securing an agreement for them to work together is highly 
improbable. Even attempts to galvanise the clans together under the premise, 'for 
Albania', was futile since these rivalries often pre-dated the existence of the Albanian 
state itself. The irony was that many of these clan leaders were often related. 174 
With the invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Tito realised that the 
Albanian communists must unite. He sent his two envoys, M. Popovic and D. Mugosa 
to Albania to unify the communists and any anti-fascist organisations in existence. 
While Hoxha downplays any assistance on the part of the YCP, it did secure a meeting 
in Tirana held between 8 November and the 14th, 194 1. The result was the 
establishment of the Albanian Communist Party [ACP], a Central Committee and 
Enver Hoxha as its leader. 175 The Tirana Conference itself included approximately 
twenty delegates representing the three major communist groups in Albania. These 
were the groups from Korca, Shkodra and the youth communist group known as Zjarri 
[Fire]. After the conference, one hundred and thirty communists were admitted into 
173 Logoreci, M. Lcit where he succeeded in doing so primarily in the south of the nation. The north 
was dominated by the clans who saw communism as a threat to their feudal system., at p. 71., Pollo 
and Puto (198 1), pg. cit, on party recruitment, pp. 226-227. 
174 Conversations with Messrs. Isat and Genc Bajraktari, (29 December 1992 to 3 January 1993) 
175 Elez Biberai (1990), 2p-sit. - pp. 17-18., Puto (1981), 2p. cit.: p. 230., Logoreci, gp. cit_, p. 68., For 
little or no role by the YCP see, Halliday, gp. cit., pp. 22-23. 
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the party. 176 Within one year, the ACP had established five provincial committees 
across the south-east of the nation in, Pogradeci, Erseka, Ballshi, Peshkopja, and 
Kukes. These committees took directives from the eight larger regional committees 
based in Shkodra, Elbason, Durres, Tirana, Beret, Mora, Korca, and qrokastra. 177 As 
for military capability, initially, it was limited. By late 194 1, early 1942, there were 
approximately eight cetas ranging in size from fifty to one hundred men. Their activity 
was primarily guerrilla action aimed at disrupting communication lines. 178 And, even 
while the ACP sought its own direction, it still counted on the better organised YCP 
for specific directives from Moscow and to maintain a liaison with KOSMET in 
Kosova and EAM in Greece. 179 
The formation of the ACP did little though to unify action against the Italians in 
any degree of impact. Some northern clans were still fighting, not only amongst 
themselves, but sporadically against the Italians, limiting their action to small guerrilla 
type combat. And now, with the creation of a unified communist party, whose very 
ideology presented a threat to their way of life, many clans abandoned the fight against 
the Italians and took up arms against Hoxha and the ACP. By the start of 1942, the 
LNC, and more importantly, the First Partisan Shock Brigade had not yet been 
formed. 190 Anxious to unite anti-fascist forces in Albania, COM]NTERN transmitted 
to Tito instructions to be passed on to the ACP. The ACP had sought permission to 
convene a communist party conference with intentions of electing a permanent Central 
Committee. Moscow authorised the conference, but did so on four conditions; (1) The 
conference must be thoroughly safeguarded on all sides against any penetration and on 
no account must suspect persons be allowed to attend. (2) The basic task of the 
conference should be the formation of a reliable party leadership and the adoption of 
concrete decisions. (3) The organising and strengthening of the national front of all 
Albanian patriots, avoiding for the time being launching slogans which go beyond the 
scope of the national liberation of Albania. (4) Inclusion in the leadership of the 
partisan struggle of as many honest Albanian nationalists and patriots as possible as 
176 Pano (1968), gp. cit., p. 43. 
177 Bihiku, Qp. cit. - p. 507., Figures as to actual numbers of membership are disputable since, as with 
most communist parties after the war, history was written to favour and cast the victors in a 
favourable light. 
178 Marmallaku (1975), gpLcit. p. 46., Puto (1981), pp.!; jt. - p. 231., Halliday, Qg,. cit - p. 23., For a t, 
slanted version of the military capability see, Enver Hoxha, Rreziku Anglo-Amefike Me Anglo- 
Ame? Ican 7hreatl (Tirana: Shtepia Botuese, 1982): p. 25. 
179 Smiley, pp. cit.. footnote p. 119., Nfilan Borkovic, "Common Struggle of the Albanian, Serbian and 
Montenegrin People in Kosovo and Metohija Against the Fascist Invaders and Other Henchmen 
(1941-1945)", in Reldfionship Between Yygoslavia andAlbania (Belgrade: Review of International 
Affairs, 1984): pp. 103-110., For a view of the relationship between Hoxha's guerrillas, the Greek 
ELAS and the Soviet influence in the region see, Edgar 013allance, The Greek Q41 War 1944-1949 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1966): pp. 87-98. 
180 On northern activity, Conversations, and, Puto(198I), qpL. cit., p. 231., Logoreci, qp. cit. -p. 72. 
72 
well as communists. 181 The resulting Peze conference, 16 September, 1942 created the 
National Liberation Council [LNC], incorporating the Moscow directives. Moscow, 
however, did not directly involve itself in Albania leaving it to the YCP to convey 
messages. 
This subordination of the ACP to the YCP by Moscow was evident throughout 
the war and up until the Soviet-Albanian alliance of 1948. The more organised 
Yugoslav communists would serve as a link for Moscow who either had no desire for 
direct contact with Albania, or deferred to Yugoslav leadership and experience with 
the ACP, seeing as it was they who had a large role in its creation. Later Hoxha would 
accuse Tito and the YCP of deliberately blocking attempts of the ACP to contact 
Moscow. This does contain some truth since towards the end of the war and 
immediately after, Tito envisaged a Balkan federation which would have included, 
Bulgaria, parts of Greek Macedonia and Albania, with Yugoslavia as a regional 
hegemon, and the others relegated to republic status within Yugoslavia. 182 VVule Tito 
may have had designs for Albania becoming the 'Seventh Republic' of Yugoslavia, this 
approach does not take account of the fact that Moscow simply was not as concerned 
with Albania as it was with Yugoslavia. This attitude is evident when one sees that the 
first Soviet mission representative, a Major Ivanov did not arrive in Albania until 
August, 1944. By this time the ACP was well on its way to establishing a firm grip 
over the entire country. 183 
The arrival of David Smiley and William McLean, the first British Liaison 
Officers, in April, 1943 did not signal the formation of a set policy towards Albania. 
While the nation was strategically located, the British, Americans and even the 
Russians had no settled policy in Albania other than aiding anti-fascist resistance 
groUpS. 184 Perhaps the reason for this is due to the society itself. Like Yugoslavia and 
Greece, Albania faced an occupying power with both nationalist and communist 
groups battling Axis and pro-Axis collaborators. Unlike the former two, the difficulty 
in Albania lay in the 'bewildering and complex social structure'which made any 
negotiations towards it awkward. 115 In Greece the population recognised itself as 
Greek. In Yugoslavia, distinctions were made among Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc. 
Yet in Albania these differences went even further. Northerners [Ghegs] were 
181 Clissold, gp. cit.: p. 153. 
182 see, King, M. cit. - pp. 59-60., Puto (1981), qpp.. cit., pp. 260-263., Halliday, LDp. cit.: pp. 62-63., 
Andrew Borowiec, Yugoslavia After Tito (New York, New York: Praeger, 1977), on Tito's view of 
Balkan tics at pp. 60-65., Nfilovan Djilas, Tito: 7he Storv from Inside (London: Weidcnficld and 
Nicolson, 1981), Auty (1974), pR. cit. 
183 Halliday, pR. cit., p. 62. 
184 Amery, M. cit, p. 328., US Secretary of State C. Hull's promise to deliver aid in'driving the enemy 
from the Albanian soil', cited in "AmERiCAN PRONuSE To ALBANW The Times II December, 1942, 
see the similar "BRmsH DEcLARATioN", The 771mes 18 December, 1942., and Churchill's statement on 
Albanian guerrillas, IBID 5 November, 1943. 
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different, culturally and linguistically from Southerners [Tosks]. 186 Muslims separated 
themselves from Orthodox and Roman Catholic. Dissimilarity of the variations went 
even finiher as the phrase, "Pre ku je? " [Where are you from? ], often was replied with 
a geographic region such as, "Lluma, Korca, etc. " This reply however did more than 
signify location. It told the inquisitor your family background, religious affiliation, and 
often political leanings. These distinctions made negotiations impossible as it became 
challenging to reconcile the populace and even more so since the multitude of clan 
leaders, [northern Gheg], each represented a particular area and saw himself as 'king of 
his personal hill'. This was also one of the reasons why the ACP was able to recruit so 
many Albanians. It cut across family, religious and economic lines, seeking a broad 
base of support. For many youths and women, the latter who under the old system 
were seen as nothing more than chattel, the ACP offered a clean break from the past. 
This is perhaps also the reason why the British eventually endorsed the LNC as they 
were led to believe that they received full public backing. 
As more BLOs were sent to Albania they still came with the intention of 
unifying the northern clans that still were operating independently of the LNC. The 
arrival of the Nazis in force sped the course towards civil war. Already'at each other's 
throats over anti-Communist versus anti-monarchical or simply nationalist tendencies, 
German policy created a larger wedge between the groups. First, they released all 
political prisoners held by the Italians and ended the union with the Italian crown. By 
recognising a 'Greater Albania! as independent, they formed a Regency Council and 
government in Tirana led by Fiqri Dine. Elements within groups such as the ultra- 
nationalist BALKOM responded favourably to German occupation. This led to many 
siding with the Nazis against the ACP who they saw as communists that did not care 
for Albania, and were merely YCP puppets. 187 
With the failure of the Mukaje Conference, civil war ensued. The British still 
hoped to reconcile the groups especially aiming at Abas Kupi and his Legalitati 
movement. The problem however appears to have been that there was no co- 
ordination among the British as SOE Bari, SOE London and the Foreign Office all 
were putting out contradictory directives based on a variety of BLO reports from the 
field. Among these were from BLOs such as Julian Amery, Billy McLean and David 
Smiley who were concentrated in the north with Kupi. and northern clan leaders. They 
186 These two groups have been at odds with each other for centuries. Ifistorically, the Ghegs were 
more homogeneous and isolated geographically maintaining the clan culture much longer than the 
more heterogeneous Tosks. The ACP, predominantly Tosk, had its problems throughout the post-war 
period subjugating the Ghegs to communism. For a relevant and proper look into the differences see, 
Marmallaku (1975), gp. cit.: pp. 82-84., Arshi Pipa, The folifics ofLanguage in SocialistAlbania 
(New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) on cultural differences ... pp. 200-20 1., on 
membership to the party, at p. 223., These differences and resentment still e2dsts today as author can 
attest to witnessing the distinctions firsthand, coming from a Tosk-Gheg background. 
187 Amery, pp. cit. - p. 332., Pollo and Puto (1981), 2p. ciýt., p. 237. 
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made it known to Bari that Kupi was willing to negotiate with the LNC but first 
needed arms with which to fight the Germans. Bari refused, stating that supplies 
would only be given if proof of action against the Nazis could be shown. From here on 
began the flood of contrary reports. These include Kupi's offer to negotiate with the 
ACP for joint action; ' 88 reports that northern leaders sheltered some partisans, aided 
BLOs and attacked German convoys; 189 to SOE calling upon Amery, Smiley and 
McLean to turn themselves over to the communists for evacuation and their refusal to 
do so. 190 This confusion, so prevalent in general British policy, apparently prompted 
Churchill to send Eden a memo in late July, 1944, while civil war continued, asking, 
"Let me have a note on this, showing which side we are on". 191 With regards to 
Albania, London was unduly cautious in either outlining or formulating a specific 
policy. Because they had not had one before the war they felt that something specific 
now, such as recognition of Zogu, would alienate resistance making it difficult to carry 
out any anti-Axis activity there. This is also why they refused Abas Kupi's request for 
a personal letter from Zogu instructing Kupi to work with the ACP. Britain felt that by 
allowing such a letter it may be viewed as implicit recognition of Zogu. 
Several BLOs would claim, with hindsight, that the problems of British policy 
towards Albania, were largely caused by their fellow BLOs and SOE headquarters. 
Both the former and the latter either did not understand that the communists controlled 
the LNC and would do so throughout the nation, and that there were pro, if not 
outright, communist sympathies at SOE. 192 Even though this argument may be true it 
still does not prove that the situation in Albania would have been altered one bit. 
Understanding British policy in the Balkans is difficult enough. Examining it towards 
Albania is an exercise in futility. Amery himself writes, "It was perhaps inevitable that 
we should give exclusive support to the Communists in Yugoslavia and Albania. But 
such a policy involved the sacrifice of significant British interests". 193 What he and the 
188 Amery, op. cit.: p. 356., apparently prompting Bari to send Philip Leakc [head of the Albanian 
scction-SOE] to partisan headquarters. He was killed however in a German air raid 
189 IBID, pp. 352-353., Smiley, pp. cit.. p. 105., I-libbert (1991), 2p. cit. - pp. 207-208., Conversations... 
190 This latter statement was of especial interest. Apparently, according to Smiley and Amery, they 
feared that following SOE's directive would endanger their lives since the ACP, they had learned, 
were searching the country for them and in a party meeting had found them guilty of aiding the 
collaborators thereby sentencing them to death. Their concern, and rightly so, was over 'accidental' 
death or 'shot while attempting escape. See, Halliday, pp. cit.. for the Hoxha report, at p. 41., Smiley, 
gp. cit..,, on Bari's reaction p. 135., Amery, gn cit. - p. 402. 
191 cited in Halliday, pp. cit.. pp. 32-33., For an opposing view that by this time London was already, 
'tending to favour the partisans' see, Logoreci, gp. cit.: p. 78., Also for confusion due to a continued 
failure to recognise the Zogu government see, Smiley, pg.. ciýt. - p. 118., Amery, 2p. cit. 
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failed to be an influence on the ACP and indeed had become an 
instrument of Hoxha in the British camp ... 
', at p. 405., Smiley, 9p).. cit. 'it seemed incomprehensible 
that senior British officers could not understand the most simple principles of Communisne., at 
pp. 153-154., Foot, Qp-. cit. * p-241. 
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and McLean on the latter's first mission to Albania. This Teport itself stated that the LNC was better 
75 
others failed to recognise were two things. First, Britain was at the time willing to 
compromise its 'interests' if this meant the early defeat of Germany. It was not until 
later that Churchill attempted, in vain, to mitigate the damage regarding communism in 
his 'percentages split'with Stalin. More importantly, these interests could not have 
been that important to Britain since Foreign Office concern for Albania before the war 
could never match regards for Greece or Yugoslavia. Second, the communists were 
the better organised resistance in Albania. By seeking a wide base of support the 
communists aimed at distancing themselves from the petty feuds and clan rivalries 
which had so divided the nation. Their success in the civil war was due not only to 
British supplies but in being banded together against dozens of small groups which 
could not even put aside differences and unite against the same communists they 
claimed to despise. Opting instead to strike at the Germans when they pleased, and 
securing their own areas, the clans and groups such as BALKOM and Legalitati sealed 
their own doom. Pro-Communist SOE staff notwithstanding, Britaires short term 
needs offered it no choice but the support of the LNC and with it the ACP. 
By the time Churchill sought to forestall a communist take-over in Albania it 
was too late. A proposed Allied troop landing request in the southern coastal port of 
Sarande was refused by Hoxha in September, 1944. The Allied plan, apparently 
drafted by the Americans and endorsed by Britain, called for at least five thousand 
troops to be deployed to Sarande then onto Tirana and Duraz o [Durres], in the north. 
The plan never came into being. The British did manage to send a superfluous 
contingent of commandos to Sarande. By the time they arrived however, the town 
was on its way to capture by the partisans. 194Regardless, the group was too small to 
endanger the position of the ACP and its hold on the nation. If anything, the landing 
perhaps sped the seizure of power by the ACP. With British troops landing in Albania 
and in less than one month, in Greece, Hoxha believed that a large scale troop 
deployment, possibly with aims to restore Zogu, or some other pro-British government 
was not far behind. He therefore made sure that all resistance were thoroughly found 
out and destroyed at the expense of attacking retreating Germans, which the Allies had 
desperately initially wanted. 
2.4 YHE FAILURE OF POLICY 
The level of short-sightedness and the failure of the US and especially the 
British in formulating a specific policy in the Balkans was matched only by Soviet 
organised than the other resistance., see Smiley, opxit.: pp. 10 1-102., 'We should back the partisans 
with all our aid... ' 
194 pollo and puto (198 1), gp. cit., p. 244., on the purpose of the mission., Also see, Smiley, gp. cit. 
pp. 151-153., Amery, 2p-. cit., p. 394., Halliday, LDp. cit.: p. 80., Logoreci, 2R. cit. - p. 8 I., Paqrami, Qggit,. - 
pp. 76-78., Hoxha (1982), pp. cit. - pp. 287-290. 
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designs in the region. The failure of a comprehensive political solution which would 
address the area's security concerns demonstrated; not only the West's lack of interest 
and understanding of the region's problems, but also doomed the Balkan nations to live 
with these security concerns for decades after the war, which presently find expression 
in irredentism, distrust, authoritarianism and conflict. As regards the Americans, their 
miscalculation was increased when they assumed that immediately after the war, the 
Soviet Union would be more than willing to conduct itself in a 'co-operative' mood. 
The US felt that the reconstruction of the areas destroyed by war with Germany would 
require the USSR to focus on domestic concerns for years after the war. 195 To FDR, 
Soviet expansionist tendencies would be delayed when it won its security on its 
European frontiers. Eastern Europe would be accepted as an area of Soviet influence, 
but some at the State Department did not want total Soviet domination as was the 
case. 196 Assistant Secretary of State, Adolph Berle did not object to, "the small 
nations of Eastern Europe being within the Russian orbit". However, he and others, 
such as veteran Moscow observers Loy Henderson, Raymond Murphy, Raymond 
Atherton, and Charles Bohlen felt that some democracy in Eastern Europe was 
necessary to allay Soviet expansionist tendencies, only just being realised. 197 For their 
part the USSR saw the percentages split as Western recognition of long time Soviet 
designs on the area. They therefore took the necessary political and military steps to 
ensure their post-war gains. 198 
It was the faure of American and British policy however that was to be the 
cause of future problems in many of these Balkan nations. Whether it was merely 
ignorance of Soviet intentions or a delusion that Britain could recapture its influence in 
the region is hardly relevant. The fact is that their short term goals made for a total 
disregard of the needs of the indigenous peoples of the Balkans. Granted, there may 
have been little if anything Britain could have done to change the post-war situation in 
the Balkans, however; 
This ignorance about both the Balkans and Soviet aims there has been responsible for the suicidal 
initiatives undertaken by various British governments .... The realities of geography and military power 
may have made Soviet domination over Eastern Europe unavoidable in the long run. But the easy rape 
of these countries was in no small degree due to deliberate Western decisions ... 
199 
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The post-war landscape in the Balkans made the British realise to their dismay 
that their short term concerns would now have long term repercussions. Examples 
were evident in the Greece where the remnants of Greek communist guerrillas with aid 
from communists in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, launched renewed efforts of 
capturing the government by the Summer of 1946.200 More importantly the Cold War 
forced a policy in which, for political and/or strategic reasons, ethnic boundaries in the 
region which were never corrected after the First World War again were of secondary 
import to political frontiers. The result, which would remain evident up to present day, 
is the large scale fragmentation in nations like the former Yugoslavia where iffedentist 
claims prevail. 201 
3.0 POST- WAR ALR, 4NL4 
With the communists in power, Enver Hoxha could now concentrate on 
rebuilding Albania in his own image. More importantly, he would from immediately 
after the war until his death seek alliances that would protect the territorial integrity of 
her borders. With the end of the war Albania expressed a desire for normal relations 
with the Allies. But it was made known that pre-war treaties would be invalid and 
territorial demands by Albanians neighbours would not be recognised. The US, British 
and USSR issued broad statements that post-war frontiers would be decided by the 
peace settlement. For their part the British and Americans called for free elections 
within Albania to ensure the rights of the population in choosing their form of 
government. It was these elections which initially placed Albania on the road away 
from the US and the British. 202 
By November, 1945 the Soviets recognised the provisional government of 
Albania as did the US and British even if the ACP dominated the elections under the 
guise of the Democratic Front. 203 Earlier, in March 1945, Albania was not allowed to 
the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations. Fearing that it was deliberately 
being left out of any peace settlements, Hoxha was able to play on nationalist anxieties 
and push Albania further away from the West. The belief was that the West would 
make due on its promises to the Greek government and their territorial claims to 
'northern Epirus'- southern Albania. This fear was heightened when the Greek foreign 
minister, Rendis made the refusal of Albania into the UN a matter of principle since the 
200 C. M. Woodhouse, Brifish Foreigm Policy Since the Second World War (London: Hutchinson, 
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Greeks felt the Albanians had participated in the war against Greece, referring to the 
Italian campaign launched against Greece through Albania. To Hoxha, British and 
American silence in response to these charges reaffirmed his belief that Albania would 
not even be a consideration at any peace talks. 204 
After recognition, however, Albania was invited to Paris in November, 1945 to 
determine war reparations from Germany. With the matter still unresolved, the 
Council of Foreign Ministers in New York a year later did award five million US 
dollars to Albania from Italy. The survival of the nation though rested on the more 
than twenty-six million provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration [UNRRA]. 205 Hoxha, however, still believed that the West would in 
no way make efforts to ensure the integrity of Albania proper. Even during the 
elections which were held in October-November 1945 Hoxha complained that the US 
and British missions in Albania were exerting improper influence in attempts to 
undermine the elections. His attitude towards the missions and of the war reparations 
did not endear him to the West and furthered his country's alienation from them. 
For his part, Hoxha showed himself unwilling to improve relations with either Britain or the 
United States, partly because he feared their diplomatic presence in the nation, partly because 
he found it usefid to continue to make them targets of his relentless domestic and external 
propaganda against the West in general. Britain and the United States, on the other hand, 
had no strategic, political or economic interests in Albania that were sufficiently important to 
surmount their instinctive reluctance to have any dealings with an extremist and 
unpredictable leader like Hoxha. Their indifference played straight into his hands enabling 
him to generate... a veritable psychosis of siege in the minds and hearts of his fcllow 
countrymen. 206 
This siege mentality made Hoxha view any foreign missions with suspicion. He 
imposed severe restrictions on the movements of foreign officials who he felt were all 
plotting to undermine the regime. 207 This prompted the British to withdraw their 
mission from Albania in April, 1946. The US followed suit before the end of the year. 
The alienation of Albania increased over the next two years partly due to two events. 
The first was the Corfu incident. Albania claimed that the area between its shores and 
the Greek island of Corfu was not international waters. The British claimed it was. In 
a show of 'gun boat diplornacy' British ships sailed through the waterway and were 
fired upon by shore batteries, 15 May, 1946. Later in the year a British ship struck a 
mine in the channel killing forty-four people. Taking its case to the International 
Court, the British won their plea. The Albanians refused to pay, prompting the British 
and Americans to withhold Albanian gold looted by the Germans after World War 
204 Pollo and Puto (1981), 2p. cit.: pp. 254-255. 
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11.208 Corfu would close diplomatic relations between Albania and Great Britain for 
nearly fifty years. The issue was finally resolved in the Spring of 1992. The second 
event was the Greek civil war. Believing that the communist KKE were being supplied 
by Albania, the UN sent investigative teams in to corroborate these charges. Again 
denying these accusations, the two events helped effectively to isolate Albania from the 
West. 209 
It was Hoxha! s early relations with Yugoslavia however which would be the 
most immediate threat to post-war Albania. During the war the Yugoslav and 
Albanian communists maintained close relations, But Tito was wary of Kosova and his 
belief that after the war they would seek to unite with Albania proper. Because Hoxha 
originally agreed to the principles of the Mukaje Conference, including possible 
reincorporation of Kosova, he was seen as potentially dangerous by Tito. This 
prompted Tito to send Velimir Stojnic to the Second Party Plenum in November, 1944 
to indicate Yugoslavia! s position on Kosova. Stojnic used the occasion to attack 
Hoxha and his leadership of the party. Tito also used pro-Yugoslav members of the 
ACP to push Albania towards greater integration with Yugoslavia and eventually into 
making the former into the 'Seventh Republic' of Yugoslavia. Two of these members 
were Minister of the Interior, Koci Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, of the Central 
Committee. 210 Realising that he could do little to prevent Tito's designs for Albania 
Hoxha went along with the integration. He could not turn to the US or British since 
relations with them were already strained. As for the Soviets, Tito's emissary to 
Moscow, Milovan Djilas was surprised to see that Molotov and Stalin agreed to a 
'swallowing up'of Albania by Yugoslavia. 211 
Upon his return to Yugoslavia, tense relations between the USSR and 
Yugoslavia over what the latter saw as imperialist designs caused a deeper rift in light 
of discussions over Albania. 212 After the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform, 28 
June, 1948 Hoxha saw his chance. By July I st, 1948, Albania breached twenty five of 
twenty seven treaties with Yugoslavia and its remaining two on July 2nd, 1948.213 
208 Puto (1981), pp. cit.: p, 254., Logoreci, pp. cit.: p. 91., Halliday, W. cit. - p. 354. 
209 pUtO (19gl), pp. Cit.: . p. 258. 210 IBiD, pp. 244-245., Logoreci, pp. cit., pp. 88-89., Pano (1968), op. cit.: pp. 80-83., see also, Biberaj 
Jtý pp. 19-20. (1990), pp. c 
211 According to Djilas, Molotov had said, 'we have no objection to you swallowing up Albania!, at 
which point Stalin made a gesture of swallowing with fingers to his mouth. Djilas objected to the term 
'swallowing' claiming that a unification was sought to benefit both. Molotov replied, 'but that is 
swallowingl', Logoreci, gp. cit. ' p96., see also, Auty (1974), pp.. cilt. Djilas, Qpi.. cýit. Clissold, W. Cit., for 
Djilas' belief that Stalin and Molotov 'were setting a tralY for Tito since USSR-Yugoslav relations 
were already strained. 
212 Clissold, 2p. cit. - Tito's protests to Russian advisors., p. 169., to CPYs expulsion from Cominform, 
pp. 200-213., see also, Lederer, ppi.. cit. where the rift dates to Stalin's refusal to back Tito's demands 
over Trieste and Carinthian in 1944-1945., at pp. 448449. 
213 White Book on Yugoslavia... pp. 453456., All Albanian officials left Yugoslavia by 13 May, 1950. 
The breach resulted in as many as thirty-three reported border incidents between July and December, 
1948, at p. 472., The Albanians however did not break the Treaty of Mutual Friendship signed in 
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Supporting Moscow on its decision, Hoxha was able to spare Albanian incorporation 
into Yugoslavia and more importantly to save his political life. By now tying himself 
to the USSR, Hoxha found an ally that would help his nation with aid and still not be 
dangerously close to Albanians borders. 
The alliance with Moscow was to greatly influence Hoxha and his policy 
towards his nation well up to and shortly after his death in 1985. The alliance also 
allowed him the opportunity to purge those he thought were members of the pro- 
Yugoslav faction such as Xoxe, who was tried and later executed. The Soviet 
influence was great as Hoxha imposed Stalin's model of heavy industrialisation upon 
Albania as the best method of bringing it out of its backwardness. 214 To the Soviets, 
Albania represented an ally close enough to irritate and concern Tito. Albania also 
gave the Russians a new submarine base at Vlora and the vital access to the Adriatic 
and subsequently, the Mediterranean. To Hoxha, Moscow saved Albania from an 
aggressive neighbour with designs which Albania could do little to prevent. 
To the Americans and the British, Albania represented a lost chance even if it 
was their policy which indirectly helped the communists to come to power. In an 
effort to correct this policy, first the British then the Americans sought to conduct 
covert activity aimed at toppling the Hoxha regime. Beginning in 1949, the British 
recruited exiled or escaped Albanian 6migr6s and began training them for covert action 
in Albania. The US and Great Britain hoped that a weak regime such as Hoxha! s 
without its Yugoslav ally would be easy prey to rebellion and may start a trend in other 
east European nations. 215 This early action by the Americans characterised their policy 
of communist containment and even of rollback as the attempt was aimed at overthrow 
of a communist regime. 216 
The attempts however by both the US and British failed miserably for several 
reasons. The first and the most common reason given was the betrayal by British agent 
Kim Philby who, it was later learned, was working for the Soviets who kept Hoxha 
informed of the plot. This reason however is not the only one of greatest importance. 
More likely, the reason was that the planned action itself was not well thought out by 
1946. Hoxha felt this would be necessary to one day resume relations with Yugoslavia. see, Pano 
(1968), pp. cit.: p-21. 
214Biberaj(1990), op. cit.: p. 17., see also, Puto (1981), pp. ciLp. 264,, for Soviet influence dating 
from the arrival of Major Ivanov, September 1944, Hibbert (1991), op. cit.: p. 200., Logoreci, pp. cit. - 
p. 80., recognition of the provisional government, IBID, p. 86., Also Halliday, op. cit.. where according 
to Hoxha, it was Stalin who recommended that the ACP change its name to the People's Labour Party 
of Albania which it did., at pp. 97-99. 
215 Michael W. Dravis, "Storming Fortress Albania: American Covert Operations in Microcosm 
1949-1954" Intellizence and National Secur! vol. 7#4 (October, 1992): pp. 428430. 
216 im, Also, in a letter from a British agent to M. BaJraktari dated July, 1955. This policy is made 
implicitly evident stating; '... you will have learned that we intend to leave it to the Americans to take 
an interest in Albanian affairs. This is, of course, something which is happening in many parts of the 
world and is being done to make best use of our resources', letter obtained week of (28 December, 
1992 to January 4,1992) from M. Bajraktari's private file, courtesy of Mr. Isa BaJraktari 
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either the US or British. While both recruited from 6migr6 groups, these were 
hopelessly divided among themselves as some were remnants of the wartime Balli 
Kombetar and others were from Legalitati while most were simply anti-Hoxha. Even if 
successful, it was doubtful these groups could have agreed to anything since they 
lacked any form of message or cohesion. These attempts even without Philby's 
betrayal were doomed from the start as each group claimed its own legitimaCy. 217 
Second, technical disagreements arose between the US and Great Britain over the best 
method of guerrilla deployment into Albania, small craft landings and cross border 
infiltration or parachute dropS. 218 This was minor though as the latter reason indicates 
that Western policy was once again not thinking along long term paths but rather 
aiming for short term gain. Regardless, the plans were futile at best. 
3.1 ALBANIANNATIONALISM 
From the time of its inception, the Hoxha regime sought alliances with states 
that, on their face, appeared as attempts to ensure Albania's territorial integrity and 
very survival. More likely, these alliances were merely opportunistic ploys by a twisted 
leadership whose rule over Albania for four decades condemned it to an existence of 
poverty and despair unmatched in Europe. These alliances, however, do bring to 
question whether or not Hoxha! s brand of communism was tainted with nationalist 
overtones, and should thereby be construed as a form of Albanian nationalism. In The 
Albanians, Anton Logereci states that on at least three separate occasions during and 
since the Second World War, Albanian nationalism can be witnessed. The first was 
during the Italian occupation when, he states, the Italian policy was falsely based on 
the assumption that Albania was still a mixture of Ottoman feudalism and ancient 
tribaliSM. 219 The second instance was in the problem with Kosova and the YCP. 
Marxist theory could neither eradicate nor pre-date the centuries old feud between 
Albanians and Serbs for Kosova. Accordingly, nationalism proved stronger than 
Marxist theory. 220 Finally, in allying with Moscow in 1948, Logereci states that Hoxha 
did this not out of any love for the USSR or Stalin's principles but for 'nationalism, 
pure and simple'. 221 While nationalism may have been present after the war, it was not 
as strong a force, however, before or during the war. 
According to Theodor Zavlani, the preconditions for Albanian nationalism were 
not in existence, especiafly before the war. He states; 
217Dravis, o. citt. on recruits p. 429., on division, p. 434., Polio (1981), 2p. cit. - p. 265., see also 
explicit reference in, Reginald Hibbert, International Affai "Book Review of D. Smilcy's, Albanian 
Assienmen " vol. 61#2 (Spring, 1985): p. 312. 
218 Dravis, qp. Cit. - . p. 
428. 
219 Logored, 2p. Cit... p. 67. 
220 IBID, p. 87. 
221 IBID, P. 10 1. 
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Among the preconditions for its growth the following appear to have been the most important: 
advanced ccntralisation, religious unity, leadership by a self-conscious class [aristocracy, bourgeoisie, 
intelligentsia], foreign intellectual stimulus, discontent with foreign rule, and linguistic unity. Albania 
enjoyed none of these preconditions for the development of modem nationaliSM. 222 
Certainly, there was little if any centralisation by the time of Italian occupation. The 
failure to unite the northern tribes was due not simply to political differences. Indeed 
most of these clans were in agreement as to their anti-Communist posture. Instead it 
was the same 'Ottoman feudalism and ancient tribalism! which caused differences and 
inability in uniting these clans. Well up to World War II, clan culture was the 
predominant form of life in northern Albania particularly. Several families united by 
blood would often form one group orfis. They would originally live together in the 
same village until their numbers caused them to spread to surrounding areas. The 
geographic area encompassing two or more villages would then be called a hajrak. A 
village elder would be responsible for the administration of hisfis as would a 
comparable leader of the hajrak. [ahga and hehg respectively] They in turn would pay 
deference to the leader of two or more bajraks, a hajraktar, leader or clan chieftain of 
a krajhina or region. This tribalism dominated Albanian life throughout the Zogu 
years and was not abandoned during the war. It subsequently made it difficult for 
these groups to choose leadership since bajraktars would not easily give up regional 
authority. Linguistic divisions between the northern Gheg and southern Tosk also 
demonstrated the lack of cohesive nationalism before and during the war. This became 
evident to BLOs, especially as they found it difficult to find proper translators when 
moving from one part of the country to another. 
Indeed, as contradictory as it appears, it was not until communism dominated 
Albania that nationalism can be seen, especially vis-a-vis Albanian foreign policy. 
Nationalism is undoubtedly the most important factor in that policy. While professing 
fierce loyalty to proletarian internationalism and the interests of socialism and world 
revolution, Albania has always subordinated such loyalty to her national interests 
whenever the two have come into conflict with each other. Albania! s foreign policy 
reflects, above all, a 'concern to preserve ... at all costs the autonomy and integrity of 
the state. q23 
While perhaps placing too much emphasis on it, Prifti does make the point for 
Albanian nationalism after the communists came to power. Hoxha may have had 
nationalist ambitions in preserving Albania's borders but also aimed at keeping his 
position of power. His post-war alliances with Yugoslavia then Moscow and finally 
with China in 1961 before going it alone from 1977 on, show an inclination to 
222 Tajar Zavlani, "Albanian Nationalism", in Peter Sugar and Ivo Lederer, (eds. ) Aafionalisty in 
Eastern EyroM (Seattle: University of Washington, 1969): p. 56. 
223 Prifti (1978), pp. cit.. p. 242. 
93 
opportunism rather than nationalism. The alliances, however, were geared towards the 
preservation of Albania's national independence, thereby ringing with nationalist 
tendencies. 
Indeed it was the Hoxha regime which perhaps could lay claim to the rise of the 
Albanian nation. In Origin of a Nation, Anthony Smith traces the stages of nation 
development along four prescribed routes. While analysing the development of 
Albanian history relative to the rise of the nation warrants significant consideration, 
Smith's model can adequately serve as a rough guide to the formulation of the Albanian 
nation. 224 
Smith's first stage looks at the unification of clans and tribes, settlements and 
villages into a series of vAder cultural and political networks. 225 This stage most closely 
parallels the tribal organisation of Albania following the period after Ottoman conquest 
in the Cl5thup to the present day. However, this form of clan culture preservation 
was confined primarily to the northern Gheg tribes of Albania. The geographical 
isolation of the Ghegs by both the Shkumbin River and the Dinaric Mountains allowed 
them to maintain the notion offis and hajrak well into the C20th. The social 
importance of the tribe was equalled by its economic importance. It was the hajrak 
then that also served as a system of administration providing a modest form of political 
network. 226 The southern Tosks however were subject to a higher degree of 'cultural 
contamination! by Greeks, Bulgars and Serbs etc. The Tosk's inability, or 
unwillingness to steadfastly associate with foundation myths and myths of ancestry 
would aid them in the post-war era, After the communists came to power in Albania, 
it became evident that the Albanian Party of Labour was and would be dominated by 
the Tosks, to the detriment of the Ghegs. By not strongly attaching themselves to clan 
culture, communism was seen as viable alternative to the Tosks. Moreover, it allowed 
them the opportunity to persecute the Ghegs with impunity. 227 This stage of 
development though did little towards the formation of the Albanian nation. On its 
face, this system of clans may have displayed centralisation. In actuality, as indicative 
of attempts to unify the clans during the war marks, the clans operated on a loose 
association, each protective of his particular area. 
The second stage of development is registered by a period of ethnic 
consolidation, later recalled as a golden age. This period, to Sýnith is associated with 
the 'flowering of ethnic culture'. I-Estorical saga, military exploits, tales of heroes, 
patriots, saints, etc. predoýninant an often exaggerated base for ethnic identification. It 
is at this stage that two features of the later concept of 'nation'become evident. First, 
religion coincides with ethnicity. The 'twin circles of religion and ethnic identity 
224 Anthony Smith, "Origin of a Nation", in The Times Higher Perspecfive 8 January 1993 pp. 15-16. 
225 IBiD, p. 15. 
226 also, Marmallaku, "The Family and Tribal Tradition", in Marmallaku (1975), pp. cit.. * pp. 82-9 1. 
227 Arshi Pipa, "Tosk Crushing Hegemony", in Pipa, W. cit, pp. 99-102. 
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become very close, if not identical'. 228 It is this symbiotic relationship between 
ethnicity and religion which, even to this day has symbolised the difference between 
nationalism in the West and in Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans. The second 
feature becomes the 'ethnic concept of a nation'. The emphasis becomes on a 
community of birth and native culture. While territory is important to the ethnic 
group, the stress is on 'descent or presumed descent rather than territory'. 229 After 
centuries of Ottoman domination, the Albanians certainly did achieve a high level of 
religious unity as most of Albania adopted Islam. By the C19th, several of the 
prerequisites for ethnic consolidation were present. The failure of the League of 
Prizren in 1878 to form the 'Albanian Nation'; formed by a collection of 'wealthy beys, 
politicians and intellectuals', harshly suppressed by the Turks, formed an attachment for 
later Albanians to their 'golden aget230 However, centralisation still was not present as 
Ghegs and Tosks continued to feud. Even religious unity was suspect as northern 
Albanians adopted Sunni Islam while southern Albanians, reflective of' culture 
assimilation! adopted the more heretical and liberal Bektashi sect of Islam. 231 
Smith indicates that the third period of development is often seen as a period of 
decline. The community ossifies and decays and may be conquered. It is here then 
that, 'nationalism finds fertile Soil'. 232 While myth still represents a basis for common 
attachment, there is one significant difference. It is here that the 'nationalist myth 
represents a break with the paSt'. 233 Instead the nation ties itself to visions of the future 
more so than visions of the past. The significance of the past becomes the 'selective, 
singling out' of those myths that impart on the people a sense of' national destiny'. 
Myths may also be rewritten or recast to accommodate the nation and its mission 
which often includes a 'cleansing of alien disfigurements'. 234 Tracing this stage of 
228 Smith (1993), op-cit.: p. 15., see also, A. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 199 1): p. 7. 
229 Smith (1991), op. cit.: p. 9. 
230 marmallaku (1975), M. cit.: pp. 25-27., see also, Zavlani, op. cit.: p. 60. 
231 For a proper explanation of the sects of Islam and Bcktashi see, Moojan Momen, An Introduction 
to Shi 7 Islam: The Ifistory and Doctrines of Twelver 5hihm (New Haven, Conn: Yale, 1985); 'The 
Bcktashis were accommodated within the Ottoman Empire as a Suft ordee. at p. 100. Enver Hoxha 
himself belonged to a Bektashi family. The spelling of his name, 'Hoxha!, is the Albanian spelling for 
'hodia'meaning priest or rather Imam see Pipa, Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-Political Aspects (New 
York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990): p. 262. 
232 Smith (1993), pp-. cit., p. 15. 
233 JBID 
234 JBiD, This portion of the nationalist myth becomes the most difficult to contain or rationalise since 
visions of the future are not tied to any tangible base. Instead they find haven in the distorted past. 
Nationalists then prey upon these recast images of bygone days of glory to rally support to their 
nationalist cause. This situation is certainly displaying itself in the former Yugoslavia as Serbs 
throughout the former Yugoslavia refuse to discard the image of a 'Greater Serbia!. Ironically 
enough, there is not one Serb in Yugoslavia who can recall Greater Serbia as it predates any Serb 
alive in Yugoslavia. The national programme for Greater Serbia last dates to Ilija GarasaniWs 
Aracertanije [outline], published in 1844 which called for the reestablismcnt of Stefan Dusan! s C14th 
Serbian Empire. see, Christopher Cvic, Remakniz the Balkans (London: Pinter, 1991): p. 66. This fact 
however will not deter Serbs and Croats from each seeking to fulfil their 'destiny., see, Glenny 
(1992), pp. cit_. For the Albanian view of this form of national display and 'myth building' see, Shukri 
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development within the Albanian nation is the most difficult. After the formation of 
the Albanian nation, recognised by the Great Powers, on 28 November 1912, the 
'nation' was already on its way towards ossification and decay. Throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s during the Zogu regime, the inability and unwillingness to break the 
northern clan system kept the idea of the Albanian nation from, if not developing, at 
the very least from maturing properly. This is hardly surprising since Zogu, himself a 
Gheg, sought deference from clan leaders and understood the importance each clan 
leader placed upon their territory. By the time of the war an after, the territorial 
integrity of Albania became the primary 'vision of the future' for the Party of Labour. 
Nationalism and national identification recast the foundation of the Albanian state in 
1912 and that period up to Zogu to impart the sense of attack and jeopardy of 
Albania! s territory. Foreign policy under the communists then served as the highest 
form of nationalist expression, a method to keep the boundaries of Albania intact and 
the nation alive. 
SmitWs final stage becomes the period of the modem nation. Characteristic of 
the modem nation; 'the provision of a national constitution, the institution of a regular 
political system, the development of a modem economy and legal order, and the 
emancipation and provision of social welfare for all'. 235 These characteristics of the 
modem nation in Albania were evident with the rise to power of the communists after 
the war. By March, 1946, the ACP introduced a new constitution modelled closely to 
the Soviet constitution. Political consolidation by the Hoxha regime aimed at breaking 
the clan system so that a 'regular political systed could be instituted. The advent of a 
modem economy sought Stalin's model of heavy industrialisation and agrarian reform 
beginning by late 1944- early 1945.236 Advanced centralisation was present as the 
Hoxha regime crushed any opposition and consolidated power in the hands of the 
Albanian Communist Party, most of whom were Tosks. The intelligentsia provided the 
self-conscious class leadership for the Albanian state while Zavlani's pre-requisite for 
linguistic unity also was visible, be it through the suppression of the Gheg dialect by 
Hoxha during his time in power. Hoxha used the fears of previous inffingements on 
Albanian territory to express 'discontent with foreign rule'. More importantly, it 
allowed him to instil upon the populace a continual siege mentality thereby unifying the 
people behind Albanian nationalism and the Albanian nation-state. 
To fully comprehend the nuances of nationalism in Albania, one should 
examine the concept of nationalism in the Balkans generally. The misconception of the 
West has been in either its inability or unwillingness to realise that in the Balkans it is 
Rahinji, Giurlme Historike Te RilindLes Kombetare Me Historical Search for National Revivall 
(Prishtinc, Kosova: University Press, 1986) 
235 Smith (1993), L)p).. cit. * p-15. 
236 see Biberai (1990), 2p. cit. - pp. 15-16., Marmallaku (1975), Qp-cil 93-9 19 9 0), i)PL. gil t. pp. 5, Pipa 
pp. 17-20. 
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nationalism which more often than not is a vital component of so many problems both 
past and present. It is this phenomenon which has often not been given proper 
consideration in the construction of either state boundaries and foreign policy to the 
region generally and individual countries as well. Indeed, policyrnakers simply have 
either disregarded or fail to realise the most fundamental aspect of policyrnaking; "the 
content of different national ideologies distinguishing among common goals of 
nationalist movements is a necessary initial step in formulating poliCy". 237 A glance at 
its complexities may explain the failure of Western policy in the region. 
4.0 THE PROBLEM OFNATIONALISHIN THE BALKANS 
Tracing the roots to Balkan nationalism in hopes of finding a workable 
definition is difficult. In Centrifugal Nationalism, Leslie Tihany cites Illyrianism, from 
the ancient inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula, as a 'proto-nationalist' movement of 
the South Slavs. Emerging from Ottoman domination, it was the 'intellectual 
aspiration of a stateless people'. 231 This statement fails in its reasoning on two 
grounds. First, Elyrianism cannot be equated with the South Slavs. The Slavs are a 
different people from the Illyrians. The latter were the indigenous population of that 
part of South-Eastem Europe well before the arrival of the Slavs from the east, which 
explains why Russians show an affinity to Serbs since both are of Slav origin. True 
there has been a great deal of outside intervention in the Balkans resulting in free 
intermingling of the peoples there, most likely due to no effective land barrier in the 
Balkan peninsula. 239 However this still does not place south Slavs in the same category 
as Illyrians, The Illyrians themselves are recognised as later day Albanians. Their 
intermingling with Slavs was minimal particularly since the latter, during their 
penetration into the Balkan peninsula, drove the Illyrians further away from the south 
and into the western shores of the BalkanS. 240 Secondly, nationalism itself cannot rise 
from 'an intellectualism aspiratioW. Granted, centuries of Ottoman domination may 
have furthered nationalist characteristics. However, such rule did not create 
nationalism nor proto-nationalism in the Balkans or the Slavs. Instead, the Ottoman 
influence resulted in an eventual furthering of nationalism albeit of a type unfamiliar to 
the rest of Europe. 
In the Balkan Peninsula, nationalism developed even later because social conditions contributing to 
the rise of nationalism were even less advanced in areas which had been part of the Turkish Empire 
237 Paula F. Lytle, "US Policy Towards the Demise Of Yugoslavia: The Virus of Nationalism", East 
European Politics and Societies vol. 6 #3 (Fall, 1992): p. 317. 
238 Leslie Tihany, "Centrifugal Nationalism", in A Histoa ofMiddle Europ 11 tI to eFromEar es Tmes 
the Aze of the World (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1976): p. 153. 
239 Wesley M. Gewehr, 7he Rise offationalism in the Balkans 1800-1930 (New York, New York: 
Archon Books, 1967): p. 3. 
240 Schevill, pp-. cit.. pp. 71-72. 
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than in Central Europe. Ottoman administrative structure had a profound impact on the type of 
nationalism that emerged in its former territories. 241 
Also, the continual outside influence from the Roman to the Ottomans to the 
Italian city-states and Austro-Hungarian Empire did little to allay indigenous 
differences. In fact intermixing of peoples increased differences. The circumstances 
that made linguistic demarcations usually coincide with institutional, social, and 
economic differentiation made the bridging of the many gaps even more difficult. The 
result of all these divisions produced numerous small segments whose xenophobia 
extended to everybody who belonged to another group. The xenophobia both 
hindered and advanced the development of nationalism in Eastern Europe. It divided 
every nationality into so many antagonistic fragments that it proved difficult to pull 
them together. But once this was done the distrust of everything foreign became a 
force in developing the identity and cohesion of the various nationalities. 242 
4.1 NATIONALISMDEFINED 
Understanding nationalism in the Balkans requires that it be defined in a way 
that is readily applicable to the problems and policy of that region both past and 
present. This necessitates not only a definition but understanding nationalism' s place in 
relation to the state; nationality itself, its characteristics, the sources in Eastern Europe, 
and differentiating it from nationalism in the West. First one must determine whether 
nationalism is an end which developed over a period of time in the Balkans, or a 
means unto itself, a self-perpetuating entity that requires no state in the classic sense. 
Most likely it is both. Smith defines nationalism as; 
... an ideological movement 
for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a 
population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation!. 243 
The latter he conceives as; 
... the territorial paftla, 
the place of one's birth and childhood, the extension of hearth and home. It is 
also the place of one's ancestors and of the herocs and cultures of onc! s antiqfity. 244 
241 Robert King, Qp. Cit.. * ., p. 
8. 
242 peter Sugar (1962), PA. -cit. '. p. 
37., see also A. M. Rosenthal, "In Balkan Separations, a Lesson for 
Lucky America" [opinion] Internafional Herald Tilbune 9 December, 1992; 'Bosnians, Serbs, Croats, 
Albanians...., come out of a world where for centuries loyalties were built on the importance of 
separateness. The separate clan, tribe, family and village gave protection. The histories and fantasies 
of the individual group gave meaning and texture to life. The separateness created fear of others, 
which was intensified when the outsider was too close, a ncighbour. 
243 Smith (1991), pp. cit.. - p. 73. 
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Smith qualifies the definition of nationalism by equating it with an ideology. It 
is a conviction that may be linked to a particular geographic location but it does not 
have to be. This is why Smith deliberately avoids the term, 'state' and opts instead for 
nation. The former relates to specific territorial boundaries that are definable, 
recognised by others as legitimate and have stood the test of time. The latter refers to 
a group with a shared sense of culture and language, of common myths, an ethnie. 245 
In itself nationalism has no morality attached to it. Nor is it beholden to a particular 
form of government for its creation or continuation. While its effects can be moralised, 
nationalism itself is neither 'good' nor 'bad'. 246 
Both Stnith and Dunn, though, would concur that the idea of 'nation' preceded 
that of nationalism. To Smith, the lack of cultural and educational resources, 
especially in the Balkans, may produce a weaker form of nationalism than in other 
parts of Europe, but one that is not as intense. 247 Smith states that nationalism was a 
relatively new phenomenon of the Cl9th. Dunn agrees indicating that a nation 
promotes a common ancestry and from this, nationalism arises. This signifies then that 
common cultural characteristics of a particular group were in existence before the 
means of their promulgation, the nation, came into being. 248 
Differentiating nationalism in the East from the West highlights the Western 
misconception of nationalism. There, nationalism is popularly regarded as a, 
- reversion to primitive tribalism in which quiescent atavistic sentiments are excited and released, and 
so it is a barrier to both order and progress'. It is illiberal and undemocratic promoting disruption and 
revolution, and, as such, can never be a stable embodiment of law, morality, tradition and order, all 
those principles which western institutions rely upon to hold their states togcther. 249 
It is this attitude from the West which has made statesmen wary of supporting 
nationalist groups in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans. Such support of 
what is seen as disruptive elements may further buttress these national groupS, 250 
Recognition of them, or more importantly, of their territorial claims would inspire their 
245 IBM, p. 74., see also, Smith, "Ethnic Identity and World Order", Millennium vol. 12 #2 (Spring, 
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248 Dunn, pp. Cit. - . pp. 5-6., see also, 
Andrei Simic, "Obstacles to the Development of a Yugoslav 
National Consciousness: Ethnic Identity and Folk Culture in the Balkans", Journal ofHediferranean 
s-tudiesvol. 1 #1 (1991): P. 25. 
249 Dunn, 2p. Cit. -. pp. 8-1 I., Smith (1983), op. cit.: p. 149., see also, Smith (199 1), pp. cit_.,, where he 
differentiates between the western view of nationality and territory with that in the Balkans; 'Whereas 
the Western concept laid down that an individual had to belong to some nation but could choose to 
which he or she belonged, the non-Western or ethnic concept allowed no such latitude. Whether you 
stayed in your community or en-dgrated to another, you remained ineluctably, organically, a member 
of the community of your birth and were forever stamped by ie., at p. I I., see, King, pp. cit., - p. 7. 
250 Dunn, pp. cit.. pp. 8-9. 
89 
nationalist cause and legitimate it, perhaps leading to violence or war over attempts to 
gain what is theirs. Ironically, in seeking to avoid conflict, this very position has led 
the West into conflict this century. It is the West's failure to correct the problems 
caused by nationalism which may again lead it into hostilities in the Balkans, witnessed 
by present day Yugoslavia. Also, it was Western ineptitude regarding these claims of 
territory that caused it twice to redraw boundaries irrespective of ethnic demarcations. 
Granted, demographics and simple practicality make this notion difficult if not 
impossible. However, greater care and consideration should have been exercised. 251 It 
is this 'uninterested' point of view, aside from the political and economic interests of 
the West, which will continue to plague its historically inadequate poliCy. 252 
The inability to deal effectively with nationalism as a force was not isolated to 
the Western statesmen and policymakers. The communist regimes of Eastern Europe 
have at various times and in different nations either suppressed it, supported it, co- 
opted it or spurred it on. First Secretaries of the communist parties of East European 
nations realised that 'broader and deeper popular support' for their socialist platform 
often requires that they take a stand as both socialists and nationalists, not necessarily 
in that order. 253 In Albania for example, Hoxha had stated; "The continuity of the 
defiant spirit of nationalism, which seeks inspiration from the past and takes a fierce 
pride in the country's achievements under communism, however modest, is the single 
most important trait in Albanian politiCS". 254 Leaders such as Tito, Hoxha and 
Ceaucescu understood nationa! ism has the power to unite their peoples behind them. 
This became especially useful to these leaders when threatened from other 'socialist' 
allies such as the Soviet Union. The use or co-optation of nationalism, however, does 
create problems as well. Because it does not operate on reason, nationalism cannot be 
properly controlled. its ability to fracture societies even further along ethnic lines, as 
in Yugoslavia, indicates how communism more often than not repressed it, or sought 
to, rather than use it frequently. In multi-ethnic states such as Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union such repression further divided the groups. Unlike the West , where 
nationalism was used as a symbol of patriotism openly underpinning state policy, 
nationalism in the East became a toot used to defy state policy and repression. Further 
suppression, such as the quashing of Croat nationalists in 1971 or Kosovar Albanians 
in 198 1, increased group nationalism and identification. 255 
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, Once the communist regimes fell, the states, artificial creations themselves, 
ceased to have purpose as fragmentation more often became the result. Paul Lendvai 
best expresses this phenomenon occurring in Eastern Europe; 
... the 
ideological vacuum created by the lack of any realistic alternative to the Communist brand of 
authoritarian system and by the complete erosion of a thoroughly discredited Communist ideology is 
being filled by the possibly most primitive, but undoubtedly most powerful ideology- nationaliSM. 256 
It is a Western myth to believe that nationalism in areas such as the former Yugoslavia, 
former USSR, the area between Moldavia and Romania [Besserabia] or Romania and 
Hungary [Transylvania], etc. 'suddenly' appeared once communism crumbled. 257 
Nationalism in these areas, as well as others in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, has 
been present long before communism in most nations. Its revitalised spirit is due to the 
fact that communism is no longer capable of suppressing it. This is why it now has 
exploded with such force and with it all the territorial claims of the various ethnic 
groups. 
4.2 THE LINKS WITH RELIGION 
For most of their modem history, East Europeans lacked an identifiable 
national state. National consciousness then often relied on factors such as religion as a 
source of inspiration. 258 Indeed, even though ruled by four decades of communism, 
religion survived the socialist call for atheism. In some cases, religion even became the 
keeper of the nationalist faith and protector of culture within the Balkans. 259 In 
Yugoslavia, for example, Tito recognised inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina [Croats 
256Lcndvai, 2p-. cit.. P-9. 
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or Serbs] as Bosnian Muslims, a separate ethnic group, albeit with a religious 
connotation. 260 
The ties of religion with nationalism often comes, in the form of 'spiritualising! 
the concept of nationalism. This usually occurs when a nationality assumes that it 
becomes a 'chosen people'. As such national destiny is seen as the preservation of its 
ethnic culture, including religion, and the restoration of its historic lands which give the 
culture intrinsic value and perpetuates the myth. 261 
To the communist parties of Eastern Europe religion was treated in much the 
same way as nationalism, alternating between periods of repression and co-optation. 
To many communists religion was seen as, 'a threat to its organisational and 
ideological monopoly and as an impediment to its utopian prograid. 262 Since religion 
championed the cause of nationalism it became lumped together with it to form an 
ideological rival to communism. To Western scholars and statesmen the two had little 
in common. However, to Eastern statesmen, the two or rather one ideal became the 
justification for policies of repression aimed at; determining loyalty, size and ethnic 
make among other things. 263 
The period of co-optation of religion can be traced to immediately after the 
war. In the USSR it was the Orthodox church which helped to rally Russian 
nationalism against the invader. By war's end, Moscow saw the potential in solidifying 
its position in eastern Europe through use of the church. By forcing a conversion of 
the Russian Uniates to Orthodoxy and subordinating them to a Moscow Patriarchate, 
they would both undercut religions base and consolidate it. 264 This plan failed 
260 Christopher Cvic, "Religion and Nationalism in Eastern Europe: ne Case of Yugoslavia", 
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however. What the Soviets did not foresee was that in their attempts to mollify 
religion, they intensified it. This was due to the ties it formed with nationalism. 
Manipulation raised the old rivalries and feuds among East European neighbours 
increasing the divisions between socialist parties over Moscow attempts to unify them 
with it at the 
lead. 265 
For example, in Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church protested the 
formation of the Macedonian Patriarchate. The Serbian church relied upon the central 
g overnment for funds and believed that a rival was not needed in an area they saw as 
'Southern Serbia!. 266Conversely in Albania it was the Catholic church which faced 
problems. Immediately after the war there were ninety-three Catholic priests active by 
1945. Of these, twenty-four were murdered; thirty-five imprisoned or sentenced to 
hard labour, ten were missing, eleven were drafted and three fled leaving only ten by 
1953.267Hoxha, though, understood that the church could be used to promote policy 
as well. Even his harsh policy against Catholicism was aimed at securing support from 
women which he claimed the church canons treated as a commodity. 268 Even 
maintaining 'Albanian Orthodoxy' separate from the Moscow Patriarchate was 
important in keeping a sense of nationaliSM. 269 Bulgaria itself forced a 
'Bulgarianization! campaign which was aimed at 'Christianising ethnic Turks in 
Bulgaria. 270 Co-optation of refigious/national groups did not exempt them from later 
persecution, nor was it meant to. Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and especially 
the Balkans, sought to take advantage of a force which existed before communism. 
Their failure was not due to secular aims or attitudes. Instead it was that a force such 
as this, relying on myth and emotion, cannot be properly controlled. Attempts to do 
so, often through persecution and other forms of suppression, intensify allegiance as 
religion and nationalism fuse and fragment along ethnic/religious lines. This perhaps 
it is necessary to assume that the Soviet authorities had good practical reasons for encouraging these 
Church efforts'. at pp. 298-299. 
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also explains why Tito, at various periods in Yugoslavia's post war history, sought to 
address nationalist and ethnic problems among the republics, not so much by force and 
a strategy of centralising power. Instead, he continued to decentralise the federal 
structure, believing this would allay nationalist/refigious divisions. As was seen, this 
strategy only sped Yugoslavia towards eventual disintegration. 
4.2.4 Within Tito 's Yugoslavia 
With the end of the war Tito began to consolidate his power base. With his 
Partisan committees scattered throughout the country, he used both the AVNOJ and 
his newly formed secret police, OZNA, to round up all those who might oppose 
him. 271 As for recognition from the Allies, Stalin convinced Churchill and Roosevelt at 
Yalta to agree to a recognition formula for Tito's government. King Peter's 
government-in-exile would provide six cabinet members, part of a coalition, which 
could serve as a government until proper elections could be held. 272 Tito agreed to the 
formula but the new government became only a facade as real power rested with the 
party. 
The party committees moved into areas throughout Yugoslavia to assist in the 
administration of the war-torn infrastructure. Faithful to his Moscow training, Tito 
refashioned Yugoslavia along the Soviet model. 273 The Constitution of 31 January, 
1946 was practically a carbon copy of its Soviet counterpart. Not surprisingly, the 
Serbs felt that they were the victims of Yugoslavia throughout the inter-war period 
and, especially, during the war. Given their numerical superiority Tito sought to 
devolve power by creating six federal units; Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia. 
Hercegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. 274 Together, these units would constitute 
the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. More importantly, a federal structure re- 
imposed internal boundaries which separated Serbs, who perhaps clung to Greater 
Serbia notions. Despite official recognition from the United States on 22 December, 
1945, relations between Tito and the West began to unravel. 275 The United Nations 
Relief Administration [UNRRA] had moved into Yugoslavia after the war in efforts to 
assist and monitor the situation on the ground. 276 The US State Department grew 
increasingly agitated over reports of harassment and the virtual imprisonment of its 
personnel in Yugoslavia. 277 Indeed, following recognition by the US, a note sent by the 
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State Department to Tito's emissary in Washington stated specifically State's 
displeasure and that US recognition; 'does not imply approval of the policies of the 
regime, its methods of assuring control, or its failure to implement the guarantee of 
personal freedom promised to its people., 278 A large measure of the deterioration 
between Tito the US and Great Britain had been initially over Trieste and the Istrian 
peninsula. Tito coveted these territories and strongly believed that he, and not Italy, 
was entitled to them. 279 The Allies, however, did not share Tito's presumptions. In an 
effort to perhaps intimidate Tito, US Air Force planes flew over Yugoslav territory 
without permission during the first part of 1946.280 With Tito claiming that more than 
thirty-two violations of Yugoslavia's airspace had occurred in one week, the stage 
was set for a crisis. 281 Tito's troops were already engaged in sporadic skirmishes with 
US and British troops near Trieste despite protests by both UNRRA and the State 
Department. Tito went too far when, in 1946, he shot down a US Air Force plane 
killing its five-man crew. The US was livid over the affair. 282 Not willing to provoke 
the US and the British so quickly after the war, Stalin had Tito formally apologise for 
the affair. More importantly, Moscow did not back Tito and his claims for Trieste or 
Istria at the Paris Foreign Ministers Conference in 1946.283 This slap in the face, as 
Tito saw it, perhaps was the beginning of a series of events which would eventually 
result in the Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948.284 
The significance of the split was not so much in how the Soviets reacted, 
believing that Tito would fall into fine, but in how the US and British responded. By 
June, 1948, the Cold War was well under way following the Berlin Blockade, the civil 
war in Greece and Mao set to take China. Within this context, the US saw to it that 
Tito would remain in power: 
Ile Americans and the British showed understanding: when the time came, they offered to 
help Yugoslavia without attaching any intolerable strings. The West was perfectly ready to 
forgive the misapprehensions of the previous three years. There were conditions, of course. In 
1949, Yugoslavia ended its support for the Communist guerrillas in Greece and the civil war 
there soon came to an end. The US returned Yugoslavia's gold reserves, which it had held 
since before the war. The British signed a trade agreement worth L 30 million in December, 
1948; the first American assistance arrived nine months later; and soon Western military and 
economic aid was pouring m. 285 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson even went so far as to imply that a secret deal 
had been struck between the US and Tito should the Soviets decide to send their 
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armed forces across Western Europe. Acheson was purported to have said that 
Yugoslavia was the 'ace in the hole' if Soviet troops mounted an offensive. 286 Yet the 
maintenance of Yugoslav integrity was not due solely to its reliance upon Western 
assistance. Given its multiethnic makeup, the existence of Yugoslavia depended heavily 
upon Tito and his secret police. 287 
So deep were the divisions in Yugoslav society in 1945 that the Communist party had little 
with which to hold the country together except the partisan myth, promises of a future 
cornucopia, and coercive force. The break with the Cominform certainly helped in this 
respect, for even anticommunists rallied to Tito rather than risk Sovietization. But the 
promises remained important. The regime had pledged, for example, to intensify 
industrialization- a clearly perceived need- and to level interregional economic disparities. 
This was to be done by fimcfling a disproportionate amount of new investment into the 
poorer regions of the soutI6 288 I.. 
In Bosnia the situation did not improve significantly after the war. Even 
though it was given republic status it fell within the "underdeveloped regions' 
classification of Yugoslavia despite its 'important reserves of coal, iron ore, lumber and 
a sizeable potential source of hydro-electric power. `289 Tito felt that economic 
decentralisation among the republics would allay separatism among the various 
nationalities. 290 However, as economic figures began to dip291, politicians within the 
republics began to express their resentment at having to divert federal funds to the less 
developed areas. The Muslims of Bosnia paid a heavy price for their various loyalties 
during the war. Forced to work on brigades, large portions of the republic were 
collectivised and all facets of Islamic law and practice were strictly forbidden. 292 Slight 
efforts at religious reform towards the Islamic community did not occur until the late 
1950s and early 1960s when Tito sought to appease Egyptian leader Nassar and 
Indonesian leader Sukarno and thereby gain their support for the Non-Aligned 
Movement [NAJA]. 293 
Tito, however, stifl did not believe, as many Serbs and Croats did not also, that 
Bosnia Muslims existed as a distinct identity. 294 Still believing they were either Muslim 
Serbs or Muslim Croats, the federal census of 1953 offered Bosnian Muslims little 
choice except perhaps for the Yugoslav designation, even having removed the Muslim 
prefix. 295 To Bosnian Muslims, and other non-Serbs within Yugoslavia, Serbian 
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memories and dreams of Greater Serbia presented a real threat to them, as Serbs still 
saw themselves as the 'big brother' within the federal system. 296 Muslim suspicions 
were only perpetuated after the war, up until the early 1960s, when the Bosnian 
Communist Party was dominated by Serbs, who constituted over sixty percent of its 
membership. 297By this time it also became apparent that economic reform was not 
making significant progress in Yugoslavia's underdeveloped regions such as Bosnia. 
Throughout the 1960s Bosnia suffered the largest per capita income decline of any of 
the republics. More importantly, for the entire period, 1952-1968, Bosnia had only a 
4.2 % average in annual growth, the lowest rate among the republics and well below 
the national average. 298 The economic situation in Bosnia did little to improve relations 
between the Muslims and the republic's Serbs and Croats. The lack of identity crisis 
which existed until the 1960s only made the Muslims resent the federal centre, which 
they felt was dominated by Serb chauviniSM. 299Moreover, the beginning of these 
divisions within the federal structure only heightened social tensions and increased 
ethnic polarisation. 
In a multiethnic: state, diverse social problems also manifest themselves as interethnic 
problems. The involvement of ahnicity and the possibility for the mobilisation of group 
loyalty and group resources transmogrify political processes. Social antagonisms are 
expressed differently in a multiethnic state from the way in which they arc expressed in an 
ethnically homogeneous or binational state. Politics in a multiethnic state is essentially 
different from politics in a nation-state. Multictlinicity becomes the justification for 
introducing a federal system in which ethnic and republic boundaries coincide. Nfiddlc-lcvcl 
interest groups tend to follow the lead of their republic leaders during times of 
intercommunal crisis, since intercommunal stability is, to a large extent, hinged on the 
viability of the federal system as a mechanism of conflict regulation and crisis 
managemcnt. 300 
Perhaps realising that social unrest among the ethnic groups within Bosnia 
would only antagonise ethnic divisions elsewhere, Tito began to grant the Muslims the 
recognition of formal identity they so wanted. In 1961 the federal census allowed for 
Bosnians to fist themselves as 'Muslims in the ethnic sense'. 301 The 1963 Bosnian 
Constitution's preamble identified Muslims as a 'nation' despite Serb protests. 302 Tito 
understood Serbs would not willingly agree to such a Muslim designation. By 1965 he 
removed Bosnia Communist Party Chief, and ethnic Serb, Djuro Pucar from his post. 
The following year, Tito's chief of security and number two man in the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY], Alexander Rankovic was also purged. 303 The 
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Muslim intelligentsia, led by Professor Muhammed Filipovic and ý Atif Purivatra saw 
these moves by Tito as positive developments in the quest for Muslim national identity. 
The 1968 Bosnian Central Committee formally designated Muslims as a 'distinct 
nation'. By 1971 the Yugoslav census affirmed Muslims as a nation. 304 
4.2.2 Yhe Bosnian Nation within the Yugoslav State 
The Bosnian Muslim nation identification gave people like Filipovic hope that 
equal standing and status would ensue within the federal structure. This, however, was 
not the immediate result. 305 'Inevitably, the non-Muslim nationalities of Bosnia, that is, 
the Croats and Serbs, felt threatened by the spectre of a new ethnic force, while 
Muslim factions were eager to legitimise the fruit of a long campaign. "306 With its 
economy lagging throughout most of the 1960s, new-found republic pride made many 
Muslims reinvigorate the Bosnian economy in the 1970s through a series of public 
works projectS. 307 Muslim self-identity was also seen as a useful counterweight for 
Tito during the 1969-1971 period when Croatian nationalism was on the rise. 309 With 
federal money being diverted to Bosnia, Kosova and Montenegro, Croats began to 
openly complain of being nothing more than a 'junior partner' within the federal 
structure. 309 A series of nationalist/cultural organisations sprang up throughout 
Croatia, particularly in Zagreb, the capital. The largest of these, Matica Hrvatska, 
began to increase its demands for more autonomy from the centre, and less domination 
by the Serbian Communist Party. 3 10 Throughout 197 1, their demands again 
increased. 311 Tito at first believed in the self-regulating capability of the republics. 
However, Croat nationalists, such as Zagreb city conference chief of the local Central 
Committee, Srecko Bijelic and LCC member Miko Tripalo began to call for the 
reincorporation of territory, specifically, Bosnia, to Croatia. 312 
To make matters worse, the LC of Serbia did not condemn Croatian activity, as 
it should have, in the Federal Parliament. [the Shkupstina] Instead, it felt that it was 
entitled to the eastern portion of Bosnia. Tito now realised he would have to respond 
or risk dissolution along ethnic lines. He considered sending in the Federal Army 
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[JNA]. 313 Instead, riot police and helicopters were dispatched to Zagreb to occupy 
strategic points throughout the city. Following the Twenty-First Session of the LCY 
collective presidency, Tito engaged in a full scale purge campaign of the LCC, 
expelling thousands of members, and sentencing most of their leadership to prison. 314 
Following his crackdown against Croatia, Tito did not centralise authority 
within the federal system. He instead went the opposite route, as epitomised by the 
new 1974 Constitution. 315 Believing that centralisation would only heighten anti-Serb 
sentiment Tito felt a new constitution was in order, one which would continue to 
decentralise authority among the repubfics. 316This, it was hoped, would allay 
nationalist and ethnic concerns by devolving more power away from the federal capital. 
The new constitution of 1974 introduced a massive shift in power away from the fcdcral level 
to the six republics and the two autonomous Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
Except in the areas of defence, foreign affairs and some joint economic concerns, the 
federation continued, but in name only, and in effect it became a cross between a federation 
and a confederation, consisting of eight units [six republics and Serbia's two autonomous 
provinces]. A similar fragmentation took place on the party level. Yugoslavia became 
feudalised, an unwieldy collection of eight small states with small economies competing 
against each other. The system was designed to offer decentralisation as a substitute for 
political pluralism. In fact, it was a recipe for chaos. 
317 
The 1974 Constitution only heightened tensions and, simultaneously, Serb nationalism. 
Serbian Communist leaders, such as Dobrica. Cosic, felt Tito was deliberately keeping 
Serbs in an inferior position both politically and economically. 318 The constitution, 
which gave more autonomy to Vojvodina and Kosova made Serbs believe that Tito 
was purposely conspiring to break up Serbia by using the Hungarians in Vojvodina and 
Albanians in Kosova as counter-weights to Serbian national expression. 319 Despite this 
growing Serb animosity over the new constitution, and Croatians, still smarting over 
the repression of their nationalist revival, the remainder of the 1970s saw little backlash 
as Tito still held authority and had the final say over vital matters given his firm control 
over the JNA- 320 
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4.2.3 The Death of Tito 
Tito's death in May, 1980 signalled the end for Yugoslavia. 321 The continually 
decentralising federal structure held its illusion of cohesion because of Tito. With him 
gone, it would remain unlikely that Yugoslavia would hold together. Sabrina Ramet 
provides four reasons why Tito's system would no longer succeed without him; 
First, without Tito, the LCY lacked an ultimate arbiter and was therefore tangibly weaker 
than before. The divided party leadership could not assert itself because, in many cases, the 
%ill ofthe party could not even be determined. Second, important power centers within the 
party wanted change [albeit change disguised as continuity] and pressed for a measure of 
relaxation. Such relaxation as did take place probably exceeded the limits of what the party 
liberals had in mind, since a retrenchment was set in motion in the Summer of 1982 met no 
serious overt resistance within the party. Third, the tangible econon-dc deterioration that 
began in 1979 threw the entire system into disarray, and numerous officials blamed the 
federal balance, that is, the distribution of powers between the federation and the federal 
units, for the country's economic problems .... And, 
fourth, the explosion of violence in 
Kosovo in April 198 1, when discontented Albanians burned cars and attacked Serbs, 
produced a nationalist backlash throughout Yugoslavia. Kosovo was placed under military 
occupation, and the entire episode reopened the question of the utility of federalism as a 
solution for interethnic tensions and distrust. 
322 
The Kosova riots of 1981 not only increased the historic Serb-Albanian hatred 
for one another, it moreover heightened the general sense of anti-Islamic feeling Serbs 
had for Bosnian Muslims as well as Muslim Kosovar AlbanianS. 323 In 1983, radical 
Serb nationalist Vuk Draskovic published a virulently anti-Muslim novel entitled, Yhe 
Knife, which was followed in 1985 by Dobrica Cosic's own novel aimed at portraying 
some Serb Cetniks in a positive light. 324 The increasing nationalism on the part of 
Serbia actually increased after the Twelfth Party Congress [26-29 June, 1982] which 
pitted those seeking greater autonomy against conservatives calling for a stronger 
central authority. 325 Ironically, however, Serbian leadership felt a stronger federal 
structure would be necessary. Mitja Ribicic, chair of the Federal Party Presidium and 
Milka Planinc, chair of the Federal Executive Council appointed Tihomir Vlaskalic, a 
Serb, to head a special political commission which was to examine the debate between 
the centralists and the decentraliStS. 326 For Serbs, anxiety was high following the 1981 
riots. Kosova was, and still is, of vital historic importance to Serbs. If they were to 
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support the continued calls for increasing autonomy, they risked losing Kosova 
altogether, perhaps, as Serbs saw it, to a Greater Albanian reincorporation. 327 
The report, delivered in December, 1985 recommended that a greater central 
authority would be needed and should be invoked by amendments to the 1974 Federal 
Constitution. 328 Croatian and Slovene leaders were not quick to support the report's 
findings. Slovene sociologist and party member, Dimitrij Rupel denounced the 
October, 1986 amendments to the Constitution believing that Slovene [and Croatian] 
autonomy would be severely 'curtailed'. 329 Reiterating a point made at the Thirteenth 
Party Congress [25-28 June, 1986], Slovene Central Committee member Ciril Ribicic 
accused the Serb leadership of deliberately interfering in other republic's economic 
affairs without just cause. It was these tensions between the Slovene leadership and 
Belgrade which set the stage for the drives toward Slovene independence in 1989- 
1990.330 
Despite their pleas for a more central authority, Serb leaders did not hinder the 
ever increasing activity of the Serbian intelligentsia, especially within Belgrade. 331 In 
1986 the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences drew up, the now infamous, 
Memorandum. 332 It was the Memorandum which was to characterise the years, 1987- 
1989, by the 'revival and proliferation of exclusivist nationalism throughout the 
republics and provinces, [including] a growing criticism of Tito [emanating above 0 
from Serbia]. '333 
The fundamental argument of the Memorandum was that the Serb people throughout 
Yugoslavia was a kind of primary entity, possessing a unitary set of rights and claims which 
transcended any mere political or geographical divisions: The question of the integrity of 
the Serb People and Us culture in the whole of Yugoslavia poses itseyýas a crucial question 
for thatpeople's survival and development. It was the pursuit of that integrity which would 
eventually destroy Yugoslavia, and bring about the destruction of Bosnia too. 
334 
Within Bosnia, Muslim leaders such as Hamidija Pozderac, felt that growing 
Serb nationalism did not need further excuses to increase its support. He had called on 
the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina to refrain from actively practising Islam, opting 
instead for a secular approach. 335 Pozderac condemned Bosnian Muslim cultural 
organisations such as the Young Muslims, and supported the arrest and imprisonment 
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of thirteen 'Muslim activists' in 1983. Among these activists was a lawyer from 
Sarajevo who had just completed his Phl), Dr. Ilija Izetbegovic. 336 Izetbegovic's 
thesis, Yhe Islamic Declaration, was, and still is used by Serbs to signify the former's 
wish to create an ethnically pure Muslim Bosnian state. 337 
4.2.4 The Rise of Slobodan Milosevic 
The Memorandum and increasing Serb chauvinism coupled with a poor 
economic state in most of the republics except perhaps Sloveni038, allowed for 
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to fill the power vacuum created since Tito's death. 
With a degree in law from the University of Belgrade, Milosevic went on in the early 
1970s to become a director of a state co-operative before heading the Belgrade Bank 
in 1978.339 Ivan Stambolic, his friend and political mentor, was instrumental in 
bringing Milosevic into politics during the early 1980S. 340 By April, 1984, Stambolic 
had become chair of the Serbian CC and recommended Milosevic for the post of Chair 
of the Belgrade city committee. Less than two years later, Milosevic succeeded 
Stambolic as Serbian CC chair [January, 1986] when the latter became President of the 
Serbian Republic. 341 From this position, Milosevic began to consolidate his power. 
Unlike Stambolic, who never openly embraced Serbian nationalism, Milosevic 
recognised its appeal among the students and intelligentsia of Serbia. 342 He publicly 
called for a revival of Serbian culture and the Orthodox religion. With his power base 
slowly increasing, he took every opportunity to exploit Serb nationalism to his 
advantage. At a party delegate meeting in Kosova [April, 1987], thousands of Serbs 
and Montenegrins attended the meeting without invitation. 343 Milosevic played the 
nationalist card to the crowd, assuring the throng that the Albanians, and the other 
minorities of Yugoslavia, would never again injure ethnic Serbs. 344 With the Serb 
media highly nationalistic, Milosevic was given a high profile which only strengthened 
both his personal confidence and his power. More importantly, his nationalist tilt gave 
him the opportunity to exploit the press for his own purposes. 345 
By the beginning of 1988, Stambolic continued to not openly support Serb 
nationalist tendencies. Seizing the opportunity, Nfilosevic turned on his best and most 
trusted friend. By not directly attacking Stambolic but instead going after his prot6g6, 
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Dragisa Pavlovic [who succeeded Milosevic at the Belgrade city committee chair], 
Milosevic was able to garner the support of party cadres without alienating them with 
a direct assault on Stambolic. 346With cadre support waning, Stambolic saw his 
position become increasingly untenable. By December, 1988, he requested the Serbian 
Parliament to vote him out of office. The latter complied and voted in Milosevic as the 
new President of the Republic of Serbia in May, 1989.347By the time of his ascension 
to the Presidency, Milosevic had aggrandised his support to a point of no turning back. 
His consolidation was accomplished in three major phases which began roughly 
in early 1987 and ended during the latter half of 1989.348 During the first phase 
Milosevic stoked the nationalist fires by embracing most methods by the intelligentsia 
during this period, in promoting pro-Serb ideals. Everything from publications to 
nationalist demonstrations were endorsed by Milosevic. 349 I-Iis appeal as a populist 
increased when he actively backed the Serbian Orthodox Church and their promotion 
of rallies and demonstrations boosting Serb awareness of its folk culture and religion. 
Second, and perhaps most important, Milosevic and his supporters began to gather 
followers outside of Serbia, especially amongst the Serbs of Montenegro and Bosnia. 
In late 1988, the Serbian Assembly, upon Milosevic's request, established the 
'Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins'. 350 Between July 
and September, 1988, the Committee organised rallies of over 150,000 people at a 
time. Miroslav Solevic, chair of the Comn-dttee summed up the organisation's 
fundamental premise, 'If we don't get our rights, we will take up arms. '1351 
The autonomous provinces, Kosova and Vo vodina called sessions of their j 
party leadership, as well as of the collective presidency. 352 They failed, however, to 
achieve what they most wanted, the ouster of Nfilosevic. The latter responded on 6 
October, 1988 with a demonstration of over 100,000 supporters in Novi Sad, the 
Vojvodin capital. 353 With little choice left, the entire Vojvodin Politburo resigned by 
the end of October, 1988. NElosevic, moving swiftly, placed Nedelijko Sipovac, his 
protdg6, as party chief in Vojvodin and MihaIj Kertes as province Presidcnt. 354 As for 
Kosova, this province became the key to Milosevic's consolidation of power. 355 Its 
mystical importance to Serbs meant reducing it and its autonomy to nothing more than 
a Serb possession, at the expense of the overwhelming Albanian population. Earlier in 
August, 1988, Nfilosevic succeeded in removing Azern Vllasi and KoIj Siroka from 
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their leadership posts in the Kosovar leadership and replacing them with Rahman 
Morina, former director of a Kosova state co-operative in the late 1970S. 356 
October/November, 1988 witnessed the Federal Central Committee formally 
register its disapproval with Milosevic. The latter, however, continued to build up his 
power base outside of Serbia. Despite Milosevic's failure to have Federal President 
Stipe Suvar removed in May, 1989, Milosevic was able to push forward and place 
personnel in key positions in Montenegro. 357Throughout the latter half of 1988 
demonstrations in the Montenegrin capital of Titograd [now Podgorica], grew 
increasingly violent over the poor economic conditions. 358Protesters called on the 
Montenegrin leadership to resign. Following riots which lasted two days, the entire 
Montenegrin leadership caved in to pressure and resigned [I I January, 1989]. 359 
Milosevic replaced them with men loyal to him and, more important, also replaced the 
Montenegrin delegates to the Shkupstina, Marko Orlandic, Vidoje Zarkovic and 
Slobodan FflipoViC. 360 
By March, 1989 the Serbian Assembly passed constitutional changes effectively 
abolishing the autonomy of Kosova and Vojvodina. Despite riots in Kosova, 
Milosevic continued to antagonise Kosova Albanians. In May, 1989 Serbo-Croatian 
was made a mandatory language subject in all schools and Albanian was forbidden to 
be taught at all. Thousands of Albanians were removed from their positions as 
teachers, engineers and police constables. Troops were sent into Prishtina, the capital, 
and Kosova was essentially placed under a state of martial law. 361 To add insult to 
injury, Milosevic supporters organised a rally outside the Kosova capital on 28 June, 
1989, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosova. Over 200,000 Serbs, most bussed 
in from outside Kosova, attended the ceremony which marked the high point in 
Milosevic's quest for power. 362 
Third, from the latter half of 1989, NElosevic began to concentrate his efforts 
on the 'plight of Serbs' outside of Serbia. It was here that he first began to mention the 
poor treatment, he felt, that Bosnian Serbs were receiving at the hands of both 
Muslims and Croats. 363 All he succeeded in doing, however, was in antagonising the 
latter two ethnic groups. By December, 1989, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims 
looked to Slovenia and Croatia for assistance. These two republics were, by this stage, 
openly denouncing Milosevic and called on him to resign. More importantly, they 
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were, by late 1989, requesting for a confederalised Yugoslavia which should include 
Vojvodina and Kosova as fully-fledged republics. 
As 1989 approached its final days, the winds of change were indicating that 
Yugoslavia would no longer remain together. Milosevic by this point had full control 
of Serbia and, more importantly, controlled four out of eight votes in the Shkupstina; 
Serbia, Vojvodina, KosoVa and Montenegro. 364 He could now effectively block any 
legislation which did not appeal to him. This possibility was firmly rebutted by 
Slovenes, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Realising that Milosevic sought a stronger 
centralised authority, as long as he was the authority, leaders in Zagreb and LubIjana 
began to talk increasingly of a confederal Yugoslavia. 365 Developments during the 
1987-1990 period were moving quickly, yet most of them were orchestrated by 
Milosevic. 
Mlosevic had a profound effect on developments in Yugoslavia. His concerted campaign to 
refashion Yugoslavia along centralist lines and to erode the two autonomous provinces 
provoked a powerful anti-Serbian reaction throughout the rest of the country, a reaction that 
wedded prodernocracy sentiment to proconfederation sentiment, and probably accelerated 
Bosnia's ultimate embrace of political pluralism. 366 
The advent of political pluralism saw a variety of political parties form 
throughout the republics. Some monarchist, others socialist, yet most were nationalist 
in orientation. By October, 1989 the Slovene Assembly expressly declared the right to 
secede from the federal structure. Less than four months later [June, 1990], the 
Slovenes broke links with the LCY after walking out of a special meeting of the 
Fourteenth Extraordinary Conference. 367 Croatia followed SUit. 368 Both Croatia and 
Slovenia held elections in April, 1990 which brought the centre-right democratic 
opposition to power in Slovenia [DEMOS], and the right-wing Croatian Democratic 
Union [HDZ] victory in Zagreb. 369 
These moves made Milosevic support Serbs in Croatia, especially those in the 
Knin area, a region Serbs refer to as the Krajina, and part of historic Greater Serbia. 370 
Efforts to establish Serb cultural societies in this region during the Summer of 1989 
were quashed by Zagreb authorities, who saw the actions as attempts by Nfilosevic to 
stir unrest. Croatian Serbs, however, held their own referendum in mid-August, 1990 
and declared autonomy within Croatia. 371 Armed with AK-47s, Croatian Serbs began 
to block entry into Knin and engaged in skirmishes with federal troops sent in to 
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restore order in October, 1990.372Undeterred, Croatian Serbs created the Serbian 
Democratic Party [SDS] and were led by former dentist, and one time Croatian CP 
member, Milan BabiC. 373Zagreb and the HDZ, headed by former Partisan General and, 
history professor, Franjo Tudjman, continued to declare the SDS and their activities 
illegal. Following Slovenia's lead, Croatia and Slovenia declared 'sovereignty', not 
independence, by July, 1990. Slovene President Milan Kucan continued to hold onto 
vague notions of a confederal Yugoslavia, yet this simply was not feasible by the end 
of 1990.374 
Despite interrepublican talks and conferences which began in February, 1991, 
collective Prime Minister, Ante Markovic was unable to get many of the delegates to 
remain at the meetings. A host of confederal plans were presented and rejected. By this 
time. signs were already pointing to all out conflict. Earlier, in January, 1991 the SD S 
declared the Serbian Autonomous Region of the Krajina. Zagreb refused to recognise 
any such territorial unit. 375 As the SDS began to harass Croats in the Knin area, 
Tudjman, elected President of Croatia by this time, sent in police units to try and 
disarm the Serbs [May, 1991]. 376 Sporadic fighting ensued and several Croatian police 
were shot and killed. 377With little left of the federal structure and both Croatia and 
Slovenia not sending any delegates to the Shkupstina., Yugoslavia was dead. All that 
remained was the formal declaration. This came on 25 June, 1991 when Zagreb and 
LubIjana declared their independence. The civil war had begun. 378 
4.3 CONCL USION 
The collapse of communism made more people turn to concept of nationalism 
as the only identifiable power. Statesmen harness its political potential to rally behind 
the idea of a 'Greater Serbia, 'Ethnic Albania!, etc. To the West, a generalised view of 
the problems confronting these countries today will not prove beneficial. The west has 
in the past and at present continually underestimated the forces of nationalism in the 
Balkans. 379 Ironically, the West's failure to understand religion/nationalism in this 
region is not due to secularism. Indeed, religion is at the root of Anglo-Saxon 
democracies. US foreign policy particularly has at times this century been a sort of 
'religious crusade' used to justify policy against threats to democracy. Certainly, 
attempts at rollback of communist regimes in Southeast Asia during the 1960s is 
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arguably one example of US policymaker's wish to impose their political systems on 
other peoples, harkening back to the days of 'manifest destiny'. It is odd then when 
Western statesmen and policyrnakers refuse to believe or understand how 
religion/nationalism is a force elsewhere. The problem with their policy then has been 
that in areas such as the Balkans, this force has manifested itself in often violent ways. 
This has prompted the view that Balkan nationalism is a fierce, disruptive force that 
must not and cannot be nurtured or supported. The resulting paradox and dilemma for 
the West is that this non-support does not diffuse nationalism. Instead it strengthens it 
as these groups see short-sighted policy or indifferent attitudes from the West as proof 
positive of the latter's plot against them. Western policy then fortifies the myth of epic 
struggle and nationalist group's belief as the 'chosen people' destined to eventually 
triumph. Such policy also presents the possibility that more radical elements 
throughout the area may use ethnicity and/or religion as the bedrock necessary to 
create and launch terrorist-type activity across Europe directed against the US and the 
West in protest of Western policy. 
Chapter Two 
ALBANIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
1.0 ME CONSOLIDA 7YON OF POKER [1944-19461 
The position of Hoxha and the ACP was one of relative security by November, 
1944. By this time they had succeeded in capturing power throughout most of the 
southern portion of the nation. More importantly, two factors aided the communists in 
the consolidation of their power. First, Hoxha and his compatriots had achieved Vic- 
tory primarily on their own. They received no large level military assistance from eit- 
her the Soviets or the Yugoslavs. Second, with no recognised government in exile, 
Hoxha was able to present himself as the legitimate government for Albania. All that 
remained now was to rout what resistance remained to the communists and seek for- 
mal recognition from the Allies. I 
Opposition to Hoxha came primarily from the northern Gheg clans who saw 
communism as a threat to their way of life, one based upon the feudal set of laws, the 
unwritten Canon of Lek. 2 The better organised and more heavily armed communists 
were able to crush their enemies in the north, many of whom were later tried as 'war 
criminals and traitors of the people'. Motivated by revenge yet driven by stupidity, 
Hoxha established a war crimes tribunal in January, 1945. This tribunal, presided over 
by Minister of the Interior Koci Xoxe began a series of show trials which succeeded in 
I eliminating! hundreds of former politicians and civil servants, the latter of which were 
certainly needed in helping to run the every day functions of the new government. 3 
Obtaining recognition from the Allies would be difficult. By 4 January, 1945, Hoxha 
had sent a communiqu6 to the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union seeking official 
recognition for the communists. He had assumed that since there was no other legiti- 
mate contender to lead Albania, recognition from the West would be forthcoming. In- 
I This did not initially present a problem as early reports from the British Military Mission in Tirana 
were *favourable on the Hoxha tearn', recognising it as communist, but, apparently popular. See, 
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2 Aside from steadfast adherence to the concepts of aghas, bcghs, bajraks, ctc., the Canon of Lek 
stood by two principles which are still followed, to some extent, to this day. The first is the idea of 
patila, a male dominated society where women, [although used by the communists as equals], were 
treated as "forms of life lower than animals with no rights whatsoever". Second was the besa, or 
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honour. Because loyalty to the Canon of Lek superseded any loyalty elsewhere, Hoxha sought to 
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deed Hoxha was confident in this position, especially since Yugoslavia offered official 
recognition to Albania by 28 April 1945. They were followed suit by Hungary, Bul- 
garia, Poland, and the Soviet Union all by or before 10 November, 1945.4 The US and 
Great Britain though were not willing to extend recognition without establishing 
criteria they felt Hoxha! s 'government' must fulfil. The US and Great Britain 
understood that Albania was now in the hands of the communists. Sensing that little if 
any emphasis was placed upon the future of Albania once the war had ended, the 
British and Americans perhaps now thought that they might be able to secure a 
position of influence in Albania. To assess the situation the US sent an 'informal 
mission', led by Foreign Service officer Joseph Jacobs who was to 'survey conditione 
which would then determine whether or not recognition would be forthcoming. 5 His 
mission entered Albania by 8 May, 1945 followed by the British mission. Once there 
they had linked up with two Anglo-American organisations already in Albania. The 
Military Liaison [MLI and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
[UNRRA] had been in Albania since February, 1945. The US and British believed that 
Hoxha's desire to gain their recognition would join with Western Allied hopes for 
genuinely free elections, an implicit part of the Yalta agreement. With a small, yet 
sustained aid effort provided by the British and the US during the war, the latter two 
believed that Hoxha and his communist led provisional government would accept allied 
calls for full and free elections. To perhaps nudge Hoxha in the right direction, the aim 
Western allied aim therefore was to tie economic aid and formal recognition to 
assurances of influence via a more 'democratic' government. 
... Mhc 
British and American governments informed the Albanian side .... through their 
representatives in Tirane that their recognition would be conditional on the holding of free 
elections devoid of intimidation or anti-dcmocratic practices. The elections should be held at 
an early date, all anti-fascist parties should be enabled to put up candidates, and foreign 
journalists should be allowed to report on them freely. 6 
Flaud, head of the first UNRRA mission to Albania later confirmed that the 
goal was to present Hoxha with an 'ultimatunf, as well as a contingent of ML troops, 
approximately one thousand, which would demonstrate visible proof of US and British 
presence and lay the groundwork for future influence. The US also expressed its 
desire that the new regime was beholden for any and 0 treaties and agreements 
Albania had with Britain and the US during the Zogu regime. Hoxha refused the 
4 pano (1968), 2p. cit.. pp. 58-60., Marmallaku (1975), 2p4pit, - p. 114., Puto (1981), 2p git - p. 247., 
Hikuban, pp. cit., p. 543., see also, Stravro Skcndi, "Albania", in Stephen D. Kcrtcsz, (cd. ) 7he Fate o 
East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures ofj mefican Foreign Policy (Indiana: Notre Dame, 1956): 
p. 305. Among notable non-communist nations that offered recognition were the French, by 26 
December, 1945. 
5 Skcndi (1956), Qp-. c-i-t-.,, p-305. 
6 Marmallaku (1975), L)p. cit. j p. 114. 
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conditions and after their failure to convince him, UNRRA and the ML allowed the 
distribution of aid to rest in the hands of the Albanian authorities. 7 With the nation in 
ruins and wartime aid primarily from Anglo-American sources, the US and British 
believed that their ability to direct the course of events in Albania after the war would 
be met with little resistance. 
For their part, the British and American missions at Tirane did not spare any efforts to 
integrate hostile forces into the new regime, hoping for an imminent Anglo-American 
landing in Albania. But even though they presented the new regime with numerous 
problems, they did not achieve their objective, because the new regime, despite the enormous 
difficulties they had to surmount, enjoyed enormous popular support. 8 
Holding firm to his belief that the ACP represented the legitimate government 
in Albania, Hoxha still sought official recognition from the US and Great Britain. The 
reason for this is clear. Although a communist, Hoxha was a realist. He understood 
that the Greek government, as well as the Yugoslav one, would now with the war 
ended, press for territorial demands well within Albania! s borders. This had been the 
situation in the past following all conflicts in the Balkans. To preserve her territorial 
integrity, Hoxha understood that this could only be achieved by formal recognition. 
He also realised that, regarding Greece particularly, Western sentiment was high and 
favourable. To appeal to the West's demands an agreement was reached for general 
elections to be held on 2 December, 1945. The provisional government went to great 
lengths in trying to convince the West that the elections were free and democratic. 
Westemjournalists were allowed to circulate freely; a Writees Union was created in 
October, 1945, an election campaign went on for two months, and the Council for 
National Liberation was reorganised into the Democratic Front [DF]. 9 The slate of 
candidates for the DF though was strictly monitored by the communists ensuring that 
they would be victorious in the general elections. With the arrival of those elections in 
December, 1945 it was hardly surprising then that the communists captured all eighty- 
two parliamentary seats with a nearly ninety per cent majority. The new National 
Assembly then met in Tirana in January, 1946 and formally abolished the monarchy, 
proclaiming the People's Republic of Albania. 10 The less than democratic elections 
however, began to strain relations between the West and Albania. Later, Hoxha would 
7 Skendi (1956), 2R. cit., p. 306., Marmallaku(1975), w--cit, pp. 115-116., Pano(1968), o12, cit.: p. 63., 
Pollo and Puto (1981), 2R. cit.: p. 247. 
8 Pollo and Puto (1981), gp. cit.: p. 247. 
9 Pano, (1968), p pp 'IL PU Rxit, pp. 
64-65., Marmallaku (1975), 
---ci * p. 
86., Pollo and to (1981), PP. Cit.., 
pp. 248-249., Skcndi (1956), op. cit.: pp. 306-307. 
10 Marmallaku (1975), Qp. cit. * p. 86. 
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accuse the US and British missions of undue influence, attempts at espionage and 
sabotage all aimed at toppling his regime. II 
It was these elections, which the US and Great Britain rightly accused Albania 
of violating the latter's commitment to the Yalta Declaration. Realising that Hoxha 
would not cave in, the US blocked Albania! s bid for entry to the United Nations. 
Hoxha responded by imposing severe guidelines on the actions and movements of both 
US and British officials within Albania. Believing that their officials were mistreated 
and after failing to receive an formal apology from the Albanian government, the 
British severed their diplomatic relations with Albania and withdrew their mission in 
April, 1946. The US did the same by 6 November, 1946. Two events during the 
interim, and one series of events after 1946 prompted the anti-Albanian stance the US 
and Great Britain would maintain for several decades. 
1.1 7he Greek Claims 
Most nations' claims to any territory in the Balkans almost certainly have their 
basis in history. Greece was, and is, no exception. At the time of the Congress of 
Berlin [ 1878], Greece sought to increase her territory at the expense of the declining 
Ottoman Empire. With Bismarck not recognising any Albanian 'natiolf, Greece was 
given a free hand to negotiate with the Porte for land in Southern Albania. With haste, 
Greece and the Porte concluded negotiations by 1881. These resulted in the northern 
expansion of Greek territory to incorporate Thessaly, which it still holds, and Northern 
Epirus, now part of Southern Albania. 12 The Great Powers, especially Great Britain, 
did not protest the new northern boundary of Greece. Indeed, their considerations of 
allowing Greece to negotiate the boundaries herself included the realisation that such 
demarcations would deny Russia access to the Mediterranean, something Britain was 
keen on preserving. 
By the end of the Balkan Wars [1913], Greece had acquired even more 
territory within Northern Epirus, specifically, the capital city of Jannina. 13 The First 
"Marmallaku(1975), 2p-c-i-t-., p. 86., Halliday, op. cit.: p. 88., See also Pollo and Puto (1981), gpL. glit., 
who claim that the US and Great Britain did actually establish several groups whose goal was the 
ouster of Hoxha. Led by Joseph Jacobs and General D. E. P. Hodgson, the head of the British mission, 
these 'groups succeeded in forming a number of clandestine organizations like the Albanian Unity of 
the Catholic Clergy, the Independents Group, the Resistance Group and the social-&mocratic and 
monarchist groups. They had the dual task of , on the one hand, setting themselves up as an 
opposition party to the new regime either outside or within the Democratic Front, and, on the other 
hand, of secredy organizing acts of economic sabotage as well as armed action to overthrow the 
government in power., at p. 250., The Hoxha regime also confined the British ML to Tirana and it 
expelled members of the British War Graves Commission; The Economist (13 April, 1946): p. 579. 
12 Schcvill, gpxft., p. 405. 
13 IBID, p. 477. Today the Greek city of lonnina, some fifty miles within Greek territory is still claimed 
by some Albanian nationalist parties as historically part of Greater Albania. The area is known as 
Cameria and the Albanians, as 'Chains. 
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World War saw the Greeks, Italians, and the Serbs occupy most of Albania. The 
Treaty of Paris recognised the Albanian nation and the League of Nations vetoed any 
Serbian claims to Scutari in the north. Greece had lost most of Northern Epirus, 
acquiring Thrace as compensation. 14 
However, immediately after World War II, Greece still believed that it was 
entitled to Northern Epirus. This was doubly felt by Greeks within the region who, 
after the war, took it upon themselves to promote their cause to the Allies. By 
February, 1946 a Greek delegation from Northern Epirus travelled to London and the 
United States to argue their case. They believed that apart from ethnographic and 
cultural reasons; 
.... on 
January 13,1920, the Supreme Allied Council unreservedly recognised that the Greek claims to 
the region was just, and decided to hand it over to Greece. First, however, King Constantine's return 
and afterwards the desire to appease Fascist Italy prevented the decision from being carried out. 15 
As for the Greek gover=ent itself, it sent to the Paris Conference Council of Foreign 
Ministers a memorandum holding fast to its claims. Reiterating the delegation's stance, 
the memo points to both the Venizelos-Tittoni accord of 1919 and the US Senate 
resolution of 1920, both in favour of Northern Epirus' incorporation into Greece. 16 
By this time Albanian relations with the US and Great Britain were already 
beginning to sour. Britain was complaining of the treatment its missions to Tirana 
were receiving, and were already moving towards a severing of relations. 17 
Washington also believed that Hoxha! s actions against US and British missions would 
not help his aim in the peace process. More importantly, to the US and Great Britain 
such actions were interpreted, by them, as deliberate attempts by Hoxha to isolate 
Albania from the West. 19 The immediate result was to bolster the Greek claims as 
evidenced by the Pepper Resolution. [ infra] 
Perhaps still hoping that Hoxha could be kept near the Western orbit, Secretary 
of State Byrnes removed the Resolution from consideration at the Paris Conference. 
Albania, however, still understood that Greece would never wholeheartedly relinquish 
its claims to Northern Epirus. Also, after the war, Greece found itself in the throes of a 
civil war against the communist backed KKE, under the leadership of Nikos 
Zakhariadis. Beginning by late 1944, Hoxha! s partisans had made contact with the 
military wing of the KKE, the ELAS. Hoxha even placed several small units under 
ELAS command. In return ELAS turned over'war criminals'that had fled to Greece 
14 113ID' pp. 511-516. 
15 "Northern Epirus Seeking Union with Grecce", 7he Times 9 February, 1946. 
16 "Greek Claim to Northern Epirus", The I-Imes 17 April, 1946 
17 The Times 5 April, 1946. 
Is The I-Imes 30 May, 1946. 
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prior to the communist take-over in Albania. 19 When the war had ended, the Greek 
government began its call for territory within Albania. After partial recognition was 
given to the provisional government of Hoxha in 1945, over one hundred thousand 
Greeks protested in Athens for the Allies not to recognise Albania nor its present 
boundaries. The KKE however, did not make any mention of territory within Albania, 
for good reason. Resentment towards Albania intensified between 1945 and 1947 
since the KKE and its military, the Democratic Army was being aided by the 
neighbouring nations of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. 
... [TIhe actual military aid given to the 
Democratic Army in the first place was small and mainly 
restricted to food, but its unlimited freedom to flit unhampered across the Albanian border into Greece 
and back again to security whenever harried by the Greek National Guard was of inestimable value. 
This allowed Democratic Army units to raid Greece for food and whatever else they could pick Up. 20 
This prompted two reactions from the Greeks. The first was a series of border 
skirmishes which occurred within Albanian territory throughout 1946-1947, led by 
Greek General Zervas. The second response was the continual demands by Greece for 
the territory within Albania which it called 'Northern Epirue. This area which includes 
the Albanian towns of Korce and qirokaster has a large Greek minority which has 
repeatedly called for incorporation into Greece. With the US now just as firmly 
committed to keeping Greece pro-West and non-communist, the territorial demands 
against communist Albania were treated favourably. This was evident first by the 
Greek foreign Minister Rendis vehemently opposing Albanian entry into the UN until 
the question of 'Northern Epirus' is solved. 21 Rendis also filed an official protest with 
the UN Security Council accusing Hoxha of aiding the communists thereby interfering 
with the internal affairs of the Greek government. The General Assembly created 
commissions to look into the Greek claims. 22 These inquiries confirmed Albania! s aid 
to the KKE and issued a declaration for Albania to cease all such activities. 23 Greek 
19 Hikuban, pp. cit.. p. 630. 
20 Edgar OBallance, 2R cit. p. 124., Marmallaku, (I 975), QR. ci .-p. 
118. L 
21 Pollo and Puto (1981), pp. citp. 255. 
22 The one of primary import was the Special Commission of the United Nations for the Balkans. 
23 Puto (1981), pp. cit p. 258., Hoxha rejected all such declarations and condemnations from the UN 
which he felt were under US and British control. As to the Greek communists, Hoxha continued to aid 
them well into 1949. In fact some Albanian soldiers had joined the Democratic Army in the fighting 
throughout 1948-1949 near Visti on the Greek-Albanian border. Hoxha finally cut aid to the KKE on 
26 August, 1949, believing that the KKE was doomed to failure. Some observers claim that Hoxha 
cut aid fearful that the Greek Army [GNAI may invade Albania with British and American help and 
without Yugoslavia's aid [Albania and Yugoslavia broke ties in July 19481, the Albanian army would 
not be able to repel the attack thereby risk losing territory in the south. This reasoning though fails to 
take the context of the Cold War, then well under way, into account; " ... Hoxha knew that for long the GNA was in no fit condition to look after its own territory, let alone invade Albania, and he also 
believed he was sheltering securely under the Soviet umbrella. He thought that if the GNA lost 
patience and marched into Albania, Soviet troops and those from other Communist Balkan countries 
would rush to his aid. He counted on the USA and Britain restraining Greece from invading Albania, 
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claims received their strongest support from the US Congress itself who, on 29 July, 
1946 passed the Pepper Resolution which put on record, 'the unanimous approval' of 
the US Senate towards awarding the territory to the Greek government. 24 
Realising the problem the issue would bring, US Secretary of State James 
Byrnes managed, one month later, to remove the Resolution from the Paris Foreign 
Ministers Meeting, which Hoxha personally attended. The US policy towards Greece 
vis-a-vis Albania had left its mark however, the act; 
... presented the communist with a potent tool with which to 
build up anti-American sentiment in 
Albania. It also provided them with a convenient excuse to reject on August 13,1946, the American 
stipulation that recognition of all existing bilateral treaties was a prerequisite for the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between the two nations. 25 
The Greek government did attempt some sort of reconciliation with Albania. 
These overtures were rejected by Hoxha who firmly believed that the US and British 
were determined to either award territory to Greece at Albania! s expense and/or 
undermine his regime. He was perhaps not too far from the truth regarding Western 
attitudes towards Albania. By August, 1949, an Albanian soldier deserted and fled to 
Greece. His report on conditions in Albania to the Western press was followed by 
statements which, in many ways, were reflective of both the US and British attitudes, 
and later, actions towards Albania. 
The majority of them were anti-Communist and disaffected, he declared, and were willing to 
revolt against the Enver Hodja [sic] regime if encouraged- From his testimony it is thought 
here that Albania, in her present impoverished and isolated state, could by dint of 
Palmerstonian persuasion from the West be snatched from the Cominform orbit. Greece's 
claims to northern Epirus could then, many here assert, be settled. If northern Epirus had 
been in Greek hands during the past three years, Albanian support for the Communist 
rebellion would have been almost impossible, and many of thousands of Greek lives and 
much British and American treasure would have been saved. 26 
The previous statement typifies the Western posture towards Albania by this time. A 
British anti- Albanian stance was warranted in the wake of the Corfu incident. [see 
below] The US, as well as their attempts to aid the Greek government against the 
communists were testing the Emits of their restraint since the rebels were regrouping 
because it might bring the Soviet Union into the conflict and thus perhaps ignite a world war. " see 
Mallance, oxit. - pp. 193-200., For initial reports on the Greek-Albanian border and guerilla 
disputes see, "Greece and Her Neighbours", 7he Economist vol. 152 31 (May, 1947): p. 839., on the 
discovery of base camps in Albania and the call for a UN international force ready to use military 
force against Albania, "Calling a Halt in Greece", The Economist vol. 152 (17 January, 1948): p. 87., 
"Albania-The Bad Neighbour", The Economist vol. 156 (16 April, 1949): p. 700. 
24 LogoreCi, op. Cit.: p. 90., for text see, "United States Congressional Record Seventy-Ninth Congress, 
Second session XCIII Part 8", (Washington: US Government Printing Office): p. 10336. 
25 Pano (1968), 2p-. cit., pp. 70-71. 
26 The Times 29 August, 1949. 
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and refitting themselves in Albania. The Greek territorial claims as well and the Greek 
minority in Southern Albania would also be the cause of continual strained relations 
between the two nations and further push Albania from the West. The two even 
maintained a 'state of war'towards each other well into the 1980s, an anomaly since, 
Greece was invaded by Italy through Albania in 1940.27 
1.2 Yhe Corfu Incident 
The second event involved the British and two of its warships. In May, 1946, 
British ships had sailed through the narrow waterway between the Greek island of 
Corfu and the Albanian coast. Albanian shore batteries fired upon the ships causing no 
damage or injury. After a formal apology to Great Britain, Albania informed the 
British that the area within three miles would be considered Albanian territorial waters. 
The British rejected this claim stating that the Corfu Channel [less than three miles in 
some areas], constituted international waters. Deciding it would test its resolve, the 
British destroyers Volage and Saumarez sailed through the channel on 22 October, 
1946 and struck nines in the channel, resulting in the loss of forty-four lives. Britain 
charged that Albania had mined the channel. The Albanians rejected the charge. Taking 
their case to the UN Security Council, the Council found in favour of Britain by a 
seven to two vote. However, the Soviet veto28 in the Security Council prevented any 
action from being taken against Albania. The British then took their case to the 
International Court of Justice at The Hague. The Court, presided over by Dr. 
Gueffera of El Salvador listened to the charges beginning on 26, February, 1948. 
Although actual proof that Albania had laid the mines was not presented, the Albanians 
were found guilty of violating a 'duty of care'by a eleven to five vote. TheCourthad 
awarded damages to the British in the amount of 4844,947. The Albanians refused to 
pay, prompting the US and British to impound approximately 7,100 kilos of Albanian 
27 The Greek Civil war coincided with Yugoslavia! s expulsion from COMINFORM [June, 1948]. The 
US and Great Britain tried to reconcile Greek-Yugoslav relations seeking to counter Soviet influence 
in the region. Albania! s role stemmed from its aid to the KKE guerrillas. According to reports, the 
Greek government submitted to Washington, in April, 1949 a proposal suggesting a military 
operation in Albania, in the event of satellite or Soviet aggression against Tito. By August, however, 
US and British opposition to the plan and their threats of a 'review of policy towards Greece entirely', 
should it act unilaterally on such a plan made the latter drop it. "The Western powers, although not 
happy at all with the situation in Albania, were concerned not only with possible Soviet reactions but 
also with the repercussions a Greek invasion might have on Belgrade's attitude towards Greece and 
the West. " See, loannis Stefanidis, "United States, Great Britain and the Greek-Yugoslav 
Rapprochement, 1949-1950", Balkan Studiesvol. 27 (1986): p. 324. 
28 The veto caused the British to amend their initial resolution which now claimed that Albania, even 
if it did not lay the mines, must have known of their existence and, therefore, had a duty of care in 
reporting such knowledge. The veto by the Soviets was initiated and defended by their representative 
to the UN, Andrei Gromyko. See, "The Corfu Strait Appeal", The Economist vol. 152 (15 March, 
1947): pp. 370-371., "The Veto Protects Albania", The Economist 29 vol. 152 (29 March, 1947): 
p. 448. 
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gold looted by the Nazis and held by the post-war Tripartite Commission of the US, 
Great Britain and France. The British and Albanians remained at an impasse over the 
gold and damages for nearly five decades. The matter was finally resolved in May, 
1992.29 
Corfu would severe all ties with little chance of resumption between Albania 
and the WeSt. 30 The British and Americans though should have known that, regarding 
Corfu, Albania could not have been liable. In 7he Albanians, Anton Logoreci states 
the British and US failed to take into account, 'the harsh political realities of the 
situation'. By 1946, Albania was a 'vassal' of Yugoslavia, not a sovereign state. With 
that being so, it was doubtful that mines could have been laid without Tito's 
knowledge. 31 This may contain some truth to it since by this time Tito was having 
problems with the Allies over his demands for territory in Trieste and for his and 
Hoxha! s apprehension of strong Western support for anti-Communist forces in 
neighbouring Greece. Fearful of a potential Western attempt against Yugoslavia or 
Albania may have led to mining the channel to forestall such action. The Soviet 
ambassador to Albania immediately after the war, Dimitri Chuvakhin would afterwards 
state both expressly and implicitly that the Albanians, 'had neither the means nor the 
opportunity', to mine the channel. He also accused the US and Great Britain of 
'incessantly harassing! Albania in the difficult years after the war. 32 Regardless of 
apportioning blame, the incident set Albania upon its course of isolation from the 
WeSt. 33 
1.3 Intelligence OperatiOns 
The only other involvement in Albania by both the British and Americans was 
during the years, 1949-1954. During this period British SOE had transferred its covert 
operations to M16. The US had replaced OSS first with the Central Intelligence Group 
in 1946 [CIG], which a year later became the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. Co- 
ordinated activity between the two was aimed at fighting the Cold War. The British 
with their historic knowledge of Europe and intelligence gathering ability were. given 
the first opportunity. Albania was chosen by M16 as a likely candidate for covert 
29 By 8 May, 1992 the Commonwealth Office announced its intention of returning the Albanian gold, 
now estimated at. 40,000,000. In return, the Albanian government would pay Z1,100,000. For an 
account of Corfu see, Halliday, gp. cit.: pp. 345-346., Logoreci, gp. pt - pp. 90-91., Marmallaku (1975), 
pp. cit. l, pp. 115-116. 
30 Corfu would, more importantly, sevcrly limit Albania's prospects for entry to the UN. See, "The 
Corfu Strait Affair", The Economistvol. 152 (18 January, 1947): p. 99. 
31 Logoreci, m. -cit. 
- p. 92. 
32 Dimitri Chuvakhin, *Star Hours in Soviet-Albanian Relations", Internafional Affairs (August, 
199 1): p. 132. 
33 Pollo and Puto (1981), pp. cit. * p. 260. 
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activity. The British, with American financing, gathered many escaped Albanian 
6migres and began to train them with the idea of sending them back to Albania and try 
to topple the Hoxha regime. 34 The various emigres were trained abroad in Cyprus, 
Malta and Germany by the British and were to depart from Italy and Greece. The first 
attempt was a seaborne landing in October, 1949. Further operations were undertaken 
by the British in both 1950 and 1951 but all missions failed miserably. The US 
continued to make attempts up to 1954, yet none led to any success in overthrowing or 
fomenting unrest towards the Hoxha regime. Several reasons accounted for the failure 
of Anglo-American covert activity. The most acceptable and most frequently used 
explanation was the betrayal of the missions by Harold [Kim] Philby, a Soviet spy who 
had successfully infiltrated M16 and had access to CIA-MI6 covert activity. This 
reason however, is not of primary importance. The US and British had failed to 
adequately co-ordinate activity, disagreeing frequently over tactics of covert action in 
Albania. 35 A more important factor were the Albanian imigr6s themselves. Those 
chosen had little in common with each other. Some were remnants of the national 
Balli Kombetar while others were Zogistas or northern clan leaders or members. With 
no plan as to what to do if successful, the only commonality these men had was that 
they were all anti-Hoxha, hardly the material necessary for such an undertaking since 
they constantly bickered among themselves. 36 The poorly equipped emigres, even 
without the Philby betrayal had little chance for success against a regime and people 
that were instilled with the belief that external forces were at work with designs to 
destroy the Albanian nation and distribute it to its neighbours. 37 
From the end of the war up until the end of American covert activity in Albania 
[1954], the US and British deliberately missed their opportunity to bring Albania 
within the Western camp or at the very least, to keep Hoxha pro-West. During the 
war their willingness to deal with the communists against the fascists was now 
transformed into a narrow 'black or white' approach. They failed to see that 
immediately after the war Hoxha and others, specifically SejfuUa Maleshova and Dr. 
Dishnica [the former a Politburo member, the latter, Minister of Health], had leanings 
towards the West hoping to preserve Albania! s independence from both Greece and 
Yugoslavia, the latter which had designs for Albania as either part of Yugoslavia as a 
Pollo and Puto (1981), QP. cit,: p. 265., Hikuban, 2P. ci , Ho (1982), git L xha 2p 34 see Smiley, 2g-. cit 
Foot, M. cit.., see also, Bennett Kovrig, The M th offiberation: East-Central Europe in 
DiplomM and Politics Since 1941 (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins, 1973): pp. 96-98. 
35 Dravis, W. -CAL 
Smiley, M. cit, Pollo and Puto (1981), QP. ci! L- p. 265. 
q, see also Christopher Grayling 36 Conversations with Messrs-Genc and Isat Bajraktari, Dravis, M. ci 
and Christopher Langdon, JustAnother Star? Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (London: 
Harrap, 1988): pp. 69-71., Halliday, gn--cit,. p. 83. 
37 it is also inevitable that small nations which for centuries were ruled by alien conquerors.... should 
be extremely sensitive about their national independence! "Communists and Nationalism", The 
Economi vol. 152 24 (May, 1947): p. 799. 
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republic or part of a larger Balkan Federation. Tito's designs on Albania naturally 
made him stand against any attempt by Hoxha to seek or gain formal recognition from 
the US or Great Britain. 38 The West's pressure on Albania and the latter's opposition 
to anything it believed was a threat to its territorial integrity left Hoxha with little 
recourse. Surrounded by nations that have always had territorial ambitions within 
Albania forced Hoxha into the arms of Tito and Yugoslavia. This relationship was 
cemented after a delegation led by Hoxha and the pro-Yugoslav Albanian Minister of 
the Interior, Koci Xoxe went to Belgrade and signed the Treaty of Mutual Friendship 
and Co-operation with Yugoslavia on 9 July, 1946. The irony of the entire post-war 
era regarding US relations with Albania [or lack thereof], was that, following the 
Yugoslav break with Moscow in 1948, Yugoslavia was seen at the very least a non- 
aligned nation within the Eastern bloc and at best, a pro-Western communist nation 
within the bloc, a position Albania could have filled immediately after the war. Hoxha 
and the Albanian people's desire was first and foremost to remain a nation-state, 
something it was constantly fighting for throughout its history. This sense of 
nationalism among the Albanians superseded any communist ideology. A factor which 
the West failed to recognise. 
2.0 THE SUB-SATELLITE ST47US V7S-A-V1S YUGOSLAVIA (1946-1948) 
With the deepening rift between Albania and the West, Hoxha became more 
preoccupied with protecting Albania! s independence. Aware that Tito and Bulgarian 
communist leader G. Dimitrov had discussed plans for a Balkan Federation which 
would include Albania, Hoxha had to contend with pro-Yugoslav sympathisers within 
the ACP. Among the most powerful was Minister of the Interior, Koci Xoxe. Hoxha 
was unable to turn towards the West for assistance. 1-fis attempts to contact the Soviet 
Union were subtly deflected, the latter preferring to contact Albania by way of 
Yugoslavia. With the large role the YCP played in helping to create the ACP and the 
Soviets conveying their messages to Hoxha via the YCP throughout the war, it was 
not difficult to imagine that most within the communist camp saw the Albanian 
communist party as the'fledglingý offshoot of the YCP. With nowhere else to turn and 
38Skendi(1956), 29--cit. ' pp. 307-308., The evidence that Hoxha may have been pro-west is based 
upon two significant events. First was a cable sent from the British Embassy in Washington to the 
Foreign Office on 5 December, 1944: 'OSS has recently been trying to persuade the State Department 
to adopt a more encouraging attitude towards Hoxha on the ground that besides being independcnt of 
the political fight at present, he is neither a Communist nor a fellow traveler and is sincerely anxious 
to establish a westward orientation for Albania. [FO report 371/435541 The second was immediately 
after the war when Hoxha, speaking to a youth communist group said that the liberation of Albania 
would not have been made possiblewithout the US and Great Britain and the leadership of Churchill 
and Roosevelt. 
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fearful of losing power, Albania and Hoxha bowed to the pro-Yugoslav faction of 
Xoxe and signed the Treaty of Friendship in July, 1946. The pact; 
... provided 
for the establishment of an agency to coordinate the economic plans of the signatories, for 
the standardization of the Albanian and Yugoslav monetary systems, and for the creation of a 
common price system and customs union between the two nations. The two economic systems were 
merged for all practical purposes. 39 
Albania soon found itself flooded with Yugoslav economic and military advisors and 
specialists of various fields whose aim was to quicken the pace for incorporation into 
Yugoslavia. Albania's 'alliance' with Yugoslavia Was certainly not one based upon 
equal footing nor as one ofjunior partner to senior but rather as a sub-satellite. This 
became evident by September, 1947 at the creation meeting of COMINFORM. 
Albania was not invited to this meeting since it was felt that they were adequately 
represented by Yugoslavia. 40 
Relations between the two nations began to sour immediately. The joint 
economic policy began to take its toll on the Albanian economy. Many within the 
leadership openly voiced their protest of 'imperialist' designs by Tito aimed at 
benefiting Yugoslavia at Albania! s expense. 41 The situation began to deteriorate 
rapidly by the Summer of 1947. In June, Tito addressed the ACP and criticised it for 
its anti-Yugoslav posture. He based his remarks on two related events that occurred 
earlier in the year. The first involved the visit to Belgrade in April by Nako Spiru, 
Chairman of the Albanian State Planning Commission. Spiru was dispatched to 
Yugoslavia to ease the increasing tensions between the two nations and to receive a 
pledge of economic assistance from Tito so that Albania could invest in her fight and 
petroleum industries. The Yugoslavs refused to pledge anything until the Albanians 
agreed to the formation of a joint commission with aims to further consolidate the 
Yugoslav-Albanian economies. Spiru was also informed that assistance would still 
arrive from Yugoslavia even in the event of a change of government in Tirana. Tito 
proposed that a secret pact be drawn up to ensure such a situation, should it arise. 
Spiru rejected the plans by Yugoslavia sensing that they were aimed at destroying the 
Albanian nation. This incensed the Yugoslav leadership which then contacted its 
people within the Tirana leadership, namely the Xoxe faction, and its chief 
collaborator, Pandi Kristo, and began plans for the removal of the Hoxha clique. Upon 
his return and report to the ACP, Hoxha rejected the Yugoslav proposals. Hoxha 
though realised that he could not openly attack the Xoxe faction and risk his own 
39 pano (1968), ov. cit.: p. 73. 
40 Marmallaku (1975), W. pi : t. 1 p. 120. 
41 The Yugoslavs objected to any Albanian economic planning, believing that Albania's 'task! was to 
furnish Yugoslavia with raw materials. "Albania and Tito", The Economist vol. 156 (1 January, 
1949): p. 22, 
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removal. By May, 1947 Xoxe called for the removal of nine members of the Popular 
Assembly accused of plotting against the state, namely in anti-Yugoslav activity. 
Notable among these was Maleshova. Xoxe also succeeded in having Shehu removed 
from his post as Army Chief of Staff and having himself placed as chief of the Sigurimi 
[Security Police]. With Yugoslav assistance, Xoxe was able to place himself second in 
the leadership behind only Hoxha. The second event was the Hoxha visit to Belgrade 
in June, 1947. Tito informed Hoxha that relations between the two nations should be 
strengthened to prevent a potential infringement by the Western powers. Hoxha 
however, realised that Tito's plans for a Balkan Federation would not involve Albania 
in any other role than of an integrated part of Yugoslavia, its sovereignty sacrificed. 
Hoxha also saw the threat to himself when at a formal state dinner, the place of honour 
was reserved not for Hoxha, but for Xoxe. 42 When, in the same month Tito criticised 
the ACP, the charges were rejected. By this time, leading Albanian intellectuals openly 
condemned Yugoslavia and anti-Yugoslav rhetoric was evident in both public and 
private circles. 43 Following the Yugoslav visit Hoxha paid a ten day visit to Moscow 
and met with Stalin. The two discussed the situation in Albania and the status of 
relations vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. Stalin apparently informed Hoxha that the Soviet Union 
was in favour of Albanian independence and that she should protect herself in relations 
with other states. As a result of the meeting; 
... Albania was granted a credit of 
US $6 million on rather easy terms. The credit covered some 
specific agreements on supplies. Simultaneously hundreds of Soviet specialists were dispatched to 
Albania to organise and supervise the construction of a number of economic projects. 44 
The Yugoslavs were indignant at the Albanians for not receiving prior approval before 
taking the trip to Moscow. They had demanded a copy of the economic agreement text 
and saw the ties with the USSR as an anti-Yugoslav gesture. This prompted more 
recriminations from Tito in July, 1947. The Xoxe faction placed the blame on Spiru, 
and called for him to appear to the Politburo to defend himself. Spiru turned to Hoxha 
for help. The latter would not, or more accurately, could not since doing so would run 
the risk of a direct confrontation with Xoxe at a time when Hoxha was not fully 
prepared. Spiru, apparently despondent, committed suicide by November, 1947.45 
42 Logorcci, M. cit, pp. 94-96., Pano (1968), op. cit. ' p. 75., Pollo and Puto (1981), Qp. cil.: p. 261. 
43 Pano (1968), gpxit., p. 77., see also, "Lufta c Partise se Punes se Shqiperise Kundcr Nderhydcs 
Armiqesore te Udheheqjes Revizioniste te L. K. J. ne Punet Brendeshme te Vendit Tone [The Struggle 
of the Albanian Party of Labour Against the Unfriendly Intervention of the Revisionist Leadership of 
the Y. L. C. Into the Internal Affairs of Our Country", (Tirana: Nentori, 1958) 
44 Chuvakhin, qpxLit., pp. 133-134. 
45 Pollo and Puto (1981), 2p-xit-, p. 262. , The situation between Stalin, Tito, and Hoxha was part of a 
larger scheme involving the struggle for leadership and power in the Balkans after the war. At first, 
Stalin supposedly approved of a plan for a Balkan Pact led by Tito, protected by the USSR thereby 
securing Soviet access to the Mediterranean. By the beginning of 1946, Tito's visit to Moscow first 
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The suicide of Spiru was brought up by Stalin when, in January of 1948 
Milovan Djilas journeyed to Moscow. Stalin questioned the 'special relationship' 
between the Albanians and Yugoslavs when one of the former's top leaders takes his 
own life. It was at this meeting that Stalin and Molotov expressed no objection to 
Yugoslavia 'swallowing up'Albania. Djilas objected to the use of the term and stated 
that Yugoslavia sought only to incorporate Albania into joint plans. With the growing 
rift between the Yugoslavs and Stalin, Djilas sensed that a trap was being set by the 
Soviet leader. 46 By the time of the Eighth Plenum of the Albanian Communist Party 
[26 February -8 March, 1948], it appeared as if the Xoxe faction would seize power. 
To keep his position as General-Secretary of the party, Hoxha had to admit his past 
wrongs. Xoxe also succeeded in having Liri Belishova, widow of Spiru and a 
prominent party member removed from the party as well as having Shehu dropped as a 
candidate from the Central Committee. Together with the Yugoslav emissary sent to 
Tirana, Savo Zllatic, Xoxe made plans to merge the economies and armed forces of the 
two nations. At the scheduled Politburo meeting of April, 1948, he was to formally 
apply Albania for membership within the Yugoslav Federation. 47 At the Politburo 
meeting Xoxe failed to get his proposal approved. The growing tensions between 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were causing a great deal of anti-Yugoslav feelings 
within Albania. By June, 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from COMINFORM and the 
Soviet bloc. 
News of the expulsion was received with great jubilation by Hoxha and some of his 
colleagues. Immediately afterwards, the Albanian government repudiated all its economic 
agreements with Yugoslavia on the grounds that they were incompatible with national 
sovereignty-, expelled all Yugoslav specialists and advisors, and set in motion a frantic press 
and radio propaganda campaign against Tito. 48 
The Yugoslav specialists were quickly replaced by Soviet ones who concluded 
an economic agreement with Albania in September, 1948. Feeling secure in his 
raised the Xoxe-Hoxha rift and the charges by Albania of Yugoslav activity there. Tito informed 
Stalin he doubted Hoxha's leadership and that he would keep Stalin informed of developments. A 
year later, Edvard Karde1j, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister was informed by Stalin of charges by 
Hoxha against the Yugoslavs. The USSR had recognised the special relationship between the 
Albanians and Yugoslavs and were anxious not to distance Tito since it might jeopardise the 
scheduled creation meeting of the COMINFORK see, Logoreci, op. cit.: p. 95., Pano (1968), op. cit.: 
p. 77. 
46 Nfilovan Djilas, Conversations ff Ith Stalin (New York, New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 
1962): pp. 13 5-145. 
47 LogoreCi, L)p. Cit.: p. 99., Pollo and Puto (198 1), QRcit'. - pp. 262-263., see also, Foto Cami, Partia 
Komuniste e Shqipefise ne Lufte per Rimekembien e Vendit dhe per Zhvillimin C Meteishem le 
Revolucionit. 1945-1948 LThe Albanian Communist &M in the Struggle for the Rehabilitation of the 
Nation and for the OrdeLly Development ofthe Revolution, 1945-19487 (Tirana: Instituti i Historise 
sc Partise, 1958): pp. 15. 
48 Logoreci, pp. cit. - pp. 99-100. 
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position, Hoxha now launched an attack upon the opposition. At the Eleventh Plenum 
Meeting, [mid-September, 1948], Shehu, Belishova and others wrongly purged were 
reinstated to their previous posts. Xoxe was removed as Interior Minister and at first 
made Minister of Industry. At the plenum the ACP also approved a name change to 
the Albanian Party of Labour [APL]. The minor punishment of Xoxe apparently was 
due to Hoxha seeking Stalin's approval for meting out 'propee punishment. When this 
was received Hoxha removed Xoxe and his faction from the party entirely. At a secret 
trial in May, 1949, Xoxe was found guilty and executed. 
The break from Yugoslavia moved Albania out of sub-satellite status into that 
of a formal satellite of the USSR. For their part, the Soviets now had someone close 
enough to Tito to cause harassment and concern as well as access to the Adriatic and 
Mediterranean. 49 It also provided Stalin with a formal excuse to dismiss the idea of a 
Balkan Federation which would move Tito to a position within the world communist 
movement on par with Stalin. More importantly, the Soviets were able to continue 
exercising their influence in the Balkans. The extension of such influence has been part 
and parcel of Russian aims since the time of the czars. The break with Yugoslavia did 
more than highlight an early rift within the communist bloc. By parting with the 
Soviets, Yugoslavia not only limited Russian access to warm water ports, it more 
significantly severed historic ties between the Russians and Yugoslavia's largest ethnic 
group, the Serbs. It has been these ties and kinship among Russians and Serbs, both 
Slavs, which most likely made the USSR welcome links with Albania, thereby 
compensating for its loss in Yugoslavia. Moreover, it offered the Soviets continued 
presence and an opportunity to further it influence in the Balkans, something it 
presently is maintaining. Although formal ties with Yugoslavia were limited following 
the break, present Russian efforts at attempting to influence the outcome of the current 
crisis demonstrate both the renewed kinship with the Serbs and Russian measures to 
assure itself influence in an area the latter strongly feels is within its sphere of 
concern. 10 
49 A'principle objective of Soviet policy'. "A Year of Titoism", The Economist vol. 156 (2 July, 
1949): p. 7., Vladimir Dedijer, "Albania, A Soviet Pawn", Foreign A ffairs vol. 30 #I (October, 195 1): 
pp. 103-111. 
50 For view on historic Russian aims see; Thomas Anthem, "Russia in the Mediterranean", 
Contemporary Review vol. 212 #1226 (March, 1968); 'Throughout the nineteenth century, and down 
to the outbreak of the second world war, it was Great Britain's determined policy to keep Russia out of 
the Mediterranean. ' at p. 132., and, Barbara Jelavich, gp. cit ' In foreign relations the adoption by the 
Soviet Union of an active policy in European affairs .... forced the Balkan governments to adjust their 
attitudes to the changed relationships of the great powers [after W. W. 11.... With the recovery from 
these shocks .... Russia [was] ... 
in a position to exert a strong influence on the thirteen small countries 
that stretched from the Baltic to the Moditcrranean... ' at p. 192., and, Kissinger (1994), 2p. cit. -' , As Austria grew more and more dependent on Russia, Mettcrnich's most perplexing question became 
how long his appeals to the Tsar's conservative principles could restrain Russia from exploiting its 
opportunities in the Balkans .... Nicolas I was enraged that Napoleon 111, whom he regarded as an illegitimate upstart, should presume to step into Russia's shoes as protector of the Balkan Slavs... ' at 
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For Hoxha, the alliance with Moscow preserved the territorial integrity of 
Albania. 51 The alliance was prompted by nationalistic tendencies on the part of the 
Albanians. The USSR offered Albania a protector who was not directly adjacent to 
Albanian territory and who could provide far more aid than Yugoslavia. The revolt 
against the latter was as Pano states, 'fostered by nationalism. 52 Indeed, Albania and 
Hoxha had fought for the territorial integrity of the nation and were willing to ally 
themselves with those that would ensure independence even if within the framework of 
a Soviet satellite. Logoreci claims that indeed; 
... the 
initial impulse that drove the Albanian leaders into a close alliance with the Soviet Union was 
neither any special love for Moscow nor even an afrinity with Stalin! s methods of government, but 
nationalism pure and simple. 53 
The communist regimes of the Balkans were theoretically united under the 
socialist umbrella. The idea of a Balkan Pact was not new. It had been entertained as a 
unification of communist groups in the Balkans throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Yet 
nationalist feelings were to overcome socialist brotherhood, especially in Albania 
where 'Albanian Socialism! was used to rally support for Albania, a nation whose 
sovereignty was constantly being challenged for centuries. Support for 'Albania! as 
Albania was paramount. If it was the APL which could ensure this then it would 
receive backing. This mode of reasoning would be the guiding force for Albanian 
foreign policy throughout the Hoxha regime, alliances with those that respected and 
offered assistance which would preserve Albanian independence. 54 
3.0 A SOVIET SATELLITE [1948-1961] 
With the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, Albania not only served 
as a propaganda base in the Balkans, but, also became of strategic importance. This 
was due to access to the Mediterranean and, after Greece and Turkey's entry into 
NATO [February, 1952], as a counter-weight to NATO's 'southern flanle. Hoxha 
though still believed both he and Albania were in a precarious position. While the 
pp. 91-93., and, on the view that ties do still exist between Russia and the Serbs vis-a-vis the present 
crisis see; Kemal Kurspahic, The International Herald Tribune I December, 1994 'All well-intcnded 
resolutions and initiatives in the name of unity ofthe alliance and the contact group- which includes 
Russia, the Serbs' main ally- turn out to be window dressing for a collection of failures. ', and, Laura 
Silber, The Financial Times 30 November, 1994 'Mr. Mrko Pcjanovic, an ethnic Scrb member of 
Bosnia's collective presidency, disclosed in London that he had been in touch with aides to Mr. 
Andrei Kozyrcy, the Russian foreign minister. ' 
51 "Albania in Isolation", The Economist vol. 158 (13 May, 1950): p. 1069. 
52 Pano (1968), gp. cit.: p. 86. 
53 Logoreci, Qp-. cit.: p. 101. 
54 Hoxha Used his popularity, 'however, nationalism rather than Marxism-Leninism was the primary 
force that allowed him to create a fairly solid social base for his programme'. Glenny (1992), 
p. 150. 
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Soviets made guarantees to Hoxha on preserving Albania! s territory, it was both a 
blessing and curse that Albania shared no common border with the USSR. To the 
north, Yugoslavia, from 1950 on, began to make overtures to the west, particularly the 
US. To the south, with the Greek civil war in full swing, the northern Epirus question 
threatened Albania. In both cases Hoxha became wary that the US, and the strong 
anti-Communist posture embodied within the Truman Doctrine made his position and 
Albania! s, tenuous at best. 
Hoxha was not sure of his future. In the Spring of 1949 he had secretly asked Britain and the 
United States to grant him diplomatic recognition. It was rcfuseAi Important for the United 
States, however, was the fear that any move to upset the Albanian regime-whethcr inspired 
by the West or not-might be used by Moscow as an excuse to go to its rescue, to accuse 
Yugoslavia of expansionist aims toward her small ncighbour and to take violent action 
against Tito. Since the West wished to avoid the possibility of a world NNw arising from such 
an action, the United States appeared wary of seeking a change in the delicate Albanian 
situation. 55 
Hoxha's secret overture to the West may have arisen from three factors. First, 
realising that the US was backing the anti-Communist forces in Greece and granting 
economic aid to Yugoslavia, Hoxha was wise to the fact that without formal 
recognition from the West, Albania! s territorial integrity was suspect and subject to a 
variety of claims which the West may endorse. Also, although the US was perhaps not 
willing to subscribe to military action and risk Soviet intervention, this did not preclude 
it from endorsing, aiding, and later conducting covert activity aimed at Hoxha himself. 
An overture to the West would secure his and Albania! s position. 56 Second, Albania! s 
inter-bloc relations were not on a level of equality. Although, in the early months of 
1949, several communist bloc nations sent aid aimed at improving the Albanian 
economy, Albania was not invited to the second 'significant' communist bloc meeting, 
the formation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance [COMECON], in 
January, 1949. Albania did join COMECON yet still was not treated with the same 
level of importance as the others, a fact which would be revealed later when 
Khrushchev took power. 57 Third was Albania! s relations with the Soviet Union herself 
Between 1949 and 1953, Albania! s internal problems were quite evident in the amount 
55 Skendi, (1956), M. cit.., Kertesz, gpLcit. * pp. 311-312. 
56 see Pano, (1968), 2p. cit.: p. 91., on the overture to the West. Dravis, Qp. cit.., on covert activity and its 
failure. For a contradictory stance from the US side, H. Leman by 1951 told the Commission on 
Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate; 'the battle ofnerves againstAlbania can be considered 
lost. I Yet by this time, the US still conducted anti-Albanian propaganda such as, 'dropping leaflets 
over Albania!, and gathering anti-Communist dmigrds for US led covert activity still to come [1953- 
19541 see, Pollo and Puto (1981), 22cit., p. 266. 
57 There was no official explanation why Albania was not present at the initial COMECON meeting, 
yM Marmallaku offers a reasonable interpretation when he states; '... the Soviet Union was probably 
not interested in inviting Albania, since it did not border with the USSR and was the most backward 
of all the countries in the communist bloc'. Marmallaku (1975), pXxit. ý, p. 121. 
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of aid required to keep the nation functioning. This 'dependency', it was thought may 
lead to a subservience which would undermine independence. Skendi admits that once 
the alliance with Moscow took hold; " An important role in the change of control was 
played by the Soviet Minister in Tirana, Dimitri Chuvakhin, The Albanian Government 
Was under his orders. "58 Also, to counter Western sea power, the Soviets had by 1950 
designed plans to reactivate the Nazi- wartime submarine base on the island of Sazan 
in the Bay of Vlora, less than fifty miles from Italy. By 1952, the base became 
operational and housed twelve W-class Soviet subs and support craft. 59 Although the 
Soviets spent nearly $30 million on development and maintenance of the base between 
1950 and 1960, their inherent lack of confidence in the Albanian leadership prevented 
them from large scale development of the base, thereby turning it into a major base of 
operations in the Mediteffanean. 150 Albania, facing food shortages, high levels of 
inflation, widespread illiteracy, unemployment, general impoverishment and hostile 
neighbours had little choice but the 'Faustian alliance' with Moscow. Whileitis 
debatable that nationalism is not found in the unswerving obedience to another, Hoxha 
and the APL were able to preserve, by cunning, guile and a great deal of luck, 
Albania! s borders. If national preservation meant, presently, satellite status to Moscow 
then so be it. Bulgaria, arguably the most loyal and subservient bloc nation for quite 
some time did not lose its 'Bulgarian! identity while within the Soviet sphere. 61 
Albania also, though highly influenced by Moscow and guided by it in policyrnaking, 
did not lose touch with its Albanian national identity. Indeed, even Albanian anti- 
Communists would not admit that their identity as 'Albanians'was lost when, during 
the Zogu regime throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Albania was quite literally, a vassal 
of Italy. For Hoxha and the APL Albanian nationalism and communism were 
compatible as 'Albanian socialisne, even if protected by Moscow. By the time severe 
internal difficulties were alleviated in late 1953, a new series of challenges would 
threaten Albania and her relationship with the Soviets. 
Concern from immediate neighbours was heightened in 1953. It was in 
February of that year that the nations of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey signed the 
Balkan Pact Treaty on Friendship and Collaboration. 62 The pact also included the 
clause which allowed the communist member nations to join if they broke from the 
Soviet Union. Hoxha denounced the pact calling it an American imperialist plot to 
58 Kertesz, W. cit.: p. 312. 
59 Pano (1968), gRxit.: p. 90., see also, Dokumenta Krvesore te Partise se Punes se Shgipefise 
LlLnýndpal Documents of theAlbanian Party Wabourl (Tirana: Instituti I 11istorise, 1970) 
60 Pano (1968), gpxit.: p. 91., for Soviet aims see, Thomas Anthem (1968), W. Clit - 132-137. ý, pp. 61 This was especially true during the 1970s when Zhikov, '... began to permit the development of a 
much stronger Bulgarian national consciousness ... 
', Glenny (1993), pp.! JtI; p. 168. 
62 Skendi (1956), M. 
-cit. - 
p316., On the belief that the pact invitation to join represented a piece of 
I psychological warfare', "Liberation without Fears? ", The Economist vol. 166 (21 February, 1953): 
p. 470. 
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overthrow the regime and points to the Foreign Ministers meeting of the pact 
signatories on II July, 1953, where, they declared Albania, 'an important element for 
peace and stability in the Balkane. 63 Worried that the pact represented implicit if not 
official US blessings for Greek and Yugoslav territorial designs on Albania, Hoxha 
pleaded with Moscow to make specific guarantees for Albania! s safety. 64 This 
Moscow did by first raising their diplomatic missions in Tirana from the ministerial to 
the embassy level in August, 1952. This was followed, more significantly, by Albania! s 
entry into the Warsaw Pact on 14 May, 1955. Hoxha! s fears would be allayed for the 
moment now that military assurances were provided by the pact. Of equal concern for 
Hoxha was when on 5 March, 1953, Joseph Stalin, the protector of Albania and its 
ideological mentor died. The new Soviet leadership soon found that the obedience 
provided to it by Albania would lessen greatly as its policies were increasingly seen as 
new threats to Albania! s independence. 
3.1 Yhe Khrushchev Years 
Following the death of Stafin, the USSR quickly sought to heal any divisions 
within the bloc and among the communist nations. This became evident when 
Moscow pressured Tirana to seek rapprochement with Yugoslavia. With little choice 
Albania and Belgrade resumed partial diplomatic relations by December, 1953.65 
Hoxha understood that although Albania traded more freely with other nations within 
the communist bloc, Albania's economy was still heavily dependent upon the USSR. 66 
Taking advantage of the leadership struggle in the USSR and since polemics had yet 
come into the open, Hoxha used the opportunity to search elsewhere for aid. By 
October, 1954 Albania signed a series of cultural and scientific agreements with China. 
The latter also presented a commodities and loan gift to Albania beginning in 1955.67 
This marked the first overtures between the two nations that were to be of importance 
later. 
The turning point in Soviet-Albanian relations, however, came about in April- 
May, 1955. At the Central Committee meeting of the APL [April 1955], the deputy 
Prime Minister Tuk Jakova and Minister of Education Bedri Spahiu openly criticised 
the course of the nation. They were branded 'revisionists! and pro-Yugoslav, 
63 IBID, p. 317. 
64 At this time, Marshal Papagos of Greece maintained Greek claims to Epirus but also stated that 
Greece wishes an independent Albania on its border. See, "Outpost on the Adriatic", The Economist 
vol. 168 (18 July, 1953): pp. 181-182. 
65 Pano, (1968) Qp. cit.. p. 113. 
66 Evgeny Glovinsky, "Soviet-Albanian Economic Relations", Studies on the Soviet Union vol. 11 #2 
(February, 1962), By 1957 the USSR accounted for approximately, sixty-three percent of Albanian 
exports and made up nearly fifty percent of her imports. at p. 70. 
67 pano (1968), M. cit. * p. 115. 
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eventually relieved of all official duties. 61 The following month, Khrushchev and 
Bulganin paid a visit to Belgrade in an attempt to normalise relations between Tito and 
Moscow. Speaking at Belgrade, Khrushchev expressed regret that relations between 
Yugoslavia and the USSR had soured after the former's expulsion from the 
in 1948. Lavrenti Beria, Stalin! s security chief [purged and executed in 
1954], was blamed for disrupting relations between the two nations. After his trip to 
Belgrade Khrushchev called for the full normalisation of ties between Albania and 
Yugoslavia and for the rehabilitation of Xoxe. Hoxha refused to comply. 
'With fresh memories of Yugoslav domination before 1948, Hoxha apparently 
feared that Khrushchev and Tito might reach an understanding giving the latter a free 
hand in Albania... 69 Hoxha! s concerns became more pronounced following the 
Twentieth Party Conference of the Soviet Union in February, 1956. The denunciation 
of Stalin and the cult of personality was a severe blow to Hoxha and the APL which 
now faced similar charges from both outside and within the party. At the Third Party 
Congress of Albania, however, Hoxha was able to put down the opposition and purge 
the remnants of the Jakova-Spahiu clique and their excessive pro-Soviet tendencies 
while simultaneously gaining a vote of confidence from the Central Committee. The 
apparent popularity that Hoxha had enjoyed immediately after the war had waned 
significantly in ten years. The move toward the USSR had not delivered the economic 
prosperity Albania had hoped for. Instead, heavy industrialisation coupled with non- 
existent currency reserves, bad weather and poor crop yields embittered both the 
population and led to internal divisions such as the Jakova-Spahiu faction. Hoxha 
believed that the latter's embrace of Khrushchev and his more moderate, anti-Stalin 
principles would lead most likely to rapprochement with Yugoslavia and, eventually, 
Hoxha's ouster. 70 
Wile Soviet aid to Albania continued from 1956 onwards, 71 Hoxha expressed 
his opposition to Khrushchevs Yugoslav visit and policy of peaceful coexistence. He 
also did not share Khrushchevs belief that a'zone of peacein the Balkans was 
68 Pano (1968), 
-2p. ciL: p. 
116., Logoreci, op. cit.: p. 115. 
69 Biberaj (1990), Qp. cit.: pp. 21-22. 
70 'Albania's economy continued to be characterized by her highly centralized, rigid, authoritarian, 
and generally primitive planning system... ', According to Albanian statistics the annual average 
growth rates in industrial production totalled 22.6% for the period, 1951-1955 [the I st Five-Year 
Plan]. Broken down, these statistics included, a 7.4% increase in oil production, 18.5% in chromium, 
36.5% in coal, 3.2% in copper, 14.9% in food. Industry accounted for slightly over 52% of all 
domestic investment during the same period. See Prifti (1978), gp. pft * especially pp. 52-89 "The 
Socialization of the Economy, and, Orjan Sjorberg, Rural Chgflge and Development in Albania 
(Boulder, Colorado: Wcstview Press, 199 1): pp. 81-114. 
71 By I January, 1957 the government of the USSR cancelled the debts accrued up to 1957 which 
totalled more than four-hundred and twenty niillion rubles and granted Albania new grant credits 
later in the year worth over an additional one-hundred sixty million rubles. These were added to two 
further grants of three-hundred forty eight million rubles and scvcnty-four million rubles for plants, 
equipment purchases and food delivery payments. see Glovinsky, ov. cit.: p. 71. 
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possible through the close collaboration of the Balkan nations or the ill fated Stoica 
Plan aimed at such an idea. 72Hoxha also was resentful that Moscow was deliberately 
stalling food and grant deliveries to Albania since the latter did not automatically bow 
to Khrushchevs call for renewed ties with Yugoslavia and the rehabilitation of Xoxe. 
Albania became increasingly agitated at what they perceived as tying aid to specific 
'political control! and 'military arbitrariness' on the partof MOSCOW. 73 Recognising 
that Albania no longer served the strategic importance Moscow first placed upon her in 
the advent of the atomic age, and the economic pressure beginning to be exerted upon 
her, Hoxha starting from 1956-1957, turned increasingly towards China as his primary 
trading partner outside the Soviet bloc. 74With his confidence increasing, Hoxha! s 
attacks upon Khrushchev continued. The latter, at first perhaps considering Albania 
too insignificant now made overt attempts to whip Albania, and Hoxha into line. As 
early as Autumn, 1959 Moscow blocked credits to Albania and began to withdraw its 
technicians and specialists. It was at this time that Hoxha also revealed a 'plot' aimed 
at his ouster. Though he claims that it originated from the Yugoslavs, Greeks and US 
Sixth Fleet, it was more likely initiated by Khrushchev with help from Tito as a way to 
normalise relations between Yugoslavia andMOSCOW. 75 The ever growing problems 
between Moscow and Tirana grew as January, 1960 approached becoming a part of 
the wider conflict within the world communist movement, the Sino-Soviet rift. 76 
72 The Stoica Plan was issued by Romanian President Chivu Stoica in September, 1957. It called on 
the nations of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Greece, and Turkey to confer periodically on 
matters that threaten Balkan security. Although it left out mention of a Balkan federation it left the 
idea open, and was undoubtedly Moscow sponsored See, Stefan Yowev, "Soviet Activity in the 
Balkans", Bulletin: Institute for the StuA of the USSR vol. 4# 10 (October, 1957): pp. 22-25. 
73 Jan Prybyla, "The Economic Causes of the Soviet-Albanian Quarrel", Bullefin: Insfitute for the 
StuA of the USSR vol. 10 #3 (March, 1963): p. 16., Prybyla also refers to the 'zone of conflict' and 
Khrushchcv1s suggestion that following the US proposal to station missiles in Italy, Moscow may be 
forced to do the same by installing a missile base in Albania targeting Italy and Greece thereby 
heightening tensions in the Balkans. at p. 14. 
74 Stefan Stolte, "Albania Under Economic Pressure From Moscow", Bulletin: Institute for the Studyy 
ofthe USSR vol. 9 #3 (March, 1962): p. 3 1. 
75 J. F. Brown, "Albania, Miffor of Conflict", Skn-ly #40 (January, 1962): pp. 26-27., Khrushchcvs 
visit to Albania in the Spring of 1959 may have also made him realisc that Hoxha would not case his 
polemics against Tito thereby reaffirming the former's belief that Hoxha had to be removed before 
Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement could proceed any further. See, "The Mediterranean", The Economist 
vol. 191 (30 May, 1959): pp. 815-816., Indications that Hoxha suspected something are evident when 
one also saw that coincidentally, with Khrushchevs visit to Albania, a Chinese military delegation 
headed by Marshal Peng Teh-huai was met by Albanian Minister of Defence, General Balluku in 
Tirana., "Peninsula of Peace", The Economist vol. 191 (6 June, 1959): p. 1054. 
76 For background into the rift and Albania's part see; Peter Dally, 7he Sino-Soviet Split: A Trap Fo 
the West (Cheltenham: The British Anti-Communist Council, 1984), O. B. Borisov and B. T. 
Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1975), Donald S. 
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1962), Klaus Melmert, Peking andAfoscow (London: Wcidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), William E. 
Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (London: George Allen and Unwin LTD., 1964), David Floyd, Hao 
Against Khrushchey: A Short Histo! y of the Sino-, ' Soviet Conflic (New York, New York: Praeger, 
1963) 
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3.2 Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift 
In the Autumn of 1959, Khrushchev visited the United States and was still 
holding firm to his idea of peaceful coexistence. Immediately afterward he travelled to 
Peking trying rally support for his programs realising full well that he would need the 
backing of Mao. By this time however, a rift had developed between the USSR and 
China, the latter believing that Khrushchevs policies, especially towards Yugoslavia 
were 'revisionist'. The beginning of dissension gave Hoxha the opportunity he needed. 
Khrushchev did not endear himself with the Albanians when, in May, 1960, he gave an 
interview with Greek liberal leader Sophocles Venizelos regarding Moscow's apparent 
approval at discussion of autonomy for Northern Epirus. Khrushchev had suggested 
that Venizelos discuss the option at the 'little summit' of communist parties upcoming 
in June, 1960 in Bucharest. 77 Upon hearing of this, Hoxha knew that Khrushchevs 
posture threatened Albania! s integrity. This, J. F. Brown believes was the cause for the 
deviation from Moscow on Albania! s part, 'nationalist concerns'. 79 
Neither Hoxha nor Shehu attended the Bucharest Conference, opting to send 
Hysni Kapo, third in the party hierarchy. At Bucharest a secret session brought out the 
differences between Moscow and Peking. Kapo openly supported China and their 
delegate, Peng Chen. The dispute between Moscow and Tirana was now on. At the 
General Assembly Meeting of the United Nations in the Fall of 1960, Hoxha did not 
attend, a deliberate move intended to express his dissatisfaction with Khrushchev. The 
Soviet leader replied by not meeting with Premier Mehmet Shehu and, to add further 
insult, met with Tito twice. At the subsequent Communist Parties Meeting of 
November, 1960 in Moscow Hoxha openly attacked Khrushchev as a 'traitor to the 
Communist idea'. The Soviet leader allegedly promised that Hoxha would 'pay for the 
offense'. 79 The personal antagonism created between Khrushchev and Hoxha moved 
Albania closer toward China and lent credence to the notion that Moscow may attempt 
to use both its personnel and Albanians within Albania to get rid of Hoxha. Hoxha 
consolidated his position by fresh purges of the party leadership during the period 
September, 1960 to May, 1961. Several party members were arrested or ousted for 
conspiring with Soviet Ambassador Ivanov of trying to form a pro-Soviet faction 
within the APL. 80 Hoxha's speech to the APL on 8 November, 1961 signalled to 
77 Brown (1962), 2p_. cit.. p. 25. 
78 IBID 
79 Skendi (1956), Qp. cit.;,. p. 473. 
80 Among those purged were Koco Tashko, president of the Party Auditing Commission, Liri 
Belishova, Central Committee member and Rear Adn-dral Temo Sejko, executed, May, 196 1. See, 
Stravro Skendi, "Albania and the Sino-Sovict Conflict", Foreign AffairS vol. 40 #3 (April, 1962): 
p. 475. 
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members of the party that such moves were well known and doomed to failure. The 
situation came to a head at the Twenty Second All Party Congress in Moscow, 
October, 1961. 
Khrushchev now openly and officially attacked the Albanian leadership 
accusing them of perpetuating the cult of personality and of being 'unreconstructed 
Stalinists'. His charges were followed by Mikoyan's who further accused Hoxha and 
his followers of straying from Marxism-Leninism and following a path of nationalism. 81 
Khrushchev's attacks upon the Albanians and the Chinese were not spontaneous. He 
had assumed that China would fall into line as would Albania, not believing China 
would support Hoxha at a time when she needed Soviet aid82as much as others within 
the communist bloc. 83 Hoxha followed Khrushchevs attacks with a vicious one of his 
own calling the latter a 'splittee and 'revisionist' accusing Khrushchev of straying from 
the truth path of Marxism-Leninism. Chou En Lai, the Chinese delegate then tried to 
mediate calling for a settlement of the dispute peacefully but was against the idea that 
Moscow could on her own initiative attempt to expel someone from the world 
communist movement. This Chou felt, had to be decided upon by all leading parties. 
Incensed, Moscow cancelled a scheduled aid package to Albania and all credits due to 
them. These were taken up by China which was able to cover a large, though not 
complete percentage of the aid due to Albania. 84 For China, the support of Albania 
was strictly a face saving measure. In their struggle with Moscow, support for Hoxha 
gave China the prestige she needed to compete with the USSR in their dispute. 
Abandoning Albania would be to openly admit failure and would undermine Mao's 
position within the communist movement, especially among the Third World 
movements which were increasingly turning towards him. 85 The shift towards Peking 
was, for Hoxha, one grounded in opportunism rather than practicality. The remoteness 
of China and her own struggle with modernisation made the idea of a' protector of 
Albania! s integrity' inconceivable. Instead, the move gave Hoxha the opportunity to 
further consolidate his leadership and maintain some credibility within the communist 
81 Brown (1962), pp. cit. *p. 30. 
82 For figures on Soviet and bloc aid to Albania see, "Albania's Economic Tics with the Soviet Bloc", 
East Europe vol. 10 #6 (June, 196 1): pp. 36-37. 
83 Phihp E. Mosely, "KrushchcVs Party Congress", Foreign A Lairs vol. 40 #2 (January, 1962): 
pp, 183-195., Stefan C. Stolte, "Soviet Bloc Party Congresses and the Moscow-Peking Tension", 
Bulletin vol. 10 #4 (April, 1963): pp. 17-26., Walter Z. Laqueur, 'Me End of the Monolith", Foreign 
Ayairsvol. 40 #3 (April, 1962): pp. 360-373. 
84 In April, 1961, the Soviet and Czechoslovak governments informed Albania that a scheduled credit 
package of $132 million earmarked for Albania's Third-Fivc Year Plan would not be available. The 
Chinese granted Albania $123 million in credit for the plan. At this time all Soviet and East 
European specialists and technicians were withdrawn and all Albanian students attending universities 
within the USSR were sent home. Logoreci, op. cit,: -. p. 
129. 
85 Brown (1962), M. cit., p. 39., see also, Brown, "Eastern Europe", Survey #54 (January, 1965): p. 86., 
William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Ri (Massachusetts: MIT, 1963) 
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world. 86 For the West, the Albanian dispute brought to light the Sino-Soviet rift. The 
US had an opportunity to approach Albania now that she became alienated from 
Moscow. In a situation reminiscent of 1948 and Yugoslavia's break with the USSR, 
the US should have understood that Albania had very few options as to where to turn. 
An attempt at rapprochement with Hoxha, akin to that with Tito earlier, would have 
given the US yet another trump card it could have played to counter Soviet designs in 
the southern Balkans. For Albania, US aid comparable to Yugoslavia would have 
increased modernisation and provided Hoxha with the irritant he wanted against 
Khrushchev. The US, however, failed to make any overtures to Hoxha at a time when 
he needed benefactors and may have been willing. The West though still wrongly 
believed Albania as part of the bloc. This misconception was part of the short- 
sightedness of American policy. 
The United States has never had a realistic and cffective foreign policy toward Eastern Europe. 
During World War R the official American position was that the disposition of Eastern European 
problems should await the peace settlement, but this was primarily a rationalization for a lack of 
policy. 87 
4.0 YHE TURN TOWARDS CHINA [1961-1978188 
By December, 1961 Albania had broken off diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union and maintained only a mission status with the other nations of Eastern 
Europe. Although Hoxha may have foreseen the break with Moscow, his preparation 
did not make the transition to China any smoother. 
The split with the USSR in 1961, however, brought about a sudden and drastic alteration in 
Albania's political situation, in that the country was now largely isolated from Western as 
well as from Eastern Europe. To offset the psychological effect on the Albanian population of 
this near-total isolation in Europe and to discourage a possible coup crdtat by disaffected 
elements, the regime laid great stress on Albania! s alliance with the .... Chinese ... [It] was a 
sound and useful exercise in political craftsmanship. It enabled the Party and the government 
86 Hoxha was quick to echo China's stance towards the US, especially against President Kennedy. See, 
"Maverick in the Balkans", East Europe vol. 10 #4 (April, 1961): pp. 3-6., On Albania's 
considerations, William E. Griffith, "Albania: Footnotes on a Conflict [parts one and two]", East 
Europe vol. 11 #9 (September, 1962): pp. 14-23, vol. II# 10 (October, 1962): pp. 18-24. 
87 Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe", Foreign 
Affai vol. 39 #4 (July, 1961): p. 642. 
88 Evidence that Hoxha was leaning towards China were apparent as early as 1958. After Mao had 
proposed his 'communes'idea only one nation in the eastern bloc adopted Peking's line. This was 
Albania which passed two decrees. One concemed'model farms' patterned after Chinese models. The 
other called on all state and party functionaries to spend one month per year in manual work. The 
party daily, Zcri i Popullit confirmed that the Chinese experience would prove usdW. See, "Three 
Flowers of Communism", The Economist vol. 189 (29 November, 1958): p. 778., On Hoxha's resolve 
towards China see, "Dear Comrades? ", The Economist vol. 198 (14 January, 196 1): p. 118., "Mr. 
Hoxha Stands Firm", 7he Economist vol. 198 (18 February, 196 1): p. 643., "Steel Like Unity", The 
Economistvol. 198 (25 February, 1961): p. 742. 
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to achieve a remarkable degree of stability and to project an image of self-confidence abroad 
through most of the decade of the sixties. 89 
The alliance with China was unlike that with Moscow, as Albania was soon to 
discover. China was quick to replace Soviet advisors with their own and grant long 
term, interest free loans and credit grants to the Albanian government. During the first 
half of the 1960s, Chinese technicians worked in close co-operation with their Albanian 
counterparts accepting the same rate of pay as the locals and, generally, realising that 
the Albanians were a proud an independent people. As such they were treated as 
equals rather than in a'heavy-handed mannee as by the Soviets. 90 
By 1963 Chinese aid to Albania was arriving regularly. With this aid, Albania 
was able to proceed with its plans for the Third- Five Year Plan. This included 
approximately twenty-five industrial projects and agencies such as the Sino-Albanian 
Commission for Scientific and Technical Co-operation and the Sino-Albanian Shipping 
Company. 91 Aid culminated in a new loan of $214 million for the Fourth-Five Year 
Plan [1966-1970]. Collaboration between the two reached its peak during this 
period. Adopting Mao's principles, yet not his methods, Hoxha embarked upon his 
version of the 'Cultural RevolUtiolf, 92 beginning in 1966 and carrying through most of 
1967. The size of government and the civil service was reduced; decentralisation at all 
levels was underway, party officials were required to spend time working on 
collectives, collectivisation was instituted at a more rapid pace, schools and their 
curricula were revamped, women were given greater rights within the party, and 
finally, Albania abolished all religions and their institutions and proclaimed itself the 
world's only 'atheist state. 93 Unlike China, however, Hoxha's type of revolution did 
not involve campaigns of terror against 'bourgeois and revisionist elements, no violent 
clashes with opponents of reform..., no massive parades in the streets, and no public 
turmoil. "94 Like China, however, the main aim of Albania's Cultural Revolution was 
89 Prifti (1978), op. cit.: p. 244. 
90Prifti(l970), gp. cit. * p. 120., see also, Prifti, "Albania's Expanding Horizons", Problems o 
Communism XU (January-February, 1972): pp. 30-39., by 1965, China had accounted for nearly sixty 
percent of Albania! s foreign trade and went to great lengths to develop her oil and mining industries. 
at p. 33. 
91 The latter agency aided in the expansion of the Durres harbour facilities. See Prifti (1972), gpjLit, 
pp. 32-33. 
92 For general information regarding the extent of this program see, Peter Prifti, "Albania's Cultural 
Revolution", East Europe vol. 16 #4 (April, 1967): pp. 27-29. 
93 Logoreci, op. cit.: p. 135., see also, Nicolas Pano, "Albania in the 1970s", Problems Wth 
Communism vol. 3CM (November-Deccmber, 1977): pp. 33-34., Hafizullah Emadi, "Women's 
Emancipation and Strategy of Development in Albania", Economic and Political Weekl (9 May, 
1992): pp. 999-1002. 
94 prifti (1978), pp. -gt-' pp. 
143-150, As to why China and Albania were likely to embark upon 
cultural revolutions Prifti offers the following explanation; 'Both China and Albania have known 
great poverty- a factor which possibly accounts, to a degree, for their impatience to industrialize and 
their willingness to try radical measures to achieve industrialization. Both have a keen memory of the 
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the educational system, and both its role and place in society. Attempts were made to 
develop loyal and productive cadres by closing the gap between mental and physical 
labour. 95 Due to its less radical nature, however, the Albanian Cultural Revolution did 
not meet with much popular resistance. The sector hit hardest, the military, did not 
initially respond to reform. This may explain why Hoxha had several admirals and 
other high-ranking military personnel removed or purged during the early-1970S. 96 
During this period relations with the USSR did not improve. Towards the 
latter half of 1963 trade resumed between Albania and the other COMECON nations 
except for the Soviet Union. Moscow apparently gave the others the green light to 
resume trade with Albania so that she would not be tempted in turning to the West. 
These concerns may have stemmed from China serving as the intermediary for Albania 
in material she needed outside the bloc such as grain shipments from Canada. 
Following the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, the Soviets made overtures to Albania in 
1966. These were rejected by Hoxha. The final de facto break with Moscow came 
after the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion. By September, 1968, Albania withdrew 
from the Warsaw Pact. 97 The invasion made Hoxha wary of potential aggression 
against Albania. He received assurances from China on the preservation of Albania's 
borders. 98 Although, as mentioned, the military practicality of these assurances was in 
question, it did not prevent him though from lashing out against Moscow and its 
'imperialistic' designs, Hoxha used the opportunity to rally support around himself and 
implanting the 'siege mentality' on Albanians. This made Hoxha, during Albania's 
cultural, revolution mobilise the populace to paramilitary service. It also made him 
exploitation and humiliation they have suffered at the hands of foreigners. Both have felt betrayed by 
the revisionist Khrushchevian leadership of the CPSU. Both perceived themselves as encircled and 
threatened by enemies- Albania by the capitalist-revisionist-fascist encirclement of Yugoslavia, 
Greece, the US Sixth Flect, and Italy; and China by the Ring ofFire forged allegedly by the US, 
USSR, India, and Japan. Both have great respect for Stalin, and both are intensely nationalistic. ' at 
p. 144. 
95 See Peter Prifti, "Albania's Cultural Revolution", East Europe vol. 16 #4 (April, 1967): pp. 27-29. 
96 'All military ranks were abolished, party committees were established in army units, and political 
commissars were introduced into military headquarters at all levels. Ile military's role was 
decreased, and professionalism in the military establishment was relegated to a position secondary to 
ideology and economics. ', see Biberaj (1990), op. cit,: p. 25., and, Prifti (1978), 2p. cit: , on those 
purged; General Beqir Balluku, Albania's Defence Nfinistcr [July, 19741, Army Chief of Staff General 
Dume, Head of Army's Political Directorate Hito Cako, Deputy-Chief of Staff General Rahman 
Pcrllaku, Deputy-Political Directorate Halim Ramohito., at p. 213. 
97 The Pact had tried to keep Albania within its fold by offering to support it in event of an attack 
from Greece. The offer was refused by Hoxha in a speech made to the Fourth Congress, 14 September, 
1967. See Peter Prifti, "Albania Gets the Jitters", East yrove vol. 18 #1 (January, 1969): pp. 9-13. 
98 Actual Chinese 'military' assistance, however, was not immediately forthcoming as China did not 
begin to supply Albania with military supplies until late 1970- early 1971 when, they began to export 
NUG-21 fighter planes to Albania. See, Dorothy Grouse Fontana, "Recent Sino-Albanian Relations", 
Survey vol. 21 #4 (Autumn, 1975): p. 132. 
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build thousands of impractical, concrete pillboxes along the Albanian coastline as a last 
line of defence, which remain to this day as unsightly reminders of the past. 99 
4.1 Looking Elsewhere [1970-19731 
By the start of 1970, Hoxha began with a series of open disagreements with the 
Chinese on several foreign policy issues. 100 The first of these was when Yugoslavia 
openly denounced the Czechoslovak invasion and threatened to fight any similar 
attempt. China, perhaps seeking even more influence in Europe, relaxed its hard-line 
policy towards Tito and sought the resumption of diplomatic relations with Belgrade in 
1970. Understanding full well that Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement may endanger 
Albania, Hoxha nonetheless went along with Peking and resumed full diplomatic 
relations with Yugoslavia in 1971. Later on in the same year, ambassadors were 
exchanged with Greece and some overtures were made to West European nations, 
primarily by way of a loosening on tourism controls. Hoxha sought, however, to 
explain this position in foreign policy by stating; 
when the bourgeoisie and the modem revisionists recognized that their methods did not have any 
effect on socialist Albania, they changed their tactics but not their aims.... [TIhey represent each of 
our diplomatic moves as a reversal of our previous policies. They interpret their changes of tactics 
towards us as our changes towards them. We have made no changes in our policy. 10 1 
Hoxha would, later make true his position on his firm stance to the principles of 
Marxism-Leninism and any deviation from them. I-Iis words had no impact on the 
Chinese who, by November, 1971 expressed their wish to seek accommodation with 
the United States. This was followed by the February, 1972 visit of President Nixon to 
China. Hoxha rejected the move and China! s suggestion that Albania seek more aid 
from the West. To demonstrate his resolve Hoxha initiated a series of purges in 1973 
aimed at the Albanian youth which recently had been calling for change. 102 These 
purges were part of the trend in Albania during most of the early-1970s. The APL had 
expressed its concern over the intelligentsia and did an about-face on policy towards 
the latter. The APL had first set out to purge the nation of the **evils of archaic and 
conservative thought and activity. By 1971-72, this policy focused instead on the' evils 
of liberalisation, 'or modernist trends in the arts and culture, including literature, 
99 The best bit of satire on these 'bunkers' comes from Isabel Fonseca who states that should tourism 
take off in Albania and its unspoiled coastline these remnants could serve as 'solid, ready made beach 
front cabanas. see I Fonseca, "Last to Leave, Turn Out the Lights", The Nation (5 October, 1992): 
p. 358. 
100 Pano (1977), op. cit.: p. 33. 
101 Envcr Hoxha, Rgporte E-&afime. 1970-1971 IReports and Sqzeeches7 (Tirana: Shtepia Botucse, 
1972): pp. 34-35. 
102 pano (1977), 2pýciýt p. 36., Zed I Popullit [Voice ofthe People] 26 July, 1973. 
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fashions, music, radio, the theatre, television and the dance. '103The creation of the 
Committees of Culture and the Arts [ 197 1 ], sought to counter the effects of foreign 
culture, often via Italian television, and recruited members in each district to actively 
guide the intelligentsia, among them poets, writers, and artists to produce work more 
reflective of the working masses and similar Albanian themes. It became difficult, 
however, to dissuade the intelligentsia from external influences. Realising that he could 
not allow for the contamination to continue further, Hoxha and the APL initiated a 
wholesale purge of the League of Albanian Writers and Artists [LAWA] in July, 
1973.104 
Hoxha's suspicions on the Nixon trip were confirmed [in his eyes], when less 
than one year later, beginning in 1973, the US; 
.... expressed willingness to resume 
ties with Albania. It was in the United States' interest that 
Albania continue to pursue an independent foreign policy and not reestablish closc-cspecially 
military- ties with the Soviet Union. A revival of the Albanian-Sovict alliance would give the 
USSR military access to the Adriatic, increase potential Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia and 
Greece, and heighten the threat to NATO's southern flank. An independent, nonaligned 
Albania was thus important for Western policy in the volatile Balkans. 105 
Despite these dfferences, relations between China and Albania took a warm turn in 
1974-1975. The Chinese, as mentioned, treated Albania with a higher level of equality 
then did the Russians. Understanding their concerns, Mao sought to allay Albanian 
fears by sending, in November, 1974 Politburo member and candidate member Yao 
Wen-yuan and Wu Kuei-hsien to Tirana to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of 
Albania! s liberation. The Chinese delegation reaffirmed China! s support for the 
Albanian leadership and the ties of friendship between the two nations. 106 
103 Pfiffi (1978), pp. cit., p. 185. 
104 HoXha sensed trouble when his Vice-Nfinister of Fducation and Culture, Mantho Bala stated 
publicly that, 'we must learn from others', and'we are in Europe'. This led to a plenum by the APL 
on 24-25 July, 1973. 'The plenum resulted in a shake-up of the entire LAWA leadership. [Naim] 
Shuteriqi, president of LAWA since 1946, fell from power and was replaced by poet Dritero Agolli, 
who also delivered the main report to the plenum. Vilson Kilicia was replaced as general-secretary of 
the league by Nhemal Dini, and Hamide Stringa and Ksenofon Dilo were replaced as secretaries of 
the league by Anastos Kondo and Kujtim Buza ..... From all indications, the central motive for the 
campaign against liberalism in the arts was not so much to combat alien influences as to maintain the 
Party's Stalinist control over the intelligentsia, as a means of preserving state power. To stifle rising 
voices of dissent, the Party went so far as to invade the privacy of individuals and dictate to the 
citizenry on matters of manners and morals. ' Others within the APL felt that unless the intelligentsia 
were kept in check they would eventually seize momentum; 'Albanian communists maintained that, 
unless checked in time, liberal attitudes in the arts translate into liberal manifestations in morals, and 
liberalism in morals translates into liberalism in ideology and politics, ending finally in the overthrow 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Yet, despite the intense campaign against liberalism, or the 
penetration of Soviet and Western cultural influences, influential segments of the artistic 
intelligentsia persisted in their dissent from the Party directives on art and culture. ' IBID, pp. 187-189. 
105 Biberaj (1990), Qp-c-it', P-90. 
106 Pano (1977), Qp. cit., p. 38. 
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The death of Mao in 1976, however, marked the beginning of the end for the 
Sino-Albanian alliance. At the Seventh Party Congress of the APL, Hoxha attacked 
the post-Mao leadership for its purge of the more radical elements of the Chinese 
communist party, specifically the Gang of Four. Hoxha also did not endorse the 
leadership of Hua Guofeng and openly criticised the rehabilitation of Deng Xiao-ping, 
believing that Mao's principles were being violated. 107 China responded by reducing 
the level of aid for Albania's Sixth-Five Year Plan [1976-1980]. Although exact figures 
vary and are subject to scrutiny due to their originating from communist Albanian 
sources, the decrease in aid from China made Albania start to turn towards self- 
reliance, as evidenced from the creation of the Constitutional provision banning any 
foreign aid, promulgated during the Sixth FYP [ 1976]. The decrease in aid from China 
also led to delays on the construction of an oil refinery, a hydro-electric facility, and a 
metallurgical combine. 108 By the Summer of 1977, the visit of US Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance to China demonstrated the latter's aim at continuing d6tente with the 
Americans. With the differences between Hoxha and the new Chinese leadership 
widening and with little chance at narrowing them, China ended all economic and 
military aid to Albania, recalled its specialists and suspended trade by July, 1978. It 
did not though break diplomatic ties. 109 The break with China now left Albania truly 
isolated. Hoxha wasted little time in looking elsewhere for economic aid, increasing 
trade with neighbours including Yugoslavia and, surprisingly, the US in amounts of 
$157 million by 1975-1976.110 
This aid, however, was short term and should not be construed as efforts to 
open up. The isolation, it seems, played directly into Hoxha's lap. Paranoia over plots 
to remove him and the perversion and continuation of the cult of personality typified 
the Hoxha regime during this period. His unrealistic view of the world around him 
doomed the nation to endless strife. His doctrine of self-reliance has resulted in the 
creation of poor quality goods, even by communist standards. Moreover, it has been 
107 JBID, p. 3 3., ZeH I Popullit 2 November, 1976., see also Biberaj (1990), Qp. cit., which implies that 
a reason for the attacks may have been personal since Beijing announce it had invited Tito to China, 
an obvious affront to Hoxha., at p. 28. 
108 These delays were due specifically to Chinese reduction in aid during this period. The Fierze 
hydro-electric power station, Ballsh oil refinery, and metallurgical combine at Elbasan were not 
completed until the 7th FYP [ 1981-19851. 'Nfidway through the sixth plan period, cfforts to make up 
for these losses had to be made .... The overall result, then, was that import substitution continued and 
the most drastic efrects in the province of economic strategy were delays and marginal modifications 
rather than outright alteration in priorities. No changes of consequence appear to have emerged since 
then... ' Sjorberg (1991), pM. cit. p. 83., and, for figures indicative of the level of self-reliance necessary 
due to the decrease in aid see Ibid; ie. number of state employees within agriculture [# in thousands] 
increased from 86.2 [19731 to 136.9 [1980], at p. 116, and, number of apartments and houses built 
decreased from the 5th FYP to the 6th FYP. [from 61,908 (1971-1975) to 56,390 (1976-1980), those 
built by the state; 32,038 to 26,326 f same periods)] at p. 155. 
109BiberaJ(l990), Qp-. cit. * p. 28. 
11OPano(l977), M. cit,. * p. 40. 
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his utter contempt for the outside world which continues to plague present day 
economic reform. The need for external investment and, equally important, for foreign 
trade has led to the current situation, one in which Albania finds itself with a foreign 
debt over $800m [US] and exports totalling only $44m in 1993 while imports 
exceeded $244m. III How else does one justify the creation of over one Million 
concrete pillboxes as 'lines of defence' in a nation of only three miffion? Withover 
one meter of concrete and steel used for each bunker, Hoxha's Stalin-type insanity was 
matched only by his stupidity. The resources alone for this project, not only depleted 
Albanian coffers, but more importantly, signified marked failure for Hoxha! s foreign 
policy. A deliberate turn away from the East, West, Far East, and the Non-Aligned 
Movement [NAM] relegated Albania to the 'Fourth World'. The damnation of the 
state by the Hoxha regime to the self-interest of the latter is evident today as Albania 
struggles towards democratisation and modernisation. The present difficulty in these 
processes is directly attributable to Hoxha! s rule, and perhaps lends credence to the old 
adage; "it is easier to destroy, than to create". 
5.0 GOING ITALONE[1978-19851 
Hoxha steered Albania on the path towards an end to outside dependency 
opting instead for true 'Marxist self-sufficiency'. One way to ensure this was by the 
constitutional prohibition of receiving foreign credits embodied in the new 1976 
Albanian Constitution. 112 Albania also was the only European nation that refused to 
sign the Helsinki Final Act on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975. Hoxha 
pursued Mao's 'dual adversary doctrine, believing that such conferences and 
organisations were instruments solely for the benefit of the 'revisionist' Soviet Union 
and 'imperialist'United States. Convincing the average Albanian would not be too 
difficult. Many did not care, merely paying lip service to Hoxha! s views under terror of 
prison or death. As for others, Hoxha relied on geographic and historical factors. 
The absence of adequate internal communications and the lack of railway and motor-road 
links with other countries had bred in many Albanians the feeling that they lived on an 
island off Europe which had for centuries been surrounded by a world that was either hostile 
or merely indifferent to their interests and general welfare. The long isolation together with 
the awareness of hostility or indifference, greatly strengthened by their bitter historical 
experiences, had in turn engendered in many of them similar feelings towards other 
III Dr. Kees Zijlstra Albania, "New Beginnings Amidst Immense Challenges", Draft SRecial REM 
International Secretariat of the European Union (May, 1994): p. 2., and unemployment in outlying 
areas up to nearly 60% of the local population, an upcoming budget of $74 1m with foreign assistance 
expected to reach $46 Im for FYI 995. See The Economist (2 April, 1994) - 112 Kushtetuta e Repyblikes Popullore Socialiste te ShqýJperlse [CoNs=oNoFTHEPEOPLE 
SocmusTREPuBLic oFALBAArL41 Crirana: Albanian Information Agency, 1980); Article 28. 
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countries. Such sentiments had in time tended to produce a some-what self-centered and 
apathetic attitude to what went on beyond their borders. 113 
By the start of 1980, the doctrine of self-reliance was causing severe 
economic difficulty for Albania. 114 This became evident when Mehmet Shehu, 
apparently clashed with Hoxha over Albania! s need to open up to the West. After an 
argument over what path to choose, Hoxha announced that on 18 December, 198 1, 
Shehu had apparently, 'committed suicide. After his death it was revealed that Shehu 
had been a multiple agent and spy for the British, Americans, and Yugoslavs among 
others. 11is followers, and appointees, many of whom were family were subsequently 
purged, removed or arrested. ' 15 One such person arrested was Ali Cena, chief of the 
Prime Mnister's personal bodyguard. Cena recently has offered a personal account of 
the events which led to Shehu's death. The former is adamant in his belief that 
following a dispute at a Politburo meeting on the night in question [ 16 December], 
Shehu was shot on the direct order of Hoxha. The meeting, according to Cena, was 
the focal point of the entire incident. For a long period of time during the late 1960s 
and throughout the early 1970s, 116it was believed from many within the party that 
113 Logoreci, M. cit. - pp. 201-202., The common misconception was that Albania simply closed her 
doors following the break with China. This is not so; 'To be sure, by autumn 1977, Albania had 
established diplomatic ties with a total of eighty nations, including all West European nations with 
the exception of Spain, West Germany, and Great Britain. Nonetheless, owing to her militant 
ideology, revolutionary stance, polemical warfare against both East and West Europe, and refusal to 
have broad cultural exchanges with European and other nations, Albania remained a Cold War island 
in the Balkans and Europe. 'Prifti (1978), 2p. cit. - p. 252. 
114 Though they broke with China, Albania retained characteristics of Chinese socialism which can 
be aptly named, 'muscular socialism', that is, labour intensive, grandiose economic projects, ix, dam 
building etc., terrace farming reclamation programs, youth brigades, and mandatory agricultural 
cooperative work for all dcsk-bound party members. See, Michael Kaser, "Albania's Muscular 
Socialism", Contemporary Review vol. 243 41411 (August, 1983): pp. 89-94. 
Pý pecif diffl ce 115 Halliday, pR. cit. - pp. 327-328., see Biberaj (1985), P cit. - for s Ic eren s on trade policy; 
'Given its emphasis on the development of heavy industry, Hoxha's regime had paid little attention to 
supplying more and better consumer goods. One of the charges Hoxha had leveled against Shehu was 
that the former Prime Minister had advocated the development of a consumer society. Shchu 
reportedly had called for a reallocation of resources away from heavy industry so as to boost the 
consmer-goods sector'. at p. 74., See also "Interview with Milto Kola, Military Construction 
Supervisor", Associated Press 26 September, 1984 who states; 'Most Albanians are convinced that 
Shehu was shot on Hoxha's orders... ' 
116 For the view that Shehu's death was a matter of who Hoxha wanted to succeed him see, Patrick 
Artisien, "Albania in the Post-Hoxha Era", The World TodaLy vol. 41 (Dec/Jan 1986); '1 suggest 
instead that Shehu's demise was related to the question of succession. Since the late 1970s, Ramiz 
Alia had received extensive exposure in the press, including frequent appearances on Hoxha's side. 
While Shehu was alive, however, Hoxha could not ignore the fact that Shehu stood in the way of his 
hand-picked successor and that Shehu's reputation for ruthlessness and support in the party hierarchy 
represented a major threat to Alia's smooth succession. Shehu's brother-in law, Kadri Hazbiu, was 
Minister of Defence; his nephew Fecor Shehu, held the post of Interior Minister; and his wife, Fiqret, 
was Director of the Lenin Party School. Given Shelm's power base, the question of succession became 
clouded as a struggle for Hoxha's place between Alia and Shchu, or a Shchu designate, appeared 
inevitable. The evidence given by Paul Milliez, Hoxha's French doctor who last saw him in December 
1984, confirms that the Albanian leader elected to destroy Shchu's power base in order to forestall a 
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Shehu would naturally succeed Hoxha, given the latter's poor health. According to 
reports, Shehu had clashed with Hoxha over the poor state of the Albanian economic 
reforms program and felt the time had come for Albania to open up to the West. At a 
Politburo meeting on 16 December, 198 1, Cena reports that Shehu emerged 
despondent, 'fiercely criticised by the Party'. Whether Hoxha's paranoia was 
responsible for Shehu's death, or whether their was a genuine dispute over the course 
of reform matters very little. What can be established is that it is not likely that Shehu 
neither committed suicide nor was a multiple agent. 117 With Hoxha! s health failing, he 
sought to see that there was a smooth transition of power after his departure from the 
seen. He brought in long time party member Ramiz Alia who emerged from late- 1983, 
early- 1984 as Hoxha! s heir apparent. I 111 
Hoxha near his end, began a cautious approach to outside links for Albania. In 
1982, Albanian trade with the US amounted to nearly US $20 million. Not discarding 
his dual adversary doctrine, Hoxha conducted all such trade through third parties, 
often the French or Canadians. 119 By 1983-1984; spare parts were purchased from 
Italy for old Chinese machinery, air connections were opened between Greece and 
Tirana, telephone links were set up, a ferry service was established between Durres and 
Trieste, Austrian television was allowed in Albania, and a series of cultural, scientific, 
and technical agreements were signed with Greece, Turkey, Italy, West Germany, 
Austria, [renewed trade ties with] China and Yugoslavia. 120 It was relations with 
Yugoslavia, however that were to influence Albanian foreign policy throughout the 
remainder of the 1980s fluctuating between periods of co-operation and deterioration. 
By early, 1981, plans for extensive ties with Belgrade including a rail link were met 
with positively by Yugoslavia. But, by the Kosova riots of March-April, 1981 
following Tito's death, problems arose. Belgrade accused Tirana of fomenting unrest 
within the Kosova province and of territorial designs there since more than ninety 
succession crisis. Hoxha confided in his physician that, 'he was prepared to die peacefully because the 
question of his succession had been settled. ', at p. 109. 117 For a good account of the events and reports surrounding the Shehu incident see, Barry Baldwin, 
"The Mchmet Shelm Mystery Solved? ", Besa [Newsletted Published by the Friends of Albania Issue 
#8 received by author (October, 1994): pp. 18-26., On the question of suicide Ccna stated that Shchu 
had been found on his bed killed by one shot through the heart. The doctors explained that 'it is quite 
abnormal for anyone to shoot himself in the heart: the natural instinct is always to shoot yourself 
through the temple., at p. 22, and on the question of Shchu having been a multiple agent, Baldwin 
states; , incidentally, not only are we asked to believe in the polyagency of Mehmct Shehu, we also 
have to swallow the hilarious claim that every single Minister of the Interior (the Sigurimi were in 
this official's fief) from 1945-1982 was actually a foreign agentl', at p. 18. 
118 Bibcraj (1990), QpLciV. p. 88. 
119 Pressure for more diplomatic concessions and casing human rights violations ftom the US made 
Hoxha however reduce the level of trade with the US to $12 million by 1984. see, Biberaj, "Albania: 
Between East and West", The Institute for the SNA of Conflict London (1986): p. 24, note #2 1. 
120 Biberaj (1990), 9p. cit- p. 15., Peter Godwin, "Former Fascist Set to Rule in Albania", 7he Times 
23 September, 1984., Marvin Howe, "Insular Albania Improving Ties to China", The New York Times 
24 October, 1983. 
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percent of the population is of Albanian origin. Tirana rejected all territorial claims but 
criticised Belgrade of its repressive measures against the Albanian populace of Kosova. 
Indeed, Kosova was to become the cause of strain between the two nations and to this 
day remains a potential flashpoint of violence and instability in the Balkans. 121 The 
potential for conflict in Kosova and its impact upon Albania will be fully analysed in a 
subsequent chapter, relative to the present Yugoslav crisis, however, a brief synopsis at 
this stage may aid in the understanding of why it has been and still is a major' bone of 
contention! between the Albanians and the Serbs. 
5.1 Yhe Kosova Question'22 
By the latter part of the C13th, Kosova was home to both Albanians and Serbs, 
and in the early Cl4th seat of the Serb empire of Stephen Dusan. With the advancing 
Ottomans, Serbs tried halt the invasion and failed to do so at the Battle of Kosova in 
1389. Defeat in battle, however, instilled within the Serbs a sense of destiny, and built 
upon myth and legend to justify a continual Serb presence in Kosova. As with most 
myths, distortion of events became part of Serb folklore mutating, over time, defeat 
into a'victorious! moment for Serbs. As the Ottomans swept across the Balkans, they 
formed a suzerainty in present day Kosova, bringing Islam with their rule. Mindful of 
121 Henry Kamm, "Albania Cautiously Looks For Friends", New York Times 16 October, 1994. 
122 For background to the Kosova issue see, Biberaj, (1990),! gp. cit. - pp. 107-133., Halliday, pp. cit-. 
pp, 341-344., Marmallaku (1975), gp. cit.: pp. 135-152., Prifti, (1978), pp. cit. pp. 222-241., Hikuban, 
Qp. cit. vol. IV., Andrew Borowiec, Yugoslavia After Tito (New York, New York: Praeger, 1977), 
Gary Bertsch, "Currents in Yugoslavia: The Revival of Nationalism", Problems of Communism 
vol. =l (November- December 1973): pp. 1- 15., Viktor Meier, "Yugoslavia! s National Question", 
Mark Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo", Problems of Comm inism vol. =I (March-April, 1983), Alex 
Dragnich, "The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia: The Omen of Upsurge of Serb Nationalism", "East 
European Quarterly", (June, 1989), Bruce McFarlane, Ygeoslavia, Politics, Economics, and Societv 
(London: Pinter, 1988), Fred Neal, "Yugoslavia's Approach to the Nationalities Problem", East 
European Quarterly (September 1984), Pedro Ramet, (ed. ) Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Colorado: 
Westview, 1985), Elez Biberaj, "Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg", Research Institute for the StuA of 
Conflict and Terrorism #258 (February 1993), Stefanaq Polio, (ed) Mi X Met Ne Kosove [The 
Confusion About Kosova7 (Tirana: Shtepia Botuese, 198 1), Sinan 1-lasani, Kosova: Te Vertetat E 
Mashtrimet Mosova: The Truth and the Lies (Prishtine: Rilindja, 1987), Christopher Cviic (1991), 
pp. cit. - pp. 63-82., Denison Rusinow, Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism (Washington DC: 
Wilson Centre, 1988), James Seroka, "Prognosis for Stability in Yugoslavia in the Post Tito Era", 
East European Quarte (June, 1988), Arshi Pipa, *The Political Situation of the Albanians in 
Yugoslavia with Particular Attention to the Kosovo Problem: A Critical Approach", East European 
Quarte (June, 1989), "Persecution of the Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia", HeariLig an 
Briefing ofthe Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Orizanizations ofthe Committee 
on Foreijzn A flairs US House ofRepLesentatives Nincty-Ninth Congress Second Session (2-8 October, 
1986) US Govt. Printing Office, John Zametica, 2p. cit.., Liam McDowall, "Confused Signals in 
Kosovo", New Statesman and Socie (5 March, 1993): pp. 12-13., RFE Rep2rts. - Patrick Moore, "The 
'Albanian Question! in the Former Yugoslavia", vol. I# 14 (3 April, 1992), Louis Zanga, "Albania 
and Kosovo", vol. 1 #39 (2 October, 1992), Louis Zanga, "Albanian Reconciliation Plan Sparks 
Intense Debate", (6 March, 1992), Patrick Moore, "Kosovo Could Spark Another Balkan War", vol. 1 
#50 (18 December, 1992), Radon-& Lukic, "600 Years Since the Battle of Kosovo", Belzrade Review 
RLInternationalAybi vol., NL #942-3 (July, 1989): pp. 8-10. 
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the benefits conversion would bring within the millet system, Albanians adopted Islam 
and began to populate the area after Serbseither left voluntarily, or by force. The 
centuries that followed down until the C20th saw a growing dislike develop between 
Serbs and Kosovar Albanians [Kosovars] which periodically resulted in occasional 
violence. 
As for Kosova, the region was becorning predominantly Albanian. By 1878, the 
ill-fated League of Prizren was seen later, by Albanians, as the birthplace of Albanian 
nationalism. As such, both groups attach significant importance to Kosova within their 
respective cultures. The official Turkish census of 19 10 listed Kosovars as making up 
sixty percent of Kosova while Serbs, Turks and Bulgars constituted the remaining forty 
percent. 123 World War I saw Albania divided and occupied. The peace process 
afterwards placed Kosova, over ethnic Albanian protests, within the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia. With administration falling under Serb rule, Kosovars began to feel the 
wrath of Serbs and their attempts to; repopulate the area or'Slavisizeit, invest 
resources sparingly or inefficiently, repress or not allow Kosovar cultural and social 
events, and, generally, disrupt many of the traditional relationships in existence. 
The future of Kosova was still in doubt during World War H. While Tito toyed with 
the idea of rights guarantees and self determination for Kosova, he understood the 
significance Kosova played for the Serbs. 11imself a Croat, Tito needed Serbs, the 
largest ethnic minority in Yugoslavia to back his cause. One way of doing this was to 
assure them that Kosova would remain within Serbia! s hands. Nazi occupation 
resulted in Kosova! s reincorporation to Albania. It was here that the foundations for 
the intense post-war hatred between Serbs and Albanians stems from. 
... Mhe Kosovars were treated with open hostility, often deprived of elementary civil and human rights. Such a behavior gave rise to an irredentist mood, which materialised when the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia was destroyed by the fascist-nazi aggression. The territories in 
question were annexed to Albania, to the elation of their Albanian inhabitants, who saw 
foreign administrations as a change for the better in their dejected situation ... [Mhcn the Nazi troops occupied them, an Albanian unit of volunteers joined the SS troops. Now it was 
the turn of the Albanians to harass the South Slavs, an affront avenged by the Yugoslav 
Partisans soon after the end of the war ... 
124 
Immediately after the war a delegation of Kosovar Albanians met with Tito and 
received guarantees on rights. Although the 1946 Yugoslav Constitution described 
Kosova as an, 'autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia, Albanians were 
treated as second class citizens. Their persecution was carried out by Tito's Vice 
President, number two party man and head of the secret police, Alexander Rankovic. 
123 Pipa (1989), gp. cit.: p. 160. 
124 JBID, p. 164., Appealing to Albanian nationalism, the Nazis created the appropriately named 
'Skanderbeg SSI division, named after the C15th Albanian noble who drove the Ottomans from most 
of northern Albania for approximately, thirty years. See Hisani, 
_2ncit. 
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With Rankovic's fall from grace in 1966, Kosovars took to the streets in large and 
violent demonstrations seeking greater rights. This culminated in large concessions by 
Tito in 1968. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Kosovars would periodically 
demonstrate against harsh Serbian policy aimed at keeping the Albanians in an inferior 
position. The Hoxha regime for its part did not come readily to the defence of 
Kosovars. While Hoxha and the post Hoxha leadership occasionally spoke out against 
human rights abuses in Kosova, they did little or nothing in actual aid of Albanians in 
Kosova. Opting instead to publicly denounce the government in Belgrade, Albania 
launched a series of inflammatory articles in the Albanian press against the treatment 
Kosovars were receiving. As for an official position, Hoxha stated at the Seventh APL 
Congress [November, 1976], that; 'fraternal ties of blood and language with the 
Albanians in Kosovo ... and ties of tradition ... gave the 
Albanian leaders and people the 
right to interest themselves in their conationals in Yugoslavia. '1125 This position most 
likely originates in the pren-dse that fomenting unrest in Kosova could result in risks to 
the Albanian leadership which would prove too costly at a time when Albania could do 
nothing positive by provoking the neighbouring Yugoslav leaders. Indeed, following 
the Kosova riots of 198 1, Hoxha never raised the issue of human rights abuses in any 
international forums such as the United Nations or the European Commission on 
Human Rights. Even his earlier public denunciations were tempered and, as Belgrade 
became increasingly annoyed with both Tirana and the Kosovars, Albania realised its 
precarious position. This prompted Hoxha to even assist the Yugoslav State Security 
Administration [Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti UDBa] during the period 1981-1983, 
when, the former detained and returned 249 Kosova Albanians which sought refuge in 
Albania. 126 This did not, however, prevent Albania and Yugoslavia from accusing each 
125 'Hoxha was totally silent on the question of a merger of Kosovo with Albania. This is perhaps not 
surprising, in view of the fact that Albania has not pressed any territorial claims on Kosovo. Indeed, 
APL's first secretary did not even lend support to the demands of Kosovo Albanians for a republic of 
their own. In brief, since normalizing diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in 1971, Albania has 
been content to develop cultural relations with Kosovo and to ignore the larger and more pressing 
political questions which, in recent years, have been a source of increasing friction between the 
Albanians of Kosovo and the Yugoslav government'., Prifti (1978), 2p_xit., p. 238., andTheNew 
York 771mes 24 November, 1975. 
126 See Arshi Pipa "The Political Situation of the Albanians in Yugoslavia with Particular Attention 
to the Kosovo Problem: A Critical Approach", East European Quarterly vol. 4 46 (June, 1989): 
pp. 162-174, and, Branka Magas, pp. cit.; 'When after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact 
forces in August 1968, Albania made a first tentative attempt to mend its severed links with its 
northern neighbour, it met with a ready and immediately positive response. Yugoslavia opened its 
frontiers with Albania, and Kosovo became the host for many cultural and scientific exchanges with 
Albanian artists and intellectuals. The growing warmth between the two countries throughout the 
seventies found its peak in their joint celebration in 1978 of the centenary of the foundation of the 
League of Prizren. Clearly, however, these developments were also seen as something of a threat to 
the Hoxha regime in Tirana, which restricted the entry of Yugoslavs into Albania and never allowed 
its own citizens to visit its neighbour freely. Thus the 1981 events in Kosovo, and the rapid cooling of 
Albanian-Yugoslav relations, must in reality have come as a relief to the dominant tendency inside 
the Albanian Party. ', at p. 38., and, Biberaj (1990), 2p. cit.. - , who correctly points out that Albania 
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other of violations and promoting unrest in Kosova. Ultimately, any 'thaw' or general 
rapprochement between the two nations would eventually turn to Kosova, which has 
and still serves as a large impediment to Albanian-Yugoslav [Serb] relations. 
6.0 THE POSTHOXHA ERA [1985-19901 
On II April, 1985, Enver Hoxha died. Ifis succession was quick and easy as 
Ramiz Alia now sought to slowly, and subtly move Albania away from her self 
imposed isolation. So as not to deviate from Hoxha! s ideology and risk alienating 
party hard-liners, a posthumous work of Hoxha! s was released indicating that when 
ready, and necessary, Albania would open ties with the rest of the world in accordance 
with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. With legitimisation, Alia began the process 
of slowly bringing Albania into the modem age. 127 At the Fortieth Session of the 
United Nations, Albanian Foreign Minister Reiz Malile signed several agreements and 
met with representatives from Greece, Turkey and Austria, seeking to exchange 
delegations and cooperate on economic and cultural programs. 128 Malile had also 
reiterated the position of the Albanian government that co-operation among the 
neighbouring Balkan nations was not only necessary, but vital to securing peace and 
stability in the region. 129 
Despite its moves away from isolation and into the international community, 
Albania reasserted its desire to avoid ties with both the US and USSR, even though 
recogniscd, 'the fluctuation and instability of their relations with Yugoslavia, [and] tried to minimize 
the costs of potential punitive actions ...... at p. 98., and 
for his insightful analysis of the position of 
Albania immediately following the death of Hoxha; '... Albania had nothing to gain ftom disturbances 
in Kosove and the destabilsation of Yugoslavia. Despite long-standing political and ideological 
differences with Yugoslavia, the Albanian government expressed support for its neighbour's 
independence and national integrity. Officials in Tirane repeatedly stated that Albania had no 
territorial claims on Yugoslavia. In his keynote address to the Ninth APL Congress in November 
1986, Alia said; 'We do not want the situation in Kosove to grow worse. In no instance and in no way 
have we sought or do we seek to destabilize Yugoslavia. It is not in the interest of the peoples in the 
Balkans, nor in our interest, that [Yugoslavia] should be turned into an arena of quarrels and disscnt, 
a situation which could facilitate the interference of foreign powers. ' at p. 95., and, Ramiz Alia Report 
to the Ninth Congress ... 
[ for the original teN11, at pp. 186-187. 
127 Within a year evidence of Alia! s move outwards was displayed at the party congress when he 
stated; 'We wish good relations with ncighbours as well as others and have declared so publicly. No 
barm. will come from such relations and we have indicated this not only with words but with actions 
as well! see, Ramiz Alia, Raport Are Kongresin LY Te PPS11 LRepert ofthe A7nth Con-gress of the 
A lb an i an Lart L 170-171. X of abour7 (Tirana: Shtcpia Botucse, 1986): pp. 
128 Elez Bibcraj, "Albania After Hoxha: Dilemmas of Change", Problems of Communism vol. =V 
(Novembcr-December, 1985): p. 4 I., By the end of 1985, the border road separating Greece from 
Albania was reopened and plans for a Greek company to build a chrome processing plant in Albania 
were finalised., at p. 43. 
129 Biberaj (1985), p. 47., For a somewhat critical view that these ties are limited due to their 
strictly bilateral basis see, Haden Gavrilovic, "The Balkans Bloc and a Peace Zone", ContemgQ 
Reviewvol. 247 # 1434 (July, 1985): pp. 6-9. 
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both nations expressed their wish to pursue relations with Albania. 130 It is not unlikely 
that such a policy is an attempt by the Albanian leadership to avoid ties with nations 
that may later result in 'internal' changes. The difference being that while Albania 
seeks to 'open up' to the outside world, ties with a nation such as the US may lead to 
threats to Albania! s leaders if the populace, especially the disenchanted youth, are 
allowed to experience the benefits of the West. 131 
6.1 Regional Relations 
From the start of 1987, several developments furthered Albania and Alia 
towards co-operation with the rest of Europe. In that year, the Greek government of 
Papandreou formally ended its state of war with Albania, an aberration since 1940. A 
series of agreements established a ferry link between Corfu and Sarande with long term 
industrial projects also agreed upon. By 1987, Albania had extensive dealings with 
Italy, Austria, West Germany and Canada, all in efforts by the Alia government to 
bring Albania out of its state of backwardness and remove the stigma as Europe's 
I poorest' nation. More important, however, were Albania! s relations with the other 
nations of the Balkans. Taking the initiative, Yugoslavia sent out invitations to the 
capitals of Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, and Albania in the Summer of 1987. 
The aim was for a 'Balkan Conference' whose purpose was to strengthen ties among 
these nations and achieve some level of co-operation which would not leave them in 
130 For general policy see Patrick F. R. Artisien, "Albania in the Post-Hoxha Era", 7he morld Today 
vol. 41 (June, 1985): pp. 107-111., for specific Albanian view see Alia, 2p. cit-. pp. 134-135., For Soviet 
position following the coming to power of Gorbachev in 1985, and their faulting Khrushchev for the 
break in Albanian-Soviet relations see Biberai (1985), pp. cit*. pp. 103-104., Specific US overtures 
towards Albania were made immediately after Hoxha! s death when Mr. Edward Djerejian, US 
Department of State Acting Press Spokesman declared in a daily press briefing; 'Following the death 
earlier this year of longtime Albanian leader Enver Hoxha, the United States reiterated its view that, 
should Albania indicate an interest in resuming relations with us, we would be prepared to respond. 
To date, however, despite some gradual improvement in relations with some west European countries, 
the Albanian Government has firmly restated its opposition to any relationship with either the Soviet 
Union or the United States. ', US interest in Albania was also expressed in general US East European 
policy when it stated; 'The United States continues to have virtually no relations at all with Albania, a 
tiny, poor, hut strategically located counhy. Some have suggested that the United States should seek 
to improve relations with Tirana, though Albania has not been receptive to such overtures in the past. ' 
see, US Policy Towards Eastern Europe and Y-y-goslavia Document 161 American Foreign Policy 
Current Documents (Department of State Washington: US Printing Office, 1985): p. 413., _LS 
Polig: 
.y Towards Eastern Europe 1985 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East 
(House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs: Ninety-Ninth Congress First Session 2-7 
October, 1985): p. 243. 
131 'Again with the exception of the two superpowers, Albania is today prepared to establish relations 
with all countries and to pursue cooperation with them to the extent allowed by its objective 
possibilities and interests, but cautiously and with constraint, lest such cooperation have repercussions 
on its internal system. ' See, Mile Vdjovic, "The Extent of Albania's Opening to the World", Belgrade 
Review ofInternational Agairs vol. N)CMII #901 (October, 1987): pp. 8-11. 
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the 'backwaters of foreign technology development in Europe. 132 Though initially 
wary of such a proposal, Albania relented and agreed to attend the conference 
scheduled for February, 1988. Albania attended the meeting and expressed the joint 
hopes of the participants that regional disputes could be settled peacefully. Albania 
also agreed to host the meeting scheduled for January, 1989 in Tirana, and during the 
interim attended the gathering at Sofia in June, 1988. The other Balkan nations 
welcomed the opening up process of Albania and expressed their concerns that they 
join efforts or be left behind in the new developments taking place in Europe, 
Today, we are on the threshold of the XKI century and international relations are facing new 
challenges. Consequently, all the Balkan states, realising their historical responsibilities are 
seeking to answer a vital question- how to prevent the Balkan from being relegated to the 
fringes of current favourable international trends and what to do so that this region may 
shake off the fetters of its past. 133 
With the Albanian economy in disarray and reforms taking place throughout the 
communist bloc of Europe, Albania! s move in foreign policy displayed a pragmatic and 
realistic approach. 
6.2 Ae Impact of 1989 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the televised pictures of Ceaucescu's fall in 
Romania, [which were seen in Albania via Italian TV], impacted both on Alia and the 
vast number of Albanian youth which had now been openly calling for reform. 
Initially, Alia, at the Albanian Trade Unions Council [December 1989] announced that 
the changes in Europe would not have any bearing on Albania; 
Albania and the European East have developed along completely different ideological, 
political, economic, and social roads. Therefore, the problems are not and cannot be the 
same. The crisis that is sweeping the countries of the East is the crisis of what used to be 
132 Haden Gavrilovic, "Balkan Heads of Diplomacy to Forgather", Belgrade Review OfIntemational 
. 
Agairs vol. XXXVIII #902 (November, 1987): pp. 21-22. 
133 Rade Bogdanovic, "Balkan Cooperation in Transportation", Belgrade Review ofInternational 
Agairs vol. XL #931 (January, 1989): pp. 16-18., For views and results of the various conferences see, 
Dobrivoje Vidic, "What Are the Unsettled Questions in the Balkans? ", vol. XX= #906 (January, 
1988): pp. 7-8., Vladen Jelic, "Continuing Balkan Cooperation", vol. XKNIX #922 (September, 
1988): pp. 17-19., Cedomir Vuckovic, "Strengthening Balkan Cooperation", vol. XL #932 (February, 
1989): pp. 9-10., For the belief that Albania had little choice but attend these conferences see, Milorad 
Komatina, "Albania and the Balkan Meeting", Belgrade Review ofInternationalAffai vol. 3CKM 
#911 (March, 1988) ; 'Probably, Albania took the view that if she absented herself from the Balkan 
conference, she would deprive herself of the possibility of participating in and influencing the shaping 
of cooperation between neighbouring countries and revive suspicions on the part of Balkan and other 
countries regarding her present policy of a more dynamic, flc)dble and diversified international 
cooperation, in other words cast doubt on the credibility of her more active opening to the world. ', at 
p. 13. For view that these cooperative efforts were failing due to Albania's continued reliance on 
barter trade see, Elez Biberaj, "Albania's Economic Reform Dilemma", ne World Tod vol. 43 
(October, 1987): pp. 180-183. 
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called the socialist community, but, not the crisis of socialism as a theory and practice. 
Consequently, the events taking place over there have nothing to do With US. 134 
Alia, though, understood that Albania needed to 'democratise' if it was to survive 
economically. Not wasting any time, the People's Assembly waived the constitutional 
provision against accepting foreign credits in January, 1990. The turning point in 
Albanian foreign relations, however, was at the Albanian Labour Party's Tenth Plenum 
in April, 1990. Reflecting current trends and growing unrest, Alia declared that after 
nearly five decades, Albania would finally seek to re-establish ties with the US. At the 
plenum meeting, he also announced Albania! s desire to join the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE]. This was followed up by Albania! s intention to 
also sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in August, 1990.135 
Joining the international community, however, also meant that Albania would 
have to abide by universal principles on human rights, which they were guilty of 
violating throughout the rule of the communist party. The Twelfth Party Plenum [6-7 
November 1990] therefore saw the introduction of a series of constitutional changes 
which; legalised small businesses, created programs to decentralise the economy, 
allowed for independent political organisations, removed travel restrictions, allowed 
the State Bank to negotiate with the RAF and World Bank, and removed restrictions 
and prohibitions on religious worship. The moves by Alia, however, opened a 
'Pandora! s bo)e. Hoping to control the rate of democratisation, Alia increasingly gave 
way to pressure for reform. By the end of 1990, [22 December], over fifty-thousand 
Albanians demonstrated in an anti-government rally in Tirana calling for; democracy, 
release of all political prisoners, postponement of the elections to May, 1991, and the 
revision of the electoral law. 136 The rally came just ten days after leading intellectuals 
and students led by Gramoz Pashko [economist], Ismail Kadare [writer], Besnik 
Mustafaj [writer], Remzi Lani [chief editor youth paper Zeri i Rinise Noice of the 
Youth], and Sali Berisha [heart surgeon] met to formally create Albania! s first, and true 
opposition party, the Democratic Party. 137[for a profile of political parties in Albania, 
their aims, leaders and organisation see Table 1. ] By giving in to the calls for reform, 
Alia, in attempting to secure his and his party's position ensured their eventual demise. 
134 Ramiz Alia, Zeil I Popullit 13 December, 1989. 
135 "Albania's Moves to Democracy", Background Briefforeign & Commonwealth Office, London 
(January, 1992): p. 3., Albania's wish to formally enter the CSCE was announced at the June, 1990 
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension. Here, Albania applied for observer 
status. Albania sees its participation to the CSCE as part of its return to the international community 
and to European affairs. See, "Democracy and Human Rights", Iluman Rights Law Joymal. 
Procedural Framework for the CSCE vol. 12 #6-7 (12 July, 199 1): p. 227. 
136 FO, 2p-. cit., p. 5. 
137 Elez Biberaj, "Albania at the Crossroads", Problems of Communism (Scptember-Wober, 1991): 
p. 5. 
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In keeping with the spirit of Albanian foreign policy, the Albanian leadership did what 
it had to in order to preserve Albania's integrity or else be left behind just as the rest of 
Europe was moving forward and, more importantly, just as the beginning of rumblings 
of civil war were underway in neighbouring Yugoslavia. A position of isolation or of 
simple bilateral ties would do little if full scale conflict were to erupt in Yugoslavia 
thereby threatening Albania as well. Unfortunately for Alia, these changes reflective 
of current developments also led to the eventual demise of himself and the Albanian 
Party of Labour. 
6.3 Yhe Role of Nationalism in Guiding Foreign Policy 
In Albanian Stalinism, Arshi Pipa opposes the notion that nationalism is a 
viable concept within the communist framework. 'True independence', he states, 
I cannot but be national. And those who think that communism can fraternize with 
nationalism have a poor idea of the former's essence. '138 While Albania! s borders were 
kept intact, Pipa believes that the Albanian state under communism was never truly 
independent. 
Independence may be lost not only through foreign invasions, but also through treasonous devotion to 
foreign powers. The chief mark of national sovereignity is the will to preserve and increase, within 
the frame of a truly independent state, those elements which make for the individuality of a nation. 
Communist Albania is the negation of that concept. 139 
Pipa! s critical analysis, however, fails to take the underlying principles of nationalism 
and link them to the historical factors of the Albanian nation. Granted, by design 
communism, as an ideology was not intended to be superseded by a rival ideology. 
Communist leaders knew, however, that popular support for communism would need 
more appeal than, 'workers of the world unite. Nationalism, particularly in Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans, where ties to historical boundaries and homelands runs deep, 
offered these leaders the rallying cries they needed to gain support for their communist 
cause. Nationalism then became co-opted by communism, especially in Albania, 
Appealing to the population's baser instincts mobilises them against outsiders including 
those neighbouring nations that have in the past had territorial ambitions against the 
home nation. Justifying themselves within the communist principles became easy as 
'Albanian socialisne or 'Romanian socialism, etc., accused the others of straying from 
the true path of Marxism-Leninism, of 'revisionism', neo-imperialism, and the like, all 
the while maintaining that their 'brand' of communism was the true form. 
138 pipa (1991), pp. Cit - p. 5, 
139 IBID 
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Pipa may criticise Albanian communism of 'treasonous devotion, hence lacking 
in nationalist principles. However, Albanian communism was nationalist in nature as 
evidenced by its foreign policy from the time of its creation. The 'devotion' of the 
Albanian leaders lasted only until it became obvious that Albania! s patron had designs 
above and beyond 'socialist brotherhood'. True adherence to communism would not 
have made Hoxha reject incorporation into Yugoslavia in 1948, nor break with 
Moscow in 1961 when it became apparent that Russian influence in Albania was 
becoming too great. After all, theoretically, the eventual apex of communism was the 
removal of all borders, and Hoxha fancied himself a true communist. Yet, the notion 
of preserving the historic 'homeland' is an idea that certainly predates communism and 
is part of the motivation behind nationalism. One need look only to the period after 
the break with the USSR to witness how Hoxha played the nationalist card to his 
advantage. Between 1965 and 1970, Hoxha and the APL; promoted Albanian 
literature, local songs and dance, folklore, celebrated the 500th anniversary of the 
death of Skanderbeg and surprisingly, the 90th anniversary of the League of Prizren. 
Why? Peter Prifti offers a valid answer when he states; 
The resulting isolation ... 
induced the leadership to foster nationalism as a means of 
strengthening the country's defences, and promoting the party's programme for socialist 
construction ... To 
be sure, Albania practised national communism, but in this case 
nationalism was used to reinforce communism rather than as an alternative to it. In other 
East European countries still under the influence of Moscow, nationalism as a force had 
tended to erode the power and authority of the communist party. In Albania, the communist 
leadership, being relatively ftee of outside control, appeared more and more to be using 
nationalism for ideological ends ... 
140 
The intention is not to glorify the Albanian communist leadership for their 
unswerving devotion to theAJbanian nation. Indeed, opportunism gratified Hoxha! s 
paranoia. Nationalism presented him with a tool he could manipulate to fulfil his own 
self-interest. Instead the intention is to demonstrate that, within the realm of foreign 
policymaking, the communist leadership used the historic concern of Albanians to instil 
the idea that Albania is alone. These concerns included Yugoslav, Greek, and Italian 
aims and territorial designs. Past Western activity towards Albania, either covert 
activity and/or indifference also fuelled this feeling. As such Albania must fight to 
preserve not only its territory, but, its culture and national identity, all that is associated 
with being 'Albanian' . Execution of these goals could, the APL argued, only be 
achieved through obedience and loyalty to the Albanian communists. Biberaj reaffirms 
this when he states; 
---j, 
140 prifti, (1970), pp. Cit - pp. 111.112. 
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Several interrelated factors determined Albania! s foreign policy .... Nationalism no doubt was 
the most important determinant. Historically, the fate of Albania had been one of domination 
and threat by its more powerful neighbours- Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The nationalist 
aspirations of the Albanian nation remained unfulfilled. The country's partition in 1912 and 
the loss of Kosove and other compact, Albanian-inhabited territories had psychologically 
scarred the Albanian nation, fostering xenophobia and a siege mentality on the part of many 
of its citizens and leaders. The Albanians attributed their inability to achieve national union 
to the hostile policies of their neighbours, supported by the major powers. 141 
Pipa admits that, 'Albanian communism grew to unbelievable proportions because it 
championed the national feeling of resistance to a foreign invader,. 142 It was also the 
motivation for Hoxha to ally with those who would serve as protectors and patrons for 
Albania when neighbours, be they communist or not, exerted their designs upon 
Albania. 
This mentality has not passed from Albania simply because the communists 
have lost their grip on power. The 'siege mentality' continues for Albanians. Thisis 
especially true presently when one views the area. While analysts, officials, and 
politicians argue over what are the causes of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 
Albanian concern mounts. At its simplest, and perhaps most correct form, the conflict 
in nearby Yugoslavia is a battle for land. Nationalism is used as the driving force, 
however. Supported by images of historic boundaries and revenge for past injustice, 
nationalism has mobilised civilians, both young and old, women and children, to war 
for territory they once shared with those they now kill and land that will most likely be 
unusable for quite some time after the warfare ceases. 
The US has applauded Albania's moves towards democracy and is seeking to 
help the process. The post Cold War world, however, is not one where democracy 
will come easily, and Albania is no exception. The US must realise that while these 
'democrats' and 'reform communists' may have abandoned the old system, many have 
not discarded their views, positions, and attitudes on foreign policy. Warfare on their 
doorstep, heightening tension, and risk of escalation and spreading of violence will not 
make the road to democracy any easier for Albania, particularly when domestic 
concerns, i. e., unemployment, inflation, food shortages, rising crime, etc., are also on 
the rise. An examination of US policy towards Albania may bring to light the measures 
being taken to create and nurture a democracy where one has not existed before. 
More importantly, focus on US-Albanian relations may help to answer several wider 
and more fundamental questions about US policy towards the Balkans, and whether a 
change is taking place in US foreign policy in the post Cold War world. Specifically; 
will the US policy adapt to meet changing needs and considerations of the region and 
Albania, or will it be fundamentally unaltered, a continuation of short-term and often 
141 Biberaj (1990), 9RCit - pp. 85-86. 
142 pipa (199 1), MCit. .. p. 
3. 
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ineffective policies? The need for US policyrnakers when looking at Albania is to take 
full account of indigenous factors and, [with warfare in neighbouring Yugoslavia 
continuing], historical ones as well. Serious policy failure may lead to widespread 
conflict and general instability in the region, the price of which, would be much higher 
for the region, Albania, and the US. 
But first, an examination of recent developments within Albania will 
accomplish two tasks. First, it will lay the groundwork for analysis of US-Albanian 
relations in the post Cold War. Second, and more importantly, it will provide insight 
into current factors, such as the rise of nationalism, that will not only determine the 
outcome of democratisation, but help map out which direction US policy will take and 
why. A look into the dynamics of Albanian internal politics and the status of regional 
relations should help in analysing US foreign policy formulation. 
Chapter Three 
TOWARDS REFORM 
1.0 OPENING UP [1990-19921 
The revolutions that swept across Eastern Europe in 1989 left no state 
unscathed except, of course, Albania. Keeping true to its mantle as, 'the most 
backward country in Europe, it appeared that Albania would hold on to its hard-line 
policies and reject any opportunity to look westward. Immediately after the death of 
Hoxha, Ramiz Alia made it clear that 'isolation' would remain the norm. 
.... 
Mhose who dream of and expect changes in our line, who interpret the usual normal political and 
diplomatic acts of our independent and sovereign state as 'opening upý of Albania or 'tendencies' to 
get closer to one side or another, are wasting time. I 
The stance on outside ties was not only impractical for Albania but simply foolish. The 
statement by Alia, while perhaps meant to appease hard-liners within the party, actually 
reflected most of the old guard's views on foreign tieS. 2 Centuries of foreign 
domination made Albania wary of not only its immediate neighbours, and their various 
territorial claims, but also of the larger powers that in the past have sponsored and 
promoted these claims. 3 The belief that with a state such as the United States, Albania 
could never hope to enjoy an equal status perpetuated isolationism and, unfortunately, 
Albania! s position as the poorest nation within Europe. 
Alia, however, unlike Hoxha, was a pragmatist. 4 In an increasingly 
interdependent world Albania was being left behind as perhaps the only Third World 
state within Europe, less developed than even its fellow communist neighbours. By 
mid-1991 Albania had accumulated a budget deficit of approximately $580 million, a 
balance of payments deficit of $400 million, and a foreign exchange deficit of $170 
million [US]. Its economy was in a state of chaos, still patterned upon the Stalinist 
I David Binder, "Albania! s New Leader Consolidates his Power", New York Times 22 October 1985 
2 See Biberaj (1986), op-cit.. The Old Guard included, Adil Carcani [the Premier], Rita Marko and 
Manush Myftiu [Politburo members since 19561, and Nexhmije Hoxha [head of the Democratic Front, 
a powerful grouping of cultural, social and intellectual organisations which included older Party 
members], at pp-2-3- 
3 S. V. Papacosma and Mark Ruben, (eds. ) Europe's Neutral andNon-Aligmed States (Delaware: SR 
Books, 1989): p. 219. The party played on this attitude to instil a siege mentality upon the populace. 
Tids involved using history as a base to promote class struggle. The view became one of seeing 
foreign powers as untrustworthy and generally oppressive. This in turn made both alliance and 
reliance on them simply unfeasible since they would seek to take advantage which in turn would 
undermine Albanian culture and nationalism. 
4 Alia sought to consolidate his power base as early as 1982. Then, as titular head of Albania, Alia 
supported the Politburo membership of Lenka. Cuko and Simon Stefani [November, 198 11. Following 
his ascension in 1985 he supported the candidate membership of Foto Cami and Besnik Bektashi, the 
deputy Premier. See Biberaj (1986), p. 12. 
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model of industrialisation and collectivization. 5 This general state of depression and 
stagnation left Alia little choice but to look towards the West. Hoping perhaps to 
control the pace of reform, it appeared that Albania would pattern itself upon the 
Chinese model of economic liberalisation and political conservatism. Alia, 'understood 
the link between liberalisation and democratic values on the one hand and economic 
development and international assistance on the other'. 6 Unlike China, Albania was 
not in the same bargaining position. If it sought to open up to the West, especially the 
United States, aid would only come if political democratisation was also part of 
reform. This naturally entailed political pluralism and with it, the rise of opposition 
parties. By 17 December, 1990 the Democratic Party [DP], originally representing 
disgruntled students, was recognised by the government. It soon incorporated reform 
minded communists and others and quickly became the largest opposition party in 
Albania. 
Well motivated, the DP began to organise a series of rallies across Albania 
calling for full democratisation and a quicker pace of reforms. While eager to reform 
the economy, Alia was not ready for the vast resistance from the various opposition 
groups. [See Table 1. source: Albanian Information Agency] 
TABLE. 1 ALBANIA'S PO LITICAL PARTIES* 
Pol. Party Chair/Bio Goal Aims Future 
Democratic Partv Eduard Selami- to establish a democratic privatise state farms & most popular, yet, may 
[PDS] legally attorney and former Albania based upon the industry, restructure foreign fragment due to 
recogniscd 17 philosophy prof. rule of law, human and debt, liberalise prices, domestic and foreign 
Dec. 1990 Deputy in Assembly economic rights 'shock therapy' issues within 1-3 years 
Socialist Pa Fatos Nano^- For/Eco to setup a social security socially responsible market popularity in outlying 
(PSS] formally Minister under Alia. net and move into the economy, welfare state, areas may wane as PSS 
the APL 119411, Former economist and European mainstream continuation of state co-ops, offers little legislation 
reorganised June, Prime Minister, 28 through a gradualist no new taxes on farmers and continues to block 
1991 March- 15 May, 1991 approach efforts at reform 
Amarian P Meno Gjoleka-joined to deal exclusivly with greater regulation over land weakening and may be 
[PAS] founded Bufi govL [June, the nation's farmers, privatisation, right to absorbed by PSS or 
Feb. 1991 1991] as Secretaryfor rural areas and their voluntary farm co-ops, PSDS 
Agriculture problems Agricultural Bank, 
Rerublican P Sabri Godo- minor creation of a managerial greater foreign relations weakening, relying on 
[PRS) founded novelist and member technocracy under the w/neighbours, strearnline right-wing emigree 
January, 1991 of the intelligentsia democratic direction of bureacracy, greater system of support. May be 
the rule of law checks and balances in govL absorbed into PDS 
Democratic Neritan Ceka- MP creation of the greater long-term foreign membership growing, 
Alliance [PAD] and Archelogy Prof. institutional democracy policy strategy, economic could pose long term 
founded August, Tirana University and equilibrium in govt. reform for creation of middle rival if properly funded 
I QQ? Aq. c 
Social-Democrat Skender Gjinushi- to integrate Albania into modernisation of agriculture, may continue to 
[PSDSl founded former Minister of mainstream of Europe's housing reform, balance in distance itself from PSS 
March, 1991 Education under Alia Social-Dumocratic urban & rural construction, in effort to increase 
system with a high higher focus and aid towards support. Needs to 
degree of social welfare leducation at all levels revamp party program. 
Note there are currently 18 political parties recognised by law in Albania. Many receive funding from emigrees. 
A Nano was arrested in July, 1993 on embezzlement and corruption charges and is currently serving a nine year sentence. 
The Socialists are led by Servet Pellumbi, number two man and former philosophy professor, Tirana University. 
5 Albania's Moves to Democracy BACKGROUArp BRjEF, (London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office) 
January, 1992 p. 2. 
6 IBID p. 1. 
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He failed to realise that once the door on reform had been opened he could not control 
its pace. The only viable option, which some hard-liners advocated, was severe 
repression backed up by the military. While this would have led to widespread 
bloodshed and perhaps even civil war, it was not outside the realm of possibility. 
Indeed, Alia even called for military backing according to his accounts. On February 
20th, 1991 a crowd of over 100,000 people gathered in Tirana! s main square. Fed up 
with the state of the nation and the pace of reform, they openly denounced the 
government and the old system. Seizing the moment, they toppled the large bust of 
Enver Hoxha while troops stood by and observed the scene. Prime Minister Adil 
Carcani, himself a conservative along with several military hard-liners questioned Alia 
as to why no action was taken. Alia responded that he had ordered troops to fire at 
the crowd. According to later accounts, however, Interior Minister Hekuran Isai 
apparently did not carry out Afia! s orders fearful that this would lead to large scale 
violence and bloodshed. 7 With elections scheduled for March, 1991, Alia saw that 
such acts would undermine both the party's ruling position and, more importantly, 
general order within the nation. He therefore assumed full control and many both 
within the party and outside it saw Alia as necessary to guide Albania through its 
difficult period. In an effort to appease the hard-line 'Enverists', Alia formed a nine 
member Presidential Council with prominent conservatives on it. 8 The March 31 st, 
1991 elections not surprisingly handed the APL 169 of 250 seats in Parliament and a 
general state-wide victory. The DP had little time or money to properly organise its 
campaign. It did, however, manage to embarrass the APL by a strong showing in the 
cities, including a defeat for Alia, Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani and party 
secretary Spiro Dede within Tirana. The DP also managed to gain seventy-five seats in 
Parliament. Alia, however was elected President and asked Fatos Nano, a young 
economist, to form a new government. 9 
I Me Nano Govemment 
According to international monitoring groups sent by the Helsinki Watch, the 
1991 elections were, by their standards, free and fair. Opposition groups though, felt 
that government intimidation tactics were improper. Contesting the results of the 
election in several cities, the DP often clashed with police. Such resulting violence in 
the northern city of Shkoder accounted for four deaths, including local DP leader 
Arben Broxhi, prompting outcries by the DP. With the Nano government Assembly 
7 Biberaj (199 1), Qp. cit., p. 7., See also Louis Zanga, "Albania: Between Democracy and Chaos", 
RFEIRL (3 January, 1992): p. 74. 
8 IBID, p. 8. These included people such as Carcani, Nexhmije Hoxha, Haxhi Lleshi and Xhelil Gjoni 
9 IBID, p. 9. The second round of voting held on 7 and 14 April consolidated the AM victory. See 
Keesings Contemporary Archives (April, 1991): p. 38160. 
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set to convene on 10 April it was hardly a shock when the DP delegates initiated a 
boycott of the proceedings. Seeking an official investigation into the killings, they 
finally reconvened on 17 April. Approximately one week later, despite its two-thirds 
majority in the People! s Assembly, a new draft constitution was presented to the ruling 
APL. The significance of this was that it called for the renaming of the Albania from 
the 'Socialist People's Republic' to the 'Republic of Albania!. While pledging reform 
and adherence to social equality, protection of rights, and political pluralism, the Nano 
administration faced a no win situation. Linked with the old guard and not anxious to 
sever all ties to it, the new government would never be able to appease the opposition 
parties or their followers. Despite this natural disadvantage, the Nano government did 
succeed in moving Albania closer to the outside world and in some internal 
liberalisation. 
In an effort to distance itself from the Hoxha legacy, Nano pledged on 28 
March, 1991 to release all political prisoners and move Albania 'towards democracy 
and into the civilised world'. 10 Realising this meant foreign investment and foreign aid, 
the administration succeeded in repudiating the 1976 Stalin Constitution. This meant 
the formal lifting of the ban on foreign aid. The government also sought assistance 
from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank the International Monetary Fund 
and the newly formed European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Joint 
ventures were encouraged and foreign investment was scheduled to take place by May, 
1991. 
These measures, however, were not enough in either scope or swiftness. Following the 
Skoder riots and killings, the DP organised hunger strikes and general work strikes throughout 
Albania. The trade unions organised a general strike of over 250,000 workers set for 15 May, 
199 1. With increasing pressure, Nano submitted his resignation on 4 June, 199 1, less than two 
months after he had taken the post of Prime Minister. With the economy in shambles, 
lawlessness rampant, refugees fleeing in the tens of thousands to Greece and Italy, and an 
almost total dependence on outside assistance for the most basic of foodstuffs, Nands attempts 
at a gradualist approach to reform would simply not do the job. [see Table 2] 
11 His 
resignation, therefore, came as no surprise. Instead it highlighted the desperate situation and the 
need to remove hard-liners from positions where they may block reform. This occurred at the 
APL meeting of 14 June, 1991. Several conservatives were expelled from the party. For his 
part, Fatos Nano was named chair of the now renamed, Socialist Party. While 
1OFO, pp. cit. -p. 5. 
11 Sources on figures in the table range from; Keesings Contemporary Archives, (August, 1991), and 
(January, 1992), and, RFEIRL (3 January, 1992), (6 February, 1992), and, The New York Times 5 
August, 1993, and, Derek Hall, op. cit.: pp. 189-190. Note also that labour migration figures were not 
displayed. For FY 1993; 1500-2000 went to Italy, 1000 to Germany and 300-1000 in Austria and 
Switzerland. Approximately 200,000 Albanians are currently working abroad For more information 
see, "Survey of Albania", The Financial Times 21 July, 1994 and RFEIRL (18 February, 1994) 
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generally considered a failure, the Nano administration did succeed in one major area, 
the foreign policy front. Specifically, it formally reestablished ties with the United 
States, suspended since 1946. The resumption of diplomatic ties with the US now 
afforded Albania the opportunity to head down the path of full democratisation and 
economic reform, with outside assistance. 12 
TABLE. 2 Albanian Re fugee Flow [approx. 1 
ITALY: Italian authorities 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
repatriated over 25,000 20,000 Januar) 22,000 March to 3,000 to 5,000 1,000 to 1,500 40-50,000 total 
Albanians between August/91 to December April for the entire year following allowed to remain 
and January/93 Operation 
Pelican * 
GREECE: Expelled 
10,000 10,000 12,000 [January] 130,000 by 600-1,500 a day 
January to January/ 91 200,000 June-Sept February during the Summer 
85,000 [19911,380,000 harvest season [May 
11992], 92,000 [between to Sept], 70,000 
Januar), August 1993 ]A repatriated during the 
month of August, 
1994** 
With Operation Pelican, Italian troops were able, not only to distribute food, but more importantly 
monitor the Albanian ports of Vlore, Sarande, and Durres thereby stemming the flow of refugees. 'Me 
operation began in 1992. 
AGreek and Albanian government sources vary as to the actual numbers of refugees and illegal workers in 
Greece. Many are expelled from Greece and return immediately during the harvest season where Greek 
farmers use them as a source of cheap labour. Their numbers are usually tacked onto existing figures. 
Expelled following the trial of five ethnic Greeks accused of spying for Athens. See heading [infral on relations w/Greece 
1.2 The Bufi Government of 'National Stability' 
Following the resignation of Nano, President Alia was left little choice but to 
cede to the demands of the opposition parties, particularly, the DP. An agreement was 
reached to form a coalition government with aims to 'stabilise' the nation until general 
elections could be held in either May or June, 1992. 
According to the agreement, ministers in the new government had to resign from their 
parties and were prohibited from running for office in the next elections. The communists' 
choice for prime minister was Ylli Pufl, a young and relatively unknown candidate member 
of the party's Central Committee who had served as niinister of food since July 1990. He 
formed a government of experts don-driated by noncommunists. 13 
The Bufi government was faced with an almost impossible task. Industrial and 
agricultural production was down by nearly fifty percent. Albania's foreign debt had 
reached more than $400 million [US], its export values had declined from $300-350 
12 The agreement, restoring relations, was signed on March 15,1991 in Washington by Foreign 
Minister Muhamet Kapllani. See, Keesings Conte? nporarV. 4rchives March 1991 p. 38106. 
13 Biberaj (1992) 0. cit.. p. 12. 
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million in previous years to only $60-65 million by 1991, and inflation was running 
rampant at six hundred percent. Unemployment figures vary, yet estimates, 
conservative at that, placed more than one-quarter of a million people out of work, in a 
population of three million. To make matters worse, the government, in an effort to 
stem potential violence from these vast numbers of unemployed, was continuing to pay 
approximately eighty percent of the workers wages. This severely depleted government 
funds resulting in the increased printing of money, and with it, even higher inflation and 
debt. 14 With this many people unemployed and obviously alienated, crime increased 
exponentially. Reports of gangs roaming the country robbing, looting and causing 
general unrest continued to spread. " This atmosphere only increased Albania! s 
problems as foreigners became wary of investing money when instability and 
lawlessness appeared the norm. Indeed, Albania seemed to be headed towards total 
collapse both economically and socially. 
It was amidst this climate that Bufi took the reigns of government. The DP 
leader, Sali Berisha, as well as other opposition members, felt that a coalition was 
necessary to return Albania from the brink of anarchy and prevent the quite possible 
imposition of military rule. 16Nurturing external ties and aid, Albania looked to Europe 
and the United States. It was admitted as a member of the CSCE and established links 
with the European Community. The latter quickly moved to help Albania, providing a 
measure for emergency aid on 13 June, 199 1. The aid, however, was predicated upon 
continued commitment by the Albanian government for democracy and respect for 
human rights. 17 By the end of June, the United States Secretary of State James Baker 
paid a visit to Albania. Calling for the continuation of democratisation and reform 
within Albania, Baker pledged six million dollars in US assistance. The aid, however, 
was conditional on further measures towards democracy. Fearing that Albania! s 
collapse would lead to an even larger refugee exodus, other nations followed suit, 
Italy, which bore the brunt of refugees, granted more than $150m in humanitarian and 
14 Zanga (January, 1992), pp. cit. , p. 76. 
15 See, "1993 United States State Department Human Rights Report", (Washington DC: US 
Goverruncrit Printing Office, 1993): p. I., Congressional Research Service, "Summary: Romania, 
Bulgaria, Albania/ Recent Developments", (Ibe Library of Congress Washington DC: 20 July, 1992): 
p. CRS-12., Natasha Narayan, "Freedom for Albanians Brings wave of Crime", The Sunday Dines 22 
March, 1992., and Louis Zanga (January, 1992), op. cit.: particularly p. 77.; 'Lawlessness reached 
alarming proportions and threatened to turn into organised crime". 
16 Biberaj (1991), 2p,! cýit. p. 13. 
17' Commissioner Frans Andriessen confirmed that the development of relations with Albania 
depcnded upon respect for human rights and the development of democracy. He said, however, that 
the General Affairs Council .... will 
be considering the opening of diplomatic relations between the EC 
and Albania, and if this happened, then the Commission would hold exploratory talks on the 
prospects for a trade and co-operation agreement. The EC has already given 1.5m ECU for refugees 
and another 0.5m ECU was being considered as emergency aid.. ' See the European Parliament 
Rep (Brussels: 10-14 June, 1991): p. 28. 
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emergency aid. Greece, which witnessed tens of thousands of refugees spill over its 
borders also, with Turkey pledged approximately $20m each. 18 
While the West has been more than willing to assist in humanitarian and 
emergency aid for Albania, it has been wary to grant large levels of hard currency. 
Realising that the entire system needs reforming, the West believed that hard currency 
grants might have the effect of slowing down reform by perpetuating the old system. 
Bufl, who has not advocated a 'shock therapy' approach, only confirmed the West's 
suspicions. The result was a lack of private investment and enterprises that were 
dominated by a communist party installed bureaucracy, reluctant to reform a system 
which would thereby jeopardise their position. 19 More importantly, there was a 
legitimate concern that continued Western assistance would create a situation akin to 
the welfare system of the United States. This meant the establishment of a permanent 
underclass, lacking of initiative, unwilling to work, and totally dependent upon outside 
aid. 20 
With Albania suffering from a lack of basic necessities, Bufl made the provision 
of vital consumer goods his first priority. Price controls were lifted on certain goods 
and enterprises and low level privatisation was instituted. There was even speculation 
that Albania would establish 'free economic zones' to encourage investment. 21 These, 
however, could not work when the entire nation was in a state of civil unrest and 
instability. 'Extortion, prostitution, drug-running, indeed, crime per se [were] the 
order of the day. 22 Concerted efforts, however, were made. A Foreign Investment 
Agency, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, began 
operations on I October, 1991. Immediately prior to its formation, the EC stepped up 
its trade links with Albania; 
The Commission ... put forward a proposal for a trade, commercial and economic cooperation 
agreement with Albania designed to remove restrictions on Albanian exports to EC markets 
over a ten year period and to help the Albanian economy in a market led 
19 Keesings (March, 199 1), Qp 
_cit. 19 IBID 
20 A similar view was expressed by the German State Secretary Erich Riedl while on a visit to 
Albania. When Albanians asked for more German aid, Riedl was quoted as 'having bluntly told the 
Albanians to stop acting like beggars on the world stage and to roll up their sleeves'. Zanga (January, 
1992), 2p_. cit., p. 75. 
21 FO, w. cit. - pp. 8-9., First evidence that Albania even considered such a possibility dates to the Alia 
government and its 1989 'end of the year' economic report by the then Chairman of the State 
Planning Commission, Niko QJyzari. See, Per Sandstrom and Oýan Sjoberg, * Albanian Economic 
Performance: Stagnation in the 1980s", Soviet Studie vol. 43 #5 (1991), for brief mention, p. 933., 
For recent efforts to perhaps allow such zones to begin operation in the oil industry and Albania's 
independent conglomerate, Albpetrol, see, Louis Zanga, "The Prospects of the Albanian Oil Industry", 
RFEIRL (12 November, 1993): pp. 35-38., On possibility of privatising state enterprise and turning 
these into zones; Albania: From Isolation Toward Reform (International Monetary Fund Occasional 
Paper # 98 Washington DC: September, 1992): pp. 57-58. 
22 Liam McDowall, "Albania Learns the Art of Wrecking", New Statesman and Socie (13 
December, 199 1): p. 18. 
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direction .... 
Although there is no specific mention of financial assistance, the Community has 
already allocated 35m ECU to Albania under the 1992 budget and will provide about 50m 
ECU in the 1993 bUdget. 23 
The attempts at reform, while creating some degree of normalcy, fell short, as 
increased demands by the opposition and the populace further undermined the 
government for national stability's position. A CSCE rapporteur mission to Albania 
[ 16-19 September 199 1] agreed that while positive steps were being taken, the road to 
democracy in Albania would be, 'neither easy nor rapid'. 24 This only amplified the 
demands by the DP. With social unrest rising and the continuing polarisation of the 
parties within the government, DP chair Sali Berisha issued an ultimatum to the 
government at the DP party meeting of 26 November, 1991 in Tirana. 
The democratic opposition had repeatedly demanded that its continued participation in state 
affairs be guarantied by both the government and President Ramiz Alia. It had also 
demanded that the late dictator Enver Hoxha's widow, Nexhn-dje, and former ranking 
communist party officials be arrested; that the directors of the Albanian Radio and Television 
be replaced; and that the trial of those considered responsible for the Shkoder massacre be 
reopened; and that the general elections be brought forward to February. 25 
If these demands were not met, the DP promised to withdraw from the coalition 
government precipitating its downfall. The government bowed to the pressure and 
acquiesced to the DP demands. On 4 December, 1991, however, the DP announced 
that it would withdraw from the government. The Bufi government fell immediately. 
This move by Berisha and his followers had two direct consequences. First, it threw 
Albania into an even deeper state of civil unrest as looting, violence and resulting 
deaths occurred throughout the nation. 26 Second, and more importantly, the move 
exposed a growing rift within the Democratic Party itself between Berisha and those 
more moderate elements who felt that the Bufi government should have been 
supported rather than abandoned at this critical stage of reform. 27 As for the 
performance rating of the Bufi administration; 
23 European Parliament Report, 2B cit., pp. 13-14. Keesings Archives (September, 1991): p. 38448. 
24 "CSCE Rapportcur Nfission to Albania Report 16-19 September 199 1", (Warsaw: CSCE Office for 
Free Elections, 1992): p. 2. 
25 Louis Zanga, "Albania: Fall of Government Plunges Country into Chaos", R-FEý(RL (10 January, 
1992): p. 17. 
26 Bufi's order to resign, on 6 December 199 1, was followed by rioting- attributable largely to 
economic shortages- which caused 40 deaths, and a protest rally in Tirana on 9 December against the 
failure of government, President and parliament to improve living conditions. FO, on. cit.: p. 8., Liam 
McDowall, "Albania Learns the Art of Wrecking", New Statesman and Socie (13 December, 1991): 
pp. 18-19., Brenda Fowler, "Crimewavc Fills Tirana with Fear", The Times 17 February, 1992. 
27 Berisha's announcement to withdraw from government provoked a dispute within the DP as 
Neritan Ceka, acting deputy chair of the DP resigned from his post and from that as parliamentary 
leader, accusing Berisha of acting without a mandate, describing Bufi as a 'devoted patriot', and , 
exiolling the successes of his administration, which he said was the, 'best post-war government we 
have ever had% Keesings Archives (December, 1991): p. 38686. Ccka, along with fellow DP founder 
Gramoz Pashko and Arben Imami would later form their own party, the Democratic Alliance. 
159 
Observers at home and abroad have noted that foreign policy was the only field in which the 
previous cabinet performed well. In the six months that Buffs government was in office, 
Albania gained membership in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Moreover, it won the support of the Group of 24 and the European 
Community, among others .... Bufi is thought by many observers both at home and abroad to have performed well as prime minister under extremely difficult conditions. 28 
President Alia was now faced with either seeking a new coalition government 
or a caretaker government until new elections could be held. After consulting with the 
leaders of the five coalition parties, the latter alternative was chosen. On 10 
December, 199 1, former Nutrition Minister Vilson Ahmeti, a non-communist party 
member was asked to form a caretaker administration. The new nineteen member 
government of 'technocrats' was announced on 14 December, 1991.29 One week later, 
Alia announced that new general elections would be held on 22 March, 1992. 
1.3 The Caretaker Administration 
The new cabinet was to concentrate on furthering econon& reform, 
particularly, in land privatisation. It also sought raw materials and a strengthening of 
outside ties as a way to move Albania, a nation at one point self sufficient, away from a 
now almost total foreign aid and food dependency. By the end of January, 1992, over 
three thousand tonnes of wheat were arriving daily to Albania by both rail and sea, 
provided by the EC members and the US. These measures, however, failed to alleviate 
the crisis in Albania as problems arose over storage, distribution, and looting of the 
warehouses where the grain was kept. Indeed, the months of January and February 
were witness to widespread crime and violence which threatened to bring Albania to 
the point of near total anarchy and chaos. Crime had reached such proportions that 
people would not venture outside after dusk. The situation had even the police 
ffightened and risked paralysing the whole nation. 30 The Ahmeti administration 
introduced a bill to Parliament to alleviate the crime by imposing stiffer penalties on 
offenders and putting more police on the streets. 31 This would not solve the problems 
though as many Albanians understood that the crime sweeping the nation was not the 
random acts of individuals, but the co-ordinated efforts of 'urban Mafioso'which 
sprang up in the last two years. Liberalisation had brought with it corruption and 
28 IBID, p. 18. 
29 L. Zanga, "The New Caretaker Government", RFEIRL (10 January, 1992) 
30 Brenda Fowler (February, 1992), gp. cit.; , The situation on looting only got worse as resulting 
violence led to many deaths including three women raped and killed within a two week period and 
two elderly women suffocated to death in a grain warehouse looting raid. See, "Raiders Grab Food 
Aid", Yhe Times 27 February, 1992. 
31 David Binder, "Revamped Police Slow Albanian Slide Into Chaos", Internafional Herald Tlibune 
30 October 1992 
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profiteering by ruthless men who were diverting much needed aid leaving the police 
with little they could do since, in all likelihood, some within their ranks also saw the 
opportunity to profit from the widespread chaoS. 32 
As for continued outside assistance, Albania was forced to spend most of its 
foreign currency reserves on obtaining basic necessities. This increased its foreign 
indebtedness to over $600m, up from $400m in less than one year. 33 Its continued 
economic plight jeopardised its already weakened political stability. And, as 
mentioned, this aid would not further reform. 
Although Western food aid is vital and has kept Albanians from starving, it will not reinvigorate the 
economy. Rather, Albanians must create an economic base by producing goods both for domestic 
consumption and for export. It must also resolutely promote the development of private ownership and 
a market economy. 34 
With little relief in sight, many Albanians fled the country hoping to gain work and a 
better life. The resulting flood of refugees to Italy and Greece in the tens of thousands 
forced those two nations to impose strict measures to stem the tide of this illegal flow. 
Before the start of the new year [1992], Italy dispatched eight hundred troops to the 
Albanian port city of Durres, part of 'Operation Pelican'. The troops are there to aid in 
food distribution and together with patrol boats along the coast, see that Albanians do 
not attempt to board ships headed for Italy. Greece also became burdened by an influx 
of refugees which Greek government estimates placed at over 200,000 and rising. 35 
Albania and Greece, historically had never much cared for one another. Now, the 
refugee problem only exacerbated the situation. With possibly more than one hundred 
thousand Albanians in Greece illegally, and the Greek economy itself hurting, it did not 
take much to incite unrest, violence, and border incidents which brought charges and 
counter-charges by both sides. Many of the Albanians, young males in their twenties 
and thirties, usually unskilled labourers, once in Greece often found little or no 
employment. This resulted in many of them 'roanýiing the streets' and engaging in 
criminal activity. With pressure from Greeks to do something, the Greek Prime 
32 The chief of the Tirana police admitted that, at one point, his men no longer had any control over 
the situation. The police were also wary of harsh measures since many still saw them as instruments 
of the repression typified by the old regime. This undermined their authority and, in some instances, 
threatened their existence as reprisals were sought. James Pettifcr, "Dispirited Albania Prepares to 
Vote", 7he Times II March 1992, Anne McElvoy, "Ballot Offers no Way Out for Albania's Ills", 7he 
Times 18 March 1992. 
33 Zerl i Popullit 29 December 1991 
34 Louis Zanga, "Albania Reduced to Total Dependence on Foreign Food Aid", RFEIRL (21 February, 
1992): p. 48. 
35 Robert Austin, "Albanian-Greek Relations: The Confrontation Continues", RFEIRL (20 August, 
1993): pp. 30-35., Greek estimates also claim that 1500 to 1600 Albanians try to cross into Greece 
daily and are turned back by Greek authorities. Henry Kamm, "With Nothing to Lose, Albanians 
Invade Greece", The New York Times 5 August, 1993, and RFEIRL Newsbriefs (28 October, 1993): 
p. 16. Expulsion figures for 1992 indicate 379,093 Albanians were sent back by the Greek authorities. 
Illy7la 13 February, 1993 p. 1. 
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Minister, Constantine Mitsotakis launched 'Operation Broom!, an effort to expel 
thousands of Albanians in Greece without proper documentation. Both opposition and 
Socialist party members in Albania denounced this decision by Greece and called on a 
softer stance. 36 Greece rejected the call by Albania and later protested the Albanian 
government decision to ban parties within Albania that represented ethnic minorities. 
Specifically, Omonia, a Greek minority party within Albania sought status as a political 
party, able to field candidates in the upcoming March 22 elections. A tide of anti- 
Greek sentiment, however, was expressed by the majority of the Albanian Parliament 
as they passed the legislation against this unanimously. Greece took its case to the EC 
and in a strongly worded letter to President Afia, Secretary-General of the Council of 
Europe, Catherine Lalumiere called on Albania to recall its pledge to respect minority 
rights or risk losing its guest status in the EC Parliamentary Assembly. Alia responded 
that while groups such as Omonia were not recognised as political parties, they were 
not prevented from fielding independent candidates in the general election. 37 
With foreign troops in Albania; the economy in shambles; increasing 
dependency on outside aid for basic foodstuffs and crime running rampant, the stage 
was set for the March 22 general elections. The Ahmeti government of technocrats 
served little purpose but to serve as a caretaker government handcuffed by the 
situation and events. 31 The elections of March reversed the 1991 results. With 
approximately ninety-one percent of the population voting, the opposition parties 
received nearly seventy percent of the vote. The DP was clearly the winner as it 
gathered sixty-two percent of the vote and ninety-two seats in the new one hundred 
forty seat Parliament, followed by the Socialists with twenty-six percent of the vote 
and thirty-eight seatS. 39 With its clear majority, the DP controlled government, the 
first time a non-communist government had power in roughly five decades. DP chair 
Dr. Sali Berisha, a former heart surgeon was elected President and called upon 
Alexander Meksi, a co-founder of the DP and chair of the People's Assembly from 
1991 to 1992 to form a government. The complete victory by the DP in the elections 
seemed to justify their decision to withdraw from the government coalition. This is 
what Berisha had expected. 
36 For examples of the 'incidents' see, James Pettifer, "Atrocities on Border Denied by Greece", The 
Times 17 March 1992 where two Albanians were apparently killed by Greek border patrols. On the 
levels and incidents of crime by Albanians within Greece see, Louis Zanga, "Albanian-Greek 
Relations Reach a Low Point", RFEIRL (10 April, 1992): pp. 18-2 1., J. R Shannan Peckham, 
"Albanians in Greek Clothing", ne World To (April, 1992): pp. 58-59. 
37 Zanga (April, 1992), 2p-. ci-t,. pp. 20-2 1. Keesings Archives (February, 1992): p. 3 8689. 
39 With the worst situation of all the East European nations, Albania belonged, along with only the 
former Yugoslavia, in a 'third group! of regionally classified economics. This meant that the 
transition to capitalism was not of the utmost priority despite official statements. Instead social and 
political stability took precedence. See, Ben Slay, "The East European Economics: Uneven Progress", 
RFEIRL (I January, 1993): pp. 113-118 
39 Louis Zanga, "Daunting Tasks for Albania's New Government", RFEIRL (22 May, 1992): p. II 
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He expertly timed his partys exit from the coalition government, quitting at the height of the civil 
unrest last December and thus ensuring that fresh elections would be held in a climate of disillusion 
and uncertainty and that the electorate would be ready for a change. 40 
2.0 771EDEMOCRATICARRIVAL [March, 19921 
The first true non-communist government of Albania inherited a nation in dire 
straits. President Berisha affirmed that the state of affairs was so grave that it would 
perhaps take Albania twenty years to achieve a standard of living and prosperity 
comparable to Western standardS. 41 Albania! s gross domestic product was falling 
rapidly by ten percent for each fiscal quarter. Inflation was rising equally at ten percent 
and figures indicated that almost half of the population was out of work. 42 The DP led 
government was officially sworn in on 19 April, 1992. All except four of the eighteen 
member Council of Hnisters, dubbed the 'cabinet of hope', were part of the DP. 43 
Criticising its makeup, the Socialists immediately lashed out at the Meksi cabinet 
claiming that it was filled with inexperienced personnel. While the charge is true, the 
DP filled its ranks, and those of the cabinet with a host of intellectuals and 
professionals including, lawyers, doctors, teachers, and engineers. 
Although brought in on a wave of hope, the new government will in all 
likelihood not be given much of a grace period. The Albanian people are pragmatic 
and realise that whole-sale change will not be achieved overnight. However, the DP 
has made many promises during the election campaign, some of which were from the 
time of their utterance, not capable of being achieved. Among these, President Berisha 
hinted that now, Albania could achieve access to Western Europe, its markets and 
labour possibilities. Also, he believed that economic reforms would reflect positive 
gains within two years. With Albania free and open, foreign investment would follow, 
both rapidly and in abundance. 44 This, unfortunately, was not to be the case. And now, 
with power in their hands, the Albanians will not accept excuses, but demand results, 
With a multiplicity of opposition led by the well organised and well funded Socialist 
Party, the government will be hard pressed to initiate and, more importantly, 
implement sweeping reform legislation when the former SP will block, criticise, seek to 
water down, and protect its own interests within government. While these interests 
40 Anne McElvoy, "Surgeon Turned Leader Breathes New Life into Albania", The Times 25 March 
1992., On election results and outcomes see; "Tirana Revels in Democrat Victory", The Times 24 
March 1992, "Rural Voters Hold Key in Albania", The Times 20 March 1992, "Albanian Democrats 
Scent Victory", The 7-imes 23 March 1992. 
41 Zanga (February, 1992), 2p cft.. Anne McElvoy, "Tirana! s Night Watch", The Times 23 March 
1992 
42 ERBQ RWort, Quartetly Economic Review (London: ERBD, 30 September, 1992): pp. 42-43. 
43 KeesingS ArchiVeS (April, 1992): p. 38878., Zanga (February, 1992), QP cit_, pp. 12-13. 
44 Louis Zanga, "Daunting Tasks for Albania's New Government", RFEIRL (22 May, 1992): pp. I I- 
17., James Pettifer, "Albania: A Challenge for Europe", The fVorld To"a (June, 1992): pp. 95-97., 
The Economist (5 June, 1993), on poor foreign investment totalling only $20m to date, pp-55-56. 
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vary, The SP seems more content simply opposing every DP move and proposal rather 
than formulate viable initiatives themselves. Indeed, aside from an open and vehement 
rejection of the shock therapy approach, the SP modus operandi appears as deliberate 
attempts to undermine the legislative process. 45 With this in mind, the Assembly, prior 
to the Presidential elections made 'swift amendments to the Constitution in an effort to 
bolster the powers of the President. The move was an attempt to grant Berisha 
powers to call, attend, chair cabinet meetings and to give direct orders to members of 
the government, akin to the US Presidential powers regarding the cabinet. 46 Should 
this not work, however, and the new government fail, always a possibility in a nation 
with a history of instability, there is a strong chance that a new non-democratic system 
could gain power. While not a reversion to the past, as most simple analysis indicates, 
this new system would at worst, be authoritarian in one shape and at best, adopt a 
slower more 'gradualist' approach to reform thereby keeping Albania out of the 
European mainstream once more. 
2.1 Domestic Reform 
The new government had to deal with four problems. First, the continuing 
breakdown of order threatened to undermine any attempts at stabilisation. With 
Albania dependent upon, and actively encouraging, foreign investment, law and order 
became a top priority. 
The demolition of the institutions of the onc-party state has meant that in many spheres of 
Iffe there is no state authority at all, and in some cities the police do not appear to be capable 
of enforcing the law. Traditional patterns of revenge killing are beginning to appear. A 
climate of serious violence as part of a turbulent street culture is growing and is bound to 
deter domestic or international investors, however much they may wish to help Dr. Berisha 
shake off the Communist heritage. 47 
With Albania actively seeking to pattern itself on a West European model, 48 the need 
for western investment was vital. While a series of law and order legislation was 
passed in the Assembly which brought about some stability, investment was still not up 
to the levels expected by the Albanians. Reasons may vary as to why. However, the 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia certainly plays a large role in dissuading investors. [See 
infra, foreign policy] With the advent of dissolution there, West European inability and 
a lack of understanding of the problem, or how to solve it, sped Yugoslavia on its 
course to destruction. Inefficiency, indifference, and general foolishness highlighted 
the European Union's policy. This, at a time when comprehension, intuitiveness, and 
initiative were needed. But, instead of seizing the opportunity to do something which 
45 Louis Zanga, "Albanian Political Turmoil", 
-RFEIRL 
(31 July, 1992): pp. 14-19. 
46 Zanga (Feb., 1992), gp cit.: p. 12. 
47 jaMeS peWer, "Albania: A Challenge for Europe", The World Today (June, 1992): p. 97. 
48 Zanga (January, 1993), pp. cit., p. 75. 
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would benefit themselves and the area, the Europeans flinched, With regards to 
Albania, James Pettifer expresses this position; 
The ball is now firmly in Europe's court, and in the absence of the old scapegoat some sort 
of more considered policy response to the poverty and misery of Albania will presumably 
be needed. This will inevitably involve very large sums of money and a degree of politicai 
will implying the potential for integration into Europe of this small Balkan country. It 
remains to be seen whether this will be forthcoming, now that other aspects of the Balkan 
crisis appear to have fundamentally affected the way the region is seen in Brussels. 
49 
The need to stabilise the situation in Albania has led to a decrease in the levels of 
crime. In the past year, the percentage of violent crime [murder, rape, kidnapping, 
robbery etc. ], has decreased. However, the level of non-violent crime [petty theft, 
misappropriation etc. ], has actually increased by roughly four percent. This, to some 
degree, also factors into potential investoes decisions whether or not to inject time and 
money into Albania. 50 
The second problem encompasses the slow pace of economic recovery. With the 
most backward economy in Europe, Albania embarked upon the Jeff-ry Sachs program 
of 'shock therapy. Co-operatives were broken up and large-scale privatisation 
schemes were instituted. Disputes immediately broke out over ownership resulting in 
violence5l in the outlying areas and foreign firms became wary of investing since future 
land claims would disrupt business activity. 52 Also, although only twenty-nine percent 
of the population was employed in industry, the closure of outdated, inefficient plants 
left tens of thousands without work. The high unemployment figures, estimated at fifty 
percent, do not take into account the high proportion of the 'underemployed'. These 
include the vast numbers of street vendors, bazaar merchants and transient workers 
who illegally cross into Greece or Macedonia, work for the harvest season, and return 
to Albania with their winnings. When factored in, they may represent an additional 
twenty percent of the population, although exact figures are difficult to attain. Shock 
therapy exacerbated inflation and unemployment while privatisation and market 
mechanisms destroyed many of the social benefits previously received by the populace. 
The situation did not bode well for the DP as Albanians grew restless with reform. 
The government defended its program, however, as the only means to shake Albania 
49 Pettifer (June, 1992), op. cit.: p. 97. 
50 Informal conversation with top Executive Branch official, (Tirana: 14 June, 1993) 
51 A series of hunger strikes over privatisation resulted in President Berisha calling in police to break 
up the strike in the northern city of Shkoder in May, 1993. Zanga (July, 1992), op. cit.: p. 24. 
52 From the start of the Bufl administration, June 1991 to June, 1993, Albania has managed to 
privatise ninety percent of the land. These were divided up amongst five hectare plots to farmers. 
Disputes broke out, however, between the new owners of property and the pre-war landowners whose 
property was seized by the communist regime. Many of these landowners are part of, and voice their 
claims through the dmigrd group communities. Two primary ones are leftovers from the war, still 
active today; Balli Kombetar, and Legalitati. See Louis Zanga, "Albanian President Defends His First 
Year in Office", RFEIRL vol. 2 #29 (16 July, 1993): pp. 23-26. 
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from the communist foundations of its centrally planned past. President Berisha! s chief 
adviser, Mr. Genc Pollo reiterated earlier statements regarding shock therapy by 
stating; 'while it creates problems, these are short term. Shock therapy, however, 
provides the best answer for a system such as Albania that was the most backward in 
Europe'. 53 To others within government, Albania! s economic woes and the means to 
combat them do not necessarily imply the use of 'shock therapy. Mr. Leonard Demi, 
of the Albanian Foreign Ministry represents this latter view. 
I think the term 'shock thetapy' is subjective and therefore relative to the situation at hand. 
Albania had the worst economic and political situation in all of Europe. Only now, after nearly 
five decades, are we seeking to reassert ourselves on the international scene. Naturally you are 
going to have immediate problems such as unemployment but these are expected, particularly 
when you embark upon large scale economic reform. 54 
One of the first measures of the new government was to stop paying eighty percent of 
unemployed worker's wages. While these moves were highly unpopular, Berisha was 
merely following the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund and seeking 
to preserve already depleted coffers. The high levels of the unemployed also threaten 
to increase the crime rate and divert even more time and resources to preserve order. 
Opposition to the government's decision to close various industrial plants was 
widespread as some thought that outside aid, coupled with comprehensive retraining 
programs would alleviate the employment problem. Sabri Godo, chairman of the 
Republican Party, adheres to this view. When asked what was the biggest problem in 
Albania, he responded; 
The de-industrialisation and closure of the various plants. They have left many people 
unemployed and put many more on social assistance. We now are forced to import various 
products from the West when these plants could have been and should have been converted, 
and their employees retrained, so that we could have produced these products ourselves. This 
would then result in jobs, goods, and a prosperous economy. 55 
This position, while possessing merit, is simply not feasible for several reasons. 
First, modification and retraining requires large amounts of assistance. Albania has 
been hard pressed in obtaining such amounts, particularly when the likelihood for 
positive return on investment remains sketchy at best. Second, recent aid has been 
earmarked for more pressing needs such as social welfare programs and fulfilling basic 
necessities, especially since sectors of Tirana, the capital, continue to operate without 
proper sewage disposal, running water and lack of communication and power lines. 
Third, Albania is not the only reforming ex-communist system in need. Aid has been 
53 Interview Genc Pollo, (rirana: 7 June, 1993) 
54 Interview, Mr. Leonard Demi Director Third Department Albanian Foreign Ministry, (Tirana 4 
June, 1993) 
55 Interview, Mr. Sabri Godo, Chair Republican Party of Albania, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993) 
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distributed across the nations of Eastern Europe based upon need, yet in consideration 
of, level of reform, extent of democratisation and privatisation, potential for success, 
etc., and other factors which naturally limit the amount of aid presently available. 
Lastly, aid geared for retraining cannot work when a large percentage of the 
population is comprised of unskilled labourers. With over sixty-five percent of the 
population involved in simple peasant agriculture, retraining would take time. Such 
time would mean the short term perpetuation of outdated plants producing not only 
poor quality goods by East European standards, but the further depletion of resources 
needed to keep these inefficient plants operating. 56 Such a disproportionate amount of 
the population in rural areas may also contribute to economic hardship. Urbanisation 
may bring short term problems such as overcrowding, poor living standards, crime, 
etc., but it does also bring economic prosperity in the long term. Skender Gjinushi, 
chairman of the Social Democratic party believes that by 'privatising and modernising' 
rural areas a new class of urban and suburban dwellers could be created in the long 
term. This is not only critical but one key to proper economic reform as is ensuring 
that a proper mix of urban and rural inhabitants is created. Gjinushi goes on to state 
that hopefully over ten to fifteen years, the number of rural dwellers will decrease and 
subsequently, growth can be maximised. He feels, however, that the government is not 
pursuing this within the framework of a well thought out plan. 57 Gjinushi also feels 
that education and continued promotion of it, including specialist programs along 
Western models and standards would benefit Albania! s short and long term economic 
reform. 58 He does receive support from those within Albanian academia. Low level 
exchange programs have begun with Germany, Italy and Great Britain and are 
expected to begin with the US. Even when positive strides are being made in 
education, problems arise. Rector of the University of Tirana, Mr. Gezim Karapici had 
stated that while a larger variety of courses are now available and steps are being taken 
to instruct Western techniques, the problem becomes making sure the capable stay in 
Albania. What did he see as the largest problem to economic progress? 
The 'brain drain! situation is the greatest impediment to reform, not only among the staff, but 
among the brighter graduates. As rector of this university I make apprmcimately $55 a month 
[L 401. Most professors make half that and most qualified graduating students have a chance to 
do no better presently. Given the circumstances it is not unusual, therefore, that these students 
and professors should seek better jobs and pay elsewhere. We cannot hold them here by force. 
The result then is that their skills, which could be most helpfid in Albania, will be used 
elsewherc. 59 
56 Prime Nfinister Meksi stated flatly that he highly doubts any foreign investor would be willing to 
invest large sums to renovate the Stalin-era enterprises. Zanga (July, 1993), 2R. cit.; p. 24. 
57 Interview, Mr. Skender Gjinushi Chair, Social Democratic Party, (Tirana: 18 June, 1993) 
58 IBID. This position makes sense when one considers that Gjinushi at one time under Alia served as 
a former Minister of Education. 
59 Interview, Mr. Gezim Karapici Rector University of Tirana, (Tirana: 5 June, 1993) 
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Generally, pegging educational reform to increased levels of urbanisation results often 
in the move away from urban decay and to a more prosperous economy and efficient 
infrastructure. 'The tight relationship that exists between economic development, 
educational levels, and democracy is illustrated quite clearly in Southern Europe'. 60 In 
using Greece and Spain as examples from the 1950s through the 1970s, Fukuyama 
compares the level of urbanisation with rising education levels and prosperity 
concluding; 'with urbanisation came higher degrees of education and personal income, 
and an appreciation of the consumer culture ... 161 
The problem with attempted urbanisation is the difficulty in attracting rural 
dwellers to cities when jobs and homes are not available. This then relegates many to 
the rural areas and denies them and their children educational possibilities as they must 
now either tend a small private plot to keep their family alive or simply have nowhere 
to attend intermediate and higher level schooling in outlying areas. GJinushi's 
suggestion of modernising these outlying areas would certainly help. However, the 
immediate need seems to be alleviating the state of unemployment. This requires 
continued investment, particularly in the cities. This would create more jobs which 
would draw labour in from rural areas nurturing the urbanisation needed to promote 
education and prosperity. This in turn would spur on economic reform. 
In the short to medium term, however, it appears that Albania will focus on 
agriculture as its top priority. At a rally in Korca, Berisha stressed the importance of 
making Albania self sufficient in food production which meant the improvement of the 
agricultural sector. Because of past bread shortages and the riots they led to, Albania! s 
bread production is still under state supervision. The nation consumes 600,000- 
650,000 tonnes of grain annually, yet domestically produces 350,000 tonnes. Imports 
and food aid do not necessarily solve the difference as the government resells much of 
this for hard currency. This has led to a nearly two-fold increase in the price of bread 
beginning on July 1,1993. Berisha had stated that beginning in 1994, farmers! taxes 
would be lessened and/or deferred for a two-three year period. The agricultural sector 
would receive investments of $50m towards new machinery, renovated irrigation 
systems and two thousand new tractors. The government also hopes to boost 
productivity by providing subsidy incentives and paying twice as much to farmers for a 
kilogram of grain. 62 The government's fiscal austerity programs based upon INW 
60 Francis Fukuyama (1992), M. cit. .; p. 
110. 
61 mm The transformation of the Greek and Spanish systems led to high growth. Beginning in 1958, 
Spain! s economy grew by 7.1% yearly, Greeces by 6.4%. He attributes this to the social 
transformations that occurred in those nations. By 1950, only 18% of the Spanish population lived in 
cities. By 1970, this increased to 34% while maintaining continued growth rates over seven percent. 
62 Up to I July, 1993 bread prices rose from 240 leks to 460 leks per loaf. Two factors bear 
consideration; first, the average Albanian family consumes 19.2 kilos of bread a month, quite high for 
European standards. Second, an average Albanian salary ranges from 10,000 to 20,000 leks a month. 
When factored with daily consumption and purchase, Albanians may spend as much as one-third 
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recommendations have yielded some succesS. 63 Exports have increased by eighty 
percent over 1992 figures. Inflation, at one time running over two-hundred and fifty 
percent is down to under one percent. The lek has also stabilised at 100- 110 leks per 
US dollar. Goods not available two years ago are freely obtainable on the market as 
Western merchandise makes its way across Albania. Price liberalisation has fortunately 
not led to wild price increases though there have been steady and constant increases. 
Yet, for all the positives, the situation is still one of general want and disparity. Social 
assistance is a measly 5,400 leks/month and is procurable for only six months to one 
year. Unemployment still includes nearly half the population and charges of corruption 
fill the headlines of opposition dailies. An assessment of economic reform indicates 
that; 
Berisha can point with some pride to some of his governmenVs achievements. But generally speaking, 
the country's economic situation remains precarious; and the trend seems to be towards degeneration, 
not regeneration. 64 
A possible explanation for the pace of economic reform may lie in the 
implementation of the proper measures. This brings one to the third problem of 
domestic reform, the infrastructure. The bureaucracy of Albania, like other communist 
nations was highly centralised and reluctant to give up their positions easily. The 
authoritarian command structure of government made it difficult to implement reform 
when democratisation meant decentralisation. The conflict that occurred between the 
two competing methods often resulted in nothing getting accomplished as identifying 
and carrying out decisions of utmost importance left many without a clue. Upon 
entering office, President Berisha stressed the need for decentralising when he stated; 
I am trying to delegate as much as possible, but one of our greatest tasks is to find the right people to 
help run the country. There are many very talented people in Albania and for the moment they have 
not left, but we must find them quickly. 65 
Delegation of power though is not that simple. Under the communist system, the 
nation was divided up into twenty-seven districts, each with a party leader. Following 
the July, 1992 local elections, these were increased to thirty-seven districts which are 
their salaries on bread alone. Zanga (July, 1993), 2p. cit., pp. 23-24., Farmers receiving 850 leks per 
kilo were expected to receive 1,400 leks per kilo. IBID 
63 These recommendations included generally; I)keeping a lid on inflation by holding down wages, 
2) budget outlays should be reduced, 3) financial discipline should be instituted within enterprises 
along with structural reform, 4) ownership restitution, 5) land sales and leasing programs 6) 
privatisation strategy and enterprise restructuring, and 7) price reform. "Letter from Mr. Jacques PL 
Artue, Acting Director, European Department International Monetary Fund to President Sali 
Berisha", (Washington: IMF, 2 April, 1993) 
64 Zanga (July, 1993), M. cit. ' p. 24. 
65 Paul Sullivan, "A Day in the Life of Sali Berisha", 7he Times Magazine 22 November, 1992. 
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further subdivided into three hundred-ten communes and forty-three municipalities. 66 
The government also increased the power of local mayors, empowering them with a 
degree of decision making locally which includes; housing allocation, distributing state 
aid, establishing local administrative structures and services such as doctors and 
police. 67 Berisha has also ordered the early retirement and removal of many 
bureaucrats and replaced them with more reform minded individuals. The dual 
purpose of this restructuring was to decentralise authority and increase DP support in 
the rural areas where the Socialist power base is strong. 
The infrastructure programs, however, are filled with problems and 
shortcomings. First, services are so lacking that it may take years for them to be 
instituted. Basic services in cities such as Tirana, including garbage disposal, often rely 
upon the individual's responsibility who then either let it mount or take to burning 
refuse openly. 68 The pathetic state of Albania! s infrastructure may never adequately be 
solved as some estimate it may take more than $ 10 billion to repair the infrastructure 
alone. 69 Second, the attempts to delegate power locally often fail as localities lack the 
funds necessary to provide basic services and taxation as a means to gather funds is 
met with strong opposition by those without work and on state assistance. And now, 
with the agricultural tax break for farmers about to be instituted, localities will be hard 
pressed to find ways to provide basic services without central government co- 
ordination. This has led to charges by the opposition SP and their leader, Fatos Nano 
that the Berisha government is more authoritarian than the old system. 70 It was amid 
these charges that the July 24,1992 local elections were held. In a strong showing, the 
Socialist Party gathered 40.91% of the total votes to 43.24% for the DP. In the 
municipal councils, however, the SP received 281 seats, or 43.57% to 266 seats and 
41.24% for the DP. The former also gained twenty-three mayorships to nineteen for 
the DP and 117 commune chairmanships to 113 respectively. 71 The paradox was now 
that the SP controlled power at the local levels while the DP controlled it at the centre. 
This may have been the reason for the DP's reversal on immediate decentralisation as it 
66 Louis Zanga, "Albania! s Local Elections", RFEIRL (18 September, 1992): p. 29. 
67 IBID 
68 Refuse mounted up in parts of Tirana included rat infested piles of garbage outside of the first floor 
window of Tirana's largest hospital posing health risks for the population. Street cleaning in the 
capital consisted of women with 'brooms' made of several branches of pine tree tied together and a 
sweeping of the gutter into piles for removal. Author's personal account after one month visit to 
Albania (3 June- 25 June, 1993) 
69 "Albania, Oh Dear", The Economist (4 June, 1993): p, 57. 
70 Nano, at a SP rally in the southern city of Vlore reiterated charges against the government and 
repeatedly called on the PK Alwander Meksi, to resign. The rally was held nearly a year after the 
DP victory. See, Ze? l i Popullit 28 February, 1993, on 'increasing authoritarianism', Louis Zanga and 
Robert Austin, "Albania's Growing Political Instability", RFEIRL (10 September, 1993): p. 27., Zell i 
Popuffit 28 July, 1993 p. 1. 
71 
, 
Yhe Democratic j! qM qfA Mania Handbook of General Information (Tirana: 13 August, 1992): 
pp. 24-25. 
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now appears to be foot dragging in that area. Fearful that they may lose their 
advantage, they have rejected any notion of power sharing or power distribution since, 
they claim, Albania lacks the, 'sound socio-economic and political systems found in 
advanced capitalist countries', which prevents immediate and widespread 
decentralisation. 72 
The general opposition has offered varied criticism and ways to battle the 
infrastructure problem. One example is Mr. Arben Imami, deputy chair of the 
Democratic Alliance party and Parliament delegate from Tirana. When questioned 
about the state of the bureaucracy, he replied; 'today the bureaucracy is larger and 
more corrupt than under the old system. The old system at least had checks upon it to 
prevent corruption. Today, millions have been lost due to the present bureaucracy. 
This is why the DP for three months lost 500,000 votes from the March, 1992 
elections to the July, 1992 elections. '73 Following up Imami's statement, Democratic 
Alliance chairman, Neritan Ceka offered a way to recondition the bureaucracy. 
You must have, I believe, comprehensive constitutional reform which will create the 
framework and then take a model such as the US, German or French model and modify it 
accordingly, then apply it. The bureaucracy must then be democratised and made sure that it 
provides stability by placing it above party politics. Only then will a coordinating system with 
intellectuals, the Albanians themselves and others who understand the nations indigenous 
needs be able to function. 74 
Other opposition leaders echo Ceka's comments and recommendations calling for more 
power at the local levels. Among these is Sabri Godo, chair of the Republican Party. 
The criticisms over a still centralised economy were voiced by foreigners as well, 
particularly from the US embassy in Tirana which feels that further decentralisation is 
vital to reform. 75 In seeking to deflect criticism, President Berisha has stated that the 
bureaucracy 'requires time to modifý. The Albanians are engaged in grant programs 
aimed at restructuring but 'change will not occur overnight'. In defended present 
conditions, Berisha added that the present system, albeit with problems, 'was not 
totally inadequate. 76 
The opposition, however, did voice criticisms that were well founded. Realising 
the severe condition of the Albanian economy, President Berisha and the DP have 
engaged in some degree of power manipulation. This may be the only answer though 
for a nation in such a situation. While 'extreme times may [in this instance], not 
require extreme measures, they do demand a firm hand and strictly supervised 
72 Zanga (September, 1992), 2g. cit,., p. 29. 
73 Interview Arbcn Imami, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993) 
74 Interview, Mr. Neritan Ceka, Chairman Democratic Alliance Party, (Tirana: 12 June, 1993) 
75 Interview with Sabri Godo, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993), and Interview with Mr. David Kostelancik, 
Second Secretary, Political and Economic Section United States Embassy, (Tirana: 7 June, 1993) 
76 Interview, President Sali Berisha, (Tirana: 9 June, 1993) 
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guidance ensuring, however, proper democratisation. This may sound contradictory, 
but it should not since strong leadership can coexist with democratic principles. The 
key is the proper amount of decision making delegation to those within government. 
Presently, the system remains centralised in key areas and slows down reform as 
directives and approvals for projects, legislation implementation, resource allocation, 
etc., must often come from the highest levels, either the minister himself, even the 
President. 77 Perhaps deferring to the need to depoliticise the system, or bowing to 
pressure from the opposition, especially the SP [which has repeatedly called for the 
Meksi government to resign], Berisha announced that he would institute cabinet 
changes aimed at subduing the 'weaknesses and shortcomings of economic reform!. 
Ministers of Education and Tourism, Ylli VqJsiu and Osman Shehu were replaced by 
political independents Nhazair Teliti and Edmond Spaho respeCtfUfly. 78 These two 
fields showed little, if any improvement in the last year. The ministries of Internal 
Affairs and Agriculture, which witnessed some improvement were now headed by DP 
members, Agron Musaraj and Petrit Kalakula. 79 These changes did very little to allay 
criticism as charges of nepotism and corruption continued from the SP. 
The strong leadership tendencies of Berisha though may be due to the limited 
choice offered by the political climate. The various political parties which have sprung 
up in the past three years represent the fourth, and perhaps biggest problem to 
domestic reform. The polarisation of the parties has and continues to stall any 
attempts at reconciliation and compromise which would benefit Albania. When asked 
what he believed was the largest obstacle to reform in Albania, Social Democratic 
chair, Gjinushi replied; 
There is not enough coordination between the parties on legislation for Albania. Each group becomes 
so engrossed in having a say in legislation that often there is little or no compromise whatsoever. The 
77 An example of the latter incident was witnessed by the author while waiting for a meeting with the 
President. In the waiting room were two other gentlemen, representatives from a foreign petroleum 
company. The discussion between us turned to their exasperation at having to meet with the President 
to get approval for a project which would bring jobs and revenue to Albania. They were sent from 
ministry to ministry for days in attempts to receive approval, which apparently, no one had the 
authority to do so. Finally, in desperation, they sought a meeting with President Bersiha who gladly 
welcomed their proposal. Interview with Oil Company Representatives, (rirana: 9 June, 1993), This 
total hands on approach by the President is the source of opposition criticisms of authoritarianism. An 
unattributable government source stated that Berisha! s need to become involved in all aspects of 
decision making even extends to his own choosing of his chauffeur., Imami, pp__Cftt. 
78 Louis Zanga, "Cabinet Changes in Albania", RFEIRL (7 May, 1993): pp. 14-15. 
79 The former minister of Internal Affairs, Bashkim Kopliku was made Deputy Prime Minister and 
former Agricultural Minister, Rexhep Uka was placed in charge local administration, See Louis 
Zanga (May, 1993), M. -cit. * p. 
15. By 1994, however, Kalakula was dismissed for openly calling 
himself a 'fascistand believing in 'Greater Albania. He and Abdil Bilcta have since left the DP and 
formed the Democratic Party of the Right, allied with and often receiving their funding from 
Legaliteti and Balli Kombetar. See, III)qla March 18th, 1994. 
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result then is when legislation gets passed or is on the floor, each party will raise an objection rather 
than trying to reach a compromise. 80 
The polarisation of the parties was evident by the time of the July 1992 local 
elections. From the time of the DP victory in March, an 'unofficial' alliance existed 
between the DP and the Republican and Social Democratic parties. The latter two, 
though, appear to have also lost faith in the DP ability to reform and rule Albania. This 
led to a dissolution of the alliance, and a significant reason for the positive showing for 
the SP. 81 The polarisation and rifts among and between the parties appear to have 
finally been too much for the Albanian people. They were constantly being inundated 
with charge and counter-charge from the political parties. Rather than offer concrete 
steps as to how to move Albania forward, each party became engaged in useless 
polemics. The result of the voter dissatisfaction was a significant drop in turnout. 
Whereas ninety percent voted in the March elections, July witnessed a high twenty 
percent fall-off. 82 A look at the parties shows that the DP and the SP represent the 
largest two in the nation surrounded by 'fringe' parties to the left and right. These 
fiinge parties, however, are worthy of consideration since, dissatisfaction with the main 
two push the populace towards the others and swell their ranks. Many, such as the 
Social Democrats [SDP], have sought to pattern themselves on West European models 
and simultaneously distance themselves from the DP. Their chairman, Skender Gjinushi 
has formed links with European Socialists and is trying to gather dissatisfied members 
of both the DP left and SP right. 83 Others, such as the Republican Party [RP] have 
only recently realised that to succeed, they must distance themselves from the DP. 
Representing the right, the RP has undergone internal changes in effort to formulate an 
independent reform policy. Believing that the system is still too centralised, it has 
called for a thorough democratisation of all state institutions and more local power. 84 
A more significant rift, however, was the one within the DP. Originally, a 
student movement, the DP brought in a host of intellectuals and anyone else opposed 
to the old regime. This broad base would naturally lead to dissension. When Berisha 
announced his decision to withdraw from the Bufi government, leading members 
within the DP rejected the move, beginning the rift which was to result in the expulsion 
and withdrawal of party members, Gramoz Pashko, Neritan Ceka, and Arben Imami. 85 
80 Gjinushi, 2p. cit. 
81 Zanga (September, 1992), p2. cit. - p. 28. 
82 IBID, p. 29., The DP has offered reasons for the drop in voter turnout ranging from apathy to an 
expression of dissatisfaction from the youth, and even the weather. 'The elections of July, 26 were free 
and fair: there were no signs of irregularities. The hot weather though probably played its part. As it 
was Sunday, part of the electorate from the countryside had gone to the beaches. This, accompanied 
by a growing indifference towards elections, led to the fact that 30 per cent of the electorate did not 
take part in the election! "The Democratic Party of Albania", (Tirana: 13 August, 1992): p. 23. 
83 Zanga (July, 1992), pp. cit.: pp. 14-19., Handbook, pp. cit. 
84 Interview Sabri Godo RP Chair, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993) 
85 Zanga (July, 1992), M. cit. - p. 17. 
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At the June, 1992 DP Congress, Pashko, a co-founder and leading intellectual within 
the DP was expelled from the party. These three later went on to create the 
Democratic Alliance Party [DA] - The move was downplayed by the DP who called it 
a case of sour grapes and disloyalty. The move though, by three of the brightest minds 
within the DP certainly signalled warning bells as the dissension was exploited by 
opposition parties. When questioned about the decision to split and the 'sour grapes' 
issue, deputy chair Arben Imami of the DA replied; 
When we created the Democratic Party, we did so with one objective in mind, the removal of 
the communists from power. This objective was widely accepted within the party as the only 
way to achieve democratic aims. This is why in the beginning the Democratic Party was a truly 
national movement and united the various factions within the nation. After the March, 1992 
elections it merely was no longer simply removal of the communists or uniting the anti- 
communist forces that could stand as the prime objective but the beginning of a truly 
democratic state with set objectives. At the start of democracy, Ncritan Ccka, Eduard Selami, 
Sali Berisha and myself were in agreement up until August, 199 1. During this period Berisha 
was pressured from outside groups, especially from the US and in this his politics resulted in 
an internal party conflict. It was at this point that the split began and it appears will continue 
for quite some time ..... For all of this our group split because we were not in agreement with the 
objectives of the DP even though we had more specific plans and were better organised It is 
not a question of sour grapes. We had positions in government available to us but turned them 
down when we realised that the DP has no specific long term plans. 86 
Imami continued to reaffirm qinushi's believe that there is no co-ordination among the 
parties. He states the major party representatives should meet in a series of talks aimed 
at finding ways to ease the polemics between them. He doubts though that this will 
occur. Apparently, Imami, Pashko, and Ceka twice sought a meeting with President 
Berisha to discuss the matter. They were refused both times. 87 
The Albanian 6migr6 groups also have recently become active in Albania. The 
two chief parties are the leftovers from the war, Legalitati, and Balli Kombetar. The 
latter, a party to the right, has sent representatives to Albania in the past two years and 
formed links with members of various political parties in efforts to influence political 
decisions and seek political power. Legalitati, advocating a return of a constitutional 
monarchy led by Zogu's son in exile, King Leka, has also been very active in forming 
ties within Albania and seeking to influence outcomes. At first glance, these emigr6 
groups appear downright foolish; lacking little or any political experience, and/or 
education, proposing unrealistic goals and positions, lacking specific reform measures, 
and led and staffed by men who, although away from Albania for forty to fifty years 
genuinely believe they can set the nation on the right course. 811 These groups, 
however, should not be discounted as the fantasies of foolish old men. They are much 
86 Imarni, 2n. cit. 
87 IBID 
88 Bcrisha! s chief advisor, Genc Pollo believes that while Albania welcomes the Diaspora's help they 
are 'out of touch' with the present circumstances and too disorganiscd. Interview with Executive 
Branch Official, (rirana: 7 June, 1993) 
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more organised then a superficial glance would indicate. Albanian dinigres also 
contribute approximately $400m annually to the Albanian economy, much of which 
comes from Balli and Legalitati. 89 The continued presence of their representatives in 
Albania has caused some concern among the DP as well as other groups, though not 
officially expressed. Recent disagreements between President Berisha and DP 
Secretary-General Tomor Dosti have led some to believe 6migr6 group influence is a 
factor. Proponents of this position point out that Dosti's father, Hasan Dosti, was a 
founder of Balli Kombetar during the war. The position is perhaps far-fetched, but, 
should not disregard the potential power base of the diaspora. 
This may only add to the polemics as each party seeks to undermine the position 
of the other while placing the reform of Albania second on their respective list of 
priorities. A reason for this situation may be due to the inherent attitudes of the old 
system, not easily discarded. Neritan Ceka adheres to this position. Questioned on the 
possibility of reconciliation between the political parties, he responded; 
No I don't believe so. Even though I hope it will happen I cannot foresee it because the 
members of the Democratic Party and the government come from the old attitude and mentality 
which believes that if you have a split or disagreement you must remain enemies forever. For 
example, splits within the communists resulted in either prison or death. This is what I mean 
by enemies. This attitude is preserved and governance is under the same psychology. 90 
Within Albania, however, the continued clashes between the DP and SP threaten 
the stability of the nation. Each group often spends more time and energy traversing 
Albania in attempts to defend its position while degrading the stance, actions and very 
existence of the other. With Albania in such a sorry state, most would think this would 
not occur, but it continues to, to the detriment of the Albanian people. This is best 
expressed by Louis Zanga when he states; 
One would think that under the new circumstances, Albania's two main political blocs would 
have little choice but to cooperate and seek a modus viven& for the country's economic and 
political survival. Yet the bitter fight between these two blocs has become more intense with 
each passing day and seems to indicate that the two sides are not much inclined to seek 
accommodation. Instead, they seem intent on proceeding according to the primitive tradition of 
political cxtremism. 91 
While perhaps not wholly attributable to a 'Primitive tradition', Albanian party quarrels 
are certainly a combination of Albanian stubbornness and a belief that power must be 
concentrated and not shared, hence the steadfast approach to party politics. 
89 Zanga (July, 1993), gp. cit.: p. 24. 
90 Ccka, M. cit. 
91 Zanga (September, 1992), pp. cit., p. 29. 
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2.2 Assessing Domestic Reform 
When it came to power in March, 1992, the newly elected DP government was 
faced with a situation unlike other former communist nations of Eastern Europe. Its 
years of self-imposed isolation from even the latter group compounded the already 
insurmountable problems. The nation faced total lawlessness, widespread violence, 
food shortages and nearly complete economic upheaval and bankruptcy. The new 
government has made some positive steps in restoring law and order, keeping inflation 
down, stabilising the currency, privatising land, and promoting freer Western style 
markets. Problems continue, however, as unemployment and underemployment 
increase. Resulting moves by Albanians to leave Albania [often illegally] in search for 
jobs and a better life has heightened tension between Albania and her neighbours, 
especially Greece, making diplomatic relations tenuous and threatening stability in the 
already volatile region. [ infra] A lack of servicesP charges of corruption and continued 
centralisation also plague the successes of the DP. 
The problems are evident to the population as it has voiced its discontent. 
Between I and II November, 1992, a Eurobarometer Gallup Poll of 1,049 Albanians 
indicated that, while 77% thought the nation was moving in the right direction, only 
44% were satisfied with the development of democracy compared to 55% not 
satisfied. 92 These polls also indicated that 56% felt economic reforms were proceeding 
too slowly, as was privatisation, while 72% favoured a market economy. However, 
only 46% felt the economic situation had improved in the last twelve months with 13% 
believing it stayed the same and 39% indicating it had gotten worse. 93 Perceived 
failure with government has led to a drop in government support. A January, 1993 poll 
indicates that only 52% felt the nation was moving in the right direction, a 25 point 
drop. When broken down by age categories, those age 18-24 and 25-29 pollled 58% in 
favour of the general direction of Albania. Of the largest group which felt the nation 
was moving in the wrong direction, those over age 50 polled 3 1% followed by the 35- 
49 age group registering 28%. 94 When questioned on the largest problem, an 
overwhelming 61% said economic problems followed by unemployment with 8%. A 
paradox though was the results of perceived conditions for one's self and family 
compared to conditions for Albania in general. When asked to compare economic 
conditions today with three years ago; 47% felt they were better for themselves and 
their families, 22% thought they remained the same, and 27% thought they were 
worse. The same question regarding Albania, however, indicated only 35% better, 
92 Eurobarometer/Gallup Annex Figure 11, see also Zanga, "One Year of Democracy in Albania", 
RFEIRL (2 April, 1993): pp. 26-27. 
93 EBID, annex figures 7,8,6,2. 
94 "International Organization for Nfigration Albania: Mgrant Profile Project Country File", 
(January, 1993), Received from DP headquarters Tirana June, 1993 pp. 2-3. 
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42% worse, and 14% the same. 95 Part of the reason for this though may be in a large 
percentage of Albanians with relatives abroad who have contributed much in the last 
three years to their well being. 
The situation though does not bode well for Berisha and the DP government. 
Significant improvements have been made due partly to his initiative. Yet these may 
not be enough as party polemics, unemployment, growing class differentiation, and a 
general sense of apathy and despair pervade Albanian life. Albania! s domestic reform 
appears to have been reactive rather than proactive. It relies on ad hoc approaches and 
often adheres to outside advice from 'experts' which does not always take indigenous 
factors into account. 96 In any case, the drop in support, witnessed by recent polls 
perhaps is evidence of the 'degeneration trend' of domestic reform. 97 
3.0 FOREIGNPOLICY 
While domestic reform may be lagging, many observers in the West feel that for 
Albania, 1992 was a year of immense success on the foreign policy front. 98 After years 
of isolation, preceded by a constant, unequal, patron-client relationship, Albania made 
strides in linking itself with the world around it, albeit with problems. Realising that it 
in no way can reform without outside assistance, Albania has abandoned a cautious 
opening up policy for a widespread, multi-pronged, and perhaps haphazard foreign 
policy approach. 
3.1 Me Initial Turn 
While the reform communists still held power their aim was to link Albania to 
the social-democratic systems of Western Europe. The belief being that this form of 
governance best suited Albania during its difficult transition and provided the necessary 
social welfare guarantees expected by the general population. Also, Albania felt that it 
needed to integrate itself on the European stage, particularly at a time when Western 
Europe was moving towards a single market. Hoping for aid from multilateral 
institutions such as the ERBD and the World Bank, the Nano administration sent the 
President of the Albanian Chamber of Commerce, Ligor Dhamo to London on 9 May, 
95 IBID, pp. 4-5. 
96 When asked about these foreign experts and press agents, Democratic Party Chairman Eduard 
Selami responded, I think that they tend to believe that Albania is merely Tirana and that we are a 
simple people. We are not as simple as they believe. For example, they come here and stay at the Dajti 
Hotel and think they know all there is to know and see about Albania. They must realise that 65% of 
the population live in the countryside. Foreigners then leave here as well informed people on Albania'. 
interview, Mr. Eduard Selami Chairman Democratic Party, (Firana: 9 June, 1993) 
97 Zanga (July, 1993), 2p. cit. , p. 24. 
98 Zanga (January, 1993), pp. cit,. Elez Biberaj, "Albania's Road to Democracy", Current History 
(November, 1993): pp. 381-385., Paul Lendvai, "Albania: The Rebirth of a Nation", The World Today 
vol. 50 #I (January, 1994): pp. 2-3. 
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1991. During his three day visit, which was followed up by Nano himself, talks turned 
to joint venture, foreign investment, and privatisation legislation with the ERBD and 
Great Britain. " More importantly, Albania and Britain were able to restore diplomatic 
relations on 29 May, 199 1, after forty-five years. 100 Britaies historical ties to the area 
and its EC membership marked a positive move for Albania and its efforts to turn 
towards Europe. Public and private groups moved to aid Albania in the difficult times 
it faced. Through the British Red Cross and the Feed the Children organisations, the 
British public collected more than two million pounds. The government followed suit 
by committing d 500,000 in emergency assistance. 101 Organisations such as the 
British-Albanian Law Association also sought to bring Albania into a West European 
system by providing legal aid and expertise in privatising, and joint venture 
contracts. 102 
The British regard for Albania, however, may not be as high as Albanians think 
or hope for. With the civil war raging in the former Yugoslavia, British concern was 
that Albania may become involved, further destabilising the Balkans and any possibility 
of foreign investment. More importantly, fear of destabilisation and spread of conflict 
would naturally endanger long time British ally and fellow EC member Greece. This 
may have been one reason why Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Minister visited Tirana in 
July, 1992, to assess the situation. Several months later, British MPs, wary of 
Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, pressed the minister and government for 
guarantees that Britain would not sell arms to Albania which could be exported to 
Kosova. The fear was that this might lead to a spread in the conflagration and their 
primary concern vis a vis Greece. 103 The level of importance Britain attaches to 
Albania is especially evident by their political presence there. Although offered a host 
of villas to choose from, Britaids 'embassy' is in the basement of the French embassy. 
Their representative there receives directives from the British ambassador to Italy and 
can be contacted via the French switchboard. 
More positive links were and still are with Italy. Its proximity and history of ties 
throughout the Zogu years made Italy a natural candidate for Albania to foster ties 
99 Foreign Commonwealth Office, pp. cit., * p. 6. 
100 IBID, p. 7. 
101 IBID, p. 9. 
102 The British felt that a Western style legal sct-up was vital if Albania is to attract foreign 
investment. With no experience on negotiating let alone drawing up a western business contract, the 
task became, not only modernising the legal profession, but establishing it as well. Hoxha had banned 
it and now there are only about 120 attorneys for a population of 3.2m. See, Tom Walker, "Albania 
Gets a Computer Boost", The Times 6 August, 1992. The lack of legal experience perhaps also 
explains why Albanian legislation is 'difficult to follow and often wordy'. Interview, Mr. Elez 
Biberaj, Director Albanian Section Voice of America, (Washington D. C.: 9 August, 1993) 
103 On Hurcrs visit see, Nfichael Binyon, "Land of Eagles Looks to Take Off", The Times 21 July, 
1992., The minister was pressed by Mr. Robert Wareing [Labour Liverpool W Derby] on the arms 
issue. See William Weekes, "Labour Seeks Assurance on Arms Ban", Daily Telegraph 26 November, 
1992. 
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with. Indeed, Albania even during the early 1980s looked to Italy to replace 
Yugoslavia as its primary trading partner. In exchange for industrial technology, 
Albania was to provide raw materials. Links were formed until the mid-1980s and 
resumed with full force after 1990.104 With the advent of reform and the supposedly 
imminent travel restrictions, Italy was forced to deal with Albania once more. 105 In 
March, 199 1, hoping for a chance at a better life in the West, tens of thousands of 
Albanians stormed the port at Durres and highJacked anything that would float and set 
a course for Italy. From I to 7 March, over twenty-thousand Albanian refugees 
arrived at the Italian ports of Bari, Brindisi and Otranto. Overwhelmed, the local 
authorities did not know how to handle the situation. For their part, both the Italian 
and Albanian governments mismanaged the entire affair. The former ordered navy 
slips to turn back any ship bound from Albania to prevent more refugees. With no 
place to keep the first group, Italian authorities were at a loss as to what to do with the 
Albanians. After inaction, they decided to deport most of the refugees. The Albanian 
government, not much better, tried to seize the port of Durres with military force on 7 
March. With thousands of Albanians still at the port seeking to leave, violence erupted 
resulting in several deaths. 106 The Italians repatriated roughly half the refugees and 
made no plans to deport the rest. The situation changed, however, when in August, a 
17,000 strong 'flotilla! arrived at Bari. The Italians put the Albanians in a soccer 
stadium with no facilities or proper shelter for several days in thirty-five degree 
centigrade temperature. Rumours spread amongst the Albanians that they were to be 
returned prompting rioting and injury. The incident caused severe outrage as images 
of pathetic refugees being doused with tear gas filled television screens. lEgh level 
meetings between the two governments resulted with Italy promising to send Italian 
troops to Durres to aid in food distribution and a $50m grant to assist Albanian 
industry to modernise and meet its domestic needs. 107 Immediately following the 
March refugee crisis, talks ensued between Foreign Minister Kapllani and his Italian 
counter, Gianni de Michelis over a proposed three year economic aid package. 108 Italy 
acting on its self interest could ill afford to see a failed economic Albania so close and 
104 Even during the Hoxha regime, trade agreements between the two were signed Political contacts 
included Sokrat Plaka, the First Deputy Foreign Minister visiting Rome in 1984 followed by his 
counterpart Bruno Corti visiting Tirana one year later. Relations soured, however, in late 1985 when 
six Albanians sought refuge in the Italian embassy. The Italians did not surrender the six until 
assurances that they would not be persecuted were given by the Alia government causing the latter 
embarrassment and forcing internal control relaxation. See Bibcraj (1986), gv. cit.., pp. 14-15. 
105 'The sudden arrival of thousands of refugees on the eastern coast left Rome little choice but to 
reverse its policy of taking relatively little interest in Albania and to improve relations'. Zanga 
(January, 1992), 2p. cit., p. 75. 
106 Keesings Archives (March, 1991): p. 38105. 
107 IBID, (August, 1991): p. 38400. 
108 Selami, 2p. cit.,., The three year deal involved approximately $800m. Italian officials estimated that 
some $200m a year was necessary for Albanian industry. Biberaj (August, 1993), gp. cit. 
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risk a continued inundation of refugees. Albania, unrealistically, hoped that Italy could 
serve as a mediator on its behalf for eventual EC membership. For its part, Italy 
contributed much during this initial crisis time in Albania. Its total aid package to 
Albania in 1991 alone amounted to $120m plus food aid worth an additional $98m. 109 
Italian authorities also sent 800 troops as part of Operation Pelican to Durres assist in 
food and aid distribution aside from dissuading further refugee emigration. 110 Despite 
Italy's internal problems, it has continued its strong ties with the Berisha government. 
This has prompted some within the Albanian government to call for a more cautious 
approach towards Italy. It was, after all, a series of strong links with Italy during the 
Zogu regime that eventually led to the Italian invasion of Albania in 1939. VA-We a 
repeat of this is foolish to believe, some Albanians feel that; 
With their economy in a shambles, many are concerned that a full opening up could lead to 
Albania being 'bought out' by foreigners, especially the Italians, who dominated the country 
during the interwar period and then annexed it in 1939. Although Tirana has welcomed the 
considerable humanitarian and econonidc assistance it has received from Italy, the Albanians 
fear Italian domination. III 
The belief that Bersiha is 'selling out' Albania is voiced vehemently by the SP. Fatos 
Nano has stated, expressly, that the governanent has put Albania up for 'auctioxf. 112 
Excessive reliance on Italy, for a host of projects, has made the Albanians stagnate, 
according to most SP officials. More importantly, they feet that Italy's real interest is 
not in Albania, but in using Albania as a wedge to counter renewed German interest in 
the area. "' 
The fear may be well founded but fails to recognise three key factors. First, Italy 
is presently undergoing a fundamental shift in government so profound that it will be 
forced to concentrate on internal matters for quite some time. Second, rather than turn 
away from Italy, Albania needs all the strong links it can get since it not only requires 
aid, expertise and investment to proceed forward, but stable relations with neighbours 
in the always volatile Balkans. Lastly, after two years, the Italian government has 
finally ended Operation Pelican. The program has ended its emergency aid distribution 
and will now concentrate on technical co-operation. 114 This is seen by government 
109 FO, g2sit.: P. 9. 
110 Fonseca, 92L. cit. p. 357. Albanian authorities were also to receive training from Italy on how to 
handle the illegal migrants. Biberaj (August, 1993), pp. cit. 
III Biberaj (1991), pp. cit., p. 16. 
112 111p7ia 5 August, 1993 
113 Interview Mr. Bashkim Zeneli, Vice-Presidcnt Foreign Policy Commission [SP] Albanian 
Parliament, (rirana: 4 June, 1993). See also, Spyros Economides, The Balkan Agenda: Security an 
Regionalis? n in the New Eume (London: Brasscy's Centre for Defence Studies, February, 1992): 
especially p. 29.; 'Italy is keen to counter the influence of Germany in a region which it considers will 
be beneficial to the development of trade and general economic links. ' 
114 Operation Pelican officially terminated on 3 December, 1993. It succeeded in distributing 664,000 
tonnes of food and clothing and performing 205,369 medical examinations and operations. See Louis 
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officials and outside observers as a sign that positive steps are being taken to reduce 
Albania's external dependence. 
3.2 A Multilateral Approach [Economic] 
With the start of refugees leaving for Greece [February, 199 1] and Italy 
[March, 199 1 ], the EC realised that it must do something regarding Albania. Although 
the EC placed emphasis upon human rights violations, the severe problems of Albania 
warranted some reply. At their February 21,1991 meeting Euro-MPs called on aid 
for Albanian refugees in Greece and felt that Albania could possibly be included as part 
of the PHARE package. Aside from the Im ECU granted to Albania, further aid 
depended upon the upcoming March elections. The EC wanted to ensure that elections 
were free, fair and that parliamentary reform and democratisation were proceeding 
forward before any new aid grants. " 5 
The Berisha government did not alter the position of Albania towards the EC. 
The risk of total collapse and general socio-economic chaos made the DP stress that its 
program and Albania! s future lay in 'integrating, as soon as possible, into the European 
family, where Albania belongs'. 116 Initial support for this position appeared 
widespread as ninety-one percent of Albanians polled favoured full EC membership. ' 17 
Surprisingly, however, only twelve percent felt Albania was ready for EC membership 
immediately, with fifty-five percent opting for five to ten years time and nineteen 
percent believing Albania would never be ready. ' Is For its part theEC PHARE 
program allocated II Om ECU to Albania in 1992. Problems, however, arose over 
distribution of aid and technical expertise by the EC. Complaints by Albania, as from 
other East European recipients, claim that EC consultants do not stay long enough for 
a proper look to the problems. Also, program projects are subject to stringent EC 
guide-lines and decisions leaving little chance for the recipient nation to involve itself in 
aid and projects supposedly earmarked for it. ' 19 This perhaps may explain the 
disillusionment felt by many Albanians over participation in the EC. When asked if they 
often considered themselves 'European', only fifteen percent stated they often do 
Zanga, "Albania: Signs of Progress, but Much Still to be Done", RFEW (7 January, 1994): pp. 103- 
105. 
115 At the February meeting, Parliament adopted a resolution calling for diplomatic relations between 
the EC and Albania. Humanitarian assistance and aid to refugees was called for at the March follow 
up meeting. The EC Commissioner, Frans Andriessen stated, however, that budget restrictions limited 
the amount of aid available. "Directorate-General for Information and Public Relations European 
Parliament", (Strasbourg: Central Press Division, 18-22 February, 199 1, and II- 15 March 199 1): 
pp. 40-41., 30-3 1. 
116 The DP Handbook, Pp-. cit. ' p. 8. 
117 EUrobaroineter, W. cit. - annex figure #47. 
118 END, annex #48. 
119 "EC Aid to the East: Good Intentions, Poor Performance", The EconomiSt (10 April, 1993): 
pp. 21-25. 
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compared with an overwhelming fifty-seven percent who said they never do. 120 The 
EC is naturally wary of allowing nations such as Albania to enter any time soon. 
Perhaps regretful over Greece's entry in 1981, it does not seek to grant membership to 
weak nations from a potentially unstable area such as the Balkans. Not only would they 
constantly draw off the already depleted cohesion fund, they would internalise 
historical tensions thereby further disintegrating EC decision making. Even it could 
enter, though, Albania is still minimally fifteen to twenty years away. 121 
President Berisha has called on multilateral institutions to assist Albania in its 
transition to a market economy. He hopes that with such assistance foreign investment 
will follow. In an apparent contradiction, however, he does not want to follow the 
large scale foreign investment of Poland or the Czech Republic believing this 
constitutes a 'sell-out' to foreign powers. 122 He fails to realise that these nations, part 
of the Visegrad Triangle, have the greatest possibility of EC membership. Berisha, 
though, continued to bank on multilateral support. Following a meeting in Tirana by 
representatives of the G-24 on 22 July, 1992, additional aid guarantees for agricultural 
investment and balance of payments rescheduling were agreed upon through 1993. 
The M and World Bank also have tried to step up aid to Albania. After its 
acceptance as an M member [ 15 October, 1991 ], food aid and technical assistance 
has arrived regularly. A standby agreement pledged $28m. for economic reform 
through 1992-1993. This was followed by the International Development Association, 
affiliated with the World Bank, pledge of a $15m interest free loan for new home 
construction. 123 Yet despite over $lb in aid to date many are. sceptical of success. 
The crumbling infrastructure and continued internal problems have led many 
multilateral agencies to conclude that Albania is a watershed and that pumping more 
aid into it would be useless. 124 
Towards the end of 1991) Albania became a member of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. [ERBD] Participation in this body, however, has 
done little towards the vital areas of domestic economic reform, which was the bank's 
basic intention. Its initial strategy was to focus on, 'technical assistance, especially in 
commercial banking, telecommunications, tourism, transport, energy and the 
environment'. 121 After more than a year though, of those Albanians polled, only thirty- 
one percent have ever heard of or were aware of the ERBD presence within 
120 Eurobarometcr, qp. cit. - annex # 28. 
121 William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, Understanding the Eurolzean Communities (New York, 
New York: Philip Allen, 1990) 
122 Fonseca, 2p. cit. - p. 358. 
123 On the G-24 meeting see Keesings Archives (July, 1992): p. 39014., IMFNewsbrief#9314 
(Washington DC: 31 March, 1993), RFERL Alewsbrie (13 July, 1993): p. 12. 
124 Zanga (July, 1993), QP-. Cit. - p. 24. 125 "News Release ERBD Adopts Initial Strategy for Albania", (London: ERBD, 17 December, 
199 1): pp. 1-3. 
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Albania. 126 A large part of the problem is the ERBD itself. Criticism over the 
spending policies of the bank, such as Z55.5m on office furnishings and marble slabs 
forced the eventual resignation of bank president Jacques Attali. The bank though must 
still undergo fundamental changes if it is to aid nations such as Albania. For example, 
the $75,000 spent on a ERBD Christmas party 'seems excessive given that Albania 
received only $872,772 from all sources from January, 1991 to July, 1992.427 
Regardless, multilateral aid to Albania has not provided it with the boost it needed in 
pushing towards a market system. Instead, most aid has been in the form of 
emergency assistance or simply has not been enough to tackle the large scale problems 
Albania has with its domestic reform. 
3.3 Multilateral Institutions [PoliticallMilitary] 
At the 1975 Helsinki Conference all the nations of Europe signed the Helsinki 
Final Act except one, Albania. Sixteen years later, in 199 1, Albania became a member 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]. In keeping with its 
'initial turn' strategy, Albania saw the CSCE as a mechanism for political and economic 
co-operation and the future of a pan-European collective body which would address 
Europe's problems. The CSCE, however, does not have any enforcement capabilities, 
and aside from dispatching 'observers', it can do very little when it requires unanimity 
on any decisions. As for its impact onAJbania, less than half of the population have 
actually heard of the CSCE. 128 Within the body, Albania has used its veto to block 
admission for Macedonia and has agreed to retract it when the Albanians within 
Macedonia were granted 'constituent nation' status. The Macedonian government has 
refused to do so fearing that this would perhaps fuel secessionist activity as well as 
give the Albanians the right to veto changes in the Macedonian Constitution. 129 Given 
the present situation in the Balkans, Albania's position does very little save fuel 
suspicions and heighten tensions while organisations such as the CSCE cannot 
unfortunately do much. Attempts to coerce Albania on their stance have failed. 
Measures to withhold assistance are not practical but rather counterproductive as they 
may further destabilise the nation and subsequently the area. 
126 Eurobarometer, pp. cit. , annex #3 1. 
127 Kirstie Hamilton and Rufus Olins, "The House that Jacques Built", The Sunday Times 18 April, 
1993., For assessment of ERBD activity towards Eastern Europe see, Karoly Okolicsany, "Eastern 
Views of the ERBD", RFEIRL vol. 2 #23 (4 June, 1993): p. 52. 
128 Eurobarometcr, Qp.. cit. - annex #30 
129 In May, 1993, the US, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Spain signed the Washington 
Declaration which supported a political solution in Bosnia acceptable to all three warring sides. 
Following the declaration, the leader of the Macedonian Party of Democratic Prosperity, [ made up of 
predominately Albanians], Mr. Nevzat Halili sent a letter to Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov 
calling for constituent nation status for Albanians within Macedonia. Three days later, Albania 
blocked Macedonia! s bid for CSCE entry. See Misha Glcnny, "Is Macedonia Next? ", The New York 
Times 30 July, 1993. 
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Cognisant of history and fearful that present circumstances will endanger their 
security, Albanians believed entry to NATO would ensure their borders and perhaps 
prevent the Yugoslav conflict from spreading to Albania. Support for this position was 
also expressed by German Foreign Nlinister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Following his 
third state visit to Tirana on 22 April, 1992, Genscher told a news conference that 
Albania should be admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Admission 
would secure Albania! s integrity and dissuade Serbs from attempting to move the 
Balkan conflict south. 130 Later in the year, President Berisha travelled to Brussels to 
meet with NATO representatives. He expressed Albania's concern over the Yugoslav 
war and fear that 'ethnic cleansing! would not be tolerated in the province of Kosova 
where Albanians make up ninety percent of the population. Strongly believing that 
such cleansing would lead to a larger Balkan war, Berisha saw NATO as a 'pillar of 
stability in Europe'. With that, Albania became the first of the former Eastern bloc 
nations to formally apply for NATO membership. 131 Her request was politely denied. 
While NATO offered standard reasons such as Albania not being ready for 
membership, four reasons demonstrate why membership was denied. First, there are 
several differences between the West and East such as cultural, and political 
Merences that make immediate integration within NATO not feasible. From a simply 
practical position, questions arise as to how can these former bloc nations pay their 
way if they were granted membership, particularly Albania, which is suffering through 
severe economic reform. Second, NATO will not be quick to admit new members 
which may cause immediate animosity and cripple the alliance in times of crisis. 
Greece, Turkey and the 1974 invasion of Cyprus handcuffed NATO into inaction as 
both nations are members. Long standing tension between Greece and Albania would 
only exacerbate the situation and cleave the alliance, especially when Albania is on very 
ftiendly terms with Turkey, Greece's long time enemy. Third, key officials within 
NATO are wary not to quickly incorporate members of the Eastern bloc. This, they 
state, would only lead to an encirclement of Russia by its former allies of the Warsaw 
Pact. Such encirclement may only heighten tension within Russia, fuelling more anti. 
West radicals and becoming a potentially destabilising force within the nation. 132 Last, 
and more importantly, in the post Cold War era, NATO has been wrestling with what 
130 Keesings Archives (April, 1992): p. 38878. 
131 "Albania Seeks Membership in NATO", International Herald Tribune World Briefs 17 December, 
1992. 
132 These three positions were expressed by General Robert Oakes, Chief NATO Central Air 
Command, at a seminar on "NATO and Security in Europe" (St. Andrews University: 16 April, 1993) 
See also, "Red Rag to a General", The Times 12 October, 1993 on Russian military 'paranoia! 
regarding encirclement., Michael Brenner and Phil Williams, "The United States and European 
Security in the 1990s", in Colin McInnes, (ed. ) Securf& andRratezv in the New EuMe (London: 
Routledge, 1992): p. 158. As for the second position, Gen. Oakes stated that Greece and Turkey 
represented the single biggest problem within NATO. 
183 
its new role should be. The Clinton Administration believes that NATO must evolve 
and has led the way for its program, the Partnership for Peace. In seeking to outline 
new goals and the possibility of expanding Nato's commitments to 'out of area! 
operations, the US hopes that the eventual enlargement of NATO will ensure 
European security. At the same time, Partnership for Peace aims to allay Russian fears 
while delaying entry to nations still wrestling with economic reform and political 
stability. 133 Otherwise, NATO must accept the possibility that immediate membership 
of the former bloc nations may, in the future, involve it in low intensity conflict based 
upon ethnic hatred between member states. Such a possibility, like Greece and Turkey 
would incapacitate NATO over how to handle such a situation and whether it should 
back one party over another, thereby violating fundamental NATO principles. 
The ready acceptance of these principles, however, does raise doubts. Reports of 
renewed anti-Western feelings in Moscow may have some merit. 134The belief being 
that haphazard expansion would not revive NATO nor would it allay security 
concerns. Indeed, critics of NATO's eastward expansion believe that incorporating 
the East would involve a new set of security obligations and perhaps strengthen 
Russian nationalist elements thereby actually threatening, rather than allaying European 
security concerns. 135These same critics point to US-Russian divisiveness over Bosnia, 
coupled with Russia's refusal to sign off on the incorporation of the eastern bloc to 
NATO. As Bosnia has demonstrated, the argument states, NATO indecisiveness 
between its own members as to a course of action in the Balkan crisis will only be 
increased exponentially as new members are brought in. 136Recent Russian calls for a 
133 US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher has stated that Partnership for Peace is a; process 
[that] should be non-discriminatory and inclusive. It should not be tied to a specilic timetable or 
criteria for membership .... Our idea is to build the Partnership for Peace over time, at a pace geared to 
each partner's interest and capabilities. The Partnership would involve tangible co-operation and 
would channel member's defence efforts toward the ability to participate with NATO in a range of 
multinational missions. " For full text, see Warren Christopher, "American Foreign Policy: The 
Strategic Priorities", Delivered before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Washington DC: 
4 December, 1993) in rital Speeches ofthe Day vol. 60 #6 (1 January, 1994): pp. 162-167, 
134 'Meanwhile, reports from Moscow tell of rising anti-Western feelings, a belief that the West is 
conspiring to keep Russia down and must be resisted. That is not reassuring for Europe, especially a 
Europe deprived of a strong sense of collective security based on NATO. ' See, Flora Lewis, The 
International Herald T? Ibune I December, 1994 
135 'Some US policyrnakers believe that the way to revive NATO is to enlarge it by offering 
membership and military guarantees that membership confers to a few countries in Eastern Europe... 
That is a questionable idea. If Washington continues to move in this direction, it is sure to generate 
more trans-Atlantic divisiveness. It will burden NATO's existing members with risky new 
obligations .... Worse yet, expansion could strengthen Russian nationalists opposed to Boris Yeltsin and his Western oriented reformers. The net result is that a larger NATO could diminish rather than 
strengthen European security ... Moreover, giving a pre-eminent security role to an American-led NATO is certain to arouse resistance from France and others that would like to strengthen intra- 
European security arrangements. ' See, "No Rush to Expand NATO", Yhe International Herald 
Tribune I December, 1994 
136 'But the moral pettifogging that has enveloped Western leadership can undermine NATO if it 
continues. On Bosnia, these is so little moral high ground on which to stand that Western leaders 
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more concerted effort on the part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe [CSCE, now the OSCE, Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in 
Europe], lend credence to the argument that the former is not ready to accept NATO 
as the sole guarantor of European security, since in Bosnia, it has been plagued with 
division. 137 
The present US policy of November/December, 1994, initially backed a tough 
military role against the Bosnian Serbs. The resistance this position met from fellow 
NATO members, Great Britain, France and Germany made the US adopt a more 
conciliatory stance, one which again called for the maintenance of UN peacekeepers 
and for a negotiated political settlement which would, in essence, reward the Bosnian 
Serbs with what they most want, political links with Belgrade. The US Administration 
felt that by backing away, it would help to heal the divisions and maintain the integrity 
and cohesion of the Alliance. 139 
Understanding, however, that it must incorporate former bloc nations somehow 
or risk destabilisation in the area, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council. [NACC] in November, 199 1. The NACC has offered foreign ministers, 
defence ministers and military chiefs of staff the opportunity to confer with one another 
and discuss possibilities for regional security and stability. With Germany and Italy 
offering support for Albania, the latter was admitted to the NACC in June, 1992. The 
jostle each other in the competition to seize it. Suspicion and mistrust that will crack alliance 
cohesion take root in the atmosphere of blame and self-justification. ' See, Jim Hoagland, The 
International Herald Tribune I December, 1994, and, for a different view on why NATO is suffering, 
Flora Lewis; 'NATO is imperiled now for a different reason. Too many members have lost a sense of 
strategy and have tied it in knots to serve short-term political goals and escape hard decisions. ' IBID. 
137 'Mr Yeltsin expressed angry frustration with what he said were attempts to sideline Russia in 
Europe's future security structures ..... Mr. YcItsin also vigorously criticized plans to expand the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization to include the former Soviet satellites .... The summit [in Hungary] will 
endorse a plan to give the CSCE widened powers to organize conflict monitoring and peacekeeping 
missions, using troops from various member states. It will also establish a code of conduct that 
requires members to follow a common set of guidelines on civilian control of military and openness of 
their defense budgets. ' See, Mark N. Nelson, "Uninvited Guest", The Wall Street Journal Europe 6 
December, 1994 
138 President Clinton stated that the US would be willing to supply up to half of the 25,000 NATO 
forces for a UN peacekeeper pullout. See CN7V Morld News Teletext (9 December, 1994), and, for a 
view that France and Russia believe the only way to settlement in Bosnia would be for the Muslims to 
accept defeat and that the US would only keep the conflict going by aerial force, Flora Lewis, The 
International Herald Tribune I December, 1994., and, Tom Rhodes, The Times 30 November, 1994; 
'In a move intended to close ranks with its European allies over Bosnia-Herccgovina, the Clinton 
Administration 
.... abandoned military pressure and 
decided to offer the Bosnian Serbs significant 
concessions if they accept an international peace plan ... 
This would open the way to a political link 
between the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade .... 
Ile new US policy, presented to President Clinton... 
reflects a recognition by Washington that its leverage with the allies has been sharply reduced by a 
reluctance to send American ground troops to the Balkans. Its relations with Britain, meanwhile, are 
at their lowest point since the Suez crisis. The new US policy would require the Serbs to sign the 
partition plan ... 
In return, America wants to offer some form of link with Belgrade .... 
Douglass Hurd, 
the Foreign Secretary, confirmed that the Contact Group was considering ways of allowing the 
Bosnian Serbs to have some links with Serbia. ' 
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hope was that admission would provide Albania with, 'some security in view of the 
tension caused by the Yugoslav conflict and Serbia! s treatment of ethnic Albanians in 
Kosova!. 139 For the Albanians, NATO was seen as the only way to guarantee their 
integrity. They sought membership because they felt it was; 'a normal step. In that 
region, history plays a larger role than present day politics. This is why we fear for our 
security and integrity. 140 This view was reaffirmed by Albanian Defence Minister, 
Safet )Chulali. When questioned as to why Albania sought admission, he replied; 
We sought NATO membership because we felt we fulfilled the requirements necessary. Our 
geographic position is not East. We are not a Slavic people and should not have to risk their 
consequences. The victory of democracy was absolute and as such we naturally looked West. We now 
understand we have a long way to go but hope to enter NATO when they deem us f1t. 141 
With Albanians numbering nearly seven million and spread across five states in the 
region, 142 Albania believed that it could provide NATO with a stabilising force in the 
Balkans. The variety of ethnic groups and accompanying territorial claims give NATO 
the ability to offer a 'factor of protection' for both Albania and the area. 143 
Realistically, however, NATO may want to consider the creation of a coherent strategy 
for probable conflict. Partnership for Peace may be the way forward, however, its 
foundations appear too limited and still do not provide the security guarantees so many 
East Europeans desire. 144 While NATO was created to counter the Soviet threat and 
not to involve itself in low level, ethno-nationalist conflicts in the Balkans, it risks 
obscurity, internal divisions, and becoming obsolete as it is these very same type of 
conflicts which appear to indeed represent the new security threats to Europe in the 
post Cold-War era. Redesigning its purpose is its first priority. Determining what to 
do with nations such as Albania must come later. 
3.4 Relations Within the Area 
Of natural concern to the West and to Albania are the steps toward s relations 
with the other nations of the Balkans. The history of violence, territorial claims and 
present widespread instability has caused many to approach regional diplomatic ties 
with renewed interest. Tension in the Balkans has always been high. And now, with 
newly democratising nations, nationalist elements have vocalised their demands 
139 Alfred A. Rcisch, "Central and Eastern Europe's Quest for NATO Membership", RFEIRL (9 July, 
1993): pp-38-39. 
140 Interview, Mr. Gene Pollo, Chief Advisor to the President, (Tirana: 7 June, 1993) 
141 Interview, Mr SafetNliulali, Defence Minister, (Tirana: 22 June, 1993) 
142 The figures include the 3.2m in Albania, 2m in Kosova and other 2m in Greece, Macedonia and 
Montenegro. 
143 interview Mr. Leonard Dcmi, Albanian Foreign Ministry, (Tirana: 4 June 1993) 
144 For general overview and valid criticisms of the plan see, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Way 
Forward for an Inspired NATO", Intemational Herald Plbune 2 December, 1993, Ole Diehl, 
"Opening NATO to Eastern Europe? ", The World Todav (December, 1993): pp. 222-223. 
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resulting in suspicion and anxiety over 'alliances! and agreements that may simply be 
reincarnations. Albania is no exception. With the West, especially the US, anxious not 
to see conflict spread, close tabs are being kept on Albania! s relations with its Balkan 
neighbours and to what extent these may exacerbate the situation in the region. 
3.4.1 GREECE- The fall of communism in Albania did little to ease tensions 
between Albania and its long time enemy Greece. Indeed, while there have been 
attempts to improve relations, many have been either half-hearted or have degenerated 
by one incident or another. The situation with Greece has impact not only between the 
two nations and the area! s stability, but also upon the West since Greece is both a 
NATO and EC member. As such, a worsening situation between Greece and Albania 
may represent, 'the single greatest threat to Albania's internal stability'. 145 Greece's 
long standing claims to 'Northern Epirus! appear to have been abandoned since Greece 
recognised the Florence Protocol of 1925 which fixed present borders. Greece, 
however, has criticised the Albanian government for the mistreatment of the ethnic 
Greek minority in the south of Albania. Greece also claims that the numbers of Greeks 
in Albania are actually much higher than the 50,000 to 75,000 listed by the Albanians. 
The Berisha government has criticised the Greek government for fomenting unrest in 
the area and is especially wary of a possible Greek-Serbian alliance which many 
Albanians see as an immediate threat. Recent problems between the two have been 
over the flow of refugees from Albania into Greece in the past three years. By the end 
of December, 1990 the number of illegal refugees crossing into Greece numbered more 
than six hundred per day. 146 In a visit to Tirana in January, 199 1, Greek Prime 
Minister Constantine Nlitsotakis urged that ethnic Greeks stay put in Albaniawithout 
fear of reprisals and that Albanians without passports or visas would not be allowed to 
enter Greece. This did not stop the flow as less than a week later, Greek authorities 
repatriated over five thousand refugees. 147 The Greek authorities stated that the vast 
numbers of illegal Albanians in Greece were more trouble than their worth. Incidents 
of widespread crime and of roaming vandals caused great concern among the Greek 
populace and chauvinist anti-Albanian sentiments became commonplace. The Greek 
ambassador to Albania met with the Albanian government in attempts to find a 
solution. The Albanian government criticised Greece for its position and poor 
treatment of ethnic Albanians claiming they only sought work and a better life, given 
the poor conditions in Albania. The situation became tense when reports of border 
shootings by Greek patrols of Albanians attempting to cross into Greece reached 
145 Bibcraj (August, 1993), M. cit. 
146 Keesings ContemporaryArchives (January, 199 1): p. 37973. 
147 IBID 
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Albania. 148 Greece continued to counter with the ill treatment its minority was 
receiving in the south. Albania maintained that many ethnic Greeks within Albania 
were demanding special status as well as spreading literature throughout the area 
seeking autonomy and/or a return to Greek hands. 149 
In an effort to resolve differences, Mitsotakis visited Tirana in May, 1992. 
Meeting with President Berisha, Mitsotakis stated that by now over 150,000 Albanians 
were in Greece, more than half of which were there without proper documentation. 
The two discussed right guarantees for both Greeks in Albania and the ethnic 
Albanians residing in Greece in an area known to Albanians as Cameria, historically 
part of 'Greater Albania. 150 The talks did not accomplish much. The flow of illegal 
Albanians into Greece continued throughout 1993 and numbered perhaps more than 
100,000.151 Despite attempts to rid themselves of the Albanians some Greeks have 
learned to make use of them on the black market. Many smuggle consumer items 
across the border paying a kickback to both Greek patrols and Albanian border guards, 
Towards the harvest season many Greek farmers welcome illegal Albanians as a source 
of cheap labour and Albanians are all too willing since they can make more than'they 
would in Albania. 152 
Of equal concern for Albania are the nationalist sentiments Greeks have been 
displaying lately. With the Macedonia issue still unresolved, Greeks refuse to budge 
on any usage of the term 'Macedonia!, believing it implies designs on Greek territory. 
Coupled with a call for right guarantees and territory in Albania, Greeks appear to 
have been demonstrating nationalist traits, the kind of which would make anyone in the 
Balkans edgy. 153 Given the recent crisis in the region, Albania has also expressed 
misgivings about meetings between Mitsotakis and Serbian President, Slobodan 
Milosevic. To the average Albanian, this smacks of the historic alliance between 
148 Reports included Greek border guards who were injured while seeking to capture Albanians 
smuggling arms and refugees across the border. See, 111)Wa 24 February, 1993 p. 10., and 9-11 
September 1993 p. I., Keesings Archives (March, 1993): p. 38830. 
149 Keesings (March, 1991): p. 38830. 
150 Keesings (May, 1992): p. 38920. 
151 This figure is subject to dispute depending upon the source used. Greek estimates that perhaps as 
many as 200,000 illegal Albanians have been in Greece since 1990-9 1. See Henry Kamm, "With 
Nothing to Lose, Albanians Invade Greece", The New York Times 5 August, 1993, Tony Barber, 
"Athens-Tirana Relations Sink to New Low", 7he Independent 30 June, 1993., 11"a 1-3 November, 
1993 p. 1. [on figures that as many as 300,000 have fled to Greece since 1990]. The 100,000 for 1993 
alone is perhaps accurate considering that Greek authorities had expelled 92,000 by September, 1993. 
See Kamm article. Figures also verified by US State Department Qfficial by phone (August, 1993) 
152 One Albanian border guard, when questioned about the illegal trade stated; 'Times are difficult, 
and many are without work. If someone who you know is trying to smuggle goods across the border 
says to you, "please, I need this to help my family" what are you supposed to do? We are all 
Albanians and must take care of our own. Of course I either turn my back or ask for a small token. 
This is expected. ' Unattributable meeting with border guard, (21 June, 1993) On illegal trade see, 
"Skoupa-Dooper Profits", The Economist (20 June, 1992): p. 5 1., Tony Barber, "Cheap Labour Costs 
Greece Dear", The Independent 8 December, 1992. 
153 John Carr, "Greek Nationalist Bug Makes its Neighbours Itch", The Times 22 August 1992 
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Greece and Serbia which nearly destroyed Albania. To those within the Albanian 
government, the meetings represent a deliberate attempt to 'polarise relations' and add 
to tension in the Balkans. 154 
Relations were moving forward, albeit slowly, when a recent incident added fuel 
to the tension between Greece and Albania. In the predominantly Greek towns of 
GJirokastra and Sarande, Orthodox priests from Greece have been allowed to preach 
their faith in Albania, part of the religious freedoms granted by the Berisha 
government. In late June, 1993, however, the Albanian government forcibly expelled 
one Greek cleric for preaching 'anti-Albanian! propaganda and advocating secession 
for the southern portion of Albania. In protest, Greeks marched on qirokastra but 
were turned back. Resulting violence injured several and Greece responded by forcibly 
expelling thousands of Albanian refugees in Greece. 155 More importantly, the incident 
worsened relations. Mitsotakis has accused Albania of mistreatment of Greeks in 
Albania and called for the reinstatement of the expelled cleric. Berisha has repeatedly 
claimed that the ethnic Greeks are receiving equal rights. However, irredentist activity 
will not be tolerated. He has stated that recent Greek activity aims to 'destabilise the 
south Balkans and aggravate and expand the crisis in the former Yugoslavia% 156 Toma 
Mico, Greek representative to the Albanian Parliament also expressed contempt for 
Albania! s media coverage, which he claims, in no way explains the concern of ethnic 
Greeks in Albania but instead depicts them as unruly and dangerous, as well as 
conveying images of pathetic Albanian refugees being rounded up and sent back across 
the border. 
The status between Greece and Albania has naturally caught the West's 
attention. 157With its inability to handle the current situation recent events do not bode 
well for future stability. Realising that recent economic woes have heightened these 
national elements, Albanians have been easy targets for pro-Greek fervour. It was amid 
this Greek nationalist revival that former Prime Nfinister, and leader of the Socialist 
PASOK Party, Andreous Papandreou won the October, 1993 elections. The seventy- 
four year old leader has raised fears in. AJbania that a hard stance will be taken on 
154 Gjinushi, pp. cit. 
155 On incident see, Ian Traynor, "Secession in the Air for Albania's Greeks", The Guardian 6 July, 
1993., and Henry Kamm (August, 1993), M. cit, 
156 Robert Austin, RFEIRL Mewsbriefs (15 July, 1993): p. 18. 
157 "1993 US State Department Human Rights Report", (Washington DC: US Government Printing 
Officc, 1993): p. 2. The report highlights the Icnsion! between the Greeks and Albanians 
emphasising the alleged mistreatment of refugees by Greek authorities. Inferences can be drawn that 
the State Department keeps tabs on such reports in order to preclude the possibility that incidents will 
not get out of control., Also, The Economist (6 November, 1993); "The Americans now want the 
Greeks to be less fractious towards their Balkan neighbours ..... The [Greek] Socialists hope that the Clinton people- who are on good terms with Mr. Bcrisha- "I help patch things up"., at p. 46. On 
Albanian sources that the US monitors Greek-Albanian relations, and that more must be done, see, 
"Cfare Pritet pas Zgjcdheve ne Grcqi? [What Wait after the Greek Elections? ]", Bashkimi 2 October, 
1993 p. 1. 
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Balkan policy much to Albania's detriment. 158 No sooner had Papandreou taken office 
when incidents of border shootings resulted in the filing of formal diplomatic protests 
in Tirana by Greece, and, more importantly, the recalling of the Greek ambassador to 
Athens for 'consultations'. 159 Some Greeks also are wary of Albania! s road to reform 
since they may feel that increased attention by the West and Albania! s high potential for 
tourism, and mineral/oil production will detract much needed profit from Greece, 160 
the West's long time bastion of democracy in the area. 161 Albania has also exacerbated 
relations. While new faces may inhabit the corridors of power, many still will not give 
up old attitudes, especially towards the Greeks. Others within the Berisha 
government, the President included, have displayed poor management skills regarding 
the crisis. With warfare on its doorstep, Albania needs to allay fears of increasing 
tensions. 'Immediate neighbours should take immediate presence'. 162 This means that 
rather than charges and fiery speeches denouncing Greek actions, Albania should be 
taking positive steps to; ensure minority Greek rights, initiate a proper census to reflect 
the actual number of Greeks in Albania, speed up joint ventures projects and perhaps 
even mutual defence pacts to ensure each other's territorial integrity. Some steps in this 
direction were taken when Greek foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias met with 
Albanian counterpart, Alfred Serreqi in early November, 1993. The two discussed 
ways to ensure rights for their respective minorities and ways to improve regional 
relations, perhaps through a Balkan SUMMit. 163 The West should encourage such action 
and take more initiative in promoting it. The likelihood that relations may break down 
[given deep seated mutual suspicions, historically rooted hatred and general regional 
instability], are high. 
Indeed, efforts by both the Albanians and the Greeks appear as simple cosmetic 
gestures, subject to circumstances which undermine any attempts at easing polemics. 
158 On the election, its results and general repercussions see; Tom Rhodes, The 771mes 12 October, 
1993 p. 15., "Europe Groans at Greece's Choice", and, "EC and NATO Wince at Papandreou Victory", 
The Independent 12 October, 1993, For a more thorough approach to Papandreou! s regional policy, 
see; James Pettifer, "Greece's Post Election Dilemmas", The Morld To (December, 1993): pp. 225- 
227., Thanos Veremis, "A Search to Create Regional Stability", The 771mes Focus 17 December, 1993 
p. 4 I., "Greece-So Far, Not Good", The Economist (6 November, 1993): p. 46-48., RFEIRL Mewsbrie 
(25-29 October, 1993): p. 10. 
159 Kjell Engelbrekt, RFEIRL Newsbri (25-29 October, 1993) p. 14., International Herald Tilbune 
27 October, 1993 p. 1. 
160 'Greece is still hampered by a weak economy. The country has the lowest productivity, highest 
inflation and largest external debt in the EC. The Times 12 October, 1993 p. 15., The downward spiral 
of the Greek economy costs the EC almost $6 billion a year from the cohesion fund. Inflation is 
running at over 12% and GDP growth barely reached 1%. For comprehensive accounting see; The 
Economi (16 October, 1993): p. 19., and pp. 47-49., Brian Beedham, "The Economist Survey of 
Greece", The Economist (22 May, 1993): particularly pp. 4-13. 
161 Interview Mr. D. Kostelancik, (US Embassy Tirana: 7 June, 1993), who stated, 'there is naturally 
a concern on Greece's part in the greater interest in Albania on the part of the US, Germany, Italy and 
Turkey... ' 
162 Interview Mr. S. Godo, Chair Republican Party, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993) 
163 "Tirane Calls Greek's Visit'Turning Point", VL12ja vol. 3 #248 (18-20 November, 1993): pp. 1-2. 
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This view was reinforced by two major occurrences in 1994 which do not lessen 
regional tensions and further add to potential area-wide stability. First, in April, 1994, 
two Albanian soldiers were killed and three others were injured at an army barracks at 
the Albanian-Greek border village of Peshkepia. The Albanian government has stated 
that Greek terrorists were responsible. The group which claimed responsibility for the 
act called itself the National Liberation Front of Northern Epirus [MAVI]. The Berisha 
government was quick to denounce the act as a planned terrorist action with the 
possible assistance and/or knowledge of the Greek Intelligence Services. 164Greece has 
countered by vehemently denying such charges, claiming Albania is deliberately 
seeking to derail bilateral relations. The arrest, trial165 and seizure by Albanian 
authorities, of five ethnic Greeks and weapons contraband less than one month after 
the border killings, confirmed, to Greek authorities, that Albania is deliberately 
persecuting the Greek ethnic minority in the south without justification. Greece 
responded by threatening to close the common border with Albania and, more 
importantly, has announced its may organise civilian militias on the border of Albanian 
territory. Moreover, Greece has vetoed the disbursement of $30m. ECUs, much 
needed investment credits to Albania. 166Although Albania backed down on its claim 
that the five men tried were working with Greek government assistance, Tirana did 
accuse the men of spying for Athens and sentenced them all to sentences ranging from 
six to eight years. Athens answered these charges by expelling over 70,000 Albanians 
in Greece illegally since the trial started in mid-August, 1994. Also, Athens has 
claimed that Turkey is behind Albania's policy as part of a 'Balkan conspiracy against 
it. ' With tensions running high, President Clinton in a letter to President Berisha 
stated; 'It is in the interest of both countries, as well as all the world, to avoid the 
creation of another big conflict in the dangerous region of the Balkans. ' He 
subsequently sent his chief National Security Advisor for Europe, Richard Schifter, to 
mediate between Greece and Albania, while Under-secretary of State Peter Tarnoff 
164 See, 7he International Ilerald T? Ibune 14 April, 1994, and, 111y7la 14-16,1994 
165 The trial actually occurred in mid-August, 1994. See, 111y7ia 13-15,1994 
166 The men arrested were charged with, among weapons smuggling and possession, anti- 
Constitutional acts. See, "Albania Seizes II in Southern Weapons Sweep", 11"a 28-30 April, 1994, 
and, on the militias; James Pettifer, "Albania, Greece and the Vorio Epirus Question", Me Mo 
Tody -September, 1994); '... Greeks living close to the Albanian border in northern Greece .X 
(August 
have been subjected to a widespread and pervasive revival of traditional patterns of Balkan banditry, 
carried out by armed gangs of ethnic Albanians, and a general breakdown of law and order and 
widespread thefts of property by ethnic Albanian itinerants. In these conditions, with many residents 
of northern Greece believing the government in Athens does not take their problems sufficiently 
seriously, there has been an increase in the possession of small arms and in the formation of informal 
vigilante groups to protect property, a reversion to the pattern of life in pre-industrial times. The 
government in Athens has recently announced its intention to form organised citizens' militias to try 
to improve public order in these border regions. ', at pp. 148-149., and, on the border closing 
possibility see, Helena Smith, The Guardian 31 May, 1994 
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was sent to Greece and Turkey to stress the importance Washington places on good 
relations between those two countries. 167 
Second, President Berisha has sought to increase his presidential authority by 
way of a referendum on Albania's new proposed Constitution, believing that this will 
allow him to push through deliberate efforts to block reform. Moreover, it would give 
him a free hand to deal with, as he sees it, the separatists and radical Greek elements in 
the south. Rather than present the draft Constitution to Parliament for debate, Bersiha 
relied on a public referendum. The result of which was an overwhelming rejection of 
the draft by both the Socialists and their followers who feel Berisha already has too 
much power, and by the ethnic Greek minority who believed that ayes vote would 
result in a curtailing of Greek educational and religious rights. 168 These two events, 
and the ones that will likely occur, demonstrate that even US and Western mediation 
attempts fail to address the core issues, since these cannot be addressed by simple 
diplomatic efforts. 
3.4.2 TURKEY- The historic ties between Turkey and Albania date back 
centuries. These close relations include what President Berisha labelled, 'blood 
relations', referring to the number of Albanians who over years have moved to and 
were assimilated into Turkey. 169 With the outbreak of war in Bosnia, Turkey has 
repeatedly called for action to aid Bosnia! s Muslims. Turkish President Turgut Ozal 
has made several trips to the nations of the Balkans in efforts to seek regional solutions 
to the problems. With the advent of democracy in Albania, Turkey moved forward and 
made efforts to assist Albania in the transition to a market economy. Between January, 
1991 and December, 1992 humanitarian aid amounted to $21.9m, second only to 
Italian assistance. 170 Links between the two nations have covered virtually every field 
as it appears that Turkey is seeking to cement, once more, a long term relationship 
with Albania. As for its interest in Albania; 
167 See Nikos Konstandaras, "Greece Wages Diplomatic Battle on Balkan Fronts", Associated Press 
23 September, 1994 
168 See, 7he Economist (7-12 November, 1994), and, Helena Smith, 7he Guardian 9 November, 1994. 
On Berisha's leadership style; 'In recent months the criticism has been echoed by Western observers, 
who say Mr. Bcrisha has increasingly resorted to repressive tactics in dealing with his 
opponents .... 7here is no 
doubt that Berisha has a repressive streak, said one European Union 
diplomat. He has become ever more authoritarian'. 
169 The blood relations extend to figures such as Mchmet Akif Ershoy, the Turkish poct and writer of 
the national anthem who was of Albanian origin or the mother of the founder of the modem Turkish 
state, Kemal Attaturk who was also Albanian. See, Louis Zanga, "Albania and Turkey Forge Closer 
Tics", RFEIRL (12 March, 1993) 
170 IBID, p. 31. 
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Although it is unlikely that Albania will become a satellite of Turkey, it is certainly not too farfetched 
to argue that it could become another bridgehead in Europe, something the Ottoman Turks once 
tried.... this time, however, to be achieved through diplomacy and other peaceful Means. 171 
For Albania, its proximity to conflict in the Balkans coupled with its weak position has 
made it search for protectors. Turkey offers it the best chance to gain such protection 
given that Turkey is part of NATO and has one of the more modem militaries in the 
area. With that in mind, the first high-level military delegations visited one another in 
the Summer of 1992. Albanian Defence Minister, Safet Xhulali toured Turkish 
weapons facilities and more importantly, signed a military co-operation agreement with 
Ankara. The agreement, apparently with NATO's blessing, will include; exchanges of 
military delegations, bilateral co-operation in military weapons production, training and 
education of personnel, and joint military exercises. 172 Joint commissions are to be 
established as well to explore the possibility of expanding military links in the future. 
While touring the Balkans in March, 1993, President Ozal stopped in Tirana to 
meet with Berisha. He pledged to continue the level of friendship with Albania and 
sought to seal a fifteen year economic package with Albania, covering areas from 
tourism, to port renovation and further military assistance. Ozal also urged Berisha to 
recognise Macedonia believing that a normalisation of relations between the latter two 
would help stabilise the area and prevent the war from spreading. 173 Recent moves by 
Turkey in the Balkans have been treated with suspicion by its long time enemy, 
Greece. Following the conclusion of the Gulf War, Turkeys contribution to the US- 
led effort became apparent. President Ozal has perhaps finally realised that Western 
Europe, specifically the EC, will not any time soon accept Turkey into its fold. 
Seeking to cash in on the positive position it holds presently with the US, Turkey has 
been taking steps to reassert itself in the area. Its Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Scheme [BECS] looks to establish an EFTA-type organisation throughout the Balkans 
and along the former Soviet republics bordering the Black Sea. These predominantly 
Islan-dc republics are searching for foreign policy direction and assistance, something 
Turkey has sought to provide. The US apparently would rather see these republics 
copy Turkey as a pro-West, secular state rather than look towards the more 
fundamentalist nations just to the south, especially Iran. 174 Ozal's activist approach to 
the conflict in the Balkans has made some Greeks fear a Turkish attempt to revive the 
171 Zanga (Much, 1993), QpM. t, p. 30. 
172 "Military Cooperation Pact Signed with Turkey", RFEJRL (2 February, 1993): pp. 5-6. The 
Turkish destroyer, Fevzi Cakmak docked in the port city of Durres, the first visit ever of a Turkish 
warship since the days of the Ottomans. 
173 Austin (July, 1993), pp. cit, p. 32. 
174 On such US concerns and Turkey's attempts to influence the area, see: Morton Abramowitz, 
"Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Ozal", Foreign Poliey #91 (Summer, 1993): pp. 164-18 1., on the 
an: dety over fundamentalism spreading in the area, Roval United Services Institute Alewsbrie vol. 12 
#3 (March, 1992): p. 19., Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West", Foreign A airs vol. 70 #2 
(Spring, 1991): pp. 34-48. 
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heyday of the Ottomans, a foolish proposal at best. But it does, in any case, 
demonstrate Turkey's willingness to not stand by idly since it relies upon area stability 
for its own prosperity. After Ozal's sudden death on 17 April, 1993, there was 
naturally concern over what position Turkey would now take. It appears, however, 
that President Sulyeman Demirel and his Prime Minister, Tansu Cillar will continue to 
take an activist foreign policy approach. 175 This bodes well for Albania as it has come 
to depend upon Turkey for assistance and a high degree of military security. For the 
US, it will want to foster Turkey's links to the area. Turkish 'insight, influence and 
access to the Balkans offers a constructive approach to area problems and also ensures 
that Turkey will not add to the instability'. 176 This does not ease Greek fears over what 
they see as a split of the Bosnian war into religious camps. With over two million 
Turks of direct Bosnian descent, and Turkish links with Albania, a nation with over a 
seventy percent Muslim population, Greece feels Turkey is allying itself with the 
region's Muslims. Turkey denies such a charge. 177 
Such charges have also been applied to Albania. Its close ties with Turkey have 
made some within and outside of government accuse it of moving closer to Islan-fic 
nations. These charges reached new heights when Albania joined the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference [OIC], on 2 December, 1992. This made Albania the only 
other European nation aside from Turkey to be a member. Critics of Berisha! s move 
claimed that it would move Albania further from Europe and the West and result in 
'internal religious polemics'. 178 Berisha has stated that the entry to the OIC represents 
a positive move and will not harm Albania since it is, like Turkey, a secular nation. As 
to why they did join; 
It is generally assumed that the decision to join the OIC was prompted by political and 
economic motives rather than religious ones. Yet it could be due in some measure to growing 
disillusionment on Tirana's part with Western Europe! s failure to deal effectively with the crisis 
in Bosnia and Hercegovina and to the increasing concern that the West will remain inactive if 
the conflict spreads to Kosovo and beyond. Albanians may feel that the Islamic states are a 
potential source of support if the situation in the Balkans deteriorates further. 179 
Berisha had hoped that the OIC would contribute large amounts of assistance. 
While it appeared early on that such aid would not be forthcoming, recent indicators 
demonstrate 'significant financial contributions to bankrupt Albania!, by the Arab 
175 'The momentous upheavals in areas contiguous or close to Turkey have compelled Mr. Den-drcl, 
for all his preoccupation of domestic policy, to pursue a more active foreign policy than he ever did 
during his previous terms in office. 'Kcnneth Mackenzie, "Turkey's Circumspect Activism", The 
World To vol. 49 #2 (February, 1993): pp. 25-26. On the government's approach to actively 
pursuing solutions for regional crisis, see, K. Alunct Parla, "No More Dark Pages in History", The 
Turkish Review vol. 7 #31 (Spring, 1993): pp. 15-19.. 
176 AbrahaMoWitZpp. Cit., pp. 180-ISI. 
177 "Turkey Denies Turning Conflict into Jihad", The Times 12 December, 1992. 
178 Imami, 2p. cit. 
179 Louis Zanga, "Albania Moves Closer to the Islamic World", RFEIRL (12 February, 1993): p. 30. 
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world. 180 As to the Bosnian crisis, fellow OIC member Turkey has been trying to not 
portray the conflict as a religious war and has urged Albania to do the same. Berisha 
agreed, yet did not quell critics when he met an Iranian delegation to Tirana led by 
Iranian Foreign Labour Minister, Dr. Ali Akbar VelaJet. While the two discussed ways 
to strengthen ties, they also alluded to the Yugoslav crisis and Iran gave its support to 
Albania! s problem regarding Kosova. 191 Iran, another OIC member has been 
vehemently insisting on calling the Bosnian war a religious war, orfihad 182 
Albania, is a nation in which over seventy percent of the population profess the 
Muslim faith. President Berisha has stated that 'religion in Albania remains divided 
from the state, and as such, Albania and the West need not fear the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism. 183 The frequent and often passioned statements by the government 
increased following reports from a Helsinki Human Rights Committee to Albania in 
September, 1993. The committee stated that Muslim missionaries were using their 
position to 'incite religious differences and [were] offering bribes to impoverished 
people to join their faith!. Claims were also made that the head of one state institution 
was using religious criteria to hire staff. 184Links with the Muslim world have 
increased, yet these are hardly the basis for accusations implicating Albania as a 
potential base for militant fundamentalism in the near future. 195 Indeed, they more 
likely represent simple opportunism on the part of Bersiha. Renewed interest by several 
Middle East states in the Balkans, whether genuine or responsive to the crisis there, 
still offers Albania the opportunity to expand its links and perhaps gain much needed 
assistance. Balkan Muslims are scattered throughout the former Yugoslavia, Albania 
and Bulgaria. Increased activity in the region, especially by Turkey, has alarmed some, 
such as Greece'86and more radical Orthodox Serbs. Yet links between Albania and 
Turkey, and the latter's activist approach represent a stable, secular approach to 
regional solutions for regional problems and attempts to protect potential economic 
interests in the Balkans. As such they should be encouraged rather than condemned 
and treated with suspicion. 
180 Zanga (January, 1994), 2p. cit, p. 105. These contributions include a soon to open Arab-Albanian 
bank, a host of new mosques, and intentions for large foreign investment. 
Is I Ne delcgacion i Iranit ne Shqiperi [An Iranian Delegation in Albania]", 11"a 16-20 January, 
1993 p. 9. 
182 Pettifer (August-ScM 1994), QP--C-it- 
183 IBID 
184 "Rights Group Fears Religious Extremism", Illy7la vol. 3 #228 (9-11 September, 1993): pp. 1. 
185 This point is reiterated by Elcz Bibcraj, "Albania! s Road to Democracy", Current History 
(November, 1993): p. 384. 
186 Athens became immediately suspicious of Albania! s motives for joining the OIC. It fears strong 
Turkish links in the Balkans, particularly with Albania. Much of the concern stems from recent Greek 
positions which still place Turkey as Greece's 'primary security threar. See; Zanga (January, 1994), 
pa. cit.., p. 105., "Papandreou Outlines Tough Balkan Policy", RFEIRL Newsbrief(25-29 October, 
1993): p. 10. 
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3.4.3 AMCEDONIA- For centuries Macedonia has been the'bone of contention! in 
the Balkans. Three states, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria all claim some portion of 
territory referred to as historic Macedonia. 187Some Albanians also feel that the 
Western borders of present Macedonia should be part of a Greater Albania, as they 
once were during World War II. By late 1990, Macedonia followed the Croatian and 
Slovene examples and slowly moved away from the Yugoslav federal structure. More 
nationalist elements within Macedonia pushed the move and elections to a Macedonian 
Parliament were held by November, 1990. The resulting coalition government named 
Kiro Gfigorov, a former economist, President. 188 Less than a year later, a public 
referendum indicated that seventy-five percent of the registered electorate voted for 
independence. 189 With the tense situation in the Balkans, and the multi-ethnic 
configuration of Macedonia, neighbours immediately voiced concern, and suspicion 
over a sovereign Macedonia. With a population slightly over two million, Serbs 
comprise approximately forty-four thousand, though they claim figures as high a 
3 00,000. Serbia has always regarded Macedonia as 'Southern Serbia!. These claims did 
not bode well for Macedonia when Milosevic and Mitsotakis met after the referendum 
to discuss Macedonia! s fiiture. Greece has yet to recoose the republic which includes 
any name reference to Macedonia. They strongly believe that Macedonians have 
always been Greek or "Slavophone Greeks", as they are called. Their stubborn refusal 
to compromise on the name issue has even involved human rights violations and a 
strong propaganda campaign all over Greece. 190 
The Macedonian government, however, has placed greater concern on the 
Albanians within its borders. Exact figures vary from a low of 200,000 and twenty 
percent of the population'91, to a high of 700,000 to 900,000 and forty-five percent of 
the population. 192 Since they boycotted the 1991 census, determining their exact 
number will take time. 193What is sure, however, is that ethnic Albanians make up the 
largest minority in Macedonia. They have organised themselves into political parties 
187 Aegean Macedonia makes up 5 1% between Greece and present Macedonia; South-westcrn 
Bulgaria forms 10% of Pirin Macedonia and 39% is present day Vardar Macedonia. See John 
Zametica, 2pLc__it_* p. 34. 
188 Keesings Archives (December, 1990): p. 37923., Duncan Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem 
and a European Dilcmma", RFFIRL (12 June, 1992) 
199 Keesings Archives (September, 1991): p. 38420. 
190 'More worringly, Greeks who disagree publicly with their government on the subject can find 
themselves in court. Next month [September, 19931, four members of an anti-nationalist group will 
appeal against a 19- month sentence for &sseminatingfalse information and attempting to incite 
violence. Their offence was to distribute a leaflet with the title, Our neighbours are not our enemies. 
No to nationalism and to war. ' "Do Not Disagrec. ", The Economist (14 August, 1993): p. 46. 
191 Duncan Perry, RFEIRL (20 November, 1992): p. 15. 
192 Elcz Biberaj (February, 1993), 2R. cit. ý p. 16. 
193 The PDP has called for an internationally monitored census. One is scheduled for April, 1994 and 
will be funded by the international community at a cost of $ 1,5m. Poulton, RFEIRL (4 June, 1993): 
p. 25. 
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and are voicing their demands over equal nation status. This has raised concerns within 
the Gligorov government. He has attempted to quell nationalist tendencies by placing 
five ethnic Albanians in ministerial posts. The Albanian Party for Democratic 
Prosperity [PDP], and its leader, Nevzat Halili have stated that Albanians be regarded 
as an equal nation within Macedonia. 194This has raised anti-Albanian positions from 
VMRO-DPMNE, the nationalist Macedonian party and largest opposition party. 195 
Albanians in Macedonia believe that they are being denied rights such as recognition of 
the Albanian language, language education, free use of national symbols, and more 
local decision making in areas where Albanians make up over ninety percent of the 
population. 196 These claims have solidified Albanian groups in Macedonia, Albania, 
and Kosova have increased suspicions of Greater Albanian designs. Kosova! s 
Democratic Alliance, [DSK] the PDP and the DP do co-ordinate their activities, but 
have made it expressly clear that Macedonia remain intact. 197 This position was a 
more toned down stance than one earlier expressed by Berisha and DSK leader, 
Ibrahim Rugova. 
Sali Berisha, president of Albania, has asked that Albanians in Macedonia be afforded better 
possibilities for schooling in their native language and an expansion of Albanian-language radio 
broadcasts. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosovo, has demanded that Macedonia either 
allow its Albanians to seek annexation by Kosovo or grant them wide internal autonomy. 198 
Berisha has since toned down his rhetoric and called for the Albanian groups 
within Macedonia to work with the Gfigorov government. Tensions remain however, 
194 'Albanians believe their status as defined by the Macedonian Constitution is unclear. The 
Preamble reads in part, Macedonia is constituted as the national state of the Macedonian people. 
Albanians argue that on the basis of that clause they are second-class citizens and that they should be 
accorded equal status. ' See Hugh Poulton, "The Republic of Macedonia After United Nations 
Recognition", RFEIRL (4 June, 1993): p. 24. 
195 VMRO-DPMNE [Vnatresna Makedonska Rcvolucionerna Organizacija-Demokratska Partija za 
Makcdonska Nacionalmo Edinstvo] 'is a reincarnation of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organisation , which sought to 
liberate Ottoman Macedonia at the turn of the century. Its leader, 
Ljupco Georgievski, was for some months the republic's vice-president. [no political experience, 
Georgievski was a former theatre director] While Georgicvski has moderated his public statements of 
late, he still seems to support the goals articulated by the VMRO-DPNINE founding congress in 1990, 
which called for the forging of a spiritual, economic and ethnic union of the &videdMacedonian 
[read Slavic] people and the creation ofa Macedonian state in afuture united Balkans and a united 
Europe. ' When Macedonia was accepted into the UN under the name, The Fortner Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia [FYROM], VMRO believed this constituted a sell out and mobilised a vote of non- 
confidence against President Gligorov, which failed on 13 April, 1993. The moderates backed the 
Gligorov government by a comfortable margin. IBID, p. 22. VMRO has currently 35 deputies to the 
120 seat Macedonian Parliament. VRMO has sought to revamp its image yet still was not able to 
pose a serious threat to Gligorov in the October, 1994 elections. See, Duncan Perry, "Macedonia: 
From Independence to Recognition", RFEIRL (7 January, 1994), and, Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan 
Problem and a European Dilemina", RFEIRL (19 June, 1992), and, Kerin Hope, The Financial Times 
14 October, 1994 
196 111)Tia 10 April, 1993 p. 5., Perry, RFEIRL (20 November, 1992): p. 18. 
197 Poulton, RFFJRL (4 June, 1993): p. 26. 
198 Sabrina Rainct, "War in the Balkans", foreign Affairs (Fall, 1992): p. 87. 
197 
particularly when incidents of border shootings of Albanians have continued in the past 
year. Albanians, with the poor economic conditions often illegally cross the border 
into Macedonia, gathering as many goods as they can and return with them to sell in 
street bazaars in Tirana. 199 Albanian officials have called on Macedonia to detain 
rather than shoot Albanians that enter illegally and believe that such action will only 
exacerbate the area! s precarious condition. 200 President Berisha does, however, believe 
that given the conflict in the area, Macedonia is a more likely target for Serbian 
aggression and possible invasion. 201With increasing Serbian pressure against 
Albanians in Kosova, many have fled to Macedonia, heightening stress within the 
republic. PDP leader, Halili has continued to call for 'constituent nation' status for 
Albanians and he was supported by Albania three days later when it blocked 
Macedonian entry to the CSCE until such status was given. 'All Macedonians 
consider this the first step on the road to secessioh'202 The Albanian government 
denies that it is seeking any secession on the part of Macedonia! s Albanians. In an 
editorial reply, Berisha's chief adviser, Mr. Genc Pollo stated; 
As for the Albanian negative vote to admission of Macedonia into the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, it is only conditioned by the failing of the Macedonian 
government to give the Albanian community living there the rights it was conunitted to give, 
such as proportional representation in the state apparatus, more schools, an Albanian 
university and more access in the national media. Furthermore, the Albanians in Macedonia 
are crucially supporting the internal stability of that young state. 203 
Current Western attention towards Macedonia has resulted in 1000 UN troops, 
[three hundred of which are Americans], deployed there to ensure that the war in the 
former Yugoslavia does not spread south. For the US, the troop deployment is viewed 
by many critics of Western inaction as a way to demonstrate some level of positive 
engagement by the Clinton Administration. Washington sources believe that US 
troops in Macedonia would serve to not only deter cross border aggression, but also to 
assist in enforcing the UN embargo placed against Serbia. 204 The question then 
becomes one of effectiveness. While the West continues to fail in its efforts to find a 
solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, UN troop monitors may simply not 
199 Witnessed firsthand by author while on one month stay in Tirana. Acquaintance indicated that he, 
along with several friends, would cross into Macedonia and head for Skopje, the capital. They would 
purchase whatever they could with money received by state assistance and/or money from relatives 
abroad, if available. They would smuggle material back into Albania, sometimes bribing a border 
guard and sell the merchandise in one of Tirana's many bazaars. (3 June - 25 June, 1993) 
200 111pla 6 March, 1993 p. 2. 
201 Flora Lewis, "in Tirana, Tension Grows", International Herald Tribune 17 March, 1993 
202 Misha Glenny, "Is Macedonia Next? ", The New York Times 30 July, 1993 
203 Genc Pollo, "Albania Takes Refugees, Not Terrorists", The New York Times 5 August, 1993 
204 "The Big Leak in Serbia Embargo: Nervous Needy Macedonia", The New York Times 18 July, 
1993, Annika Savill, "Macedonia? It Might as Well be Corfu, Bill", The Independent 20 May, 1993. 
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offer any real comfort, particularly when their efforts appear 'impotent' at best. 205 This 
is because the problem with Macedonia lies from within. 206 Its weak economy, and 
proximity to the neighbouring conflict do not show promise for stability. Links with its 
neighbours are also subject to question. Greece refuses to budge on the name, 
'Macedonia!, despite fellow EC members Germany, Britain, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands recent initiation of the recognition process . 
207 
Within Belgrade, Serb radicals have called for aid to their fellow Serbs in 
Macedonia. Albania, although it has sent representatives to Skopje to discuss better 
links, has not improved the possibility for stability in the region with its recent posture. 
Incidents of border shootings have increased as have allegations of black market 
dealings involving drug and arms smuggling by Albanians to their compatriots in 
Macedonia. The latter's authorities also have seized weapons and files in late 1993, 
allegedly part of a plot by Albanians to initiate large-scale civil unrest with aid from 
Albania. President Bersiha denied such contentions, accusing Macedonian authorities 
with needlessly harming relations. 208 What is needed, perhaps, are assurances of 
human rights guarantees for the various ethnic groups. Albanians, for their part, have 
repeatedly demanded 'better access to education in their native tongue, a louder voice 
in government, and a stronger commitment from Macedonia on promoting the 
Albanian language media-1 209 Perhaps, the best way would be to ensure rights 
predicated upon immediate resident citizenship rather than ethnicity. This would 
remove the offending clause from the constitution and secure a feeling of equality 
status for all involved. More importantly, Albania needs to strengthen trade links with 
Macedonia. With no outlet to the sea, Macedonia will be hard pressed to gain favour 
with Greece over use of Saloniki. It could, however, make use of the port of Durres. 
The talks of a super highway link from Durres to Skopje Sofia to Istanbul should be 
given high level priority since such a link would increase trade and prosperity 
throughout the region, making the likelihood for internal dissension remote. The first 
step though must be in greatly improving relations between Macedonia and Albania. 
205 "Allies Continue to Bicker", Internafional Herald Dibune 22 January, 1994 p. 5., The Economist 
(20 November, 1993): p. 42., "The UNs Uneasy Macedonia Watch", Illyfia 10-12 May, 1993 p. 1-3., 
"Long Term Role Seen for US Troops", Illy7la 9-11 September, 1993 p. 3., Glcnny (July, 1993), 
gp. cit, p. A27. 
206 Perry (June, 1992), 2p cit. 
207 France and Italy are expected to follow. Greece has sent official letters of protest to each state. 
Duncan Perry, "Macedonia: From Independence to Recognition", RFEIRL vol. 3#1 (7 January, 
1994): p. 118. 
208 On the plot; The Economist (13 November, 1993); and (20 November, 1993), RFEIRL JVewsbP1 
(10 and 16 November, 1993). On the Albanian govcrruncnCs reaction, 111yria vol. #247 15-17 
November, 1993 p. 1. For general impact on bilateral relations, Robert Austin, "Albanian- 
Macedonian Relations: Confrontation or Cooperation? ", RFEq? L vol. 2 #42 (22 October, 1993): 
pp. 21-25., On the black market, Perry (June, 1992), 2pM. L p. 120. 
209 Austin (October, 1993), pp. cit., p. 22. 
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3.4.4 KOSO VA - In tracing the rise of Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, one 
is led to the Kosova issue. Following the ouster of his mentor Ivan Stambolic, 
Milosevic used Kosova to initiate an anti-Albanian campaign, beginning in 1987. 
Fanning the flames of discontent, he took a hard-line position against Kosova! s 
Albanians. Following a wildcat strike at the Trepca mines which brought the province 
to a standstill, Milosevic rallied over 500,000 Serbs in Belgrade's main square. He 
promised that those responsible would be punished and that Serbia would never give 
up Kosova. He succeeded by late 1989 to increase police precincts in Kosova by 63%, 
police units by 58% and, more importantly, to gain the majority he needed in the 
Kosova Assembly to retract Kosova! s status as an autonomous province. 210 Moving 
swiftly, Milosevic used the Serb led Assembly to legislate Serbia! s control over 
Kosova! s police, civil defence, courts, and selection of officials. The outbreak of 
conflict and dissolution of Yugoslavia has brought renewed attention to Kosova as 
many both within and outside the region feel that should the conflict spread, it will 
likely do so in Kosova. 
The exact numbers of Albanians in Kosova are not known since they, like their 
brethren in Macedonia, boycotted the 1991 census. They are, however, believed to 
number nearly two million representing ninety percent of Kosova! s population. 211 In 
removing any legal base Albanians may have had for autonomy, Serbia completely 
abolished the Kosova legislature by mid-1990. With little choice, the Albanians went 
underground. By 30 September, 1991, they met in the town of Kacanik to approve a 
constitution which declared a 'sovereign and independent state of Kosova!. 212 The 
only nation to recognise the 'Republic of Kosova! was Albania on October, 1991. 
Viewed upon as illegal and reaffirming to Serb eyes, their convictions that this meant 
secession and union with Albania, Milosevic used the opportunity to gain even more 
support by punishing the Kosova Albanians with impunity. After the Kacanik 
Constitution, more than one hundred thousand Albanians were removed from their 
jobs. Albanian symbols were removed and street signs were changed to the Cyrillic 
alphabet. A Serbian curriculum was imposed and thousands of Albanian teachers were 
removed from theirpoStS. 213 This did not dissuade the underground movement. 
Albanian political parties were set up and quickly gained followers despite Serb 
reprisals. The largest of these parties is the Democratic Alliance of Kosova [DSK] led 
by Ibrahim Rugova, a writer. In underground elections, Rugova was made Republic 
210 "Fighting Back", The Economist (I July, 1989): p. 47., See also Magas, Qp. cit.,, pp. 160-16 1. 
21 IThe only guide observers have to go on is data from the 1981 census of Yugoslavia, now long out 
of date. Kosovar Albanians have the highest birth rate in Europe, making estimation difficult. For a 
good accounting, however, see, Patrick Moore, "The 'Albanian Question' in the Former Yugoslavia", 
RFRRL (3 April, 1992): pp. 7-15. 
212 Moore (April, 1992), gp. cit. - p. 10. 
213 IBID, p. 11. 
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President and Bujar Bukoshi was chosen Prime Minister. Serbia has refused to 
recognise any legitimacy on the part of Kosova's Albanians. Their continued crack- 
down of rights in the territory has led to over three hundred thousand Kosova 
Albanians fleeing Kosova for either Macedonia or Albania. 214 The United States, a 
signatory of the Helsinki Accords, does not recognise an independent Kosova 
Republic. It instead believes that Kosova should be reinstated as an autonomous 
province and that human rights violations should cease. 215 This, simply, will not 
provide Kosova with the security guarantees that it requires. Crackdowns by Serbian 
authorities have led Western observers to believe that a campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' 
is not far off. By adhering to the Helsinki Accords the US and the international 
community find themselves paralysed. Serbia has gone even further and forced all 
CSCE monitors in Kosova to leave in July, 1993 pending the former's reinstatement to 
the CSCE. This has virtually guaranteed no international presence of any credibility in 
Kosova. 216 The UN has offered to broker talks aimed at settling reported human rights 
violations. These broke down by September, 1993 when Serbia felt that discussing the 
situation in Geneva rather than Belgrade would internationalise the condition removing 
it from Serbia's hands. 217 The international community has not challenged the Serbian 
view despite Albanian's claims that the removal of autonomy, by its very nature, was a 
constitutional violation thereby justifying a legal break. 218 Regardless of which 
interpretation is valid the bottom line is that aggression in Kosova will likely continue. 
This, despite the Clinton Administration's reaffirmation of George Buslfs pledge to not 
tolerate ethnic cleansing in Kosova, will not change matters. 219 Even if the US decided 
to halt any such cleansing through the use of military force, Kosova would still remain 
within Serbia. This would not appeal to the more radical Kosova Albanian elements 
that see conflict as the only answer. As the situation continues to degenerate, their 
appeals to the West continue to remain unanswered. The likelihood for radicalisation 
increases as more and more Kosovars join their numbers. 220 
214 Liam McDowall, "ConfiLsed Signals in Kosovo", Mew Statesman and Sode (5much, 1993): 
p. 13. 
215 Kostclanck 2p. ci-t, 
216 Fabian Schmidt, "Kosovo: The Time Bomb That Has Not Gone Off", RFEIRL vol. 2#39 (1 
October, 1993): p. 28., and, "Has the Kosovo Crisis Been Internalized? ", RFEIRL vol. 2 #44 (5 
November, 1993): p. 36., Tony Barber, "Serbs 'torture and kill'Kosovo Albanians", The Independent 
25 November, 1993, "Kosovo: Cleansing Up", The Economist (6 November, 1993) 
217 Schmidt (October, 1993), op. cit.: p. 37. 
218 JBID 
219 Barber (November, 1993), Qp. cit. 
220 Groups such as; Lcvizja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosovcs [The National Movement for the 
Liberation of Kosova] have repeatedly stated that war is inevitable. DSK leader Rugova has 
denounced this group's assertions and has tried to isolate them. I11Vr1a vol. 3# 182 (3 April, 1993): 
p. 2. 
201 
As to Albania itself, it has changed its position on Kosova from a demanding one 
to a more toned down approach. When questioned on the Kosova issue, Berisha had 
stated in early, 199 1; 
The Democratic Party of Albania cannot accept the division of the Albanian nation as eternal; 
therefore, it will struggle by peaceful means and within the context of the processes of integration in 
Europe to realize their rights for progress and national unity. 221 
Following his entry to the Presidency, Berisha held firm to his position indicating 
that Albania would 'resist by any meane, a spread of ethnic cleansing to Kosova. 222 
Since, he has understood that pushing for republic status for Kosova will not ease 
tension in the Balkans, nor will it likely be appreciated by either Europe or the US. 
With this in mind, Albania has subtly dropped public references to the 'Republic of 
Kosova!, instead calling for a halt of 'Serbian aggression! there. 223 Rights violations by 
Serbs in Kosova have included; raids on Albanian stores and factories, seizing goods 
for Serbs fighting in Bosnia, detainment and arrest of Albanian intellectuals, and even 
some reports of parents arrested and held hostage so that their children will engage in 
military manoeuvres and operations. 224 Serbs have denied most of these charges and 
countered with their own against 'Albanian extremists' bent upon violence and seeking 
the secession of Kosova. 
Serbian police have jailed prominent Albanian journalists and political activists and broken up 
weapons-smuggling rings organised by local Albanians, while Serbian authorities have refused 
to rccognisc Rugova! s legitimacy as spokesman for the Albanian population of Kosovo. 
Meanwhile Tanjug, the Serbian news agency, has reported that Kosovo's Albanians have 
succeeded in smuggling some arms and have sct-up guerilla forces to oppose the Serbs. These 
Albanian guerillas were said to have obtained basic training across the border in Albania. 225 
Rugova denied these Serb allegations226 as did Albanian Defence Minister Safet 
Nhulali. 227 The increasingly hostile state in Kosova naturally has worried Albania and 
its neighbours, as the West grapples with how to prevent a possible conflict there. US 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher has expressed such concerns. However, these 
concerns do not outline any other policy aside from 'negotiation' through what 
Christopher calls a 'global solution', without clarifying what exactly this entailS. 228 
221 quoted in Biberaj (1991), Qpxýit. - p. 6. 
222 "Albanian Urges West to Shield Kosovo", International Herald Tribune I June, 1993 
223 Louis Zanga, "Albania Afraid of War Over Kosovo", RFEIRL (20 November, 1992): p. 2 1. 
224 "Kosova Communication" Bulletin of the Ministry oLInformation of The RfRublic offosova 
London (26 and 30 March, 1993), (2 April, 1993), (11 and 14 May, 1993) 
225 RaMet (Fall, 1992), pp. cit.: p. 89. 
226 Rugova has also denied Serb allegations that Kosovars had built tunnels across the border and 
were using these to smuggle the arms and military supplies in from Albania. 111yria 14 November, 
1992 p. 1. 
227 IBID 
228 In his speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Christopher 'rcspond[ed] to our strategic 
interest in preventing the conflict from spreading .... 
' He also stated that; 'Negotiations offer the only 
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The situation has resulted in a degeneration of the entire Kosova issue into right 
wing nationalist fervour by elements that favour a military approach. 229 Serbian 
opposition leader of the Serbian Renewal Party, Vuk Draskovic confirmed such 
developments. In a statement issued on 24 May, 1993, Draskovic claimed that Serbian 
nationalist 'madmen' have started to implement plans to 'set Kosovo ablaze'. He went 
on to claim that these men were under orders from Croatian President, Franjo 
TudJman. TudJman would use the situation to stir unrest in Kosova as a diversion for 
the Croat army to move against Serbian Krajhina, which Croatia lost in the 1991 
conflict with Serbia. 230 Specifically, he was referring to individuals such as Voislav 
Sese1j and Zelijko Raznjatovic, and Sinisa Vucinic. These men have advocated an even 
harder stance than Milosevic regarding Kosovar Albanians and manage to enforce their 
beliefs with several paramilitary groups under their command. Milosevic has been able 
to isolate more radical factions, particularly after the December 19,1993 elections in 
Serbia. His ruling Socialist Party was able obtain a majority in Parliament. However, a 
victory over Sese1j and Draskovic does not necessarily mean an abandonment of the 
Greater Serb ideal by Milosevic or his party. Presently, though he is avoiding public 
advocacy of such a posture while he continues to seek the removal of UN sanctions 
which have crippled the Serbian econorny. 231 
As for the Albanian extremists, Rugova has been able to suppress their demands, 
but outsiders question how long this can be kept Up. 232 Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi 
has advocated a stronger response from the West. Recent troop and police build-ups 
by Serbia in Prishtina, Kosova! s capital, are seen as evidence of a new campaign to be 
launched against Kosova. The imposition of martial law in all but name has made 
Bukoshi appeal for assistance. 
This situation cannot go on. We have preached and lived by peaceful opposition to Serbian 
brutality. Yct, unless we are allowed to pursue our basic rights, our people will have no 
way to a practical solution ..... The negotiators have also explored the option of a global solution that 
would embrace Croatia, Kosovo, and other areas of conflict in the region'. Christopher (January, 
1994), pp. cit.. - pp. 166-167. 
229 "Serbian propagandists in western Europe are again talking about Albanian-populated Kosovo, 
inside Serbia, as 'a sacred Serbian land systematically occupied, usurped, ravaged, its population 
massacred, forced into Islan-Lic conversion or expelled, its churches profaned-by a foreign people 
ferociously hostile to Serbs [supported by foreign journalists and politicians who are] professional 
instigators of the murder of the Serbian nation. The implication is that something will be done about 
this". William Pfaff, "What Ought to be Done About Bosnia Won't be Done", International Herald 
Tribune 2 December, 1993 
230 RFML Newsbrie (24-28 May, 1993): pp. 14-15. 
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RFEIRL Newsbri (24 August, 1994), and, For belief that this is all a well orchestrated plot by 
Miloscvic who continues to violate the arms embargo and has not reneged on a Greater Serb idea see, 
Chuck Sudetic, The New York Times 4 December, 1994, and, Martin Preva, ne International Herald 
Tribune 10-11 December, 1994. 
232 11"a 3 April, 1993 p. 2. 
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recourse but to take matters into their own hands. That would present Slobodan Nfilosevic, the 
president of Serbia, with an excuse for a military crack-down. The disastrous result would 
make the tragedy in Bosnia pale in compariSon. 233 
The situation has also led to a flood of rumours; and increasing polemics between 
Belgrade and Tirana. Albania has called for international observers to be sent to 
Kosova and for the entire area to be dernilitarised under a UN protectorate statuS. 234 
A Croatian daily also fuelled unrest by publishing an interview with an Albanian 
military officer who indicated that the Kosovar and Tirana leadership have held 
consultations about possible 'joint action' should the conflict spread to Kosova. 235 The 
Berisha government has denied such claims and instead looks to the West to halt the 
spread of conflict. 236 Berisha has even called on NATO troops to be deployed to 
Kosova so as to contain the conflagration. 237 Albania has repeatedly indicated its 
anxiety over Kosova, particularly since it knows full well that it is not equipped, 
militarily, to fight a war with Serbia. Also such a conflict would result in perhaps as 
many as one million refugees flooding across the border, something Tirana is in no 
condition to handle. 238 The turn around policy on Kosova has led to some criticism of 
Berisha by both right wing nationalists who feel that Albania has betrayed Kosovars 
and opposition leaders who believe Berisha is caving in to Western pressure over 
Kosova. 239 Regardless, the Kosova issue remains high on Albania! s agenda. The 
historical importance placed upon it by Serbs and Albanians makes it unlikely that 
either side is willing to compromise on it any time in the near future. The more recent 
importance of Kosova has made the West wary as well that any incident could ignite 
more warfare. To Albania, this would spell disaster as warfare may undermine the 
233 Bujar Bukoshi, "Act Now to Save Kosovo", International Herald Tilbune 19 May, 1993 
234 Henry Kamm, "Albanian Urges West to Shield Kosovo", International Herald Tilbune I June, 
1993, Biberaj (February, 1993), pp. cit.: pp. 16-17. 
235 See, "Albania Prepared for War Over Kosovo? ", "War of Words Between Belgrade and Tirana, 
Albanian Parliament says 'War in Kosovo is Imminent, RFEIRL WeeklLy Revie (25November. 1 
December, 1992) 
236 President Berisha has reiterated the request made by Kosova Prime Minster [of the illegal 
government], Bujar Bukoshi. The plea from Bukoshi was made at the UN World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna, June, 1993. Specifically, the latter called on the UN to place Kosova under 
an international trusteeship. He feels that such a move would provide a 'temporary solution, allowing 
life to return to normal and creating a suitable atmosphere for negotiations'. Berisha, in a similar 
statement to the conference replied; 'We consider urgent and extremely important the placing of 
Kosova under UN control, its declaration as a neutral zone'. 111yria vol. 3 #204 17-19 June, 1993 p. 1. 
237 Berisha made such remarks in response to NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner's call for 
NATO troops in Kosova. The demand was part of a plan to halt the violence in the Balkans 
formulated by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. 111jila vol. 3 #248 18-20 November, 1993 p. 1. 
238 Interview with Mr. Arian Starova, Albanian Deputy Foreign Minister in "Albanian Fears in 
Serbia's Kosovo Region", International Herald Dibune 29 March, 1993. 
239 The nationalist elements were expressed through leader of the Albanian National Unity Party, Mr. 
Idajet Beqiri. His recent slanderous remarks against the government for its repeated failure and 
'fascist ways' have resulted in a six month prison term. Robert Austin, RFFIRL Newsbrie (13July, 
1993): p. 12. The 'pressure'view was expressed by Bashkim Zeneli, Foreign Policy Chair, Socialist 
Party. interview (Tirana: 5 June, 1993) 
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stability of the goverment itself and could perhaps lead in a reversion to a more - 
authoritarian regime. 240 Isolating itself from the situation is not possible since the' fate 
of Albania is linked with the former Yugoslavia!. 241 
4.0 Within a BaZkan Context 
Regional relations between Albania and her neighbours take on added 
significance with warfare in Bosnia still proceeding. Should the conflagration subside 
the potential for instability in the region remains high as the seeds for future conflict 
have already been sown during the period 1991-1994. The external situation has been, 
by far, the 'biggest hindrance to a successful political transition in Albania!, since the 
Yugoslav disintegration has, 'coincided with the most difficult period in Albanian 
histor. V. 242 This perhaps explains why President Berisha has sought to foster ties with 
a host of states, both East and West. Witnessing the ineffective policy of the West 
towards Bosnia certainly would give Berisha cause for concern should the war engulf 
Albania as well. 243 Despite former President BusWs and President Clintotfs warning 
that the US is prepared to 'employ military force against the Serbs'244, should war 
erupt in Kosova, Albanians believe that empty promises from the West, already given 
to Bosnians, can easily be repeated in Kosova. This may explain why Albania, while 
seeking a strong relationship and commitment from the US, has also turned its focus to 
the Islamic world for both 're-equipment and financial assistance'. 245 
Berisha has stressed the high probability of war in the Balkans. One way out, he 
feels, is a strong Western commitment such as a bombing of Serbian military targets 
thereby decreasing Serb warfare capabilities. 246 Until the West takes such concerted 
action Berisha believes that reform cannot proceed at a rapid pace. He has stated that; 
The shadow of the war next door, is the biggest problem on the way to reform because this shadow 
compounds the internal problems and prevents investment. The war also prevents the free movement 
of goods throughout the region. 247 
240 Interview Mr. Jonathan Benton, Albania Desk, State Department (Washington DC: 10 August, 
1993) 
241 Gjinushi, pp. cit. 
242 Bibcraj (February, 1993), pp. cit.: p. 18., Robert Austin, "What Albania Adds to the Balkan Stew", 
QrbLs (Spring, 1993): p. 270. 
243 Austin (Spring, 1993), pp. cit, p. 277. 
244 NeW York 771mes 28 December, 1992 
245jaMeS Patifer, "Kosova: Round One to Serbia", The World To vol. 49 #3 (March, 1993): 
pp. 4344. 
246 "Athens Names its Price", The Independent 28 November, 1992 
247 Interview, President Sali Bersiha (Tirana: 9 June, 1993); The view was supported by Mr. 
Kostelancik of the US Embassy, Tirana who stated that the crisis; 'certainly dissuades investors, 
perhaps not as much as the Albanians imagine, but it does undermine investor confidence in Albania 
and provides at best, a nebulous, undefined investing climate% Kostelancik, 2p. cit. 
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Berisha may, however, be attempting to prepare for the inevitable. While publicly 
advocating that Albania is not exacerbating the situation in any way, unconfirmed 
reports indicated that Albania was conducting military manoeuvres near the Kosova 
border and visual accounts attest to tanks being moved out of Tirana. 248 
The impact on the area is significant. 249Warfare and weak economic systems 
have already led to refugees numbering in the hundreds of thousands. And, with 
Greece, a NATO and EC member concerned about Albania and vice-versa250, the level 
of potential, and actual instability is superseded only by the level of anxiety and the 
West's failed policy to date. This is why the West, especially the US, has been urged 
by some observers to pursue a more activist approach in the region. 
It would behoove Washington to recall that Albania borders on Serbia, a country at war, and that the 
possibility of a failed Albanian regime going to war against Serbia is not at all far-fetched. No doubt it 
is rewarding to bet on the winners in East-Central Europe. But Washington should also calculate the 
consequences of creating loscrs. 251 
Berisha concurs with this stance. He has stated that given the geostrategic position of 
his nation, Albania could provide the US with a 'key of stability and peace in the 
region! . As such, 
Albania should 'represent a vital interest'. 252 Democratic Party 
Chairman, Eduard Selami was much more adamant in his posture. He questioned that, 
should the US seek to solve the area's problems, why not then invest heavily in 
Albania? This would stabilise the nation and provide a 'steadiness factor' in the 
Balkans. 253 
The United States, however, does not appear either ready or willing to commit 
itself entirely to Albania and the Balkans. Given Albania! s past record and potential 
future, it is not surprising that it has 'a low position on the West's agenda!. 254 Reasons 
for this level of interest highlight both the inadequacy and contradiction of US policy. 
The inability to define specific goals and co-ordinate them with ever decreasing or 
scaled back resources is indicative of no set policy in the post Cold War era. President 
Clinton's 'new internationalist' approach to foreign policy does very little except 
relegate nations such as Albania to the backburner of US interests. This 
248 "Albania Oh, Dear", The Economist (5 June, 1993): pp. 56-57. 
249 A more doornsayer approach has been repeatedly advocated by BBC journalist Nfisha Glenny, who 
believes that if the war does not stop by October, 1993, 'the danger of the southeast European security 
situation deteriorating into a morass like the one that preceded World War I will become accute! See 
"Carnage in Bosnia, For Starters", New York Times 29 July, 1993. 
250 "Albania, Seeking Friends", The Economist (24 July, 1993): p. 55. 
251 Austin (Spring, 1993), qp. cit. * p. 277. 
252 President Berisha, gp. cit. 
253 Mr. Selami, Qp--cit. 
254 Austin (Spring, 1993), 2p. cit.. -, p. 277. 
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'multilateralisnY [the co-ordination of activity with allies], has left the US with 'no 
capacity for movement and initiatiVe'. 255 
4.1 Ae U. S. Interest? 
In early 199 1, the US had re-established relations with Albania. Following 
Secretary of State James Baker's June, 1991 visit to Tirana, Albanians believed, falsely, 
that the US would now serve as their chief benefactor on the road to full 
democratisation and a market economy. A year after the Baker visit, President Berisha 
went to Washington and met with President Bush. The US promised over $60m in aid 
over and above the $35m already delegated to Albania. 256 The aid was divided into 
agricultural assistance [$23m], food aid [$17m], technical assistance [$2m], and 
management training [$850,000]. 257 A subsequent visit by then Deputy Secretary of 
State, Lawrence Eagleburger concluded a trade agreement between the US and 
Albania and conferred Most Favoured Nation status for Albania on 16 June, 1992.258 
The United States has more importantly sought to alleviate Albania! s fears over 
the war next door. Its admission to the NACC has been followed by talks between 
Albanian Defence Minister Xhulali and a US military delegation led by Brigadier 
General Lenon. The two discussed the situation in the former Yugoslavia and agreed in 
a 'Memorandum of Understanding', that they would meet to identify and discuss 
problems and ways to encounter them. The agreement also tied the Albanian Defence 
Ministry with the US Command Headquarters, Europe. 259 The pro-US posture by the 
Berisha government has led to reports of a'US bridgehead'in the Balkans. These 
reports, however, are at best, 'exaggerated'. 260 The present situation presents the US 
with an opportunity which it is using to ensure that. Albania does not exacerbate the 
crisis. It is doing very little more, however, as amorphous goals, such as 'democracy 
promotion! will not work when specific guide-lines are not laid out. 
Albanians view US relations with mixed results. Some, such as Neritan Ceka 
believe that Albania will never be more than a 'peripheral interest' for the US and the 
latter has no set plans for Albania since it has no specific policy. 261 Others feel that 
US-Albanian relations are proceeding forward with positive results. More importantly, 
some such as Berisha! s chief adviser, Genc Pollo, feel that 'given the present and future 
problems in Europe, the assertion of US leadership and presence is vital for a 
255 "Bosnia Farce", The Washington Post 10 August 1993 
256 Keesings Archives (June 1992): p. 38971. 
257 "Romania, Bulgaria, Albania: Recent Developments", (Congressional Research Service Library of 
Congress Washington: US Printing Office, 1993): p. 14. 
258 IBID. The Eagleburger visit concluded on 30 May, 1992. 
259 "Marreveshje Ushtarake Shqiptaro-Amcrike [US-Albanian Nfilitary Understanding]", 111yria 16- 
20 January, 1993 p. 9. 
260 "Seeking Friends", The Economist (24 July, 1993): p. 55. 
261 Mr. Ceka, Oxit. 
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politically and economically prosperous Europe. 1262 The US, however, has not 
indicated any commitment for long term policy and aid to Albania. Partly perhaps due 
to indifference or ignorance, but perhaps more so due to the rudderless direction of US 
foreign policy in the post Cold War era. The inability to define a set policy towards the 
former Yugoslavia only typifies the Bush and present Clinton administrations 
shortcomings. Hanging on to Cold War mentality without the Cold War threat means 
contradictory policy. How else can the State Department consider the Balkans within 
the national interest yet abandon the individual nations that make up the Balkans? A 
fostering, strengthening, and continuation of links with nations such as Albania offers 
the US an opportunity it should not pass up. Robert Austin best expresses this; 
Given the overwhelming instability that now envelopes the Balkan region, Albania presents the West, 
and particularly the United States, with an excellent opportunity to foster stability in the one of the 
rcgion! s key countries. If the right forces are encouraged during Albania's transition to democracy, the 
country's stability will lessen considerably the potential for a worsening of the Serbian crisis. 263 
4.2 Assessment 
The coming of democracy to Albania has not resulted in immediate benefits 
believed by many. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia has heightened Albanian fears 
and concerns within the present leadership that a spread of conflict may undermine the 
stability of the whole nation. The search for allies and benefactors has certainly opened 
Albania up to the outside world. However, its foreign policy links seem to be 'without 
a clear objective' and based solely upon a 'base for economic profit'. 264 The need for 
specific strategy was reiterated by Republican Party Chair, Sabri Godo who stated, 
'Albanians need a plan, something which will guide them in the long term'. 265 In its 
links with the United States, Albania has looked to the US as its' salvation'. The latter 
has been struggling to modify its Cold War Balkan strategy to meet present and future 
circumstances. The two, however, do share one fundamental characteristic; both are 
desperately trying to fashion a foreign policy that defines specific goals, an operating 
framework to accomplish these, and a priority list which accounts for resources 
available. For the US, the conflicting trends of post Cold War foreign policy thought 
continue to plague the present Clinton administration as it seeks to redefine America! s 
place and mission in the world. The contending theories of direction bear further 
examination as to their objectives, methods, pros and cons, and application to nations 
such as Albania and to crisis situations, such as in Bosnia, to determine their impact on 
the US, Albania, and the Balkans generally. 
262 Mr. polio (June, 1993), M. cit. 
263 Austin (Spring, 1993), gp. cit. - p. 259. 
264 Mr. Ccka, M. 
-cit. 265 Mr. Godo, 2p. Cit. 
Chapter Four - 
THE APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE 
1.0 A TEST CASE FOR U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of communism have done 
very little to promote world-wide peace, let alone any semblance of stability in key 
areas across the globe. 'Winning the Cold War' accomplished even less for the United 
States as it appears that the position it once held, that of superpower, may be in 
jeopardy. As regional crises arise the US struggles with efforts to determine; not only 
whether or not to reply, but, specifically in what manner, and, alone or in conjunction 
with others. More importantly, even determining vital US interests in the post Cold 
War era appear to have assumed a vagueness not present during the days of bi- 
polarity. From the struggle of democratisation in Russia, to the debacles in Somalia 
and Bosnia, to strained relations with China and North Korea, the problem with policy 
formulation has, and remains evident for the US. Solving and/or diffusing these crises 
in and of itself is not the answer. The damage they have incurred to American 
leadership represents a much more fundamental problem, the inability of the US 
foreign policy establishment to fashion a policy for the US in the decades to come. In 
the short term this failure has served to undermine US leadership and credibility in 
capitals around the world. US Senate minority leader Bob Dole [R-Kan], best 
expresses this frustration; 
unfortunately, our image and position abroad is on the same downward spiral as during the Carter 
years, when the United States was feared by none, respected by few and ignored by many. The bottom 
line is that America, under the Clinton administration, is abdicating American leadership at the 
United Nations, at NATO and around the globe. I 
The bipartisan jab notwithstanding, the statement does make a case for the 
situation at hand. To fix blame upon one administration over another, however, is not 
the answer. It is unlikely that a second term George Bush would fare better. 2 This 
does not suggest that President Clinton or his foreign policy team should be absolved 
from fault. After all, since the days of World War II, US presidents have been 
I Bob Dole quoted in the Internadonal Herald Dibune 12-13 February, 1994 p. 3. 
2 Even long time respected US senator Daniel P. Moynihan P-NY] adheres to this position by 
stating; '... the inadequacy is not to be ascribed to one President or one administration. There has been 
and continues to be an inadequate understanding of what has made the world turn upside 
down ... There was enough of a 
knowledge base, both theoretical and practical, to make possible a 
sufficiently accurate anticipation as to what the present era would look like. Let us hold firm to that. 
The world does not defy understanding; and what can be understood can sometimes be modified. 
See, D. P. Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethniciný in International Politics (Oxford: University Press, 
1993): pp. 167-168. 
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%primarily foreign-policy Presidents. 3 It could be argued that President Clinton and his 
staff now have the options of either adopting a proactive approach or reactive policy 
formulation. In this context, Albania demonstrates, not only a chance at a US foreign 
policy success, but also shows how past and current US policy in area vis-a-vis Bosnia 
and the former Yugoslavia has failed miserably. It is this failure which in turn may lead 
to unrest and destabilisation throughout the Balkans, with larger repercussions. This 
latter statement does not imply that the Balkans will again become the starting point 
for a world-wide conflict. It is a parochial view at best and foolish notion at worst to 
suggest that patterns of conflict in that region that are manifesting themselves in similar 
means will automatically produce world war. 
Instead, what will be suggested is that failure by the US to formulate, adopt, 
implement and nurture a comprehensive foreign policy towards states such as Albania 
will, eventually, result in negative effects for US vital and secondary interests. 
Moreover, the failure to handle crisis situations such as Bosnia will undermine US 
foreign policy direction. 
1.1 Bosnia and the Western Failure 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia by 1990 did not catch the West off guard. Yet, 
the pitiful reply made it appear SO. 4 In the United States, President Bush sent 
Secretary of State James Baker to Belgrade in June of 1991 in a vain attempt to keep 
Yugoslavia together. Baker, armed only with rhetoric, reiterated Bush's pleas that 
Slovenia and Croatia would not be recognised and, moreover, that the US would 
continue to recognise the federal state. 5 In a similar statement, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry echoed US sentiment that it would also continue recognising a federal 
3 "The world remains a dangerous place, and foreign policy remains a presidential dominion". Steven 
Stark, "The First Post Modem Presidency", The Atlantic vol. 271 #4 (April, 1993): p. 27. 
4ý Serbia's aggression against Bosnia, in particular the genocidal practice of ethnic cleansing, was an 
early and crucial test of the New World Order proclaimed by George Bush and others at the end of the 
Cold War. On almost all counts, the cooperative security structures established in Europe... proved 
inadequate. Neither the ... (CSCE) nor the various associations of Western democracies- the EC, 
NATO, the WEU- or any of their constituent governments, had the will to punish Serbia for violating 
the rights minorities on its territory or for its blatant aggression against Bosnia .... 
Little action was 
taken by the Western powers in the late 1980s to curb Serbian bullying of Albanians ..... or to 
reprimand the Croatian government for its failure to grant full rights to its Serbian minority... in the 
summer of 199 V See Jane M. O. Sharp, "Intervention in Bosnia-the case for", The Morld To Vol. 
49 #2 (February, 1993): p. 30 
5 IBID, and for the belief that the West feared recognition would set a bad precedent see, Glenny 
(1992), ppýcit. 'The West looked at Yugoslavia through the filter of the Soviet Union- as Yugoslavia 
was careering towards an explosive war, caused to a large degree by Serbia's commitment to a 
unitarist structure, the West supported this political anachronism for its fear that an outbreak of 
secession among the constituent republics might have provoked a similar process in the Soviet 
Union. ', at p. 178., and, Almond, op. cit.; "... the US government supported the 'territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia within its present borders' and declared 'the US shall not encourage or reward 
secession. '", at p. 40. 
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Yugoslavia. 6 The Bush Administration, with the re-election year fast approaching, 
most likely did not want to commit the US to a policy, or worse, to action which 
eventually might have undermined his chances at re-election. 7 Given America's passive 
position to the revolution's of 1989, Bush perhaps thought that a similar posture 
should be adopted with regards to Yugoslavia. It also perhaps explains why the US 
was so willing to defer to the Europeans, specifically the EU, in the matter. The EU 
believed that their time at demonstrating unity had come. Jacques do Poos, the 
Luxembourg Foreign Minister proclaimed this was, 'the hour of Europe. '8 
Yet the crisis signified the shortcomings of the EU. They were too busy 
arguing about their own collective future, especially vis-a-vis a common foreign and 
defence policy, to come up with anything vaguely resembling a united front on 
Yugoslavia. 9 During the Summer of 1991 the EU presidency passed to Luxembourg. 
From June until the end of the year, the EU sent its diplomatic corps to Belgrade, 
Zagreb and Lubljana in hopes of negotiating a cease-fire. Gianni de Michelis, Jacques 
de Poos and Hans van den Broek; the Foreign NEnisters of Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands respectively, travelled to Belgrade and Zagreb following the fall of 
Vukovar after months of intense shelling [20 November, 1991]. 10 The ministers 
announced that they had a 'signed agreement' which would end all fighting. Less than 
twenty-four hours later, heavy fighting resumed. II Collectively, the EU negotiated 
fourteen cease-fires alone during the latter half of 1991, all of which did not last more 
than a few days. Their ineptitude and contradictory positions; encouraging democracy 
without supporting separatism while still recognising the federal government, only 
6 For both the US and the Russians, it appeared that recognition of the republics would provide the 
justification needed by ethnic groups to break away from their host state. The precedent set by 
Yugoslavia would then have far reaching consequences since it might create the onus for a dissolution 
of other multiethnic states, specifically Russia, with more dangerous ramifications. See Nikolaos X 
Stravrou, "The Balkan Quagmire and the West's Response", Mediterranean Quarterl vol. 4#1 
(Winter, 1993), and, on Bush's statement The New York Times 27 June, 1991 
7 Malcolm (1994), op-cit.: pp. 239-240, and, Michact Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy", 
ForeignAUai vol. 70 #1 (Winter, 1991); 'The attribute he lacks-the capacity to define clearly 
American interests abroad and the policies necessary to pursue them...., at p. 6. 
8 Zametica, pp_. cit., p. 59. 
9 Point reiterated by former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzczinski, who said that European 
policy towards the breakup was, 'weak and indecisive' "Interview on CNN International Hour", (19 
December, 1994), and Noel Malcolm, "Is There a Doctor in the House? ", The National Review (5 July, 
1993); 'The EC does not and cannot have a single defense policy, for the simple reason that it does 
not have a single army. And in circumstances such as the Yugoslav crisis, a foreign policy without a 
defense policy is like a gun without ammunition-it is effective only until the moment when your 
opponent realizes that you arc bluffing. ', at p. 41., and, Chandler Rosenberger, "The Bridge on the 
Drina", The National Review Q June, 1993) 
10'The fall of the ruined Croatian town of Vukovar (once a town of some 50,000 inhabitants, 43 per 
cent Croat, 37 per cent Serb, 20 per cent Hungarians and others), two days after its besiegers had 
solemnly signed yet another cease-fire brokered by Lord Carrington, stands as a stark monument to 
the inadequacy [or cynical complicity] of the outside world's response to the degradation of the 
Yugoslav crisis into war and barbarism. ' Branka Magas, 2p-. cit.. - p. 356. 
11 Misha Glenny (1992), Qp-. cit., pp. 97-100., and Zametica, pp. cit. - p, 59. 
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brought the EU criticism from the local population of the republics and, more 
importantly, destroyed their credibility within the international community. 12 The 
Yugoslav Peace Conference at the Hague was set up in September, 1991 under the 
direction of British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. The EU believed that it could 
convince the republics to stay together within a federal system by offering an 
association agreement. 13 Failing to realise that the republics themselves rejected a host 
of confederal plans, the EU desperately, and somewhat foolishly, now felt that it could 
bribe the republics into maintaining a federal structure, even more constricting than a 
confederal system, once blood had been Spilt. 14 The republics promptly refused the 
gesture and the Conference remained in limbo from October, 1991, onwards. With 
failure now apparent, dissension began to formulate within the EU as Germany 
expressed its belief in recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, as early as July, 1991.15 EU 
members France and Great Britain refused German proposals, as did the United States, 
all still clinging to the belief that recognition was a clear violation of the 1975 Helsinki 
Principles which recognised Europe's post World War 11 borders. 16 Foolish, 
however, was the notion that Yugoslavia itself existed. The EU failure only 
perpetuated the violence by giving legitimacy to Milosevic's use of the JNA, now 
predominately Serbian led, as a pretext to invade the other republics, all in the name of 
preserving the federal integrity. 17 The belief that the EU could have succeeded was, as 
Noel Malcolm aptly states, a 'fantasy'; 
The fantasy here is that Europe [or at least that group of twelve countries which has appropriated the 
name of the whole continent], can act on the world stage as a single force with superpower potential, 
shouldering the burden of responsibility which superpower status entails. And the suffering children 
onto which this fantasy has been projected are the infant states of ex-Yugoslavia. [sic] 18 
In an attempt to stop the fighting, the rest of the EU eventually gave in to German 
pressure and recognised Croatia and Slovenia [15 June, 1992]. 19 Former US Secretary 
of State and now UN special representative, Cyrus Vance managed to broker a cease- 
fire which, unfortunately, did not indicate what the precise status of Serb held territory 
12 'Hence Yugoslavia became the first major test of the European Community's (EC) multilateral 
foreign policy. Its failure was conspicuous. Not only have the Europeans been unable to stop a civil 
war on their doorstep, but some of their contradictory responses have aggravated it. ' See Dusko 
Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds", Foreign Poli-a #91 (Winter, 1992): pA 
13 Zametica, 2p. cit. - p. 61. 
14Nicolas Stavrou (1993), pp. cit.: pp. 32-33., and, John Fenske, "The West and the Problem from 
Hell", Current History vol. 92 #577 (November, 1993): pp. 353-354, 
15 Zametica, gp. cit., p. 64. 
16 Stavrou. (1993), 2p. cit.. pp. 37-38. 
17 Magas, o. cit,, - p. 318., and, William Pfaff, "Serbs Can Reverse a Destructive Course", The 
Intemational Herald Tp1bune 17 December, 1992, and, Zalmay Khalilzad, "Stop Negotiating with 
Serbia", The New York Times 7 January, 1993 
19 Noel Malcolm (July, 1993), M. _cit.. p. 
39. 
19 Misha Glenny (1992), M. cit.. p. 143., and, Glenny (1993), gp. ciL- pp. 254-255. 
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in Croatia would be. With fighting having ended in Slovenia after only ten days, 
following the EU negotiated Brioni Accords [7 July, 1991]20, only Bosnia remained 
left for the Serbs to now carve up. The Vance cease-fire and Brioni Accords however, 
should not signify any great success for either the West or EU. The fighting between 
Croatia and Serbia ended simply because the Serbs realised that a massive military 
campaign was needed to capture all of Croatia, something they were not prepared 
for. 21 Indeed, they would have had to delay their ultimate goal, which was a link up of 
all Serb dominated lands that made up Greater Serbia. In this respect, the end of all out 
hostility between Serbia and Croatia still witnessed the Serbs gain what they most 
wanted from Croatia, the Krajina. 22 As for Slovenia, the 1991 census of Yugoslavia 
stated that no more than 5,000 Serbs lived in the republic and this figure most probably 
was slightly inflated. Many of the republic's Serbs, also did not want to identify 
themselves with Serbia since they were relatively prosperous in Slovenia. 23 The 
republic of Slovenia, also, was well prepared for possible attack. It territorial defence 
militias effectively blocked the JNA units that appeared confused in early June, 1991 
action. 24 Realising that it was not worth it to engage in a long battle of attrition, 
Milosevic bid good riddance to Slovenia. 25 It was Milosevic's desire not to pursue an 
active military campaign against Lubljana, and not the EU's poor diplomacy which 
ended the conflict there. 26 Bosnia, however, represented a different case., 
Bosnia typified Yugoslavia in MiCrOCOSM27, and its status was not clear once 
the other republics made overt moves toward independence. In May of 1990 the 
formation of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] was created and severed links with 
gn 20 Glenny (1992), pp. cit.: p. 97., and, William Pfaff, "Invitation to War", Forei A airs vol 72 #3 
(Summer, 1993): p. 104. 
21Roger Boyes, "Why the Serbian Generals do not want a Wider War", The Times 31 December, 
1992, and, Patrick Moore, "A Return of the Serbian-Croatian Conflict? ", RFEIRL vol. 2 #42 (22 
October, 1993): p. 19; 'Many analysts ... think that a major conflict 
is unlikely because the Serbs arc 
reportedly worn out and the Croats are under strong international pressure. ' 
22 'Krajina was crucial to Serbia's strategy for subduing Croatia. The Scrb-dominated Yugoslav 
military arm the self proclaimed Serb Republic ofKrajina and used federal MiGs to turn away 
Croatian helicopters trying to reestablish control. ' See, Chandler Rosenberger, "The Next Balkan 
War", The National Review (6 September, 1993): p. 22. 
23 IF Dunn, "Yugoslavia", in Post Communist Europe Instabilities 1994 (Conflict Studies Research 
Centre: Carmichael and Sweet Ltd. Portsmouth, 1994): p. 13-4. 
24 ZarnetiCa, qgxit.: pp. 12-14., and, Ramct (Fall, 1992), gp. cit,,. p. 86., and, Glcnny (1992), gp. cit,. 1 
pp, 95-97., and, The Economist (2 March, 1991): p. 54. 
25 The Economist (2 March, 1991): p. 54. 
26 'The European Community and the United States started dealing with the Yugoslav crisis in 
unison: both believed that the country's disintegration should be avoided at all costs and both assumed 
that, given the right diplomatic pressure, the conflict could be handled with relative success. The 
approach has proven to be a monumental failure. ' See, "T11e Ruins of Yugoslavia and a New 
Balkans", R USI Newsb?! e_fvoI. 12 #6 (June, 1992): p. 4 1. 
27 Jonathan Eyal Seminar at University of Stirling, (15 March, 1994) 
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the LCY. 28 The SDA was led by Dr. Alija Izetbegovic, who had been released from 
prison in 1988. By August, 1990 Bosnia-Hercegovina followed Croatia and Slovenia 
by declaring itself a 'sovereign democratic state' and, announced it would hold multi- 
party elections in November, 1990.29The elections to Bosnia's 240 seat Assembly 
were tallied by December. The SDA won 86 seats. The Bosnian Serb Party, the SDS, 
and their leader, Sarajevo psychiatrist Radovan Karadzic, obtained 72 seats. 30 The 
Bosnian Croats [HDZ of Bosnia] received 44 while a rival Muslim Party led by Adil 
ZuIfikarpasic, the Bosnian Muslim Organisation [MBO], tallied 13 seatS. 3lWith a 
plurality, Izetbegovic set out to create a government of national unity which would 
incorporate Bosnia's ethnic minorities. With rising Croat nationalism, however, it 
became increasingly dffficult for Izetbegovic to govern. The HDZ in Croatia and other 
nationalist groups such as the Croatian Party of Law, led by Dobroslav Paraga, were, 
by February, 1991, publicly expressing their desires for either the partial or complete 
annexation of Bosnia by Croatia. 32 
Bosnian Muslims also expressed their concern and anxiety over reports that 
Milosevic was, not only in touch with the SDS, but actively supporting it by July, 1991 
through secret arms shipments aimed at building up the paramilitary Serb militias which 
were forming in Bosnia. 33 Within one month, sporadic shooting incidents were being 
reported from within Bosnia. 34 It was these incidents which made the SDS ask the 
JNA to intervene on behalf of protecting the Serbs. Milosevic sponsored these calls by 
the SDS claiming it was necessary to protect the ethnic Serb minority in Bosnia. By 20 
September, 1991, JNA troops numbering over five-thousand men and one-hundred 
tanks marched into Western Bosnia and attacked Muslim and Croat paramilitary units 
near Visegrad and Nevesinje. 35 Claiming that the government was no longer tenable, 
Karadzic and the SDS delegates walked out of the Bosnian Assembly by 14 October, 
1991. Less than one week later, the SDS established the Serbian National Assembly of 
Bosnia, based at first in Banja Luka and later moved to Pale. 36 As for the Bosnia 
Croats, many supported Bosnian independence, yet realised that if Serbs were to 
28Glenny(1992), pp-. cit. * p. 129., and, Malcolm (1994), pp. cit, p. 218., and, Ramet (1992), op. cit,: 
pp. 259-260. 
29 Malcohn (1994), 212. cit., p. 219. 
30 Ramet (1992), 2p_. cit. * pp. 259-261., and, Malcolm (1994), pM. git., p. 222., and, Glenny (1994), 
pp. cit.. - p. 129. 
31 Malcolm (1994), gp_cit., p-219 
ti 32 Ramct (1992), 2p. cit, p. 203., and, Magas, gp. cit. 1 who describes Paraga as a one me'prisoner of 
conscience', at p. 125. Paraga was one of the student'leaders during the Croatia4 crisis. See Ramet 
(1992), Oxit. - pp. 203-204. 
33 Malcolm (1994), qpxiýL, p. 225., and, FBISlEastern Eume (I I July, 199 1), and, Jim Hooper, "The 
Balkan Conundrum", Conflict International vol. 8 #1 (January, 1993): pp. 1-2. 
34 Ze? i I Popullit 8 August, 1991 
35 Mark Thompson, pp. cit. - p. 189. 
36 Magas The Destruction of .. P. xv. 
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establish 'autonomous regions"37 within Bosnia, then they also should not be left out. 
Croatians from Hercegovina, led by Mate Boban supported the March, 1991 meeting 
between Croatian President Tudjman and Milosevic over ways in which Bosnia should 
be divided amongst them. 38 By 19 December, 1991, the Bosnian government formally 
requested EU recognition yet was refused. 39 
The decision of the EU can only be seen as stupidity. Attached to the Hague 
Conference was the equally inept, and culpable, Badinter Arbitration Commission. The 
Commission's findings, which were released in January, 1992, called on a referendum 
of all the citizens of Bosnia regarding the question of independence. 40 Should the 
referendum prove favourable, then, and only then, would formal recognition be 
considered. At the start of the new year [2 January, 1992], Izetbegovic appealed for 
UN peacekeepers, yet was refused because Bosnia had not yet been recognised. 41 As 
for the EU, many Muslims, Croats and Serbs believed that, given its proximity to the 
conflict, and the historic alliances and animosities which existed between several of the 
EU members states and the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, any EU actions are likely to 
be strictly politically motivated. 42 Despite this, the referendum was held in Bosnia on 
29 February, 1992. Serbs and many Croats boycotted the referendUM. 43 The 
overwhelming response was in favour of an independent Bosnia. 44 The SDS declared 
the referendum illegal. Their leader, Karadzic went to Austria in February, 1992 to 
meet with Tudjman and Milosevic over ways to carve up Bosnia. 45 Following the 
results of the referendum the EU still withheld recognition and instead called for a 
'canton' plan for Bosnia which would ethnically divide the republic into ten 
autonomous units modelled on the Swiss Confederation plan. 46 Still believing it could 
prevent conflict in Bosnia, the EU, through Lord Carrington tried to push the 
cantonization proposal in early March, 1992. The multiethnic makeup of Bosnia, 
however, left too many ethnic minorities within other proposed cantons. The problem 
37p 
, amet (1992), pp. cit. * pp. 260-261., and, Ramct (Fall, 1992), W. cit.., p. 84. 
38 WL Webb, "Driven 1ý1ad by lEstory", New Statesman and Socie (23 April, 1993): pp. 18-19., and, 
John F. Bums, "Serbian Plan would Deny the Muslims any State", The New York Times 18 July, 1993 
39 Burns, pp. cit. - appendix I 
40 Zametica, pp.. cit. - pp. 61-63. 
41 Stavrou (1993), pp_. cit., pp. 36-37. 
42 Zametica, pp. cit.: p. 67. 
43 Malcolm (1994), qp--cit., p. 231. 
44 Magas, M. cit. - p. xviii. 
45 RFEIRL Newsbrie (19 February, 1992) 
46 Doder, op. cit.: p. 20., and, John J. Mearsheimer, 'The Vance-Owen plan for peace in the former 
Yugoslavia is already a failure. Bosnian Muslims dislike it and have accepted it grudgingly. Serbs 
thumb their nose at it. .' 
in, "Balkan Peace: Shrink Bosnia to Rescue it, and Threaten Force", The 
Internafional Herald Tribune I April, 1993, and, for a full explanation why the parties to the plan do 
not accept it see, Patrick Moore, "Bosnian Impasse Poses Dilemmas for Diplomacy", RFEIRL (2 
April, 1993): pp. 28-29., and, New Statesman and Societv (7 May, 1993): p. 5., and, Pfaff (Summer, 
1993), pp. cit.. p. 106. 
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EU negotiators fOed to either recognise or admit was that Bosnia, as a map, is not 
simply a tri-coloured entity with each ethnic group represented by one colour and the 
lines clear and distinct. Bosnia instead can be described as a series of 'dots' where the 
lines are anything but clear and distinct. 47 It was not surprising then that the SDA and 
HDZoB rejected the plan by 24 March, 1992.48 Three days later the SDS declared the 
link up of autonomous units within Bosnia as The Serbian Republic of Bosnia. 49 
ironically, Izetbegovic asked for UN peacekeepers, which had been stationed in Split, 
in Croatia, to be re-deployed to Bosnia-Hercegovina on the same day of the 
declaration. 50 Izetbegovic's request was denied and sped Bosnia on its course towards 
destruction. 
Federal Army General Adzic announced on 30 March, 1992 that he was 
prepared to invade Bosnia to protect Serbs there. 51 By 2 April, Serb paramilitary units 
ftom Serbia, most notably Arkan's Tigers, marched into BiJe1jina and Banja Luka. By 4 
April, mortar attacks began and one day later, JNA NEG-29 jet fighters attacked 
strategic positions within Bosnia-Hercegovina. 52 Muslims in the towns of Zvornik, 
Visegrad and Foca were forced from their homes, many more were captured. By 6-7 
April, 1992, with little done, the EU and then the US officially recognised by Bosnia. 53 
By this time, it was too late. 54 The West's failure of Bosnia was already complete. 
Bosnia-Herccgovina, internationally recognised and a member of both the CSCE and the 
United Nations, is nevertheless a phantom state. It future viability as a multiethnic entity 
depends critically on the willingness of the Muslim component to settle for an internal 
constitutional arrangement based upon a territorial division of power. The trouble is that the 
Muslims find this most unattractive because it would leave them with little territory, little 
power, and only a semblance of a state. For they too want a statc. 55 
47 MS point Was made by Jonathan Eyal, "Seminar on Yugoslavia", University of Stirling (15 March, 
1994) 
48 Malcolm (1994), pp. cit.. - p. 232. 
49 John pilgCr, "The West is Guilty in Bosnia", New Statesman and Socie (7 May, 1993): pp. 14-15., 
and, P. Moore, RFEIRL (2 April, 1993): p. 29. 
50 Bums, W-. ci-t-., appendix I 
51 Malcolm (1994), gp. cit.: pp. 235-236., and Glcnny (1992), Glcnny indicates that General 
Blagojc Adzic were 'cajoling the other members of the collective Presidency into agreeing to a state of 
emergency and the imposition of martial law throughout the country, As for Azic himself, he was 
'from Croatia where, during the Second World War, the Ustashes killed his entire family. ', at pp. 61 
and 122. 
52 The Times 4 April, 1992 and 20 April, 1992 
53 Stavrou (1993), pa. cit, p. 35. 
54 The exact numbers of those captured varied depending upon the sources usa Following reports 
that civilians captured were beaten and tortured, the EU dispatched former Polish Prime Minister 
Tadcusz Mazowicki to investigate war crimes charges. See, John Fenske, QR. cit, p. 354. 
55 Zametica, V-. cit. - p. 88. 
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1.2 Identifying the Problem 
During the era of bi-polarity US policy towards Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans fell within the framework of the Cold War. The US acknowledged, in official 
statements, that the latter two regions were historically within the area of Russian 
influence, thereby placing them on the 'periphery' of US interests. As early as 1985, 
official Washington policy stated; 
U. S. interests in Eastern Europe fall into two general categories, stratcgic-thosc related to the 
superpower rivalry and to the U. S. relationship with its key NATO allics-and those related 
directly to the region in its own right. The first include primarily allied security interests in 
the region as a potential asset or liability to Soviet strength and as a source of stability or 
instability in Europe. They can involve economic and other issues as they relate to these 
interests. Tlie latter type of interests can include trade and economic opportunities, 
humanitarian considerations, and interests stemming from a sizeable East European ethnic 
population in the United States. In recent history, there seems to have been a tendency for 
heightened superpower tensions to bring the strategic considerations to the fore while periods 
of U. S. -Soviet Mente have allowed local interests to gain greater weight. [SiC]56 
This view held to the belief that the US and the USSR sat atop the heads of respective 
camps and organised the globe into a series of alliances. These alliances were able to 
create an atmosphere of mutual deterrence in relation to vital interests. From this a 
strategic balance was achieved'. 57 And yet even the 1985 US position admits that 
interests are categorised into general areas. The same government legislators that 
produced this statement admit that there is 'no firm consensus on basic US interests 
and objectives!. 511 Bi-polarity, however, did produce an identifiable enemy. With this, a 
sense of discipline was achieved as the US was able to lead allies against the threat of 
Soviet expansionism. And now, even though it appears that the US is pursuing the 
'latter' option in its 198 5 position, it finds it increasingly difficult, if not impossible to 
achieve the latter without simultaneously pursuing the former. 
Herein lies the problem for policyrnakers. It is not enough to simply state the 
obvious; that the former are struggling with creating a new policy, to outline specific 
interests and programmes, and to co-ordinate these with the resources available. 
Rather, the end of the bipolar system requires an entire new framework for analysis. 
This, however, is easier said than done. It may come as a shock to policyrnakers and 
politicians in Washington, yet they must realise that not every problem has a solution. 
As a crisis unfolds, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, ineptitude, inefficiency, 
and shortsightedness destroys US credibility. This in turn produces futility among the 
56 "US Policy Towards Eastern Europe", Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle 
Eastý US House of Representatives: Committee on Foreign Affairs I st Session US Government 
(Washington: Printing Office, 2-7 October, 1985): p. 243. 
57 Richard Falk, "In Search of a New World Model", Current ffiltM vol. 92 #573 (April, 1993): 
p. 148. 
58 US Policy (October, 1985), pp. cit. - p. 242. 
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policymakers and tends to highlight the problem with US foreign policy. The outset of 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia has unfortunately coincided with the process of 
democratisation throughout the Balkans. Failure to recognise and, more importantly, 
to understand, the link between these two events will do more than reflect failed US 
policy. It will result in the inability of the region to produce healthy democracies in an 
area that sits between two regions vital to US interests, Western Europe and the 
Middle East. This is why poficy-building towards states such as Albania deserves 
greater attention by policymakers 
The issue of instability in areas such as the Balkans is as old as the region itself 
The competing blocs of the Cold War managed to quell territorial claims. Yet, issues 
of security persisted throughout the World War II era and were subsidised by the 
superpower rivalry. Since 1991, however, the situation has radically altered. 
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Communist regimes in the East European region 
radically transformed inter-state relationships in the Balkans. Age-old ethnic issues, 
particularly those involving national minorities and rapidly growing Muslim populations, are 
likely to disturb the delicate post- Second World War Balkan balance. The tendency 
manifested by some minority leaderships to identify themselves with neighbouring countries- 
thus unleashing secessionist and iffedentist threats- could lead to uncontrollable external 
involvement and serious complications. Human rights issues will then automatically be 
transformed into diplomatic and even military confrontations. Moreover, the disintegration of 
the Communist system has created a large vacuum in political, economic and security 
terms. 59 
While the breakup of the Warsaw Pact did not automatically signal the demise of 
NATO, it certainly required a rethink as to its role. The Bush administration 
acknowledged that NATO modify its purpose in order to meet new threats. More 
likely, Bush and his advisers were desperately seeking ways to justify a continued US 
presence in Europe now that the Soviet menace was gone, according to most public 
perceptions within the US. 60 NATO legitamatized this conviction. And yet, the US, 
59 Yannis G. Valinakis, "Southern Europe between cMtente and new threats: the view from Greece", 
in Roberto Aliboni, (ed. ) Southern European Secudaý In the 1990s (New York, New York: Pinter, 
1992): p. 59 
60 Following the success in the Gulf War President Bush proclaimed a new world order. To the vast 
majority of Americans, most of which grew up during the era of post WWII US-USSR antagonisms, 
this proclamation meant an end to the Cold War and no need, therefore for pursuing the large levels 
of military spending which had proceeded for nearly five decades. Yugoslavia, however, has shown 
that threats remain; '... none of this would have been possible unless the West shoulders the weight 
of a consistentforeign policy. Itsfailure to do so since 1990 is partly a matter of mistakes made by 
western polWcians. George Bush should havepursued the Guy'War in 1991 until Saddant Hussein 
was overthrown. Bill Clinton ought to have been tougher with North Korea in the nuclear 
negotiations of 1994. John Major and Francois Mitterand might haveprevented the worst horrors 
in ex-Yugoslavia if they hadput afew battalions on the Croatia-Serbian border as soon as 
Yugoslavia disintegrated But no honest democrat can put all the blame on politicians. The 
politicians would have done things differently if they had known theirpeople wanted them done 
differently. 77se main reason for th e West's post-Cold warfailure is th at most people in Western 
Europe andAmerica wanted to believe that the end of the Cold War was, In thatfatalphrase, the 
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as the conflict in Yugoslavia broke out, rather than act through the very institution it 
sought to perpetuate and modify, deferred to the Europeans in handling the crisiS. 61 
The latter's ineptitude in creating a solution through its champion, the EC has shown 
that US presence in Europe is not only favourable, but necessary. 62 The US, however, 
has so far done very little itself By deferring foreign policy to the various departments 
in Washington, President Clinton has entrusted the vestiges of foreign policy power 
into hands that have returned vague and contradictory statements. This has made the 
administration seem timid and uncertain. The fear of engagement within the foreign 
policy arena has made those at the State Department tentative in their approach to 
most foreign dilemmas. The result being a superpower back-pedalling or, at best, 
standing still at a time it should be moving forward. Former National Security Adviser 
to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski highlights this hesitancy when he states; 
... 
it does appear that Washington is currently pursuing an essentially minimalist foreign policy. 
Though not deliberately isolating itself from the rest of the world, the United States at this stage 
seems inclined to defime its obligations in the most narrow fashion, exercising its leadership 
responsibilities only in exceptional circumstances, when the necessity for action becomes 
overriding. 63 
Recent sabre rattling via NATO in Bosnia demonstrates this 'necessity for 
action'. Peace proposals coupled with threats of air strikes and the US openly siding 
with the Bosnian Muslims do not discount that the administration's policy towards 
Bosnia was, for quite sometime, in a 'holding patterd. 64 Even the immediate 
outbreak of peace, however, will not address the primary issues in the region, security 
and stability. These were only available, in recent memory, through the structural 
framework provided by the Cold War. Even then, only Greece and Turkey were 
afforded some semblance of security from the predominant Soviet threat. 'As of yet, 
no clearly defined system of power relationships has developed in place of the bipolar 
endofhistory. They wanted to put up theirfeet and relax. I [emphasis added] The Economist (24 
Deccraber/94 -6 January, 1995): p. 20. 
61 James Schlesinger, "Hands Across the Sea" Less Firmly Clasped", in Henry Brandon, (cd. ) n _L Search ofa New World Order. - The Future of US. - European Relations (Washington DC: Brookings, 
1992): p. 146. 
62 This position is reiterated by Dusko Doder who states; 'Yugoslavia became the first major test of 
the European Community's [EC1 multilateral foreign policy. Its failure was conspicuous. Not only 
have the Europeans been unable to stop a civil war on their doorstep, but some of their contradictory 
responses have aggravated it. From the beginning, the absence of policy poisoned relationships within 
the EC'. See, Dusko Doder, 2p-c--it., p-4. 
63 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Great Transformation", ne National Interest #33 (Fall, 1993): p. 13. 
The latter has also stated recently that Clinton! s foreign policy stafrs general strategy is 'flawed in its 
assumptions' which may hold serious 'geopolitical consequences'. See The Economist (12 March, 
1994): p. 60. 
64 This position was expressed by White House Press Secretary Dee Dec Myers. Quoted in Vin Weber, 
"Bosnia: Strange Alliances", The National Review (7 June, 1993): p. 24. 
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system and the tight alliances of the cold war period'. 65 More importantly, the 
perceived removal of an external regional threat may have even turned the former two 
states against each other with renewed vigour as the area's nations become increasingly 
hostile towards one another. Revitalised nationalism and potent irredentism in that 
quarter threaten state integrity, political stability, economic growth, and regional 
security. Implications of which do not bode well for either the rest of Europe or the 
United States. 
The assumption by most in Washington is that the Europeans wifl defer to US 
leadership in the post Cold War era. This does not mean allowing the US to act 
unilaterally but, rather what is openly being termed a 'multilateral' approach. For 
Clinton and his staff, the belief is that the end of the Cold War will provide a 
willingness to cooperate on the part of the Europeans. This belief, however, may be 
erroneouS. 66 Nowhere is this more evident than in recent events in the northwest 
comer of Bosnia, an area known as the Bihac pocket. 67 Bihac became a very strategic 
site for all parties involved in the conflict. 68 As a predominately Muslim enclave, it sat 
amidst the Serbian held Krajina and, if captured, could serve as a vital link of supplies 
for Serbs in Knin and Pale to the South. Although designated as a UN 'safe area', the 
Serbs had the area surrounded and appeared content to isolate Bihac until they were 
ready to attack. Instead of waiting, the Bosnian Muslims, specifically the Fifth Corps, 
launched an offensive by late October, 1994. Catching the Serbs off guard, and with 
65 Michael Klare, "The New Challenges to Global Security", Current His (April, 1993): p. 157. 
66 Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: A me can A fliances a er the Cold ar (Was n on 11 1? IV hi gt 
DC: CATO Institute, 1992) Carpenter cynically predicts that; 'International relations theory would 
predict the gradual dissolution of Cold War era Western solidarity now that there is no longer a 
credible common threat to promote cohesion among the allies'., at p. 15 1. For the alternate view vis-a- 
vis the US position and NATO see, John A. Thompson, "The Problem for United States Foreign 
Policy", in David Armstrong and Erik Goldstein, (eds. ) The End of the Cold War (London: Frank 
Cass, 1990); who believes that the European cries of 'Yankee go home' are unlikely., at pp. 67-68. 
67 Bihac and the surrounding towns of Bosanska Krupa and Vclika Kladusa were part of a Muslim 
pocket that held out against Serb efforts to take the entire area. 'Because Velika Kladusa has not been 
declared a safe area by the United Nations, it has received less attention than the town of 
Bihac .... [Fighting in December, 
19941 ... pits Muslim against Muslim as well as Serb against Muslim. 
Rebel Serbs in Croatia, just north of the Bihac pocket, have armed and supported tens of thousands of 
Muslims who are opposed to the Bosnian government. These Muslims took the northern half of the 
Bihac pocket in 1993 before being defeated by the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Army last August 
[1993]. They support a businessman and politician named Fikret Abdic... ' Abdic, during the late- 
1970s/early-1980s ran Agrokomerc, one of the largest and most prosperous state cooperatives in 
Yugoslavia. He was very popular with the local Muslims surrounding Bihac, where the co-op was 
located This popularity helped Abdic as many of his loyal supporters were ex-employecs. See Roger 
Cohen, "Muslim vs. Muslim vs. Serb", The New York Times 4 December, 1994 p. 22., and, on the 
question of whether or not Serbs were arming Muslims as early as 1993 for action against Croats see 
RFE. IRL Newsbrie (29 October, 1993): p. 18. 
68 "CNN World News Report", (26 December, 1994), and Kemal Kurspahic, "Window Dressing for a 
Collection of Western Failures", The Internafional Herald Tribune I December, 1994 
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assistance from the Croats, the Fifth Corps advanced nearly two-hundred kilometres to 
Bosanska Krupa and captured Serb artillery left behind. 69 
By the end of November 1994, however, the Serbs, seemingly resupplied70, 
began their counter-offensive. The Fifth Corps was driven back to the interior of 
Bihac, while Serbs cut off all escape routes and, in flagrant violation of the UN safe 
haven designation, began a siege of Bihac with tanks and heavy artillery. The counter- 
offensive by the Serbs marked the now highly visible cracks between the US and its 
Western allies. The United States was unwilling to send ground troops to Bosnia until 
the fighting had ended, yet could not impose its will upon the allies with troops already 
present, specifically French and British soldiers engaged in humanitarian missions. 71 
The rift between the US and its allies began by the mid-November, 1994 Congressional 
elections in the US. The elections brought the Republicans, led by Senator Bob Dole, 
majorities in both the House and the Senate. 72 Earlier in the Summer of 1994, the 
Senate, on Dole's initiative, tried and failed on several occasions, to pass a resolution 
which would have lifted the arms embargo against the Bosnian MUSliMS. 73 Perhaps in 
69 "Voice of America", report (26 October, 1994) 
70'Diplomats and UN officials say a growing body of circumstantial evidence suggests that President 
Slobodan Nfilosevic of Serbia is secretly breaking his own embargo on the Bosnian Serbs. These 
sources cited increasing signs that Mr. Milosevic .... has continued supporting the Bosnian Serb 
Army .... with guns, troops and 
fuel .... UN officials said the reports suggested that rumours of Mr. 
Nfilosevic's split with the Bosnian Serbs' self-declared government in Pale have been exaggerated, if 
not stage-managed, and that recent Bosnian and Croatian Serbian onslaught against the Bihac pocket 
suggests support from Belgrade. UN officials and diplomats pointed to the following developments... 
A large number of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems have appeared in Serbian held parts of 
Bosnia since Mr. Milosevic announced the embargo ..... The Bosnian Serbian Army, which six weeks 
ago was reported to be low on fuel, suddenly has a surfeit .... There are 
increasing numbers of 
suspicious helicopter sorties close to Serbian territory along with indications of troop movements from 
Serbia into Bosnian Scrbian-held turf. ' John Pomfret, "Belgrade Suspected of Breaking its Embargo", 
The International Herald Tfibune 10-11 December, 1994 
71Michael Gordon, (et. al. ) "US and Bosnia: How a Policy Changed", 7he New York Times 4 
December, 1994, and, for a look into the UN missions see, The Economist (17 December, 1994); The 
UN has two operations in Bosnia: the blue helmets of the UN Protection Force [Unprofor], and the 
humanitarian missions run by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. Between them, 
they do three main jobs: Aid Provision ... Protecting Nfinoritics... Peacckeeping..., at p. 39. 72 The Economist (12 November, 1994) 
73 "Lift Bosnia Arms Embargo", (Newsletters from the Office of Senator Robert Dole, July, 1994) [R- 
Kan]; 'I am pleased to be joined once again by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut Senator 
Lieberman, in introducing this amendment to lift the US embargo on Bosnia-Hcrccgovina .... For more than two years now the United States has gone along with failed policies in the name of consensus. 
For more than two years we have forsaken principle and ignored international law in the naive hope 
that this war will end by the good graces of the very perpetrators of this aggression... Now don't get 
me wrong. I would like to see a peaceful settlement .... But, for the momcntý let us put aside issues of justice, morality, principle, or Bosnia's legal rights. There is one big question that no one in the 
administration can answer, or anyone else that advocates denying the Bosnians their right to self 
defense, and that is: who or what is going to make the Bosnian Serbs withdraw from 70% of Bosnia to 
49% as proposed by the so-called contact group? ... History has shown us that a stable peace can be 
achieved when there is a balance on the battlefield. Our own history of negotiations with the Soviets 
taught us that. ' [24 June, 19941, and, on the question oficopardising relations with the allies; [I July, 
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an effort to delay the Republican move once it takes control of both houses, President 
Clinton announced in mid-November, following the elections, that the United States 
would no longer enforce the arms embargo against the MuslimS. 74 This signalled the 
first major rift between the US and her NATO allies at this particular moment. The 
US did not condemn the Muslims for launching attacks by late-November, 1994, 
claiming that the Muslims were the victims of Serb aggression. 75 Britain and France, 
fi-ustrated in their efforts both through the EU and the Contact Group to gain an 
international peace settlement, -- argued that, 
indeed, it was the Muslims who were the 
aggressors in Bihac. 76 Undeterred, the US was able to get NATO to launch, in 
November, 1994 a raid of NATO aircraft designed to limit Serbian military advances 
by bombing the Udbrina airfields on the Croatia/Krajina border. 77 By the end of 
November, however, the rift between the US and its allies was significant. Serbs had 
seized UN peacekeepers, holding them hostage in an effort to halt allied bombing. 78 
The tactic appeared successful as the US and NATO countries France and Britain 
questioned the military strategy of bombing since it might jeopardise their troops on 
the ground. The incoming Senate majority leader, Bob Dole, highlighted the gap 
between the allies by calling for a heavier bombing campaign against Bosnian Serbs 
and a lifting of the arms embargo. 79 His position was seen by Britain as the policy to 
19941, and, rebutting the Geneva talks; [ 21 July, 1994], and, condemnation of new wave of violence 
following Bosnian government's signing on to the Geneva proposals, [26 July, 1994]. 
74 "CNN World News", (28 November, 1994), and, on possible impact, "CNN Interview with Michale 
Clarke", Centre for Defence Studies London (19 December, 1994), and, for reaction from allies such 
as French President Mitterand's reply that this move would'add war to war' see, William Pfaff, "The 
Death of an Ideal Darkens Europe", The International Herald Tribune I December, 1994 
75The New York 771mes 4 December, 1994 p. 22. 
76 IBID, and, for view that the allies are at fault in this respect; '.. the French and British effort to use 
their peacekeeping presence to slow and shape [but not directly oppose] a Serbian victory could be 
described as a success- particularly if the major powers continue to avoid seeking national advantage 
in this conflict that would upset the balance of power in European security. ' Jim Hoagland, "In Sum, 
Powerftd Democracies Looked Evil in the Eye and Blinked", The International Herald Tribune I 
December, 1994 
777he raid on Udbina was aimed at changing Serbian behavior following three Serbian bombing 
raids that originated from the airfield and targeted Bosnian Muslim areas in the Bihac pocket. Serbian 
jets dropped napalm and cluster bombs during one attack. ' See, John Pomfret, "Shrugging off NATO 
Attack, Serbs Repair Airfield", The International Herald Tribune 6 December, 1994 
78'NATOIS strike at Udbina, followed on Nov. 23 by two more raids against Serbian anti-aircraft 
systems, touched off a Serbian roundup of UN personnel and triggered fears among UN officers that 
the Serbs would retaliate by killing UN soldiers. Although Serbian forces ... released 
two convoys of 
British and Dutch peacekeepers, totaling 53 soldiers, about 350 UN soldiers remain under detention. ' 
IBID, and, for a view that; 'soldiers wdst to fight and, if necessary, to die. That is the contract a 
soldier undertakes. The democracies, not to speak of the United Nations, no longer seem to take this 
very seriously. No doubt this is a tribute to the democracies' sensitivities, but it is not a tribute to their 
prudence or intelligence when their unwillingness to employ their soldiers as soldiers produces more 
war, not less. ' William Pfaff, The International Herald Tribune I December, 1994 
79 Dole called for a 'strike and lift' strategy. This meant more concerted and heavier air bombing 
raids against the Serbs coupled with a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. See, 
John Darnton, "In UK, Dole Adds to Alliance Tcnsion", The International Herald Tribune I 
December, 1994 
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expect from the US once the Republicans controlled Congress. " Dole's views were 
criticised by both the Foreign Secretary, Douglass Hurd, and French President 
Mitterand who believed it would only increase the fighting. 81 
More importantly, talk now focused on whether or not UN peacekeepers 
should be removed, as the British and French threatened to do so with their troops. 
United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali acknowledged that such a 
measure may be necessary. 82 The British and the French appeared willing to accept a 
proposal that if UN peacekeepers were removed, the US would supply more than half 
the men necessary, through NATO, of the approximately 25,000 soldiers needed to 
cover withdrawal and safeguard the removal of UN personnel. 81 US Secretary of 
Defence, William Perry acknowledged that should NATO agree to such a military 
move, a US force would be ready and capable for the task at hand. 84 
The Europeans, however, by December 1994, backed away from their earlier 
threat to remove their peacekeepers. 85They believed that, were they to remove their 
troops, they would fulfil Senator's Dole's call, and perhaps the United States' one as 
well, to escalate the conflict by a 'strike and lift' strategy. 86 This only heightened 
differences among NATO allies who were too busy with mutual accusations and claims 
of seeking to undermine the alliance while the fighting in Bosnia only increased. 871n an 
80 lbid, and, for view that Sen. Dole has cited Britain as the 'chief obstacle to decisive and co- 
ordinated action in defence of Bihac... ' see, Tom Rhodes, "US Drops Demands for Bosnia Military 
Solution", 7he Times 30 November, 1994 
81W. Pfaff, The International Herald Tilbune I December, 1994 
82 The Secretary-General stated, 'My message to them [Bosnian Serbs and Muslims] is that unless 
they do this [cooperate with UN mission] it will become impossible for me to persuade the Security 
Council to keep the United Nations protection force here. ' See, Roger Cohen, "Bosnia's Factions 
Rebuff UN Chief", The International Herald Tribune I December, 1994 
93 "US Force in Bosnia Would be Ready for Combat, Perry Says", The International Herald Tpibune 
10-11 December, 1994 
84 EBID, and, on the logistical problems between the British and American military see peacekeeping 
differently-, 'The British Army view is that if a UN peacekeeping force has been allowed into a 
conflict area with the consent of all parties, its conduct must be aimed at preserving that consent. The 
Americans, however, have to have an enemy to sort out whereas the British refer only to conj7icting 
factions. The American peacekeeping slogan is: Behave or else. The British slogan, even after two 
years of endurance in Bosnia, is: Trust us, we are here to help you. ', See, Michael Evans, "British 
Army Blueprint on Peacekeeping llighlights Rift with Washington", The Times 30 November, 1994, 
and, for an overview of the peacekeeping rules see, Bruce D. Berkowitz, "Rules of Engagement for 
UN Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia", Orbis (Fall, 1994) 
85 Michael Evans, "Rifkind: Pullout Serious Option", Vie 771mes 6 December, 1994 
86 Darnton The Tribune IDecembcr, 1994, and, William Drozdiak, "Europeans Back Off on Bosnian 
Pullout", The International Herald Tribune 10-11 December, 1994 
87, 
... the 
Europeans say that reviving the lift and strike strategy once the UN peacekeepers would be 
safely removed from Bosnia would quickly lead to a nightmare situation, involving a confrontation 
among the major powers, civilian massacres and a serious escalation in fighting throughout the 
Balkans. ', IBD: ), and, Roger Boyes, "EU's Brave Words Fail to Conceal Bosnia Disarray", The Times 
12 December, 1994, and, for a look at the various cleavages among the allies; Germany and France 
managed to smooth over differences when Helmut Kohl's, 'Chancellor [Wolfgang Schauble, Kohl's 
most trusted lieutenant] urged Germany to embrace the American call for a lifting of the arms 
embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. France, with troops on the ground in Bosnia, quite plainly does not 
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effort to close ranks and save the unity of the alliance, the Clinton administration 
backed down from earlier statements on the need for tougher measures in Bosnia. 88 
They now reaffirmed their pledge that UN peacekeepers should remain and that a 
diplomatic solution should be sought, even if this meant offering greater concessions to 
the Bosnian Serbs, specifically, political links with Belgrade. 89 
In the midst of this 'muddle'90, was the scheduled meeting of the CSCE in 
Hungary during the first week of December, 1994. The meeting in Hungary was 
attended by President Clinton who sat while Russian President Boris Yeltsin launched 
a verbal barrage on the West, specifically the US, and its plans to expand NATO 
eastward. 91 Yeltsin rejected the claim that NATO alone should be regarded as the sole 
European security organisation and in a phrase reminiscent of polemics past stated; 
'Europe has not yet freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War and is in danger of 
plunging into a 'Cold peace. '192 The statement by Yeltsin appear to have also driven a 
further wedge between the US and Europe over NATO expansion eastward. 93 Critics 
believe that NATO expansion will only increase Russian authoritarian tendencies over 
favour such a step .... Franco-German relations are 
billed in every German policy speech as the engine 
of the new Europe. Yet there is a large degree of pretense in this relationship. ' See, Roger Boyes, 
"Kohl Bids Adieu to his Ailing Paris Ally", Yhe Times 30 November, 1994, and, Rick Atkinson, 
"Kohl and Mitterand Avoid Bosnia Quarrel", Yhe International Herald Dibune I December, 1994, 
and, for a violation of the arms embargo by a NATO member while it had peacekeeping forces on the 
ground, "General Admits Turkey Sent Arms to Muslims", 7he Independent 6 December, 1994, and, 
for perhaps the most damaging claim that France sought to undermine NATO; '[US] administration 
officials say they have evidence, based on electronic eavesdropping, that Paris is using the crisis to 
inflame relations between the United States and Britain and break up the organisation. [NATO] 
... The next step 
in this conspiracy is to replace Nato with a European security alliance. The French 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman ... 
denied the story saying that if such a report really exists it is not in line 
with French policy... A classified position paper prepared for the Defence Secretary, William 
Perry-says: We should recognise that nothing about Bosnia is worth a serious split with our NA TO 
allies.. We are at a point where we risk losing not only Bosnia but also Nato. ' See, Patrick Cockburn, 
"French Plot to Split Nato over Crisis", 7he Times 6 December, 1994, and, Ian Brodie, "Paris 
Engineering Nato Collapse", The Independent 6 December, 1994. 
88 Drozdiak, Qpsift- 
99 'The Clinton Administration began by condemning the Vancc-Owen plan of early 1993 as a sellout 
of Bosnia. Now it seems ready to concede to the Bosnian Serbs both the right to confederate with 
Serbia- to form what would be the Greater Serbia of President Miloscvic's dreams- and the right to 
remain in control of all the territory they have seized by force until they obtain satisfactory 
constitutional arrangements from the Bosnian government. All of this, offered behind the backs of the 
Bosnian authorities, would be conceded in exchange for the Serb's willingness to stop using force. ' 
See, Stanley Hoffmann, "Appeasement Again: Like Ethiopia, Like Czechoslovakia", The 
International Herald Tribune 6 December, 1994, and Stanley Hoffmann, "What Will Satisfy Serbia's 
Nationalists? ", The New York Times 4 December, 1994 
90Roger Cohen, Clinton's Muddling Carries a High Cost", The International Herald Tribune 21 May, 
1993, and "More Washington Muddle", The Wall Street Journal Europe 6 December, 1994 
91Andrew Marshall, "Russia Warns Nato of a Cold Peace", The Independent 6 December, 1994, and 
Michael Binyon, "Yeltsin Clashes with Clinton over Nato at Russia's Door", The 771mes 6 December, 
1994 
92 Mark Nelson, "Uninvited Guest", The Wall Street Journal Europe 6 December, 1994 
93 Anatol Lieven, "Don't Bait the Bear", The Times 6 December, 1994, and, George Melloan, "A 
Drop-in Guest for Yeltsin's Budapest Bash", The Wall Street Journal Europe 6 December, 1994 
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a fear of encirclement and perhaps rejuvenate the threat from the East. 94 As for the 
US, Clinton did not discount NATO expansion eastward, but did try to close the gap 
with Yeltsin by agreeing for a more concerted effort by the CSCE as perhaps the first 
line of defence for a European security network. 95 This, however, appeared 
contradictory to other views within the US, specifically, of the incoming Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Chair, Senator Jesse Helms. Helms' leading advisor, 
Steven Berry, reiterated Helm's belief that Russia should be encircled by NATO. 96 
This would ensure that it is not tempted towards military expansion and would speed it 
on a course to democratisation. Helms' view, however, is characterised by his 
inconsistency over Yugoslavia. Back in 1983 it was Helms who believed that to 
counter possible Soviet expansion in the Balkans; 
The USA should work towards a rearrangement of South-Eastern Europe, based on a confederation of 
free Balkan nations each within its own natural ethnographic borders, and, whose integrity and 
sovereignty would be guaranteed by the USA. He described Yugoslavia as an artificial state and 
welcomed its [possible] disintegration as natural evolution. 
97 
Today, however, Helms believes the US should not throw its money away on 
democratising nations in Eastern Europe and feels that Bosnia is 'Europe's problem. '98 
President Clinton and his NATO allies though, faced, at Budapest, a more 
stinging denunciation from Bosnian President Izetbegovic. 99 In an accurate 
assessment, the Bosnian leader called the Western efforts in Bosnia, 'a mixture of 
incapability, hesitation and ill will' which would 'discredit the UN, ruin NATO and 
demoralise nations. '100 Izetbegovic also rebutted the claim by William Perry, US 
Defence Secretary, that the Muslims had lost. 101 The former stated in defiance that his 
people would continue to fight and ended by blasting NATO; 'The whole international 
community and even the mighty NATO cannot save one single City. " 102 
94 The New York Times 4 December, 1994 p. 22., and, Michael Binyon, The Times 6 December, 1994, 
and "No Rush to Expand NATO", The International Herald Tfibune I December, 1994, and The 
Times 12 October, 1993; 'The Russian military has almost a paranoia about being encircled by its 
foes .... Defence secretary, 
Malcolm Rilkind, sought to allay Russian alarm in Moscow ... rightly saying 
that Nato must not create new areas ofcontention and mistrust. France and Britain have long 
counselled caution... ' 
95 Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton NATO Vision Leaves Ycltsin Cold", The International Herald Tribune 6 
December, 1994 
96 Anatol Lieven, The Times 6 December, 1994 
97 Michclc Lee, "Albania's Isolation in Post-War Politics", Labour Focus on Eastern Europe (Winter, 
1984) 
98 "Jesse Helms Interview on Evans and Novak CNN" (12 November, 1994), and The Economist (19 
November, 1994) 
99 Michael Binyon and James Bone, "Izetbcgovic Blasts West and UN for Betrayal of Bihac", The 
Times 6 December, 1994 
100 The Times 6 December, 1994 
101 IBID 
102 The Times 6 December, 1994 
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The recent debacle over Bihac has made it hauntingly clear for Clinton that 
NATO may not be as cohesive as first appears. Yet the problem runs deeper than 
Bosnia; 
The story of how and whi the allies failed to act in Bihac, pieced together from interviews 
with American, British and French officials, goes well beyond the Balkans. It is a tale of the 
changing dynamics within the 45-year old NATO alliance, which is still searching for a role 
in the a world with no clear adversary such as that embodied for decades by the Soviet Union. 
With a common enemy gone, it has become increasingly hard for the United States, Britain 
and France to find the point where their national security interests converge. 103 
The latter statement though, should not hold much weight. The post Cold War 
era may have removed the monolithic threat that existed during the days of bi-polarity, 
However, this does not mean, conversely that no threat to the East exists. 104 Logically 
then, it more importantly signifies that security interests between the US and its 
Western allies have not vanished. It does, however, bring to light the inadequacies of 
policy formulation for the Americans. Security concerns have engulfed Europe. 
However today these concerns are not being examined from their constituent parts. 
Instead, they remain tied to outdated notions of security that limit the US and its allies 
into an'all or nothing' approach. Flexible response may have been a doctrine adopted 
during the era of the Cold War. It has, however, little relevance when ethno- 
nationalist conflicts, civil war and civil unrest due to struggling democratisation seem 
to be the pattern emerging throughout Europe. Most views on this pattern are 
inadequate as they fA to recognise that they are not the same pre-war patterns the 
preceded the Cold War. Colin McInnes best outlines this new pattern; 
... the new security system 
in Europe will be determined not only by its institutional 
architecture, but also by the changing pattern of bi- and multilateral relationships in the 
continent. The political and economic dynamics of these relations are already very different 
from what they were in the Cold War years of rigid bipolarity. With the greater fluidity 
which now exists in European interstate relations, more traditional patterns on conflict and 
cooperation [determined by a mixture of geopolitics, cultural affinities and history] are 
manifesting themselves. However, this does not mean that European politics are simply 
reverting to older, pre-war behavioural norms. These traditional patterns of conflict and 
cooperation are emerging in the context of a continent substantially transformed by 
thickening networks of interdependence, radically new forms of supranational integration, 
higher levels of socio-economic development and a much more widespread acceptance of 
democratic values. The past can thus serve only as a partial guide to the future of European 
sccurity. 105 
103 7he New York Pmes 4 December, 1994 
104 *As always in dealing with Moscow, the West is tom between roles as strategist and therapist. 
Strategy is simpler. Surely the West could, by being smart and carcftd over time, deal with Russia's 
perfectly reasonable insistence that no NATO move diminish Russian security. Therapy is the hard 
job. How to deal with the apparently widespread Russian perception that alliance enlargement is an 
anticipatory vote of no confidence in the prospects of Russian democracyT See, Stephen S. Roscnfcld4 
"Between Strategy and Therapy: The Russian Dilcrarna", Yhe Intemational Herald T11bune 10-11 
December, 1994 
105 Colin McInnes, 0-. cit-, pp. 39-40. 
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McInnes makes a valid point regarding history. Unfortunately, when relating 
these security concerns to states such as Albania, and the Balkans generally, history of 
the region must serve as the guide. It is the outlook of past events superimposed onto 
present circumstances that should be viewed with scepticism. Manifestations of 
previous conflicts and tensions are firmly rooted to the past. 106 To discount the 
validity of the various claims to simple drives for territory and opportunism is to 
undermine the very foundations of international relations, to assume that history does 
not matter. Granted, present day tensions and conflict throughout the Balkans are at 
some basic levels, drives for land and/or political opportunism. These, however, by 
their very nature require motivation to rally support and the large-scale expenditure of 
resources, both diplomatic and otherwise. The resurgence of nationalism in the area 
therefore is not the product of random happenstance, as claimed by many in the West. 
It was instead the calculated manifestation of actors in the area that use it as their toot 
to foment unrest, making sure that its base rests within the same historical foundations 
many policymakers either discount or do not fully understand. This is best expressed 
by Branimir Jankovic, one time professor of international relations at the University of 
Belgrade. He is worth quoting at length; 
The history of the Balkans is complex because it is the history of a region and not just of one 
single country or nation. Matters are further complicated by the fact that for many reasons, 
certainly more of a historical than of a geographical nature, the Balkans have been treated as 
a single historical entity. When such entities, which are acted on by very dynamic, diverse 
and even mutually contradictory trends of developincrit, are viewed in historical terms, the 
identification of certain specific patterns of development bestows coherence upon them. it is 
these patterns which, notwithstanding the highly specific features of Balkan history, place 
this region in the mainstream of European and world history. Regarded from this 
perspective, the peculiarities of Balkan history appear simply as variations of universal 
trends, and not as unique features that make the Balkans something different, something 
separate from the general course of history. 107 
Clear implications of this view is that the 'nostalgia! of Cold War diplomacy 
cannot provide solutions to the security concerns of today. Current reality shows that 
there is no homogeneous state in the Balkans. Efforts, therefore to apply some 
universal principles of conflict resolution fail when they simply do not provide realistic 
proposals for addressing this fact. Calls for a third C20th peace conference to 
formulate answers would, by their own admission, not provide 'precise solutione. 
Instead, the West, particularly the United States, should realise that fragmentation 
106 See Armstrong, 2g. cit.. -. 'The lessons of the past provide at least a key to some of the potential 
problems to be faced by the post-cold war world... ', at p. 11. 
107 Branimir Jankovic, The Balkans in Intemational Relafion (London: Macmillan Press, 1988): 
P. 11. 
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throughout the Balkans is not solvable by 'conventional means'. 108 ThoseUS 
policymakers and academics that hold onto visions of a 'new world order' by adopting 
and modifying the principles of Wilson are deluding themselves with their assumptions. 
The 'neo-Wilsoniane criticise the realist argument, challenging the view that 'many 
polities refuse to accept limited goals or the methods of traditional diplomacy. 109 
Granted that the changing world has undermined the foundations for the type of 
traditional diplomacy preached by the realists. The former, however, have not been 
able to provide any alternative and some have even concluded that either 'history has 
ended', or that common liberal values will sweep across the globe. Events in the past 
few years have shown instead that, 'discontinuity is the central reality of our 
contemporary history... "'O 
If this is taken as such, it should not imply that the future of American foreign 
policy formulation will be akin to a large ocean liner travelling on stormy seas, 
rudderless. Instead, the challenge for the US in the post Cold War era, will be to 
'shape an influential world role for the United States that takes due account of the 
limits on American power'. "' In areas such as the Balkans the US has the option of 
taking a rather different role, as expressed by veteran analyst Paul Shoup, 'draw on its 
capital of goodwill to act as a stabilising force in the region, hoping to contain conflict 
and to encourage modernization and reforiV. 112 But first, an examination of the 
course of US foreign policy will determine, not only its direction, but whether its goals 
are identifiable, compatible with its resources, and Albania! s place in relation to the US 
Policy. 
108 On the idea of a conference, former RAND researcher J. F. Brown proposed that it be through 
'inter-action between NATO, the European Community, the United Nations and the United States. 
This intcr-action could generate the necessary will, money and military force. It would also influence 
the sides concerned in disputes to make their own bilateral cfforts... 'J. F. Brown, Nationalism, 
Democracy and Secu? ltv in the Balkans (Dartmouth: RAND, 1992): pp. 186-187. By conventional 
means, the implication that the US and international community have from the outset of the Balkan 
crisis relied on sanctions and recognition of sovereign nations as methods to stem the violence. 
Nicolas Stavrou believes; 'There arc no monoethnic states in the Balkans. Applying this dubious 
model would mean that each and every time an ethnic group sets up barricades, occupies military 
barracks, and declares independence, the rest of the country must either stand by and accept its 
amputation or face international sanctions if it uses force to restore sovereignty'. See, Stavrou (1993), 
O. Cit..., p. 39., Also, Moynihan who feels that a more'confident world order'can be achieved from a 
'reasonable commitment to international law, [and] a realistic deployment of international 
organization... 'Moynihan, 2R. -c-ft.., p. 
145. 
109 Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy. - FulfillingAmepica's Destin (WashingtonDC: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1992) pp. 33-34. 
110 ZbigniewBrzezinski, Out of Controk Global Turmoil on the Eve ofthe 21st Centy (NewYork, 
New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1993): p. x 
III McInnes, w. -cit. * P. 
153. 
112 paul Shoup, "The United States and Southeastern Europe in the 1990s", in Paul Shoup ed. George 
W. Hoffman project director, Problems ofBqjkqg_ý (Washington DC: The Wilson Center, 
1990): p. 264. 
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1.3 The Direction of Policy 
The defeat of the Iraqi army during the Gulf War seemed to mark a watershed 
in the direction of US foreign policy. President Bush had achieved what he and his 
staff initially set out to do. By using the United Nations to condemn, and then, 
sanction the use of force, the US appeared to be using the UN, finally, in the role it 
was originally designed for. President Bush saw the unravelling of communism 
throughout Eastern Europe as the beginning of a new era, an era where co-operative 
multilateralism would be the norm, and where organisations such as the UN would not 
become gridlocked by an East-West divide. This was to be his vision for which he 
proclaimed a 'new world order. What, however, did this exactly mean? It should not 
have been interpreted as Buslfs belief that all the world's problems would vanish once 
the USSR ceased to exist. Bush never went into specific detail in defining the new 
order. In general terms though, 'it referred to a world in which stability no longer 
rested on the balance of power between competing military blocs and, in which 
problems were solved through cooperation and the beneficent intervention of the 
U. S. '113 The immediate implications of this order for the US were unfortunately 
negative. The positive attitudes after the Gulf War hid a more deep seated problem for 
Washington policyrnakers, namely what would now constitute US objectives and 
goals? It is simple enough to state that the security and prosperity of the American 
people has and always will constitute a viable, definable goal. However, policymakers 
in Washington soon realised that determining the link between ends and means was not 
so simple. 'The security and prosperity of the American people and the achievement of 
any particular foreign policy objective' has historically plagued foreign policy makers 
in the US. 114 
The question of how to achieve these goals brings to light the outlay of 
resources. Irrespective of arguments over whether or not the US is declining in power, 
the issue instead is whether or not the US has the resources, and in some cases, the 
political will to expend those necessary for the achievement of its goals. Resource 
expenditure and its inconsistency is particularly evident in the Clinton administration. 
Clinton continues to speak, as he did during his campaign, of the need to maintain America's global 
leadership- to 'build a world of security, freedom, democracy, free markets and growtW- but his first 
defense budget submission is inadequate to such a grand task. 115 
Clinton's supporters have been quick to criticise past US government crusades in 
search for stability at the expense of human rights and democracy. And yet, what 
policy are they themselves engaging in if not some global crusade to promote 
113 Ray Moseley of 7he Chicago Tribune (24 May, 1992); quoted in Moynihan, gp. cit. * p. 18. 
114 Armstrong, M. cit. - p. 77. 
115 Alan Tonelson, "Superpower without a Sword", Foreign Affairs vol. 72 #3 (Summer, 1993): p. 167. 
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democracy, human rights and market capitalism? Their assumptions falsely rely on 
what they see as the strong link between the former and the latter. Present realities 
have shown that nations such as China offer alternate models to nations searching for 
identity and a pattern of growth. More importantly, the scaling back of resources in 
the name of domestic consumption may not allow for the grandiose projects of 
democracy building currently being espoused by Washington. 
The demise of communism appears to have also placed about the notion that 
with one superpower gone, the global playing field has somehow been levelled. The 
scope and change of recent events would indicate otherwise. Brzezinski rightly states 
that, 'the world ... 
is still divided into leaders and followers. The pace and style of 
political change is set by what might be called the catalytic nations, radiating their 
influence to their more immediate neighbours. "16 It seems to follow then that the more 
complete a power the nation is, the greater its range of influence. The US is, and 
continues to be such a nation. It is the latter statement, however, that continues to be 
debated among the corridors of power in Washington. 
The direction of policy has done more than pit Democrat against Republican. It 
has made each party re-evaluate its position of America's place and role in the world. 
For the Democrats, the challenge is a struggle with their past. They must answer a vital 
question: Are they really 'New Democrats', willing and able to use military force 
decisively? ... For the Republicans, the challenge puts them at a philosophical crossroads: With the end of the Cold War will the GOP return to its older isolationist roots and adopt an 
'America First' foreign policy? Or will the party continue to support America! s engagement 
internationally and our position as leader of the free world7I 17 
It is this 'fault fine, argues Alan Tonelson, that will produce a more 'generic model of 
foreign policy' competing with a more 'passive strategy'. Tonelson defines the former 
approach as one resting on the notion that American activism abroad is, in itself, a key 
to US security and prosperity. The latter belief, one seen as much more radical in 
nature, sees its primary objective in'consolidating American military and economic 
strength, and enhancing America! s freedom of action. " 18 
Observations of the two US administrations since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union would indicate that Bush and his staff adhered to the first model, while 
Clinton and his team have opted for the second. This appears evident when witnessing 
the respective administration's policy once the crisis in the former Yugoslavia began. 
For the Bush staff, initiative was not the watchword as it sought to mitigate damage 
116 Brzczinski (1993), pp. cit.: p. 94. 
117 Vin Weber, "Bosnia: Strange Alliances", Arational Review (7 June, 1993): pp. 22-23, Weber also 
highlights the cleavages among the Republicans, specifically over Bosnia where more traditionally 
conservative leaders such as Trent Lott, Thad Cochran and John McCain are all Bosnia 'doves'..., at 
p. 24. 
I Is Alan Tonelson, "Beyond Left and Right", ne National Interest (Winter, 1993/94): p. 4- 
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and downplay the crisis, opting instead for outdated policy. By holding onto visions of 
Yugoslavia, Bush failed to realise that the combatants there had already reached the 
point of no return. Bush's policy in Yugoslavia instead demonstrated that, 'the pattern 
of the conduct .... showed 
bias in favour of order and stability and an aversion to change 
and instability'. ' 19 Once the Clinton team came in, there appeared to be the same 
aversion towards any new policy which would radically alter the situation. A 
I muddling! type approach was adopted. This policy sought answers through vague 
promises, empty assurances, and hopes of consensus among allies who had a very 
different list of priorities regarding themselves and the crisis at hand. Indeed, it seems 
that, regarding the latter, Americans have still yet, either not understood or refuse to 
believe, that what Washington sees as within its realm of vital interests and what its 
European allies see as such is not in harmony. 
What then is the reality? Perhaps it is somewhere in between the previous two 
positions. Probably not however. The reality of American foreign policy should be 
that factors which guided policymakers for nearly five decades do still exist. 
Understanding their place in present policy formulation becomes difficult if those 
which make policy cannot agree that these factors do still matter. For example, the 
notion of geopolitics which was relevant during the era of bipolarity is currently being 
debated as to its importance and very existence. In 77ie End ofHistory and the Last 
Man, Fukuyama argues that the US must comes to grips with the idea that geopolitics, 
part of the 'rules and methods of the historical world are not appropriate to life in the 
post-historical one. 0120 Abandoning the principles of power politics should then 
naturally follow the demise of communism. And yet, regional instabilities across the 
globe seem to destroy Fukuyama! s premise. Instead, it appears that former President 
Richard Nixon is correct when he states; 
in charting our course, practical idealism and enlightened realism should guide our policies. The 
world has not changed to the extent that we can ignore the realities of power politics. But it has 
changed enough so that we can devote more resources and attention to issues other than security in 
the narrowest sense. 121 
The former argument suffers from what Samuel Huntington rightly labels, the 'single 
alternative fallacy theory. The collapse of communism should not assume that no 
other alternative exists other than liberal democracy. It subsequently implies then that 
the characteristics and realities of Cold War politics, including geopolitics will not 
vanish once the USSR does. 122 
119 Carpenter (1992), 2p. cit., p. 146. Carpenter believes that such policy by the Bush administration 
was a 'reflexive policy typical of a status quo power'. 
120 Fukuyama (1992), pp. cit_, p. 283. 
121 Nixon (1992), qp. cit. ' pp. 35-36. 
122 Huntington addresses the theory in responding to his critics of the Clash of Civilizafions approach. 
See, "If Not Civilizations, What? ", Foreign Affairs (December, 1993): p. 19 1. 
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it would seem then that the only thing the demise of communism has done is to 
rearrange priorities among the European allies, much to the dismay of the US. The 
security concerns of Europe differ from those of the US as exemplified by the Balkan 
crisis. With no immediate vital threats injeopardy, the US deferred to the Europeans 
in handling the affair. Their 'embarrassing! display only served to demonstrate the 
inconsistencies in interest co-ordination between the US and Europe. More 
importantly, it showed that regional balance of power politics does still matter. 123 This 
situation does not bode well for democratising states such as Albania simply because 
defining the security threats as they see them will, in all likelihood, vary greatly from 
how the US and its West European allies view regional instabilities. Indeed, it is 
security threats, and what constitutes them, which highlight the contradiction between 
America and her allies vis-a-vis the Balkans. 
Colin McInnes aptly explains that during bipolarity, defence and security were 
'virtually synonymous!. The traditional idea of security was centred upon the 
individual states, that such policy sought status quo preservation, and that effective 
military defence were of primary importance. 124 It was these concerns which caused 
the US to adhere firmly to the belief that the security and prosperity of its European 
allies depended upon strong political links between the US and Europe. And yet the 
Yugoslav crisis demonstrated the distance between US and European interests and 
concerns. It more importantly appears to show that US leadership and presence are 
still necessary to Europe. 125 
For the nations to the east, their desire to join NATO has not waned, and has 
instead increased, as regional instabilities have also. 126 Their wish to join NATO, as 
well as the EU, signifies that, to them, security and prosperity are symbiotic in nature. 
They want to achieve economic prosperity and market capitalism and believe that 
123 See Brzczinski (1993), pp. cit, who believes that Europe's failure was symptomatic and 
demonstrates the 'socioeconomic and geopolitical turbulence' that Europe will likely face in the 
future..., at pp. 139-140. His criticism towards Europe's failure to respond is also made expressly 
evident; 'The failure of Europe to react firmly to the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia similarly 
reflects the combination of parochialism and selfishness that currently permeates the European 
outlook. The collapse of that multinational state produced the most bloody outbreak of sustained 
violence %ithin Europe since 1945. But, unlike some local conflicts during the years of the Cold War, 
it did not pose the danger of escalation to an international collision among the superpowers. A firm 
reaction to the brutal 'ethnic cleansings' thus entailed tolerable risks. Yet Europe's posture was one of 
military temerity, political passivity, and social indifference. Its failure to react dramatized how long a 
road Europe still has to travel before it becomes a truly constructive political force in world affairs. ', at 
p. 145. 
124 McInnes, pM--ci-t., p. 4. 
125 Brzezinski (1993), qpL. cit. p. 134. 
126 Brian Becdhani, "Russia Gains, Germany Loscs, America Should Stay", The International Herald 
Tribune 15 December, 1994, and, Aaron Rhodes, "Threats to Human Rights in Europe are Threats to 
Security as Well", The International Herald Tribune 15 December, 1994 
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joining the EU is the way this can be achieved. 12711owever, they have seen that the 
EU still lacks a common foreign and defence structure. The East Europeans may want 
to become part of the EU, yet feel that it cannot protect them as they attempt to 
democratise and gain market economies. Such interests can only be protected by 
NATO, and more specifically, by the leader of NATO, the United States, which has 
stood as the guarantor of Western Europe's security for nearly five decades. 128 The 
problem, however, then becomes how to reconcile the new security considerations and 
their place vis-a-vis vital and non-vital interests on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Yugoslavia has shown that accomplishing this task is not easy. After the blunder in 
handling by Europe, Washington sought damage mitigation. It too, soon realised that 
conventional responses would not work. 
With the precipitous collapse of the Eastern bloc, a new policy was adopted in Washington, 
which for lack of a better name can be called, 'one size fits all'. Pleas by a distinguished 
Yugoslav diplomat and friend of the United States 'not to lump Yugoslavia into the former 
iron curtain baskef fell on deaf ears. 'We [the US] treat all Communists the same', was the 
response. 'Communism must go'. A shift in American positions- even if not with evil intent- 
contributed significantly to the current phase of the Yugoslav tragedy. 
129 
Arguments can be made as to whether or not the policy was in fact new. It 
appeared instead that Washington sought to preserve the Cold War status quo ante 
without the same threat. Once civil war ensued, the Bush administration could not 
gain consensus on policy. After realising, too late, that Yugoslavia would cease to 
exist, they drew a line at ethnic cleansing in Kosova. This, however, was not, and 
probably still not, is taken seriously by the combatants in the crisis. Allowing gains 
through force and the changing of borders in the same manner violates the very 
principles the US adhered to when it signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Recognition 
of Slovenia and Croatia did not serve as the catalyst to combat, but it certainly sped 
along the process. And, by non-recognition of an independent Kosova on principles 
that it would violate the Helsinki Accords seemed outright contradictory following the 
secession and recognition of the other republics. More importantly, the empty threats 
127 Flora Lewis, "The World Community is Betraying the Victims", The International Herald Tribune 
I December, 1994 
128 "Reassuring an Insecure Europe", The New York Times 4 December, 1994, and, Zbignicw 
Brzczinski, "The Way Forward for an Inspired NATO", The Intemational Herald Tribune 2 
December, 1993, and, Warren Christopher; 'The United States has an enduring political, military, 
economic, and cultural link to Europe that must be preserved. The European Community is our 
largest single trading partner, and we have a powerful stake in the collective security guaranteed by 
NATO. This alliance of democracies- the most successful in history- can lay the foundation of an 
undivided continent rooted in the principles of political liberty and economic freedom. To meet the 
new challenges in Europe, the Alliance must embrace innovation or risk irrelevance. ', Speech before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Comn-dttee [4 November, 19931, in "American Foreign Policy: The 
Strategic Priorities", Otal Speeches of the Day vol. 60 #6 (1 January, 1994): p. 164. 
129 Stavrou(1993), pp. citp. 32. 
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by the US would probably not, in any manner, gain what it most sought, regional 
stability. By 'calling the US bluff', the Serbs realised that Washington was not ready 
to involve itself in 'nasty, intractable conflicts which would strain resources', 
particularly when objectives were not clear. 130 It appeared that the spectre of Vietnam 
still haunted Washington, despite the rhetoric following the Gulf War. 
The fundamental problem on the part of America, once the crisis began, was in 
ignoring factors that contributed to and perpetuated the conflict. 
When analysts have looked at territorial conflict, they have done so in a limited and conventional way. 
The explanations for whether military conflict has occurred or whether the dispute was resolved 
peacefully relate to the attributes of the states or pairs of states in the dispute; the relational and 
intrinsic importance of the territory to the states involved arc ignored. 131 
This discrepancy also typifies the problem with American foreign policy presently. The 
deep-seated attachment to historic homeland coupled with opportunism and security 
fears much different from the US and/or Western Europe doomed the latter two to 
failure as they adopted responses that did not take these nuances into account. The 
factors highlighted above will, in all likelihood, continue in the post Cold War era so 
long as the US fails to develop coherent policy. 
Concurrently, these factors will increase in intensity for democratising states 
such as Albania, now that humanitarian issues link themselves with aid and exacerbate 
irredentist claims which use this new democracy as a forum to present long-standing 
grievances. The failure to comprehend regional instability is of primary concern to 
Albania vis-a-vis the US. The former has expressly stated that the crisis next door is 
more than simply an impediment to democratisation. It has increased the likelihood 
that, should it continue, it may drag in Albania, 132 Even if warfare ends quickly, it still 
does not address the more fundamental issue of security in the area among the region's 
states. The affect of this consideration is high and put well by Paul Shoup; 
From the U. S. point of view, it is the post- cold war cra. For the peoples of Southeastern Europe, 
however, this new chapter in their history is part of a long and continuing battle for security and 
progress. It is a struggle that often seems unending. New obstacles appear as soon as wdsting ones are 
ovCrCOMC. 133 
130 Carpenter (1992), pp-. ci-t-,, p. 149. 
131 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, Territofial Changes and International Conflict (London: 
Routledge, 1992): pp. 24-25. 
132 There appears to be some justification for this premise. Goertz and Diehl have stated that; '... a 
state with a warring neighbour was three to five times as likely to be at war as one that did not have a 
bordering state at war .... [W]arring 
borders increase uncertainty and decrease the degree of control 
that states have in a given area and therefore increase the prospects for war ... The t3r of war 
[internal 
or external] does not seem to affect the diffusion across borders! IBID, p. 9. 
133 Shoup (1992), o M. t., p. 276. 
234 
The above statement puts well the divergence in US attitudes towards the Balkans and 
the states that make the area up, and the region! s in-built tendency for fragmentation, 
and, as history has shown, a distrust for the West. 
The present outlook by the US and its idea of democracy promotion by way of 
enlargement demonstrates that it still has not understood that America should not, and 
in the Balkans, cannot remake the world in its own image. 134 This is not to suggest 
that it has embarked upon such a policy. Indeed, is the contention that a doctrine of 
non-policy exists in the area generally, and Albania specifically. Again, we may ask, 
'what should guide US policy then'? An affirmative role is necessary and should be 
prepared for short and long term considerations. Shoup again best expresses this; 
The short-term objective of U. S. policy must be to act as a stabilising force, vigorously 
opposing the use of violence and repression [especially towards minorities] and the 
emergence of new forms of authoritarianism. The long term objective must be to facilitate the 
transition from state-run economies to market driven economies, supported by pluralistic 
institutions. Working toward this objective need not mean a vast commitment of American 
resources, but should be a highly visible element in U. S. policy. It must encompass long-term 
projects in countries not yet ready for reform as well as more blunt assessments of failure in 
those countries that are now engaged in efforts to marketize their economies. 135 
To take on such a grand task requires first that the US define and outline its goals and, 
what it sees as, its threats, the linkage between the two and amount of resources at its 
disposal able to carry out this task. Goals will be examined synonymously with 
interests later on. First, threats will be viewed with particular emphasis on militant 
nationalism and the Yugoslav crisis. This is because given the present case study, 
Albania! s proximity to, and anxiety over, Yugoslavia, represents more than a look into 
the problem with US foreign policy. It will perhaps demonstrate the direction in which 
it is heading, and more importantly ask; 'do irredentist movements which manifest 
themselves by way of violent conflict, as in the Balkans, represent the new threat to 
peace and stability in the post Cold War world? If so, how do these affect US policy, 
how should the US respond, and does this threat seriously jeopardise democratisation 
in states such as Albania and stability in the Balkans as a wholeT 
1.4 Nationalism Revisited 
It is perhaps no surprise that nationalism finds fertile breeding ground in states 
which are not well developed or economically sound. A strong link between stability 
and prosperity does exist. And yet while their remains a 'growing gap between the 
world's rich and its poor which may, [in and of itselfl, create regional insurgencies, 
134 See Nixon (1992), Qp. cit.; 'We should not set out to try and remake the world in our image, but 
neither should we retract from our global responsibilities. We should set goals within the lin-dts of our 
resources while working to the limits of our power. ', at p. 278. 
135 Shoup (1992), pp. cit. * p. 266. 
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this alone does not provide the onus for the new forms of violent iffedentism. 136 
Indeed, in examining the potential threat crises such as in Yugoslavia and the former 
Soviet Union pose to both Europe and the US, it is vital to understand this link. 137 
Russian troops in Chechenya only highlight the failure of the West and 
demonstrate that Moscow is still capable of pursuing its interests when it believes they 
are threatened. 138 'Although the West is not currently confronted with a major military 
threat from post communist Europe, it does face a series of risks emanating from 
small, but intense regional disputes. In general, these risks are much less predictable 
and less manageable than the previous superpower confrontation. ' 139Russia's near 
abroad has made it clear that nationalist factions within the Russian Defence Ministry 
still exert influence. Russian troops have encouraged regional conflicts which appear 
aimed at restoring Moscow's will in regions within their sphere of influence. 140 As this 
circle is enlarged to include the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Western meddling 
and US measures which would perhaps perpetuate the conflict, and moreover appear 
to take the Muslim side, only; strengthen the influence of Russian nationaliStS, 141 Worry 
US allies in Europe, 142force a re-think in WashingtonlOand heighten regional 
chaos. 144In the final outcome Russia gains the most while highlighting Western 
confusion and driving a wedge between Washington and its West European allies. 145 
More important, this confusion reaffirms that the threats to the East do continue to 
exist. 
136 The previous believe is held by US Marine Corps General A. M. Gray who believes that the gap 
between rich and poor will provide the foundation for insurgencies which, in their struggle for limited 
resources, have the potential to threaten regional stability and, concurrently, threaten US access to 
vital resources it may have in these particular regions. Quoted in Noarn Chomsky, Deterrin 
Democry (London: Vintage Press, 199 1): p. 3 1. 
137 'The implications of a collapse of Yugoslavia for the Soviet Union were clearly on the minds of 
Bush's officials! Almond goes on and presents a statement by then Deputy-Assistant Secretary of 
State, James Dobbin which implies Administration policy of this link. '... his error revealed the close 
interlinking between US policy towards ostensibly non-aligned Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union., 
See, Almond, gp. cit., p. 45. 
138 Richard Beeston, "Russia Verges on War in Chechenia", The Times 30 November, 1994, and, The 
International Herald Tribune I December, 1994, and, Beeston, "Russian Tanks Roll Towards Rebel 
Capital", The Times 12 December, 1994, and, "Chcchcnya Test for Russia", The International Herald 
TPIbune 15 December, 1994. 
139 Post Communist Europe, Qp. cit.. - p. 21-3. 
140 IBID 
141 Flora Lewis, The Tilbune I December, 1994 
142 'Foreign policy flops .... 
have unsettled America's European allies and given the Clinton 
administration a reputation for foreign policy incompetence. A reputation for incompetence, once 
established, is not easy to reverse. ' See, Daniel Franklin, "How about a foreign policy? ", The 
Economist World In 1995 published by the Economist Intelligence Unit London (December, 1994): 
p. 61. 
143 IBID, and, "CNN broadcast of Face the Nation Interview with Senator Dole", (2 January, 1995) 
144 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Overstate the Chaos, Undermine the Help", The International Herald 
Tilbune 26-27 November, 1994 
145 John Darnton, The Intemafional Herald Tribune I December, 1994 
236 
These conflicting interests have been demonstrated in Croatia and Serbia, where government 
is dominated by extreme nationalists who are prepared to sustain conflict and confront the 
West if or when it furthers their political agenda. This conflict of interests would be 
particularly dangerous in a nuclear-armed state. Warren Christopher .... has pointed to the 
threat posed by a possible reversal of reform in Russia .... However, a renewed military 
confrontation is only the most obvious threat to Western interests. Other more subtle dangers 
have been developing since 199 1.146 
Yet, it should be understood that questions of 'security, particularly in Europe 
are, as Colin McInnes aptly put, 'in a conceptual flUX1.147 The threat posed by 
irredentism is not simple to define. Most general analysis states that the removal of 
communism has opened a 'Pandora! s box! of sorts. 141 Now, after decades of 
suppression national expression has found itself, and all the claims that go with it. The 
question, however, still remains, 'does this pose a threat to the UST 
By mid-April, 1994, NATO jets struck at Serb positions in Bosnia. After all 
the criticism of non-action the US move via NATO appeared a desperate ploy to 
demonstrate resolve. The US National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake stated that 
'America cannot afford to ignore conflicts in Europe. He went on to mention that 
conflicts, such as the Yugoslav one, 'presents a clear challenge: to NATO's credibility 
and to our very vision of a post- Cold War Europe. 149 Why the sudden change of 
heart on the part of the US? More importantly, is such concerted action meant to 
show that the US now does view ethno-nationalist conflicts as credible threats to their 
interests? Moreover, what vision exactly, does Lake and the US have for post-Cold 
War Europe? The growth of militant iffedentism 'poses major problems to 
governments throughout the world'. 150 It not likely, nor possible, for the US to engage 
itself in all of these actual or potential conflicts. Yet it is safe to assume that Lake, and 
146 post Communist Europe, op. cit.: p. 21-3. 
147 McInnes, pp-. cit. - p. 59. 
148 An alternative view comes from E. J. Hobsbawm who states; 'The changes in and after 1989 were 
thus essentially not due to national tensions, which remained under cffective control even where they 
genuinely e)dsted,.... so long as the central party operated, but primarily to the decision of the Soviet 
regime to reform itself .... 
Nationalism was the beneficiary of these developments but not, in any 
serious sense, an important factor in bringing them about'. See Hobsbawm (1990), 2p. cit.; p. 167., 
For a view that concurs with the premise see, Victoria Syme and Philip Payton, "Eastern Europe: 
economic transition and ethnic tension", in Michael C. Pugh, European Secufi& Towards 2000 
(Manchester: University Press, 1992); 'Economic concerns are aggravating, and in some cases, causal 
factors in inter-ethnic antagonisms. In the difficult and uncertain period of economic transition- with 
all its imponderables, false starts and unmet expectations-the potential for further conflict and 
dislocation in the next decade is enormous. Inexperienced and often inarticulate practitioners of 
democracy that they are, politicians in Eastern Europe find it difficult to explain to their restive 
peoples why full employment or fixed prices are impossible to maintain, pushing many critics towards 
the panacea of nationalism!., at p. 10 1. 
149 Anthony Lake quoted in Anthony Lewis, "No More Appeasing the Serbs? ", Internafional Herald 
Tribune 12 April, 1994 p. 6. 
150 Hugh Poulton (1993), W. cit. - p. 209. 
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the US, given its ties and commitments to Europe for decades, will not and cannot 
stand idly by with conflict within Europe's boundaries. The concerns of the various 
minority groups within Europe will likely experience, what they perceive as, threats to 
their security and very existence. These fears will in turn produce a 'demand for 
minority self-definition!. 151 This will then likely find forms of violent expression as in 
the former Yugoslavia. Should the US then hold these forms of expression as the new 
threat to, [if not world], at least regional peace in an area of vital interest? To 
automatically engage in such a policy, however, smacks as a somewhat desperate 
attempt by hawks to replace the USSR as the chief threat and enemy with violent 
nationalism in its place. For the US, however, basing a foreign policy upon irredentism 
is not only impractical but foolish. Brzezinski believes that, 'extremist nationalism is a 
minority phenomenon..., defensive rather than offensive'. And yet, he concedes that 
'intense European nationalism is not fully ovee. 152 Implications for policy though 
remain cloudy. Perhaps the idea of enlargement was meant to remedy the problem 
violent nationalism would bring. Establishing the conditions for democracy, it is 
hoped, will also bring respect for minority rights. This should then quell extreme 
separatist trends. Sadly, as recent events show, the advent of democracy has not 
guaranteed such rights. Poor relations between Albania and, for example, Greece and 
her neighbours remain despite long democratic traditions in the latter and the recent 
arrival of democracy in the former. It seems rather that democracy and its principles 
are being manipulated to promote the very causes of violence throughout the Balkans. 
The results appear similar, undisciplined leadership in the area has, and is, using non- 
democratic means to suppress nationalist claims, the results of which threaten to 
destabilise an entire region. 
It may be simple enough to state that in such instances the US should respond 
by threatening to withhold aid and integration of the democratising country into the 
West. However, to do so would likely slow the rate of reform, heighten anxiety within 
the state, mobilise extremist positions, and thereby quicken the pace of destabilisation. 
Herein lies the problem with the way the US sees nationalism. 'Western officials and 
publications circulate myths that perpetuate misunderstanding about the nature of the 
war and render any effective countermeasures more elusive'. 153 Some observers believe 
that a 'fundamental error prevalent in the Western policy debate was that nationalism 
was an unmitigated evil threatening to unleash instability and violence', 154 which could 
151 Vincent Cable, "The World! s New Fissures", (1994): pp. 4344. 
152 Brzezinski (1993), on. cit.: p. 142., As to the defensive and offensive varieties of nationalism, 
Vincent Cable believes that regardless of their nature [in places like the Balkans], they do have a 
common thread which binds them; 'all reflect attempts to express a sense of threatened cultural 
identity in political form, a new politics of identity. Cable, 2p. cit, pp. 3-4. 
153 Ramet (1992), pp. cit., p. 80. 
154 Nixon (1992), Qp. cit. * p. 55., and Sabrina Ramet (Fall, 1992), pp. cit., p. 80 
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be tackled by simply applying economic pressure. Once this perception is fused with 
the earlier premise regarding poor economies, one sees the statements such as those by 
Fukuyama; 'these new manifestations of nationalism must be put into proper 
perspective. First, the most intense ones will occur predominately in the least 
modernised parts of Europe, particularly in or near the Balkans. "15 Such perceptions 
on the part of the US will not aid it in finding direction of policy. More importantly 
they do not address the actual affects and concerns on both the Balkans and its states 
such as Albania. 
These previous theories have a kernel of truth yet seem to imply, as economic 
determinists do, that poor economic conditions create or spur on nationalist 
tendencies. Granted, they may serve as catalysts, however, this should not mean that 
once economic modernisation is achieved and once a fully functioning market economy 
is in place, will irredentism cease to exist, particularly in the Balkans. Spyros 
Economides best expresses this; 
National questions have been the scourge of stability in the Balkan region for generations. 
Nationalism is manifested in a variety of ways and is not a discrete problem. Not only do 
nationalist rivalries lead to international tensions in their own right, they also spawn ethnic 
and territorial disputes which are highly detrimental to regional peace and security. 
Furthermore, nationalist rivalries have been, and are used internally within all Balkan states 
as a legitimatizing and propaganda tool in the face of internal unrest or unpopularity. 156 
This would indicate that programs such as enlargement may not succeed. After all, 
economies may prosper, yet irredentist claims will remain. The process of 
democratisation, however, should continue in the Balkans. Concurrently, the US 
should encourage and aid in its development and growth. It still offers the best path 
towards regional stability and, more importantly, an opportunity for minorities to 
address grievances. 157 The importance of regional stability to the US and to Europe is 
155 Fukuyama (1992), gp. cit., p. 273., Fukuyama also states that if labour markets function effectively 
and becomes more mobile, the result eventually would be an undermining of traditional social groups 
'like tribes, clans, extended families, religious sects and so on'., at p. 77. This underscores, however, 
the importance of these groups in areas such as the Balkans. They have been in existence for ages 
and have been used as means to counter negative effects from one form or another of authoritarian 
rule throughout the Balkans be it monarchies or communists. It is not likely that they will be readily 
given up with the advent of modem labour. Democracy promotion has often solidified such social 
groups by now allowing for even more open expression. 'It is not clear that democratic regimes will 
be consolidated even where elements of democracy have already been established. In some cases, 
greater openness has accelerated political and cultural polarisation. ' See, S. Burg, "Nationalist Redux: 
Through the Glass of the Post-Communist States Darkly", Current Historv vol. 92 #573 (April, 
1993): p. 164. 
156 Spyros Economides quoted in Stephen W. Griffiths, "Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict", SIPRI 
RESEARCH REPORT #5 Oxford Press (1993): p. 35. 
157 Advocated well by Stephen Burg, Qp -cit. * p. 
164., "The strength of nationalist political 
movements, the popular appeal of avenging long-held grievances, and the resultant escalation of 
ethnic conflict impede the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Democratisation involves 
the creation of stable political institutions and processes 'that make conflict, change, and conciliation 
possible without institutional collapse!. Nationalist conflict suppresses the importance and, in some 
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to prevent, in the fidure, a 'Lebanon-type' situation from being created in Europe. 158 
The potential for future violence is high, which in turn would negate possible 
investment and harm relations with allies in the region. This is where the US should 
pay heed. For a state such as Albania represents the fundamental problem with the 
Balkans. The incursions of war, the variety of peace processes and the careless 
drawing of boundaries has resulted in a nation with more Albanians living outside the 
borders of Albania than within. Most of these are not very far, often in the 
surrounding states of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Greece and Italy. And, with 
the present conflict in Yugoslavia, the Albanian question could become, for the US, 
'perhaps the most urgent and problematic'. 159 
To the realist, the impact on American interests would, at first, second and 
even a third glance, appear negligible. Addressing the interests of the US to such 
advocates results in a 'black or white! approach, or examining the 'ledger boole of 
American concerns via time and money put in. Scholars such as Carpenter highlight 
this belief; 
Although ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes might be extremely important to the 
parties involved, they would rarely affect even the European, much less the global, 
geopolitical balance and are therefore not threats to America! s security. Taking the risk of 
becoming entangled in the ancient and intractable conflicts of Eastern Europe is not merely 
unnecessary, it would be foreign policy masochism. 160 
in the cold, hard reality of US interests, statements such as Carpenter's are valid. Yet 
they fO to realise that interests are simply not those that can be measured by cost- 
benefit analysis. Intangible as well as tangible factors ought to guide policy. 
Conversely, the argument that humanitarian issues should act as a guide are also faulty. 
To state that aggressive nationalism should be stopped before bloodshed ensues, yet 
only in Europe, invites cries of hypocrisy, and rightly so, for the tens of thousands 
being killed in the sub continent. Carpenter is correct in believing that the US need 
not, and should not, displace the old Soviet threat with aggressive nationalism. Yet he 
cases, even the emergence of multiple issues, demands, and interests as nationalist leaders try to 
subordinate all other issues .... Ethnically based claims strike at the heart of the process of democratisation, since they compete with individual rights... ", 
158 James Chace believes that it is unlikely that the civil war in Yugoslavia would provoke a larger 
conflagration in Europe, yet feels the Lebanon type scenario is a distinct possibility. See, James 
Chace, The Consequences ofPeace: 7he New Internafionalis? n andAmepican Foreigm Policy (New 
York, New York: Oxford Press, 1992): p. 46. 
159 H. Poulton (1993), gp. cit. - pp. 11-12. 
160 Carpenter (1992), pp. c . -ift., p. 
6., and at p. 2. where he states; 'Washington! s Cold War era alliances 
also have the potential to entangle the United States in a host of obscure conflicts that have little 
relevance to America's legitimate security concerns. The ongoing transformation of NATO from an 
alliance to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe into a regional crisis management 
organization is a case in point. That new mission blurs the boundaries of NATO's traditional theater 
of operations and threatens to involve the United States in volatile and intractable conflicts in Eastern 
Europe'. 
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is wrong in discounting its credibility as a force to be reckoned with. Granted, it may 
not represent a threat to vital US interests [infra for definitions of these]. Yet, how can 
the US and NATO justify the existence of conflict within Europe, an area designated as 
part of the theatre of operations. The only 'blurring of its boundaries! is in the threat, 
militant nationalism as opposed to Soviet troops. Yet, is not the premise similar? To 
protect and secure allies' territory from the possibility of incursion. Greece is a long 
time NATO ally. Albania, Bulgaria and Romania have all applied for membership to 
the Partnership for Peace plan. Do not the variety of iffedentist claims among these 
states threaten to engulf them in conflict? The possibility exists, and as such may 
factor into US policy making. At a more basic level, every US politician knows the 
value of a vote and the power generated by lobbyists who may or may not wish to cast 
these votes. Ethnic groups in America represent some of the more powerful, 
motivated, and vocal groups present. It was the powerful Greek lobby which recently, 
made the US step back on its initial proposal to officially recognise the Republic of 
Macedonia. 161 Albanians in the large New York borough of the Bronx number more 
than 200,000 and own one-third of all private land there. 162 These groups, more 
importantly, are highly concerned towards their respective homelands which in turn 
make many US politicians 'respond strongly to their ethnic appeals'. 163 Since most 
came to America embracing and believing in the principles of democracy, they all vote 
and make their nationalist concerns known to politicians. Carpenter and his like must 
understand that the realities of politics supersede what on paper may appear as "no 
vital interests'. In most cases, they are seen as such to the vast electorate most realists 
claim would be difficult to sway in promoting a more activist US approach in places 
like the Balkans. 
For institutions such as NATO, the US appears to have already decided that 
irredentist conflicts within NATO's field of operations may indeed constitute the new 
threat to peace. Prior to the decision to send NATO jets on bombing missions over 
Bosnia, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated; 'NATO must improve its 
ability to deal with the disorder of ethnic conflict and aggressive nationalism, 
proliferation, and political and economic instability. 164 The discontinuity of policy, 
however, will not help either NATO's or America! s credibility. The first steps by the 
US and international community were condemnations followed by economic sanctions 
with poor results. 165 It appears that for the US the management of crisis follows 
logical steps and assumes a level of rationality on the part of those involved. Yet as 
161 Duncan Perry, RFEIRL Newsbdefs (31 March, 1994): p. 17. 
162 Derek Hall, Albania and the Albanians (London: Pinter Press, 1994): p. 47. 
163 Hobsbawrn (1990), pp. cit.: p. 155. 
164 Warren Christopher, "Speech to NATO", February, 1993 in US Foreto foligy Bulletin vol. 3 #6 
(May/Junc, 1993): p. 54. 
165 Gaddis Smith, "What Role for America? ", Current History vol. 92 #573 (April, 1993): p. 152. 
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the crisis has demonstrated, violent nationalism is a phenomena that has very little to 
do with rationality. It may proceed forward with rational means, however, its premise 
is not rational. Despite sanctions against Serbia which have practically destroyed the 
economy, Serb public opinion has continued to support to Mlosevic as witnessed by 
the December, 1993 elections. 166 Of course, drives for land are often rational, 
calculating and ruthless. However, nationalism has, and is being used to motivate 
action and justify purpose. This is where the US and the West must understand that 
peace processes involving the redrawing of borders is not the answer in the long term 
despite short term success. Satisfaction of one group's claims, especially in the 
Balkans will, more often than not, involve 'threatening the identity and security of 
other minoritiee, 167which may likely find expression through violence. 
Democratisation offers hope, yet trying to manage its pace and the unfortunate 
consequences is often nothing more than an exercise in fUtility. 168 How should the US 
respond to someone like President Berisha when border incidents with neighbouring 
Greece169 threaten to destabilise the area? Criticisms by minorities and opposition 
groups point to an increasingly authoritarian command structure where dissent with 
Berisha's government is not being tolerated. 170 The pro-US position and ties between 
Albania and the US cloud what may be a short-sighted policy approach. It appears 
that governments in the Balkans are taking a somewhat hard stance against minorities. 
Perhaps the situation in the former Yugoslavia has instilled a fear that minorities within 
their borders may seek similar solutions. Western policy has not alleviated their fears 
either as recognition of Bosnia followed by acceptance of peace plans involving its 
'carving up' show, to area leaders, that perhaps no boundaries are safe. The precedent 
set in the former Yugoslavia may provide the onus for irredentist groups to begin more 
concerted activity. 171 At the very least, regional relations and security concerns have, 
166 "Serbia- Roots of War", The Economist (25 December, 1993 -7 January, 1994): p. 45. 
167 Cable, pp. cit.. p. 45. 
168 Best expressed by Stephen Burg, gp. cit. -. 'The supporters of democratization in the 
region .. confront a vexing 
dilemma: the collapse of authoritarianism has unleashed forces that make 
the establishment of liberal democracy difficult. Yet to suppress these forces would require actions 
that might make democracy impossible. Some accommodation of the national aspirations of local 
populations is essential in order to avoid violence, to strengthen the legitimacy of new democratic 
institutions, to motivate these populations to endure the sacrifices associated with transitions .... I p. 165. 169 Recent incidents near the border towns of Korea and Gjirokaster include the killing of Albanian 
soldiers by what the Albanian government has called, 'Greek terrorists'. They claim the group 
[Northern Epirus Liberation Front] may be sponsored by the Greek government. Albania has recalled 
its ambassador from Athens and cut its embassy staff in half. It is the most serious incident to date. 
See The international Herald Tribune 14 April, 1994 p. 2. 
170 See "Albania- Just for Show", The Economist (9 April, 1994): pp. 3940. 
171 Nicolas Stavrou emphasises this point regarding recognition. The cardinal principle that defined 
Helsinki was the legitimization of post-WWII borders, Tito accepted this in multi-cthnic Yugoslavia 
as international recognition of existing borders. When Prime Minister Markovic tried to restore 
borders 
.... things changed 
Yugoslavia was told, in effect that the rules had changed: internal and 
administrative borders became, overnight, international'. See Stavrou (1993), p2ýdt , pp. 
37-38. 
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and will probably continue to affect pro-Western states in the area such as Greece and 
Turkey. The latter's perceptions of regional security coupled with its internal 
problems'72should make it a concern to the US as it seeks to promote regional 
stability. 
The disappearance of the dampening effect of the cold war has been accompanied by the 
revival of nationalism, ethnocentrism and minority issues especially in the former Soviet 
Union, [and] the Balkans.... The course of future political developments in the former Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, where such issues abound, is of particular 
importance for Turkey 
.... 
Instability and conflict within and across national borders in the 
Balkans could swiffly draw into their orbit of interaction the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria 
and Greece, possibly mobilizing new waves of immigration to Turkey, as well as tensions in 
bilateral relations. [SiCl 173 
During the Ozal presidency, there were efforts by Turkey to assist in regional 
co-operation hoping that aiding democratisation would in turn aid in regional relations. 
One option for the US could perhaps be to promote these efforts more openly and 
strongly. Doing so might not only address grievances but may further bilateral and 
regional co-operation. The US would need to appreciate, however, that while it 
advocates democracy, the often lengthy process involved requires that it create a much 
more improved damage mitigation technique(s) in the short to medium term. 174 This, 
however, is easier said than done. There appears almost an apprehension on the part 
of the West to come up with anything radically new. Also, there seems to be an angst 
among Western capitals to allow such 'solutions' or 'conflict management techniques' 
to be settled by the nations in the area themselves. 175 The latter development appears 
as part of the trend after the Cold War that very little will be treated as within the 
realm of a state's exclusive license. Civil war, such in Yugoslavia then, is 
internationalised with the West taking it upon itself to solve the problem. The former 
concern, however, may be the more vital one. Creating a technique, in and of itself, is 
difficult, if not impossible. How to fashion a specific response to ethno-based conflicts 
must turn on; not only how to implement policy, but also to how can it take into 
account the resources available, the political will necessary, and whether or not the US 
should adopt a uni or multilateral approach. 
172 Turkey, aside from the continuing problems it faces with its Kurdish minority, has been 
experiencing a severe economic crisis as well. The Turkish lira has devalued by 28% against the 
dollar forcing a three month austerity package by the Cillar government. The Economist (9 April, 
1994): p. 6. 
173 Duygu Bazoglu Sczcr, "Prospects for Southern European Security: a Turkish Perspective", in 
Roberto Aliboni (1992), 0. cit. - p. 12 1. 
174 Nixon reaffirms this premise by stating; '... dernocracy is not an Alice in Wonderland solution to 
these problems. Much of the underdeveloped world lacks the political traditions necessary to make 
democracy function properly. In some countries, ethnic hatreds, class divisions, and even tribal 
rivalries would frustrate the most well-intentioned advocates of democracy.... ' Nixon (1992), pp_. ci_t..., 
p. 248. 
175 McInnes, Qp. Cit p. 73. 
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It must be remembered that in creating foreign policy, implementation 
matters. 176 MoStof the difficulty in the Balkan crisis involved, not in being able to 
formulate plans and alternatives, but in how exactly these would be implemented and 
their repercussions. From this, consensus became almost impossible to achieve. In 
spite of what appears as strong Western resolve recently, fashioning a policy approach 
towards the region will likely still present the US with problems. "n Much of this 
potential difficulty comes from what Andrew Bacevich refers to as the, 'summoning of 
popular support necessary for implementation!. 178 The American populace has had to 
face the recent reality that the US seems adrift in formulating a foreign policy capable 
of meeting post- Cold War threats. 
Fashioning a foreign policy response to address, as NATO appears to be doing, 
ethno-nationalist conflicts within Europe would require, however, both the political 
will, and the ability to implement such policy. As to the policy itself, Jack Snyder 
offers a general guide; 
1) Eliminate military threats to states security 
2) Provide economic resources so that states can legitimate their rule through 
econon-dc gromh 
3) Encourage the spread of liberal, transnational, economic and cultural ties 
4) Cushion the impact of market reforms on disadvantaged groups 
5) Co-opt intellectuals 
6) Promote constructive dialogue between nationalities at the local level. 179 
All these considerations are constructive points. Yet they still do not specify the simple 
questions of, how, to what extent etc.? For example, point one makes a good case, 
I remove or eliminate a military threat to a state's security. Yet such a point implies 
that the US and the West engage upon proactive policy, to eliminate or lessen the 
potentiality of military threat from a state before it gets out of hand. Such a method 
of conflict prevention does not appear to suit the US as it often is not prepared to 
undergo the process. Again, implementation remains vital. Jonathan Eyal may be 
coffect in assuming that; 
... the notion of conflict prevention 
does not square with the nature of Western democracy. 
Foreign policy issues are usually viewed by the electorate as diversions from the 
176 Smith and Clarke, M. cit.. - p. 2. 
177 IBM 'What must be stressed is that decisions make different patterns of demands for 
implementation. We must be clear initially what form and degree of implementation is required by a 
particular decision. Some may not require implementing, or may require it only in the indefinite 
future; some may be declaratory, merely to posture, or procedural, for their own sake; some may 
conflict with established patterns; some may be incapable of being carried out; and some may be 
programmatic decisions, as in cases in the field of foreign aid, where a structure and plan of action is 
prerequisite to a decision being taken. ' p. 6. 
178 Andrew J Baccvich, "Strategic Studies: In From the Cold", W-sReview vol. 13 #2 (Summcr-Fall 
1993): p. 17. 
179 Jack Snyder, "Controlling Nationalism in the New Europe", cited in S. W. Griffiths (1993), gp Lcit. ' 
P. 89. 
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government's real task of improving economic wealth; they only assume importance once a 
crisis is acute. No politician has won votes by claiming to have prevented a conflict, which by 
definition, never wdsted because it was prevented. 180 
Yet Eyal fails to explain why then was President Truman able to move the US towards 
large-levels of commitment after World War 11 when most Americans were all too 
ready to revert to another era of isolation from Europe? The US populace most 
certainly understand the simple notion that prosperity today requires firm commitment 
abroad, particularly when the world is becoming increasingly economically 
interdependent. Swaying public opinion to a policy geared to protect interests, or 
potential threats to interests can be reconciled to the American people. But first, they 
need a coherent policy to which they can rally behind. 
This is why the Balkans should have mattered much more to the US. Not 
because they did not, as realists espouse, affect vital US interests or threaten US 
strategic security. To realists, however, the situation in the Balkans, from 
democratising nations such as Albania, to strained relations amongst neighbours, to the 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia, all represent the missed opportunity by the US' 81 to 
demonstrate resolve and maintain credibility within the international community. This 
is not to imply that such credibility is destroyed. It is, however, damaged, or rather 
lessened in stature. Moreover, the Balkans could have become the staging ground for 
a new US policy that was much more coherent than the frequently heard cries of 
'democratisation', or 'new world order'. From the outset of crisis in the Balkans, 
however, the US seemed to devolve to the Europeans in handling the crises that arose. 
While perhaps not a blatant error, such a move can be construed as an error in 
judgement. As 'architects of the new world order', or certainly at least, the driving 
force in world politics for nearly fifty years, the US should have understood a simple 
rule; 'power entails responsibility. 192 Devolution of responsibility to the Europeans 
should not preclude the idea that the US 'work with the continent's leaders to channel 
the new East European nationalism in constructive directions'. 183 Multilateralism, 
offers its benefits [infra for details]. However, it appears that, recently, the US has a 
tendency to act in conjunction with allies automatically without fully examining the 
consequences of unilateral action. Discrepancies of interest between the US and its 
European allies have often led to non-policy making the US appear indecisive, 
180 J. Eyal, "No One Cares Until it's War", The Independent 10 March, 1994 
181 Point reiterated by Warren Christopher, 'The West missed too many opportunities to prevent or 
contain this suffering, bloodshed, and destruction when the conflict was in its infancy, The lesson to 
be learned from this tragedy is the importance of an early and decisive engagement against ethnic 
persecution and aggressive nationalism'. Christopher (May/junc 1993), QP. citl p. 56. 
182 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order 
andAmepica's PurRose (New York, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992): pp. 207- 
208. 
183 Nixon (1992), pp. cit.. pp. 134-135. 
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confused and weak. Again, we come to the question of threats. The notion of 
democracy establishment in places like the Balkans has merit. 'Stable democratic 
regimes are strategically important to Western society. They aid in the formation of a 
security frameworle. 184 But, are ethno-nationalist conflicts the specific threats to this 
notion that the US must address in the post Cold War era? 
ý In states such as Albania, territorial claims precede the existence of the 
Albanian state. Nationalism has been explained in that country as a means to promote 
the Albanian cause and perpetuate the myth of a nation besieged by outsiders, 
deliberately separated by the Great Powers. [supra heading on Albanian Nationalism] 
The advent of democracy in Albania has not resulted in the heightening of nationalism 
among the Albanian people. The conflict next door did raise concerns on the part of 
the West that violence could spread to neighbouring Kosova. Indeed, the threat of 
Albanian nationalism appears stronger from Albanians in the adjoining areas of 
Kosova, Greece and Macedonia to rejoin Albania proper. 185 The ideal of a Greater 
Albania certainly does hold popular appeal. However, groups and political parties 
within Albania that are advocating such a notion are either few in number and/or do 
not wield much political influence. President Berisha has repeatedly warned of the 
possibility of conflict spreading to Kosova. 186 His government has toned down its 
initial rhetoric which called for an independent Kosova, perhaps a prelude to 
unification with Albania and thereby a final redressing of grievances. His foreign 
minister, Alfred Serreqi has indicated, however, that any final solution to Yugoslavia 
must include Kosova. 187 To the other states in the Balkans Albanian nationalism may 
pose a threat. The large numbers of Albanians outside of Albania represent possible 
and actual irredentism for years to come. For Albania, their anxiety over becoming 
engulfed in conflict has preoccupied their time with 'a consolidation and purification of 
national identity', in other words, with a maintenance of their present boundaries, 188 
The implications for relations with the US, however, do not appear immediately 
clear. A strengthening of ties should aid in the development of democracy. The US 
may want to consider though that, 'policies toward individual states must reflect the 
nature of the threat to democracy in that state. And, where democracy is threatened by 
interethnic conflict, counterweights must be bUilt'. 189 In Albania's case, strong bilateral 
184 S. Burg, pp. cit. - p. 163. 
185 As to the latter it appears that religion also factors into Albanian nationalism. Islam is seen by the 
'Macedonian authorities as a tool of Albanian nationalism and as a way for Albanians to assin-tilate 
other small Islamic minority groups... ' Poulton (1993), gp. cit. 1 p. 82. 
186 Stated again upon his recent trip to London RFEIRL (31 March, 1994): p. 19. 
187 IBID 
198Fukuyama(I992), pp. cit. - p. 272. 
189 S. Burg, Qp. cit., p. 166., 'Events in the former Yugoslav states,.... make it clear that the use of 
force in pursuit of nationalistic goals threatens the stability of neighbouring states and raises the 
prospect of direct military involvement by outside actors, including the West. The costs and 
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relations should be tempered with an understanding that threat may come from the 
surrounding states. Prevention may be achievable, yet requires strong, unilateral 
'presence of action'. The possibility of deterioration in relations, however, remains high 
as states in the Balkans have had the opportunity to witness, firsthand, the less than 
stellar performance of US policy in the region. 
The tensions that have characterised relations between Southern European countries and the 
USA could re-emerge and perhaps even intensify, as has always happened when the national 
dimension of the American presence in the Mediterranean has prevailed. Furthermore, the 
reassertion of the national dimension of European countries could result in differences 
between European and American objectives that would be harder to reconcile through the 
Alliance's multilateral constraint. The renascent national dimension would be ushered in by 
traditional balance-of-power policies, which would weaken the collective European-security 
organization and jeopardize the creation of a similar trans-Mediterranean organization. 190 
The historical failure of the West and its relations with Balkan states is made 
explicit in the variety of iffedentist claims that have arisen in the area since the demise 
of communism. The US is currently on good footing in Albania. However, is it 
prepared to address the possibility of a reversion to a more authoritarian system? 
Moreover, if the Albanians of the Balkans decide to express their claims more 
vehemently, how will, and should the US respond? The US may have to come to 
terms with the fact that ethno-nationalist conflicts are not the new threat of the post- 
Cold War era. However, they do represent one of the major threats to US interests. 
For democratising states, such as Albania, they are the main threat. Reconciling the 
two points of view requires that America first lay out a comprehensive outline of its 
interests. In doing so, it can define where both the Balkans and Albania fit. It would 
then follow that policy responses can be formulated that take such interest 
considerations into account. More importantly, hammering out a policy itself may be 
achieved, and with it, the consensus neýded to support it and carry it through. 
1.5 Consensus Building v. Interest Idenlýfication 
Recent analysis on US foreign policy has been replete with calls for a 
protection of 'vital, primary, or important' US interests and goals. Specification of 
these interests, however, has been difficult. It would seem natural that there is an 
order of priority regarding US interests. Generally, they may lie within one of three 
categories. First are those of primary importance to the US. These are 'vital interests', 
and may be defined accordingly; 
controversy such involvement would create place a premium on preventing and resolving these 
conflicts before they turn violent! 
190 Aliboni (1992), W. cit. - p. 9, 
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.... one for which the nation must be willing to 
fight a major war, if necessary. A threat to a vital 
interest would automatically involve the very survival of America as a Eree society, and repelling such 
a threat would justify all but suicidal exertions. 191 
Former President Nixon concurs in this definition of a vital interest by relating it 
directly to the 'security of the United States'. 192 Such threats should, by definition 
then, entail the use of force. Yet such explanations of vital interests would imply then 
that states have the requisite ability to defend these interests when the situation 
warrants. Even from the realist's vantage point, such security requires the 
I accumulation of power'. The latter, however, also refers to, 'those material and non- 
material assets which enable actors to shape the behaviour of others in desired 
ways'. 193 Seen from this perspective, such accumulation may refer to factors outside 
the realm of a state's physical security. Strong economic links and reliance upon trade, 
etc. may also describe something as a 'vital interest'. As such, military action by the 
US in defence of this type of vital interest would be justifiable. American response to 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not, first and foremost, a desire to stop an aggressor, 
as it was to ensure that large portions of the Middle East's oil supply do not fall under 
the control of a state which was seen by the US as non pro-Western. Protection of 
energy supplies and their access by the US made the Iraqi invasion fall within the realm 
of vital American interest. This would seem to undermine the premise by some 
analysts that 'milieu goals-especially stability, should not be pursued by the US. 194 
However, if we are to assume that vital American interests outside the physical 
security of the United States can also affect the US, then goals such as stability should 
not simply be aspired towards, but actively pursued, particularly in the post-Cold War 
era. Democratisation has shown that it will require time to develop and prosper. In 
Eastern Europe, reversion to more authoritarian forms of governance are already 
visible. The short term requires that stability promotion in key areas should perhaps be 
pursued rather than shunned as an outdated method of the Cold War. American 
interests in Western Europe, the Middle East and Asia have shown recently that 
regional events do affect regional allies. The US cannot simply turn its back on these 
circumstances which are likely to negatively affect American interests in the long term. 
Two factors, however, should be outlined in regards to such an approach. First, 
practicality dictates that the United States cannot unilaterally respond to crisis 
situations across the globe. Second, the US should not limit itself to support of those 
states and leaders which, on their face, are simply pro-US. The Cold War 
191 Carpenter (1992), Qp. -cit, p. 
174. 
192 Nixon (1992), gp. cit. - p. 36. 
193 McInnes, gp-. cit.. p. 7. 
194 Carpenter (1992), pp. cit. - p. 7. 
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unfortunately forced hard choices upon the States to support those which, although 
anti-Communist, by their very rule destroyed, perverted, and simply ignored the most 
basic principles of democracy the US upholds. This is not to imply a sense of moral 
righteousness on the part of the US. To do so would highlight past US policy 
hypocrisy. More importantly, to anchor oneself literally to the statement would also 
demonstrate the contradiction in the principles of democracy promotion with stability 
promotion. Instead, it should be realised that the end of the Cold War has indeed 
presented the US with choices. It can now weigh options against interests without 
examining the possible repercussions within a bi-polar context. 
The current crisis in the former Yugoslavia can serve as the proper yardstick 
for the weighing of such options. Opponents of a more active US approach, including 
the use of military force, make several points. The US should not, they claim, involve 
itself in a civil war which would mean forcing the US to take sides. Doing so may 
involve the US in long, protracted warfare. Also, to take sides may damage US 
relations with states such as Russia, particularly since the latter has been outspoken 
against further US action in Bosnia without prior consultation. 195 Moreover, 
opponents correctly point out that Bosnia is not a vital US interest, nor is likely ever to 
become one. Carpenter makes such a case; 
.... such internecine or 
bilateral conflicts do not affect the global- or in most cases, even the European- 
geopolitical balance and, therefore, do not impinge on vital American security interests. Indeed, it 
would be better to insulate the United States from [such] a conflict .... than to preserve security 
arrangements that might entangle American troops in it. 196 
The point is valid. The reluctance by the Bush and Clinton administrations to act 
unilaterally in the former Yugoslavia may demonstrate that it does not hold a high spot 
on the West's agenda. Yet, the US should perhaps realise that other considerations do 
factor into assessing what constitutes a vital interest, as well as what may threaten such 
an interest. Regional security to long time allies in the area has become seriously 
jeopardised with the outbreak of conflict. Concurrently, the crisis has led to the 
polarisation of allies in the area against one another. While they all agree on the need 
to 'do something'to stop the bloodshed, they continuously argue over the means to do 
so. The poor efforts and recent undiplomatic measures by some states in the Balkans 
have only served to raise tension levels and exacerbate existing suspicions. The 
Clinton administration has understood the regional ramifications to some degree. The 
early attempts, for example, to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia may have, ' been 
influenced partly by the perception that Turkey has become crucial to American 
strategic interest in the Near East, surrounded as it is by an oil-rich Azerbaijan, Iran 
195 Internafional Herald T? Ibune 19 April, 1994 p, 4. 
196 Carpenter (1992), pp. cit. - p. 34. 
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andIraq'. 197 Turkey's role in the current crisis has increased with its deployment of 
troops as part of the peacekeeping force. The active role being played there by Turkey 
has not been well received by either the Greeks or the Russians, both of which feel that 
pro- Bosnian sentiments by the Turks may compromise an already delicate situation. 
As the bloodshed continues, however, it is likely that the rest of Europe will 
feel the results as hundreds of thousands of refugees flood across borders. The level of 
violence has brought to fight the humanitarian issue vis-a-vis vital interests. For the 
US, its stake in Western Europe supersedes the mere economic interests to include the 
premise of former US Secretary of State James Baker's pledge that Europe remain 
'free and whole'. Baker's plea, however, highlights the US hypocrisy as it was he who 
travelled to Yugoslavia before its dissolution in the Summer, 199 1, clinging to the, by 
then, already defunct notion of a federated state. The wider repercussions of the crisis 
demonstrate that an interest 'may not be found in the Balkan war itself, but in the 
European order'. 198 The roots of US involvement on humanitarian grounds alone 
dates to the early days of the repubfic. 199 Many states, such as the US, have in the 
past 'rushed to the aid' of others even if not within American vital interests, motivated, 
as they were by altruism. 200 Yet the US cannot base a foreign policy upon the 
principles of altruism, regardless of how noble. For America, its opportunity to take a 
more active approach in the Balkans should depend upon its concern over a wider 
European order and security for the long term. 201 'Interests, not altruism, lead states 
to cooperate. We must recognize that in the coming decades the thrust of our policy in 
Europe should center on those states that most need the US connectiorf. 202 Regional 
security and stability directly affect those states in the Balkans which are currently pro- 
US. The likelihood of long term periodic outbursts of conflict pose threats to these 
states which in turn may affect US interests through their European allies. This is not 
to suggest some revamped version of the domino theory within a post- Cold War 
context. That theory was hardly valid during the Cold War. Instead, it is meant to 
imply that a more determined US policy in certain areas may aid in the security and 
stability of US interests that could be indirectly affected. For the Balkans, its 
geostrategic position between both Western Europe and the Middle East should 
perhaps make the US more concerned in adopting a coherent, long term policy for the 
region. 
197 Misha Glenny, The New York Times 29 July, 1993 
198 Robert Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "America and Bosnia", The National Interest # 33 
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199 See for examples, Patrice Curtis, "Humanitarian Assistance: An Expanding Role for US 
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To the newly democratising states such as Albania, instability in the Balkans 
offers it little hope in a smooth, successful transition to a democratic, prosperous state. 
Its preoccupation with its neighbours and security concerns su - persede its desire to 
move forward. Some analysts may state the unlikelihood of the Yugoslav crisis from 
spreading. 201 However, many do not offer the consequences of failed democratisation 
in the region. Failure may lead to a return of authoritarianism at best, and widespread 
iffedentism, low intensity conflict, and area-wide destabilisation at worst. On its face 
Albania is not, and probably will not ever constitute a vital US interest. Business 
interests in that country are negligible. Security threats through Albania are minimal, 
and its influence throughout the region are trifling. Yet states such as Albania should 
not be so quickly discarded as outside the realm of US interest. With large numbers of 
ethnic Albanians scattered throughout the Balkans, poor relations continuing, and the 
pains of reform, Albania may represent the possibility for either success or failure in 
fashioning a foreign policy in places like the Balkans. Albania! s proximity to the 
former Yugoslavia has not been lost by US policymakers which have sought to use it 
for information gathering on the crisis. 204 The failure of reform, and even of conflict 
within or involving Albania will not likely affect the US directly. Abandoning a 
comprehensive policy, however, does not take into account the likelihood that 
conditional or secondary interests are affected, It is the affect of these interests upon 
those vital ones which may also require specific policy responses from the United 
States. 
Secondary or conditional interests205 also have a tendency to impact heavily 
upon US foreign policy formulation. Their influence upon and relation to primary 
interests therefore require equal attention from policyrnakers. As Nixon defines them, 
critical interests are those which, 'if lost, would create a direct threat to one of our 
vital interests'. 206 Determining such interests, however, often is more difficult than 
ascertaining vital ones. This is because secondary interests are those which in and of 
themselves are not of supreme import until a crisis arising from them is seen as having 
the likely possibility of affecting, directly, the primary interests. Conditional interests, 
therefore, become even harder to determine for the US in the post- Cold War era. 
Deciding which areas are strategic in relation to vital interests requires that the US 
establish policy projections which are specific and subsequently formulate policy 
203 Carpenter (1992), Qp cit., p. 4., and, Eyal (March, 1994), M. cit. 
204 "CIA Planes in Albania to Spy on Serbia", L11yria vol. 4 #268 (3-5 February, 1994): p. 1. 
205 terms from Carpenter (1992), M. -cit. * p. 
176. He defines them as; '... assets that are pertinent but 
not indispensable to preserving America's physical integrity, independence, and domestic liberties. 
Preventing the domination of either Western Europe or East Asia by a power hostile to the United 
States would be a prime example of a conditional interest' . 206 Nixon (1992), Qp. cit.. p. 36. 
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options to handle any threats to secondary interests. Such requisite proactive policy, 
however, has not been available to date. 
In applying the principle of secondary interests to the Balkans, a case for a 
more assertive US role; 
.... 
begin[s] with the premise that Western Europe is indisputably a vital US interest; move on to 
assume that ff the conflict in Yugoslavia spilled over its borders, it would pose a threat to Western 
Europe; and then conclude that stopping the eNisting fighting .... 
is a vital interest of the United 
States. 207 
The view held by some observers, that the conflict will probably not spill over outside 
the boundaries of Yugoslavia'208 should not be the should not be the focus of US 
interest determination in the Balkans. If it were the case, this would harken back to the 
foolish notion of some sort of domino scenario in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. 
Instead, it should be understood that it is the conflict itself which threatens; to limit 
investment in the area, 209 slow the pace of regional democratisation, 210 alienate 
regional allieS, 211 generally destabilise the area'212 and heighten already existing 
tensions, relations, and security concerns. The Clinton administration has repeatedly 
clung to the Wilsonian premise that democracies do not wage war upon one another. 
The pursuit of prosperity and of a free society benefits all involved. Even Nixon agrees 
that; 
Beyond it security concerns, the United States has a profound interest in the survival of democratic 
states, the expansion of economic prosperity through free trade and development, and the promotion 
of democratic forms of government. 213 
The foregoing premise of this view relies upon the current belief in 
enlargement. It should not, however, have to rest solely upon this foundation. A 
207 Carpenter (1992), pp. cit., p. 172. 
2011 McInnes concurs by stating; 'The risk that Balkan conflicts might escalate into a general 
European war, as in 1914, is so minuscule as to be irrelevant. He does, however, go on to believe 
some danger is possible; 'Even so, the fear of some spillover cffcct is justified, it could take the form 
of large population movements, economic dislocation, or some military intervention by neighbouring 
countries on behalf of fellow nationals living as minorities in regions of conflict. All this means that 
any violence in East or Central Europe or the Balkans must be of general European concern!. 
McInnes, M. _cit. * p. 
22. 
209 Both Greece and Albania can testify to this point, see The Economis (22 April, 1994): p. 6. 
210 Referred to by President Berisha, Interview (Tirane: 9 June, 1993) 
211 For example, Turkey which has repeatedly called for more conceited action and Greece which 
rebuked the idea of air strikes. See, Aliboni (1992), gp. cit. - pp. 129-133. 
212 Expressly stated by Misha Glcnny, "Carnage in Bosnia, for Starters", The New York Times 29 July, 
1993 
213 Nixon (1992), j)p. cit, p. 37. 
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simpler method would show that US 'failure in the Balkane, would undermine 
credibility, result in 'recriminations', and weaken the link with our European allies. 214 
Such a process already seems to exist. Turkey, for example, has recently hung on to 
its belief in the role it could, and perhaps should play in the Balkans. Strong links with 
Albania, Croatia, Bosnian Muslims, and Bulgaria seem to demonstrate Turkish resolve 
in showing the US that Turkey can offer itself as an 'island of stability"215 in the 
Balkans. The validity of this claim may be subject to interpretation. 216 Regardless, 
Turkish interest and influence in the area are, and have been, growing in recent years., 
Promoting links and strengthening ties with such states offers the US the opportunity 
to not only advance the case for democracy, but would aid it in developing policy 
geared specifically at building strong, conditional interest states. 
It would appear that this is also where Albania may find a place in the interest 
formulation of American foreign policy in the post- Cold War era. The way forward to 
both security and stability is through success in ensuring that democracy succeeds. 
The lack of experience a state such as Albania has in such a task coupled with it 
precarious position in the volatile Balkans requires that the US do more to nurture the 
process of democracy along in Albania. Quicker integration of Albania into the West 
European community would provide for yet another anchor of steadiness in an area in 
desperate need for security and stability. Democracy and market capitalism may not 
erase deep-seated suspicions between Albania and her neighbours. Yet, significant 
strides forward would undermine extremists and those that may search for scapegoats 
for failed democratisation. Successful democracies also, eventually provide safer 
minority rights guarantees once they are firmly established. For the US, a long term, 
comprehensive policy towards Albania to ensure its successful transition would help 
solidify US influence in the region. Consequently, the area itself, of secondary interest 
due to its strategic location, would be provided with another economically viable, 
democratic, and pro-West state. The subsequent prosperity and democratisation of the 
Balkans, beginning with states such as Albania, would serve to secure US vital 
214 Tucker and Hendrickson (Fall, 1993), 2p. cit.: p. 25. 
215 Point expressed by former President Ozal; 'The Middle East will retain its. strategic importance for 
the West. And Turkey will be an even more significant island of stability in this troubled region. 
Turkey will be a vital bridge between the Islamic World and the West. With the developments taking 
place .... 
in the Balkans, a strong element of stability and predictability is needed more strongly than 
ever, and that Turkey can and does provide'. Turgut Ozal's address to the International Club of 
Washington DC, 17 January, 1990, full text in "European Order and Turkish-American Relations", 
Turkish Review Quarterly vol. 4# 19 (Spring, 1990) p. I 11. 
216 The notion is dismissed by Philip Robins; 'Its place in both the Council of Europe and the ICO has 
led to repeated claims that it is a bridge from one continent to another, from one culture to another. 
Such claims are weak and unconvincing. The truth is that rather than understanding both continents 
and both cultures, and hence having a unique role as interpreter to both, Turkey comprehends neither 
adequately to fulfil this role. Its relationship with the Arabs, the Persians and the majority of the 
Islamic states is confused and tentative. P. Robins, Turkey and the Afiddle East (Undon: Pinter Press, 
199 1): pp. 13-14. 
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interests in Europe. For-Albania, their pro-US position is built primarily upon the need 
for economic aid and investment and, wlich of course, is presently overridden by quite 
tangible security threats emanating from both the crisis next door, potential unrest from 
ethnic Albanians outside its borders, and poor relations with neighbours. The US has 
sought to ease Albanian anxieties by small levels of economic aid, and through the 
latter's recent incorporation within the NATO Partnership for Peace plan. The US has 
also expressed strong support for the Berisha government. Such support also appears 
to be highlighted by the Americans turning a blind eye to an alarming trend in Albanian 
politics, the growing authoritarian leadership style of the present government and its 
increased intolerance to dissent, and continued failure at strengthening regional/ 
bilateral relations. The US appears to have placed all its support behind Berisha 
without planning for other possible contingencies or perhaps in strengthening its ties 
with viable players outside the present leadership. Such a move, unfortunately, may be 
construed by the latter as implicit hopes in its failure by the US. This need not be the 
case. Granted, in a country where suspicions of outside powers are high, the US 
nonetheless ought to explore the long-term possibilities of links with other players in 
Albania. Open, and present support should continue, yet in its relations with Albania, 
America may want to consider the consequences failure may bring to the region, 
particularly if it backs such failure or does little to prevent it. 
Present policy moves in the area, however, seem to have relegated designs to 
the final category of interests, peripheral interests. These interests are those which, 'if 
taken by a hostile power, would only distantly threaten a vital or critical intereSt'. 217 
From the outset of conflict in the Balkans, the US sought to distance itself from the 
situation by deferring to European crisis management. American diplomats and 
politicians alike were also quick to point out that any conflict in the region was of 
marginal interest to the US, that it was a 'European affaie, or an internal civil conflict 
and, therefore should not involve the US at all. Early pundits for an activist US role, 
particularly those which believed that this sort of conflict was exactly the type meant to 
demonstrate NATO's new role and moreover to solidify President Busws vision for a 
I new world order', were quickly drowned out by those seeking a minimalist role for the 
US now that the Cold War was over. Resurgent nationalism was seen as a new virus 
across Eastern Europe. As such, the prospects for instability remained high. For this 
reason the US should not, therefore engage itself in 'stability missions' which would 
likely involve needless 'entanglements', and where the scope of interest is marginal at 
best. 219 Such reasoning also would allow for a further reduction in the US military 
commitment to Europe now that the Soviet threat was gone. 
217 Nixon (1992), pp. cit.: pp. 36-37. 
218 Carpenter (1992), 2p. cit., p. 33. 
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Advocates of the minimalist approach, which seek to place the Balkans and 
crises there, on the heap of peripheral interests, also seem fond of shouting the praises 
of the Europeans. 'Greater European initiative and self-reliance on security issues' 
seemed the catchphrases most bandied about Washington at the outset of crisis. 
Allowing for greater range in European crisis management would also aid in alleviating 
American military burdens on the continent, so the argument went. 219 The pathetic 
European response did more than highlight the incompetence of the European Union in 
handling the situation. It demonstrated exactly how most West Europeans felt about 
their brethren to the East and South. Washington should have perhaps taken'its cue 
that Europe was not interested at all in the Balkans despite cries from Jaques Delors 
for the Americans to 'stay out of it. During a parliamentary representative group of 
the Council of Europe visit to the US in 1990, a high ranking European official 
expressed the following sentiments; 
He told his audience that West Europeans felt Central Europe-by which he meant Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany- to be of direct concern to them, part of 'larger 
Europe' to be brought into the 'European mainstream! as soon as circumstances permitted. 
The Balkans, however, - here meaning Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria- were of 
'no concern! to Europe, now or, presumably, ever. If they wanted to 'tear themselves apart, 
that was their business and theirs alone. What went on in the Balkans, even the direst 
calamity (which he considered by no means unlikely) was certainly no concern of the West 
European countries because it could make no impact on them. This indifference was uttered 
by a man well-versed in international affairs and, in some respects, not without a certain 
breadth of view. 220 
This prevalent attitude most likely remains regardless of 'exhaustive' European 
efforts to end the conflict. Yugoslavia undoubtedly thrust itself onto the table of West 
European interest, yet the other 'Balkan countries have always been regarded by the 
West as a lower priority than Central Europe"221 and will likely continue to be so, For 
these other states. the fear of being 'marginalised and singularised' adds to their already 
heightened sense of insecurity. The trend to isolate the Balkans highlights a 'shift of 
Europe's centre of gravity towards the north' and the polarisation of the south. 222 By 
placing, however, these nations on the backburner of Europe's interests the possibility 
that future problems may arise with direct consequences remains. 
219 JBID, pp. 17-18. 
220 quoted in LF. Brown (1992), gp. cit.: p. 181., Brown reiterates the point well with a question; 
'... the poverty-stricken Balkans were never as important as the oil-rich Middle East. Will instability 
there, war even, make much difference? Are not the Balkans, in any case, so insignificant that any 
instability would be self-circumscribing, or would have very few wider ramifications even if it were 
notT, IBID, p. 179., Colin McInnes also points to this north-south divide in Europe; '.... one danger for 
Europe is that instead of seeing itself as a bridge between old and new ways of thinking and acting on 
North/South issues, it will drift and be co-opted into playing an increasingly neo-imperialist role, and 
so exacerbating a bitter and explosive divide between the rich and poor'. McInnes, 9p. cit-, p. 3 I. 
221 CViC (1991), pp. Cit. - . P. 91. 222AIiboni (1992), pp. cit. - pp. 11-12. 
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For the US, it may want to consider the ramifications such problems may 
present for Europe, an area of both vital and secondary concern. American allies in the 
region include Greece, Italy and Turkey. While of marginal interest to the rest of 
Europe, the Balkans is, and will probably remain, 'an area of immediate regional 
concern! for these latter three states. Stalled or poor efforts at democratisation, a 
resultant refugee influx, heightened tensions and security issues all weigh heavily into 
the formulation of interests for these allies. 223 it is these reasons which appear to 
have made nations such as Italy and Turkey take a more active approach in 
strengthening ties with the area. 224 Such measures, though, should not be tackled 
alone. Co-ordinated aid and development packages on the part of the US via states 
such as Italy, Greece and Turkey would accomplish two tasks. First, such efforts 
would demonstrate US resolve in seeing that democratisation and development 
proceed in this region. This would also remove some of the burden from allies who 
would not be able to engage themselves in comprehensive development schemes over 
an extended period of time. Through multilateral efforts, America aid and links would 
help in solidifying its credibility with allies in the area as to their concerns, both security 
and otherwise. Second, 'diplomacy, foreign aid and hardheaded negotiating! 225 would 
strengthen ties with the area which in turn may allay security fears over the long term. 
There may be a tendency, as stated, to place the Balkans within the scope of 
peripheral interest. Granted, these types of interests should not involve extensive US 
commitment, particularly of a unilateral nature. Realists of American foreign policy 
would be quick to point out that peripheral concerns require marginal assistance at 
best. They may want to consider, however, that their premise often fails to account 
for contingencies such as the passage of time. International relations teaches us, not 
only that 'nature abhors a vacuunf, but that policy cannot and should not be 
formulated within the very same vacuum. Regional situations, particularly in an area 
undergoing such change as the Balkans, are continuously in a state of flux. Relegating 
regions and/or individual states to a zone of marginal interest now and forever is 
223 IBID, p. 65. 
224 Aliboni (1992), op. cit.. 'Owing to its geographic location, Italy fccls directly affected by 
instability, both to the cast and to the wcsV., at p. 23. , 'Developments 
in Eastern Europe could also 
spur southern members into action: Italy's revived regional vocation in southeastern Europe with its 
effort to create an area of influence in the Danube and the Adriatic and its special concern for 
Yugoslavia .... could 
be complemented by Greece which, by virtue of its geopolitical location, could 
extend this role into southern Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. The predominant 
Christian Orthodox religion of these populations constitutes another important factor enhancing the 
potential role of Greece as an agent of the EC in the Balkans., at p. 36. For Turkey, 'its adjacent 
position to an area politically volatile and unstable', subjects it to 'spill-ovcr cf[ects of regional 
conflicts'. All this is factored into Turkeys regional defence strategy. See, Necip, Torurntay, [former 
Turkish Defence Mnister] "Turkey's Defence Strategy", Turkish Review Quarterly vol. 4# 19 (Spring, 
1990): P. S. 
225 Nixon Seize the Moment... p. 37. 
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impractical and foolish. Circumstances have sometimes shown that such a situation 
often results in scenarios which come back to haunt the US and the West. Failure to 
adopt policy for even the slightest of interest can be detrimental, certainly not perhaps 
in money, men or territory, but rather in credibility and influence. Accomplishing the 
formulation of policy in conjunction with US interests vis-a-vis threats would require 
then that the US first determine which direction it appears to be heading within the 
foreign policy arena. Recent analysis has been replete with everything from the 
triumph of America and its new place as the world's only superpower to those which 
have signalled the beginning of long and steady decline. The inevitability of either 
course or of some approach between the two extremes smacks of determinism. Since 
when, however, has the US been subject to mysterious, overwhelming forces of nature 
and history to which it can do nothing and must acquiesce to its fate? Acceptance of 
such a notion seems to imply a futility even in the formulation of any policy. Instead, 
review of the various premises may offer choice or rather, the direction in which the 
US may be headed. 
2.0 The UnitedStates General Orientation 
Understanding the link between interests and threats to those interests also 
requires that America examine its place and role in the post-Cold War world. There 
appears from recent analysis three schools of thought as to the direction or orientation 
of American foreign policy. They are the declinists, the triumphalists, and the multi- 
lateralists. The declinist debate actually traces its roots to the early days of the Reagan 
administration and has been, to date, the most controversial of the three. The notion of 
the US on some downward spiral with little, if any recourse, has 'touched a raw nerve 
in American politiCS'. 226 Nye correctly argues that many people react emotionally 
against such notions primarily out of national pride. He does, however, state that some 
'natural decline in power is inevitable and only power'. This should not, though, 
naturally imply steady or continued decline in relative power. Further examination of 
the declinist theory may shed light upon the validity of these claims and their 
applicability to present circumstances. 
2.1 Yhe Declinists 
The debate on decline received large attention from econo-historian Paul 
Kennedy's work, Ae Decline and Fall of Great Powers. In this work Kennedy argues 
that the US, like great powers before it, is suffering from 'imperial overstretch'; when 
interests and obligations of a particular country become larger than that empire's ability 
226 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lea& The Changing Nature ofAmetican Power (Washington DC: 
Basic Books, 1990): pp. 11-12. 
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to defend them all'. 227Yet such ideas of decline predate Kennedy's premise to the days 
of Ronald Reagan228 and while they may use varying facts for their conclusions, all 
point to the same end, the US is in decline. 229 It seems even President Clinton adhere 
to this pren-dse. In early, 1988, then still Governor of Arkansas, he commented on 
America's place in the world; 
What we are seeing is a widespread awareness that we have come to the end of the postwar era .... 
We 
don! t dominate as we once did There is a growing belief that America has been living in her past 
during the 80's. We can't move back anymore. 230 
Understanding this conclusion, however, requires some idea of what declinists 
mean by power. Such a definition and 'measurement of power relative to a state's rate 
of decline has plagued international relations scholars for years'. Goertz and Diehl 
aptly point out that, 'power is clearly a dynamic, intangible relationship that is not open 
to direct empirical observation or measurement'. 231 But to most declinists arguments 
appear to relate to capabilities, that is tangible factors such as economic output and 
production, military capability and expenditure and a state's relative debt. Charle's 
Doran indicates that such factors, 'involving the future trajectory of US power and its 
foreign policy, constitute part of the 'structural theory' and its place within the 
international system and 'dynamics of international politiCS'. 232 As such, Doran 
believes that whether the analysis talks of decline or otherwise, these theorists should 
realise that such changes may also rely upon change in the structure of the international 
system itself. 233 
Such an approach accounts for dynamics of the international system. Whether 
or not the US in decline, it would seem highly unlikely that this occur without influence 
and impact both upon and from the international system. Doran then points out that 
decline must then follow, 'at the inflection point where ... rate of growth 
in relative 
227 See, Kennedy (1988), 2p. cit.: p. 515. 
228 For examples see; Owen Harries, "The Rise of American Decline", Commen vol. 85 #5 (May, 
1988), David Calleo, BeyondAmefican Hegemony (Maryland: Johns Hopkins, 1987):, Callco, The 
Rise and Decline offation (New York, New York: Macmillan, 1982), Bruce Russat, "The 
Mysterious Case of vanishing Hegemony, or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead? ", International 
Orzanizafion vol. 39 #2 (Spring, 1985) 
229 NoaM Chomsky points to the 'relative decline in US economic power during the Reagan years'... 
which has, 'reduced the United States' capacity to compete for this rich prize [Eastern Europe]'... See, 
Noam. Chomsky, pp. cit., p. 62., also, Muravchik, op. cit. e 'Declinism sounds as though it was 
formulated in explicit rebuttal to Ronald Reagan's reelection theme of 1984, It's morning In Ame? lca. 
The declinists want to convince us that in truth it is evening. They want especially to convince us that 
Ronald Reagan! s presidency was not the success that it appears to have been. ' pp. 61-62. 
230 quoted in Peter Schmcisscr, "Taking Stock: Is America in Decline? ", The New York Times 
Magazine 17 April, 1988 p. 67. 
231 Goertz and Diehl, Qp. cit. - p. 68. 
232 Charles F. Doran, "America's Changing Role in a Transforming World", &41SRevi vol. 13#2 
(Summcr/Fall, 1993): p. 69. 
233 IBID 
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power begins to fall off even as the level of relative power continues to rise'. 234 The 
general premise reached, according to Kennedy then, is that of overstretch. Yet such a 
premise is subject to scrutiny. Kennedy also implies that the US would have to comes 
to terms with its own constitution to tackle decline due to a 'division of constitutional 
and decision-making powers'which hampers the ability of the US to make swift 
decisions as opposed to nations without so many constitutional constraints. 235 
Kennedy's statement, however, obviously does not take into account the most 
fundamental point, the United States constitution is a living document. Its flexibility 
has been recognised from the time of its origin. The realm of foreign policy constitutes 
eleven of eighty-five papers of the Federalist Papers. 236 There has been little 
incidence when constitutional constraints have handcuffed the foreign policy 
establishment of the US. The principle of overstretch also raises a more basic question; 
.... Whether America should stretch 
itself at all, of what would be the proper degree of stretch, 
of whether there is any such thing as understretch. The declinists never even ask, much less 
answer, such questions. Are any military expenditures or any foreign alliances or bases ever 
justifiable? If a country can make itself vulnerable by overexerting itself, can it not also do so 
by underexerting itself? If this undeniable point is granted, then the debate must turn to 
concrete evaluations of needs, interests, and strategies. Such evaluations cannot be waived 
away with airy generalizations. [SiCI237 
For the Clinton Administration, lowering military spending and a decreased 
military presence abroad seem to point the way to a lesser role in world affairs. The 
late 1990s indicate only 3% GNP will be spent on defence, nearly a third of that spent 
during the 1950s and 1960s. This would imply greater flexibility in international 
affairs for the US. Overstretch, however, 'is a political , not purely economic 
concept'. 239 By simply arguing the numbers discrepancies in many of the declinist's 
arguments can be found. 239 The counter proposal by declinists point to an 
234 Doran, pp. cit.. p. 73., Doran relates his point to the international context by stating; 'For 
others..., decline seems to mean extensive movement downward on the relative power curve, perhaps 
even past the time of the second inflection point when the rate of relative decline slows down .... A 
more familiar benchmark is the apex of the relative power curve, the point at which declining 
competitiveness begins to chip away some of the previously held share of relative power. ' 
235 Kennedy (1988), gp. cit.., p. 678. 
236 See Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, The Federalist Pa e Yor New R (New k, 
York: Mentor Books, 196 1) 
237 Joshua Muravchik, pp. cit.: p. 58. 
238 Alan Tonelson (Winter, 1993/94), O. cit.,; p. 17. 
239 By pointing to US percentage of GDP immediately after WWII and then twenty years later, 
Kennedy indicates that the US share has decreased dramatically from 45% to 22%. Nye counters by 
stating: 'Charles Wolf of the RAND Corporation notes that Jfa more appropriate and representative 
base year is used- say, the mid-1960s [or even apre-jVorld War IIyear such as 19381- the 
remarkablefact is that the US economy's share ofthe global product was about the same 'thee as it 
is'now': about 22% to 24%.... Similarly, the American Council on Competitiveness finds that the US 
share of world product has held constant at 23 percent since the mid-1970s, and actually that its share 
of the product of the major industrial democracies actually increased slightly in the 1980s... The 
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unwillingness to engage in overseas commitments and more importantly, to a lessening 
of American influence, respect and credibility abroad. It is this then which finds 
expression in policy making typified by the Clinton defence budget. By scaling back, 
Clinton seems to accept the declinist's fundamental argument; 'the country's best 
strategy for long-term security and prosperity is to scale back an overextended foreign 
poliCyl. 240 By concentrating less on influencing the international landscape America 
can, so the argument goes, 'consolidate national powee. 
The logical conclusion arrived at for the declinists is that the post Cold War era 
should not automatically mean the extensive overseas commitment of the US in 
grandiose schemes such as democracy promotion. Pundits of an activist overseas role 
view areas such as Eastern Europe as new bases for resources and markets, as high 
potential investment regions with cheap labour. Moreover, an activist role would help 
in creating like minded democracies and preserve peace and stability. Advocates 
against this approach are quick to purport that such a notion is not lost on the West 
Europeans. Carpenter mentions that the European Community collectively constitutes 
more than 342 million people and a GDP of nearly $6 trillion. How then could it, not 
only take advantage, but also solve problems which may arise from the area? 241 The 
argument has some validity yet fails to consider a basic notion; 
The EC does not and cannot have a single defense policy, for the simple reason that it does not have a 
single army. And in circumstances such as the Yugoslav crisis, a foreign policy without a defense 
policy is like a gun without ammunition- it is effective only up until the moment when your opponent 
realizes that you are bluffing. 242 
Carpenter also states that the US must realise that its interests, though some overlap is 
likely, will not match those of its allies in Western Europe, thereby widening the trans- 
Atlantic gap. 243 There should be, however, no surprise in this, nor cause for alarm. To 
imagine that America! s allies would precisely match her own is 'self-deluding'. 244 
Indeed, it has been the crisis in the former Yugoslavia which appears to lend 
credence to the declinist's premise. The changing security environment in the post 
Cold War world no longer reflects US posture during the time of bi-polarity. The case 
is then made that this change in environment shows 'US incapability at preventing or 
even at repelling aggresSiolf. 245 The declinist's argument, however, suffers from 
results of these studies conflict with the view that American decline has been precipitous or 
continuous! [emphasis in original] Nye (1990), 2p. cit., - pp. 6-7. 
240 Alan Tonelson (Summer, 1993), 2p. cit,. - p. 166. 
241 Carpenter (1992), pp. cit., p. 45. 
242 Noel Malcolm (July, 1993), pp. cit.: p. 4 1. 
243 Carpenter (1992), i)p-. cit. * p. 4 1. 
244 John Gray, "Backward into the Future", National Review (29 March, 1993): p. 27. Point made in 
reference to the Yugoslav crisis which Gray believes will only 'strengthen American isolationism and 
cloud American perception of the real dangers to global security'. 
245 Carpenter (1992), pp_. cit., p. 109. 
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several flaws in reasoning. First, 'it tends to be highly deterministic and suggests that 
man's fate is largely the product of inanimate forces around him'. 246 The notion that 
decline is inevitable would have us believe that methods to correct this dilemma are 
uselesS247 and that, instead, the US should manage its decline gracefully to ensure that 
upheaval does not occur. If this is the case, then current measures by the Clinton 
administration to trim defence spending and overseas commitment reflect this 
prevailing attitude. The irony of this policy, however, is that military spending during 
the time of America's peak economically has not been matched since the late 1950s 
when industrial growth was spurred on by military production spending. 'Why then do 
declinists treat it as self-evident that America can slow its decline by cutting military ý 
spending? '248 To proceed in the present policy demonstrates nothing but a willingness 
on the part of the US to disengage from Europe at a time when the latter still requires 
US influence, direction, security guarantees, aid and general presence. Non- 
predictability and potential instability require a more concerted effort, not a decreasing 
one. This should not imply an ever burdening debt or mortgaging America! s future to 
non-vital interests. It may, however, require a rethink as to the level of activism in 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans and overall reconsideration to the benefits of unilateral 
action. 
Second, the notion that America has lost its 'empire' or that it should even be 
called one loses touch with the realities of current circumstances. Mead referred to the 
US as the 'greatest empire in history. 249 Since when, though, has imperialism 
dominated American foreign policy making? Muravchik correctly points out that, 'the 
American empire, conversely, consists of states that trade with America, some that 
receive aid from America, and some that have mutual defence treaties with America. 
But none lacks the freedom to govern itself, and none fails to defy American wishes 
when it wishee. 250 The idea that the US is an empire in the classical sense does not 
accurately reflect that America has 'neither sought wealth nor territory. Ours is an 
246 MUraVCW pp. clit. - -54. _. 
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247 JBID ..... . the classical self-contradiction of 
determinists. Namely, if our history is shaped by forces 
larger than ourselves, then there is little point to exhorting one another to political action ... 
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imperiurn of values'. 251 Advancing the cause of democracy, of free markets and its 
like are ideals that have found supporters across the globe since the demise of 
communism. The progress of democracy and of free markets should not signal decline 
but success. Granted, the US share of global wealth and production may decrease 
relative to this rise. Yet, is it not better to witness this phenomenon which in turn 
provides for a safer and more secure world than to see its failure and witness, instead 
widespread regional instability and the potential for more in areas of strategic 
importance such as the Balkans? 
The third weakness, as previously mentioned, offers a plethora of economic 
indicators and statistics to demonstrate America! s steady and continuing decline. For 
every statistic offered by the declinists, however, an equally valid one can be dredged 
up to indicate otherwise. Declinists are quick to point to the budget debt and its sharp 
increase during the Reagan era as proof positive that the US has declined. From the 
world's largest creditor to the world's largest debtor surely smacks of relative 
economic decline. Yet, even the declinists may want to consider that power, an 
amorphous beast, cannot be measured by data alone. Has the US, since the Reagan 
era lost its stature upon the international arena? More importantly, how exactly can 
this be measured, and who is to judge? 
The fourth inconsistency relates to the declinist's view that decline can be 
managed, and perhaps even reversed or slowed. This argument though contradicts 
simple notions of international politics. If we are to agree with the premise of declinists 
that the world is becoming smaller and more interdependent, then logically America 
I cannot seal off its fate from the fate of others'. 252 To make various parts of the globe 
unimportant represents a failure to understand the dynamics of global politics. Realists 
would have the US scrap ideas of commitment in regions where vital interests are not 
present, such as the Balkans. Albania, also would reflect minimal interest and 
therefore should not rely upon American activism. Expenditure of resources into 
these areas would hasten decline. Others would argue that some level of involvement 
should proceed yet be confined to diplomatic gestures. Such moves would not severely 
hamper American resources and still demonstrate US involvement on the world scene. 
Yet the recent crisis has shown that diplomacy without the backing of American will 
supported by US resources does very little save weaken US resolve, cloud US 
consensus, limit US influence and damage US credibility. Such a policy highlights the 
fifth, and perhaps most damaging belief of the declinists. By relying upon, and 
couching their theory on past and present data and circumstances, declinists offer very 
little recourse for the future of American foreign policy making except the 
25IBenJ. Wattenberg, The First Universal Nation: Leadinz Indicators and Ideas about the Suree o 




preconceived notion of decline. It appears that they also are very adept at descriptive 
analysis with limited availability to a prescriptive method aside from a decrease in 
military expenditure and overseas commitments. Were it that simple, would it not be 
likely that the large foreign policy establishment in Washington would have taken 
appropriate measures to allay decline? Perhaps not, yet the question does raise a more 
pertinent one; how can declinists be so sure that their measures of 'retrenchment' will 
succeed? Again, power does entail responsibility. The US may consider that drawing 
back from the international arena may do it more harm than good. Nye makes the case; 
Policies of retrenchment are premature and, ironically, they could produce the very 
weakening of American power they are supposed to avert. Withdrawal from international 
commitments might reduce American influence overseas without necessarily strengthening 
the domestic economy. Further, the nations of the world have become so inextricably 
intertwined that efforts to draw back would be difficult at beSt. 253 
Advocates of the counter-declinist argument are quick to point out these faults. Many, 
however, adhere to the second broad category of US foreign policy orientation, the 
universalists or triumphalists. 
2.2 Yhe Triumphalists 
The notion of superpower varies to some degree with the triumphalists from 
those that believe in the universality of American dominance, to those that feel the US 
may be a first among equals, and to others who see American hegemony yet also see 
threats to such hegemony. However scholars of this approach do agree that with the 
end of the Cold War the US has emerged as the only superpower, that is, the only 
complete superpower. While this ideal encompasses economic, political and military 
capability and dominance, it also includes certain intangible factors difficult to quantify. 
Brzezinski offers some explanation; 
The emergence of great powers is also the consequence of special historical opportunity 
combined with inherent physical capability. The moment- Or the historical tTcnd-must be 
congenial to the flowering of a dominant, catalytic state that has something of importance to 
say to the World at large- be it through a mission civilisatfice Or a doctrinal revelation or a 
compelling social example- to which others are historically receptive. Last, but not least, 
254 extant must be necessary sinews of power, economic and also military. 
Indicators and statistics can reaffirm the cries of the triumphalists that America 
is indeed dominant in relevant fields compared with others. The end of the Cold War 
does, moreover, put the US in a 'pivotal' position in world politiCS. 255 Retrenchment 
from world affairs now would not only be foolish but would also be incompatible with 
253 Nye (1990), M. Cit.. p. 4. 
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America! s place in the world given its sole superpower status. Triumphalists such as 
Wattenberg do not contend the rise of others, especially economic and/or military 
powers in Europe and the Pacific Rim. Yet, they do claim that the end of the Cold 
War has signalled triumph for the US of something perhaps of more weight, American 
universality of ideals. The 'American way of life, Wattenberg claims, is 'the pervasive, 
persuasive, universal model for activity all over the world'. 256 The premise is that 
America has demonstrated to others that American ideals are an 'imperium of values', a 
culture that has been and is being duplicated and sought after. 
It may, however, be premature to believe that others win automatically 
subscribe to the'American way of fife'. The US, for all its positive points, has not 
exactly been a paragon of virtue, as the Los Angeles riots demonstrated. Problems do 
persist and it is these internal factors which may undermine the triumphalist's premise. 
Some, such as Nixon do not support Wattenberg! s theory yet agree with the basic 
prescription of America! s dominance in world affairs. As most realists do, Nixon 
weighs the tangible factors and it is these which offer the US the opportunity to lead in 
the post Cold War era. 
As the world! s complete superpower, the United States must exercise leadership without 
imposing its political and cultural values on others .... we can advance our values and 
ideals 
with restraint dictated by realism. We should cultivate the growth of democratic principles 
where a reasonable prospect exists for their success and where they would be supported by 
nationalist traditions, customs, and institutions. We should not, however, engage in an 
indiscriminate global ideological crusade. 257 
Brzezinski concurs with the tangible factors approach yet addresses the intangible ones 
as those which require the US to 'transform its power into a leadership that commands 
moral legitimacy'. 258 Both approaches seem to believe that American activism abroad 
is not only capable, but necessary. While the circumstances of global security have 
shifted from the days of bi-polarity, threats still require US presence and leadership, so 
the argument goes. The shift may represent the US moving from a position of 
ý protector and dominator' to that of 'coalition-builder and persuader. Regardless, the 
'mantle of leadership will still tend to fall to the United States'. 259 These advocates do 
not adhere to the call for isolationism espoused by some which base their notion upon 
curing America! s ills before getting involved abroad. Indeed, those that believe in US 
256 Wattenberg, gp. Cit. - . p. 
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resurgency, and the need to maintain it, feel an inextricable link exists between the 
domestic and the foreign. By having and equally strong domestic policy, our interests 
at home can be served while simultaneously enhancing US interests abroad. 260 This 
may contain truth, yet formulating such a policy requires being equally capable to 
convince the American public that a strong, activist approach in foreign policy serves 
US domestic interests. It appears that the present administration has been either 
unwilling or incapable of doing this so far. 
For the democratising nations of Eastern Europe this technique involves 
continued 'responsibility to act', and subsequent aid to assist in democratisation. This 
may appear a grandiose project yet, as realists contend, 'this does not mean that [the 
US] should write a blank checle. 261 It instead requires that US leadership also involves 
prudence and scrutiny and programs which encourage states to help themselves. Such 
a policy would continue to promote US involvement abroad yet not hamper America 
by a unnecessary drain of time and resources on 'no-win' situations. Former US 
ambassador to the United Nations, Jean Kirkpatrick takes this notion further by 
criticising the American ideal that states could be 'democratised anytime and 
anywhere'. 262 The US can and should take hold of its mantle as leader, yet be able to 
temper its policy where and when necessary. Critics of the triumphalists school believe 
that the US nature of power is not geared for the new threats of the post Cold War 
world. By examining the tangible factors of power, such as military strength, they 
conclude that America will likely not be capable of adjusting to the new threats. 'A 
superpower, they contend, is essential only for major military tasks, such as - 
deteffence'. 263 In this realm the United States has fared well throughout the Cold 
War. Now, however, as ethno-nationalist conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have 
shown, the US finds itself handcuffed by inaction or action of a limited nature, subject 
to allied approval and of little likelihood for success. This, the critics contend, is not 
the mark of 'unipolarity' nor of America! s opportunity to lead, but instead may 
demonstrate the pattern for the upcoming decades. 
It is this contention, though, that triumphalists feel can be reversed by assertive 
US leadership, the type they believe is not currently being practised. By scaling back 
the military, for example, some feel that the Clinton administration is deliberately 
abandoning the 'security structures that kept the peace' during the Cold War. 264 Such 
260 Nixon (1992), pp. cit. - p. 278. 
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policy, they assert, is 'folly', particularly at a time when the potential for high-tech 
weapons proliferation is increasing and key regions are subject to potential instability. 
As for those critics which see defement of responsibility on the part of the US, as in 
the case of Yugoslavia, advocates of US leadership, such as Nixon offer less than a 
flattering reappraisal; 
In Yugoslavia's internal crisis, mediators from the European Community responded like 
Keystone Kops. During the initial phases of the crisis, European powers split over whether to 
support the Communist Serbian and central government or the democratic secessionist 
republics of Slovenia and Croatia. The community sent teams to act as ceasefire observers but 
did not marshal its massive political and economic leverage to demand a nonviolent 
resolution based on democratic self-determination. In the first major political play in the 
post-cold war period, Europe fumbled the MI. 265 
Nixon, may perhaps have failed to realise that at the outset of problems in Yugoslavia, 
the United States under the Bush administration was, not only too delighted and ready 
to let the Europeans handle it, but also clung on to the already defunct idea of a 
federated Yugoslavia. Granted, triumphalists claim that pre-emptive, concerted action 
may have been successful. However, hindsight unfortunately is always 20/20. 
These scholars though are not easily swayed by such arguments. Indeed, some 
believe that the general situation in the Balkans was perhaps typical of the need for US 
leadership and America! s first true opportunity to act. 
Accordingly, throughout this decade and into the next century, the world! s political affairs 
will be dominated by issues and conflicts that are the product of conditions, histories, and 
concerns of an essentially regional character. The worlds political power is likely to be 
distributed in terms ot.. several clusters .... with America not only 
dominating one of them 
directly but still intruding to a significant degree in several of the others. 266 
Yet, even Brzezinski admits that the US cannot 'extinguish all regional fires' that are 
likely to erupt. 267 The US may stand alone but it does so in an era when the 
environment of global aftirs is in a chaotic state of flux. By not being able to adapt 
and to do quickly and efficiently, the United States risks not being able to lead and 
shape the post Cold War world it did so much to help create. The Clinton team may 
be correct in its domestic focus but so far appears unable to understand that the link 
between domestic and foreign interests require and equally strong, comprehensive 
foreign policy. The domestic interests of America may limit its foreign policy power 
265 Nixon (1992), gp. cit. * p. 126. As for other Europe-basedorganisations such as the CSCE, Nixon 
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projection and it is in this realm that the US, and the Clinton administration, may want 
to consider addressing the policy inadequacy. 268 
For areas like the Balkans, and Albania specifically, America should consider 
the option of taking the lead in stabilisation and democracy promotion. If the region is 
placed within the scope of US strategic interest, it would make little sense for the 
United States to allow the West Europeans to attempt leadership in the region. The 
European Union states have demonstrated to date that they are not able to readily gain 
consensus, invest heavily in the free market capitalisation of the zone, and secure the 
safety and integrity of the constituent nations. It has been argued that the 'alternative 
to- not only regional- but general American leadership [then] is global anarchy. '269 In 
the case of Albania then, the US is presented with the opportunity to foster the growth, 
success, and democratisation of a state which already is strongly pro-US, in a region 
of, marginally, conditional interest, in an area of strategic importance. 270 Ensuring 
stability and continued aid in the short to medium term would likely achieve 
prosperous and stable growth in the long term, perhaps with regional consequences. A 
minimalist approach, however, relying upon diplomatic initiative, low level aid and 
offering lip service instead of concrete security guarantees in a volatile area does very 
little save promote unrest and hinder development. This in turn will likely have a 
damaging affect an area of strategic importance to the US and cost it more so in the 
long term. 
2.3 The Multilateralists 
Apart from the previous two schools of thought are the multilateralists. They 
may include those which do not deny US power and leadership capability with those 
that feel the US may indeed be heading away from its once superpower status. They 
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do, however, agree that the US should, with the Cold War over, operate within the 
arena of world affairs on a multilateral basis. This entails the notion of a 'great power 
cooperation, rather than unilateralism!. Some such as Bruce Cummings call on the US 
to 'ally with rising capitalist powere. By doing so, the 'multilateral arrangement would 
focus on New York, Berlin, and Tokyo, with Washington still hegemoniC'. 271 It 
appears that multilateralism has indeed become the watchword for the Clinton 
administration. It should be noted, however, that multilateralists themselves often 
encompass those that may be called declinists or resurgence theorists. The distinctions 
in some cases are subtle, in others they are vast in contrast to declinists who believe 
that multilateralism would only accelerate decline. 
The basic premise though is that the world has become increasingly multi-polar, 
that is that other centres of power be they econon-dc and/or military have sprung up to 
either challenge the notion of unipolarity or to make it known that they too are now 
players on the world stage. In this environment, the US may still be the most powerful 
nation, however, it will likely no longer enjoy hegemonic status. 272 The alternative 
then is to accept the premise that other centres of power exist and should be dealt with 
in a co-operative manner to deal with the new global threats. Some multilateralists 
though believe that the United States, even within a multi-polar world, still should take 
the lead in concerted action. Its place within the hierarchical structure of states should 
continue to reflect its status as great power. Therefore, it should be willing and able to 
make the 'important strategic decisions which do not necessarily cater to the interests 
of its smaller allies'. 273 It is natural to assume that within a multi-polar system a 
disparity of power does exist. The greater such disparity, the greater the range of 
decision-making. The US believes that multilateralism in conjunction with its 
European allies, for example, offers it the best possible route to protecting its vital 
interests, maintaining presence within Europe, and yet not severely draining its 
resources through unilateral action. To achieve the premise, however, of the US as a 
'chairman of the board', it may must negate the image of 'weakness' and decreasing 
credibility among its European allies. Within the domestic context, the US should take 
care to 'put its economic house in order'. 274 The Gulf War demonstrated that the US 
was dependent upon others to pay for the cost of war. A superpower or, first among 
others, should not be so dependent. 275Granted, the US has for some time been calling 
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for a burden-sharing among its allies. The question, however, becomes whether such 
burden-sharing also entails a devolvement of the 'political and moral responsibility, for 
concerted action. 276 This notion of interdependence lend credence to multilateralists. 
By accepting that the world indeed has become a smaller place and that the gap 
between domestic and foreign is shrinking, multilateralists claim that such 
interdependence cannot be managed unilaterally. In other words, 'the management of 
interdependence needs an expansion of political capacities to shape events at the supra- 
national level. 277 The operation, then, of the United States within a multilateral 
framework would seem a logical outcome. 
In the addressing the security threats that would arise, multilateralists opt for 
co-operative efforts which do not discount the possibility of a military response. What 
is necessary, however, for a 'Western alliance is to redesign and adjust their security 
structures'. 278 By doing so, the belief is that consensus can be reached and threats to 
the security and stability of Europe can be met. Yugoslavia has demonstrated 
otherwise. By immediately placing the issue within the realm of the United Nations 
Security Council, the US removed any possibility of acting unilaterally in a region of 
strategic interest. It is natural to assume that even like minded democracies will not be 
in accord with ways to combat crisis. Deliberately placing Yugoslavia within the 
international arena removed any possible alternatives unilateral action may have 
presented. Moreover, multilateralists are not in accord with democratisation. By 
embarking upon the policy of democratisation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans via 
enlargement it appears the US is engaged in contradictory policy. To seek to 
democratise an entire region yet, should crises arise in that region, to address them 
within a multilateral framework is assume much on the part of our allies. For one, that 
our interests coincide. Our allies may not deny that democratising the Balkans is a 
'good thing'. Yet they, like America, may want to admit that they 'have no special 
wisdom about the process of transitiont. 279 Further, security threats will meet with 
opposing views as to how to handle them, thus crippling initiative and delaying 
solutions as appears the present case in the Balkan crisis. 
Those who call for democratisation may want to consider that democracy 
encompasses more than the rule of law and free market capitalism. It also, by its 
nature, implies the security and integrity of peoples without fear of subjection. In the 
Balkans democracy cannot be built without addressing 'long-standing ethnic 
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grievances'. 280 Concerted action by the international community has shown that 
I redrafting maps' does not relieve the 'ethnic insecurity of minoritiee. 281 Andwithout 
such guarantees on behalf of minorities, democracy cannot succeed. These security 
guarantees are part and parcel of democratic tradition and are not likely to be ensured 
by multilateralism. Multilateralists contend, however, that indeed regional and 
international organisations offer the best protection for these rights. Group action has 
greater chance for success than action taken individually. In the Balkans, for example, 
international guarantees of existing borders protected by NATO, would, so the 
argument goes, 'deprive transnational ethnic rivalry of its political and military 
explosiveness, [and may] provide one substantial defense against the spread of violence 
and disorder'. 282 NATO air strikes and threats of more, may have achieved their 
limited objectives, but, they have hardly dissuaded Bosnian Serbs from continuing the 
fight. Gaining consensus on the crisis in the Balkans has been difficult and will likely 
continue to be S0.283 For the United States, such multilateral actions may also 
highlight inconsistencies with its proposals of democracy promotion. 
It was hoped by many within the Clinton administration that the end of the 
Cold War would, at last, bring to the fore the principles espoused by President 
Woodrow Wilson following the First World War. The belief of these 'neo-Wilsonians' 
is that 'democracies do not wage war upon one another'. Further, that 'political order 
was based upon liberal democracy. As such, it was naturally assumed that the goal of 
foreign policy then was to 'speed or assist the global convergence on democratic 
institutions, and thereby bring about the cessation of war'. 284 The assumption should 
not be that democracy, in and of itself, curbs 'maifs natural instincts for aggression and 
violence', but instead that democracy represents ideals which run counter to ideas of 
domination by one or many over another and thereby eliminate the 'motive for 
imperialism', often the cause of war itself. 285 For multi-lateralists, democratisation 
meant aid packages through organisations designed to achieve political and economic 
development. Yet, as the end of the Cold War has demonstrated, aid levels are not 
readily available and in fact are decreasing. 286 While the US Congress has been ready 
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to assist developing nations in the past, recent budget constraints indicate that 
programs such as America! s Agency for International Development [AID] has had to 
scale back. AID's chairman has outlined four goals which seek to correspond with the 
Clinton administration! s foreign policy goals of enlargement; 
foster and help build democracy 
protect the environment 
foster sustainable economic development 
encourage population controj287 
Eastern Europe is currently competing with the rest of the Third World for limited 
resources. Given this, it becomes difficult for multilateralists to accomplish their goals 
without realising that tough choices may be necessary. Democratists may want to also 
consider that aid alone is often not the sole answer to fostering democracy, particularly 
in areas where there has been no past experience with it. 288 
The promotion of democracy may have its merits yet the US should also realise 
that its vital and strategic interests require it view international politics with an eye 
towards national security. Multilateral aid to Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the 
former USSR may be earmarked for democracy promotion, however, such aid must 
also take the realities of international politics into account. Aid to these areas is seen 
by the US in 'strategic termS"219 and should also be balanced in accordance with its 
interests, once the latter are defined. Advocates of the democratist approach criticise 
the realists for assuming that democracy promotion represents grandiose schemes with 
I no geographic limits' and believe that the US should instead be dictated by interests. 290 
These criticisms may hold some validity. 'The assumption and expectation that the 
American model would be enthroned in Eastern Europe ... 
[is] more an reflection of 
optimism than reality. 291 Democratists who would advocate democratisation across 
the globe and based upon the US model assume that the US has either the resources 
available for such a grand task or believe that multilateral institutions should naturally 
embark upon such a course. Both assumptions are false. Yet realists should not be so 
quick to criticise democratisation. As a foreign policy goal, it does have merit. 
Granted, the US model may not be the most applicable or even the most practical one 
available. This should not preclude the possibility of democracy. Democratists are 
correct in stating that foreign policy is sometimes driven by factors other than vital or 
strategic interests. Yet, they should also understand that foreign policy without the 
287 EBrD, p. 21. 
288 MuraVChik, 
, pp. cit.. - p. 187. 289 The Economist (7 May, 1994): p. 22. 
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direction and influence of interests is not policy but instead represents the random 
instances of crisis management. The democratists and the realists can coexist but need 
to make clear certain points. By outlining interests in key areas, democracy promotion 
can proceed in those regions where vital and/or strategic interests predominate. The 
US can operate such a policy unilaterally via enlargement assisted by multilateral 
organisations in areas where vital or strategic interest are not of primary concern. 
Realists have argued that Wilsonian ideology, however, should be abandoned 
as a base for American foreign policy. The end of the Cold War has created a 'global 
power vacuum' which, as seen in the cases of Yugoslavia and North Korea, has 
triggered instability in Europe and rearmament in the Far East. 292 Yet these realists 
may also want to consider if such Wilsonian ideology was performed on a proactive 
basis instead of the present reactive one, such instability may not have arisen. 
Democracy promotion has its value yet multilateral aid alone is not the answer. 
Democracy must entail stability promotion in the short term, coupled with the creation 
of institutions which would help instil a 'civic culture"293and economic development in 
the medium term, followed eventually by democracy over the long span. Granted, 
democracy may be tougher in areas such as the Balkans and Eastern Europe where it 
has a limited history. The likelihood for more 'authoritarian structures'to emerge in 
that region are high . 294 This should not, however, preclude the policy of 
democracy 
promotion in the area, particularly since US vital, or at least, conditional interests are 
likely affected. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher has reiterated the US 
position on enlargement. By promoting democracy, the belief is that America! s security 
also benefits. By doing so through multilateral institutions, the US reduces its resource 
expenditure. With success comes therefore a group of democracies which would not 
only make the world more peaceful, but would lessen the military burden of theUS. 295 
As such, enlargement would be cheaper to maintain than the military spending and the 
series of alliances kept during the Cold War. 
Europe's long term security-like America! s- requires that we actively foster the spread of 
democracy and market economics. Democracies tend not to make war on each other. They 
are more likely to protect human rights and ensure equal rights for minorities. They are more 
likely to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and environmental 
protection .... 
Assisting them is not charity; it is essential to our common security. We must 
provide political support for reform, keep our markets open to their products, and target our 
292 John Gray, 2g. Cit. - p. 28. 
293 Fukuyama believes such a culture is essential to healthy stable democracies. See, Fukuyama 
(1992), pp. cit., p. 215., Civic culture implies the intangibles of democracy aside ftom'the political 
process, the constitutional system, the sovereignty of law and the preservation and enhancement of 
individual rights. It also entails the role played by culture and philosophy which together generate the 
values that motivate and shape social bchaviour'. Brzczinski (1993), pp. cit. - p. 75. 
294 Geir Lundestad, "The End of the Cold War, the New Role for Europe, and the Decline of the US", 
in, M. Hogan, M_. cit. * p. 199. 
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assistance programs for mwdmurn positive effect. It would be the height of folly to spend 
hundreds of billions of dollars to overcome communism and then refuse to invest in the 
survival of the democracies that arc cmcrging. 296 
Isolationists and the realists, among them political commentator and former 
Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan, continue to criticise democracy 
promotion. 'We are not the world's policeman, nor its political tutor. Whence comes 
this arrogant claim to determine how other nations should govern themselves, or face 
subversion by the National Endowment for Democracy [NED], the Comintern of the 
neo-conservatives? What have the 'democracies' done for America lately? '297 
Buchanan' s scathing rhetoric, however, suffers from the most fatal flaw for most 
realists, it deals with the present. Democracy promotion in key areas not only would 
ensure our interests in these regions but would also aid in securing and creating' zones 
of stability' and perhaps a safer world. 298 But even the democratists should realise that 
promoting democracy entails more than'procedural democracy'. 299 In Eastern 
Europe, for example, there has been little history of democracy. The latter is not some 
good that can be traded or bartered. It can, however, become subject to outside 
influence. 300 
Hyper-democratists such as Wattenberg who opt for democracy promotion 
based upon the 'American model' may be too extreme, particularly in his calls for a 
doctrine of 'neo-manifest destinarianism'. Yet he does raise the point that America's 
foreign aid budget along with that for the NED should be raised to ensure that 
programs such as enlargement takeoff. 301 For the declinists, managing US decline 
should preclude any such notion of democracy promotion especially if handled 
unilaterally. To do so would only further deplete US resources and thereby hasten 
decline. 302 Regardless of the position, democracy promotion does raise the question, 
'does aid foster democracy and whether or not it should be pursued by the US 
unilaterally or through multilateral institutionsT More importantly, critics would argue 
that the US is currently operating an inconsistent policy when it calls for democracy 
promotion yet continues to scale back resources. Vital and strategic interests are . 
necessary to protect, yet democratists may want to consider that should such interests 
296 Warren Christopher (May/June, 1993), op. cit,: p. 55. 
297 quoted in Wattenberg, pp. cit.. p. 198. 
298 ]]3ID, p. 18. 
299 Brzezinsld (1993), pp. cit, p. 183. 
300 'Democracy arises from certain social circumstances .... A solid case can be made that literacy, 
affluence, national unity, peace, and the like are factors that make democracy easier to create or 
preserve. It is equally true, however, that democracy is created; it does not just arise. It is created as a 
result of political, cultural, or intellectual processes that persuade a body of people to create 
democratic structures. Those processes arc manifestly subject to external influence., Muravchik, 
pp. cit, - p. 81. 
301 Wattcnbcrg, LDp. cit.: p. 196. 
302 Exporting Democracy... pp. 49-50. 
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conflict with the promotion of democracy, they may be hard pressed to automatically 
choose the latter and thereby forfeit the former. The case of Eastern Europe, the 
Balkans and the former USSR presented the West with an opportunity to construct 
policy which would perhaps dictate relations with these areas for the next several 
decades. In its natural apprehension not to cause further disruption, the West became 
caught between seeking stability and furthering democracy. This was particularly 
evident in the Balkans. 
The rapid disintegration of the 'evil empire'affected the Balkans in a profound way. No 
plans were formulated for an orderly transition to democracy in a region that had very little 
of it prior to 1945, when communism came to power.... It was assumed that because 
American ideals were internalized by the students of Beijing and Moscow, they would also be 
adopted by prewar dmigrd elites, their offspring, and recycled Communists who crashed the 
gates of democracy to lead again. This assumption was still firmly embedded in the minds of 
Western officials and was even integrated into the preelectoral rhetoric of American 
presidential candidates .... What the West seemingly 
failed to notice in the Balkans, however, 
was that prewar elites and opportunists leapt to the front with old scores to settle. In some 
countries, these opportunistic elements succeeded in hijacking the bandwagon of 
democratization and moved to pursue their age-old agcndas. 303 
However, the most fatal flaw in the reasoning of multilateralists and the 
democratists may rest upon a simple premise, that democracy is the sole ideology that 
should be pursued. Indeed, the more basic premise assumes that the rest of the world 
wishes to cooperate with the West. 'The West should understand that the one billion 
Moslems [for example] will not be impressed by a West that is perceived as preaching 
to them the values of consumerism, the merits of amorality, and the blessings of 
atheism. To many Moslems, the West's (and especially America! s) message is 
repulsive . 304 Brzezinski's point 
is a valid one. Moreover, it raises the more recent 
argument by Samuel Huntington. 305 Huntington makes the case for a new paradigm 
within international relations, one based upon a 'clash of civilizations'. 306 'Western 
ideas of individualism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of 
law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little 
resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox culturee. 307 
These latter cultures represent over half of the world's population. To believe that 
Western culture, including politic culture, can be superimposed or replace cultures 
303 Stavrou (1993), gp. cit., p. 33. 
304 Brzezinski (1993), pp-. ci-t-., p. 2 10. 
305 Huntington, "A Clash of Civilizations? ", Foreign Affairs vol. 72 #3 (Summer, 1993) 
306 Huntington explains the latter as; 'A civilisation is .. the 
highest cultural grouping of people and 
the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other 
species .... 
A civilisation may include several nation states..., or only one .... 
Civilisations obviously 
blend and overlap, and may include subcivilisations ... 
Civilisations are nonetheless meaningful 
entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilisations are dynamic; 
they rise and fall; they divide and merge'., (Summer, 1993), 2p. cit. * at p. 24. 
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that have been in position for millennia is more than foolish, it fails to understand the 
basic notion democracy itself is meant to protect, that culture is indigenous and part of 
what distinguishes one peoples from another. Huntington's argument deserves greater 
attention. He has presented the case that the end of the Cold War will witness threats 
of a primarily 'cultural nature'; that is that conflict will pit civilisations against each 
other as non-Western societies struggle against attempts to 'Westernise' while 
simultaneously seeking to 'modemisethemselves. 308 Religious differences, such as 
those being felt in the Balkans are but one example of this clash. 
Huntington claims that as the post Cold War evolves, co-operation will 
abandon the traditional balance of power politics. It will instead opt for co-operation 
among states based upon elements of commonality. 309 These elements are likely to 
come from common culture. As coalitions form among the cultures, differences will be 
apparent. It is these differences, then, once exacerbated which will form the root of 
conflict. Huntington examines the conflict in Bosnia and portrays it as just such a 
clash. 'With respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics 
manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they 
suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed, however, 
over'Croatian attacks on Muslims ... 1310 Huntington sees Yugoslavia as the epitome of 
the cultural clash of civilisations. It is there that three separate and distinct cultures 
have come together. Croatia represents the dividing line between the Western world, 
Catholicism and Bosnia which belongs to the Islamic world dating from its Ottoman 
days, to the Serbs, representatives of the Eastern Othordox Byzantine culture. 31 I The 
Islamic world has from the outset of warfare in Bosnia been highly critical of the West 
for allowing the slaughter of Muslims. They were particularly angry over a refusal by 
the UN for a request to supply 15,000 peacekeepers from Islamic states, 10,000 of 
which were from Iran. UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali did, however, 
allow for Russian troops to be deployed in Bosnia, but feared Islamic forces may 
308 ..... the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or 
primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the don-dnating source of conflict will 
be cultural ..... 
Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the 
modem world!. Huntington (Summer, 1993), gp. cit.: p. 22. 
309 IBID, p. 35. 
3 10 Huntington (Summer, 1993), 2p. cit. , p.. 37. 
311 'As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between 
Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has 
reemerged... In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the 
Hapsburg and Ottoman empires .... The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or 
Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched 
by the shaping events in the rest of Europe, they are generally less advanced economically; they seem 
much less likely to develop stable democratic Political systems'., IBID, at pp. 29-3 1. 
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become involved. 312 Huntington recognises such circumstances as the precursor to a 
civilisations clash. 
Even democracy promotion appears to suffer in such circumstances. 
Democracy is based upon a'concem for people'. In Bosnia, the West has, perhaps too 
late, recognised that people are dying and that something should be done. Yet the far 
greater number of people slaughtered in Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Liberia all within 
the past two years has evoked little press or response from the West. It appears that 
Western policy based upon principles of democracy not only 'lacks integrity, but such 
a policy of avoidance appears raciSt'. 313 This discrepancy in Western, and US policy is 
not lost on the non-Western world. It is the cultural differences, as they see it, which 
turns the West against them, or worse, not even pays attention. This inbuilt 'unfairness 
is then turned into populist pofitiCS"314 the kind of which men such as Milosevic have 
turned to their advantage by portraying themselves as underdogs against the West. 
Such views may hold weight and seem to reaffirm Huntingtotfs theory. Yet, 
there are inconsistencies. Huntington offers six reasons why civilisations clash to 
perhaps explain away the inconsistencies. First, 'differences among civilisations are 
real'. These differences go beyond the political ideologies yet do not necessarily mean 
conflict and violence. It has been these differences, however, that have often caused 
the most violent conflicts throughout history. 315 Second, the growing interaction 
throughout the world is shrinking the globe. As this proceeds, an increasing 
civilisations consciousness will intensify differences, and draw common peoples 
together. 316 Third, economic modernisation and social change has weakened the 
nation-state as a source of identity. The void created has been filled by religion and 
culture. 317 Fourth, as the West grows in power, the non-Western world will mobilise 
itself among common cultures with an increasing desire to shape the world in non. 
Western ways. 318 Fifth, cultural characteristics are not so easily compromised as 
political or economic ones. This will solidify cultural consciousnesS. 319 Finally, the 
growth of economic regionalism will reinforce cultural consciousness. Success of such 
regionalism will depend upon a common civilisation. 320 
In examining the applicability of Huntingtores theory one should look to the 
current trend among the West, especially the United States to democratise. The values 
of democracy cannot be treated as universal principles. To do so risks encountering 
312 Il"a 27-29 January, 1994 p. 1. 
313 Charles Doran (Summer/Fall, 1993), op. cit.: p. 83. 
314 Vincent Cable, pp. cit., p. 56. 
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stiff opposition from the non-Western world. Critics may state that Huntington's 
premise does not account for violence within cultures. He believes that these will 
occur yet are likely to be less intense. 321 This should not, however, provide impetus 
for a crusade of democratisation. The non-Westem world views the West, led by the 
US as seeking to use institutions backed up by military, political and economic power 
and influence, to shape the world in a way which protects their interests and values. 322 
This cannot be and will likely become an inherent source of conflict. Hyper- 
democratists such as Wattenberg claim the *American style democracy' which carries 
with it American style culture should not present a problem. Using 'traditional 
diplomacy, or necessary military muscle, or geopolitical gamesmanship' is necessary to 
accomplish the task. Culture, he claims, would be 'enhanced, not replaced'. 323 The 
US, however, would likely be hard pressed to convince states of this. For them, such a 
policy of democratisation is anathema to their existence. Why then does the West 
continue to pursue such policies? 
The West considers itself to be inherently superior, not only on the level of economic 
development but in political maturity. Much of the West's political rhetoric about the world 
reflects that attitude: the less developed countries are viewed as politically primitive, 
economically backward, and religiously fanatic. And while there may be some justification 
for such feelings, they also tend to betray a patronising and parochial attitude, insensitive to 
the historical and cultural factors that prevented other societies from pursuing the same path 
of development as the West. Moreover, inherent in that attitude is the assumption that 
historical development is unlinear, and that imitation of the West is the only positive option 
open to others. The West's concept for religion is also part and parcel of this mind-Set. 324 
What then, if this statement holds any truth, are the implications for US policy? 
For Huntington it means that the short term should witness Western efforts to 
I promote greater unity and cooperation within its own civilisation'. As for the long 
term, the West should maintain economic and military power necessary to protect its 
interests in relation to other civilisations. 325 It would appear, however, that such a 
policy would itself intensify differences and set cultures against each other. Yet this is 
precisely what Huntington has tried to lay out, that a world of %clashing civilisations is 
inevitably a world of double standards', where actions against 'kin countrieS, 326 as 
Huntington calls them, will not resemble actions against contrary cultures. In looking 
at the Balkans, states such as Turkey present a 'presentable face of Islam' as opposed 
to the, as the US sees it, type of Islam preached by states such as Iran. Indeed, Turkey 
and now even Albania, a nation predominately Islamic, offer a 'force for Islamic 
321 Huntington (Summer, 1993), 2p. cit. * p. 38. 
322 IBID, p. 40. 
323 Wattenberg, pp. cit.. p. 205. 
324 Brzezinsld (1993), pp. cit.: p. 217. 
325 Huntington (Summer, 1993), L)p. cit. * pp. 4849. 
326 IBH), p. 36. 
277 
moderation and secular political and economic development in the region!. 327 Fear of 
fundamentalism on the part of the West has made it seek states that opt for a more 
secular, Western approach. 
Coalition-building on the part of the US in the post Cold War era may fluctuate 
between the desire to promote democracy and stability. Yet Huntington's theory may 
preclude the possibility of both. Adherents of the view would not condone an activist 
policy since both stability and democracy promotion represent 'arrogant social 
engineering schemes on an international scale'. 328 Yet such critics are not so quick to 
offer viable policy options. Critical analysis may be insightful, however, it does very 
little by way of recommendations. The United States policyrnakers may be incorrect in 
attempting to impose ideology and/or political systems on other cultures. Yet, what 
are the alternatives? Should interests be simply abandoned or worse, not even 
formulated or given consideration merely because others may view attempts to protect 
them as some form of 'cultural imperialisid? The promotion of democracy in areas of 
vital and/or strategic interest does not mean to 'foist democracy on others by force. 
Nor does it mean to seek carbon copies of American institutionS'. 329 Of course the 
underlying assumption is that people seek the basic premise of democracy, that they 
should not be subjugated to the will of others by force. To claim this as a value is 
indeed, an 'unprovable axione, yet to automatically discount it, is likewise to reject the 
foundation of American foreign policy, that it includes within its formulation tenets of 
morality. 330 The ouster and demise of communism throughout Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans has revealed that people do not wish to be governed without consent. This 
failure of communism, however, should not automatically mean subscription to liberal 
democracy. 331 The case of the three general schools of US foreign policy orientation 
all share a basic characteristic, all share the desire to witness the promotion of 
American interests, even if they either do not agree what these interests may be. 
Differences become apparent as to the direction of the United States given its relative 
place within the international system and the means it should take reflective of this 
position, its interests, and the resources available at its command. Accounting for 
these factors, and how, exactly a state such Albania fits within them takes one to the 
issue of policy formulation on the part of the US in the post Cold War era. 
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Chapter Five 
A PROACTIVE APPROACH 
1.0 Policy Recommendations 
The end of the Cold War has raised doubt among some in Washington that the 
concern for American activism on the world scene will diminish significantly, especially 
with the arrival of the Clinton team, an administration much more comfortable with 
domestic policy. Indeed, during the days of the Cold War, the American people were 
made to realise that communism presented a threat to American interests as well as to 
the American way of life. Such a threat, therefore meant that the US could not shy 
away from its international commitments. Now, however, with the dissolution of what 
once constituted the primary threat to the United States for nearly five decades, the 
prospect of convincing the US public of a need for continued international activism 
becomes less defensible. I Gaddis Smith correctly asks the question; 'how does a 
democracy, with leaders who can be replaced at the polls, convince its citizens to make 
sacrifices whose benefits may not be apparent for decadesT2 Indeed, for the American 
public success or failure of its elected officials is usually measured in how well they 
perform during crises. Convincing them to subscribe to a policy, the effects of which 
will likely not be felt for years, if at all, would be difficult. However, proactive policy 
measures should not be so quickly discounted. Policy, it is said, cannot operate within 
a vacuum. And while most policy is meant to counterbalance the prevailing trends of 
a given time"3 proactive policy may allay the possibility of crisis and protect interests in 
the long term. Cynics may claim that this will not win votes for elected officials. 
Should this mean then that the adoption of a comprehensive strategy of foreign policy 
should be abandoned so that only success vis-a-vis crises situations can continue to 
justify the self-aggrandisement of public officials? Most likely, no. 
The end of the Cold War has instead placed the United States once again at the 
cross-roads of policy formulation. The Bush and Clinton administrations may have 
recognised the dynamics of the international system, yet have done little by way of 
strategy formulation. While members of the latter administration have continued to 
express the merits of diplomacy as the method most likely to pursue 'national security 
interests', they have failed to understand that 'negotiation that worked in the 1940s and 
11ndeed, the US public perception of the crisis in Bosnia appears to be waning from the public's 
interest. In a December, 1994 Associated Press poll, the crisis in Bosnia did not even make it onto 
'the top ten news stories for 1994'. Whether 'de-scnsitized', disinterested, apathetic or a combination 
of all these, was not made clear. What the poll perhaps does indicate it that the US public is pushing 
the Bosnian crisis away from what it considers of vital news interest. Poll results given on "CNN 
World News" (26 December, 1994) 
2 Gaddis Smith, "What Role for America? ", Current Historv vol. 92 #573 (April, 1993): p. 153. 
3H. Branden, 2p--cit. - pp-56-57. 
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1950s will not work in the 1990S. 4 The changing international environment is certainly 
one reason for this. A far greater reason perhaps has been in the administratioWs - 
inability to outline its strategic interests. Democratists such as Muravchik criticise the 
realists for attempting to 'fix geographic definitiods to America! s interests'. 5 Granted, 
the realist's argument is limited in that it relies on the tangible factors. Democratists, 
though, do not contend the growing interdependency of the world. If democracy is to 
spread then certainly markets, and hence US interests will also spread out across the 
globe. Democratists may not also contend that it folly to believe that the entire globe 
will become 'democratised'. They admit that, 'less virtuous states may pursue their 
own interests without such qualifications [fairness, respect for others and for law], or 
scruples'. 6 If this is to be the case, then is not the formulation, identification and 
strategy creation of policy necessary for ensuring US interests? These need not rely 
solely on the realist's premise of vital, tangible, geographic locations. They do however 
require formulation. 
I Interest Formulation 
The Balkans, the crisis there, and the potential ones that may arise have 
demonstrated that the US is not prepared to identify its goals in the region. 7As the 
conflict broke out, it was not perceived as a serious threat to US interests. However, 
the US should take notice. 'In aggregate, unconventional conflicts have shaped [and 
are shaping] the international security environment and in the long term, some may 
pose serious threats to US interests. Such conflicts often threaten to institutionalize 
regional instability- instability that threatens efforts at establishing regional democratic 
systems. '8 If we are to take this statement, or part of it as containing seeds of truth, 
then it would seem to serve notice that present US strategies such as enlargement may 
not succeed. Establishing set goals and priorities become a necessity then for 
policyrnakers in Washington. Proactive policy measures may aid the US in formulating 
strategy which would make the US act in 'anticipation of events, rather than in 
response to events'. 9 
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For the Clinton administration, it may want to first consider that while it rode in 
recognising a need to combat lagging domestic policy, it should realise that foreign 
policy also requires an equal amount of initiative, planning, depth and capability. The 
links between domestic and foreign policy are continuing to shrink in the post Cold 
War world. Recognising this means the US should seek the 'appropriate balance"O 
between the domestic and the foreign policy requirements of the United States. In 
formulating its interests, the US needs to determine the placement of areas within the 
categories of interests; vital, conditional, or peripheral. Relations with Albania and the 
Balkans should perhaps be considered within the realm of secondary interests. As 
previously mentioned, the region sits between two areas of vital importance to the US, 
Western Europe and the Nfiddle East. Coalition-building of pro-US states in the area 
would aid in securing interests. In the future, strong links with the states in the 
Balkans, such as Albania could aid in promoting stability in an area historically rife 
with conflict. Advocacy of democracy still offers the best possible path for Albania 
and the region. The short term, however, requires stability and concerted efforts of 
diplomacy backed up by force if necessary. 
US-Albanian relations have increased dramatically since 1990. While they 
continue to move forward, more concrete steps are needed to solidify US commitment 
to Albania. Relations may be positive, yet are not on par with links between the US 
and her allies. Instead, current ties can be designated as relations between 'friends'. 
'Friendly relationships are characterised by positive affect, low or variable 
commitment, and limited scope. They are different in kind from either allied or 
adversarial relationships and present unique problems... "' Brady's definition of 
'friendly relations' seems apt when considering the US-Albanian association. Shegoes 
on to state that parties to this relationship lack long-standing ties. The effect of this is 
that"specific negotiations tend to be approached on an ad hoc basis'. 12 While the 
definition refers to the applicability of the negotiating process, it has equal applicability 
to building a relationship with interest ramifications. 
For nearly five decades, Albania has isolated itself from the West. During the 
days of the Cold War the policyrnakers of Washington tended to view states and their 
political regimes through a narrow lens, Failure after W. W. 11 to co-opt Albania into 
the Western orbit left the US with little, if any influence in the region. This failure led 
I kw 11 10 1 Story, (ed. ) The New Europe: Polifics, Government and Economv ince 945(Oxford: Bac c 
Press, 1993): p. 6. 
11 Brady (1991), op. cit. - Bradycontinues identifyingthe relationshipby statingthat friendly relations 
seek, '... the pursuit of individual, rather than common interests. The absence of a long-standing 
relationship between the parties reinforces a one-shot mentality. The parties consider negotiations in 
isolation from the broader relationship-because no broader relationship exists. The parties also find it 
difficult to identify common interests and objectives'., at p. 15 1. 
12 IBID, p. 29. 
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to a lack of understanding of the political climate in the Balkans, a deficiency all too 
obvious once the crisis broke out in 1990. Brady mentions that it is the lack of long- 
standing ties which often leads 'friende less likely to trust each other. With this, it 
becomes difficult to identify common interests and possibly heightens misperceptions 
and miscalculations. 13 US interest in Albania may be to see that the transition from 
communism to democracy is successful. It may also have an increasing interest due to 
Albania! s proximity to the former Yugoslavia. These two factors, however, can not 
serve as the base for a fruitful relationship. Interests are not readily identifiable. 
Albania may express the merits of democracy and its desire to see it succeed. Yet, 
security concerns in a region not particularly stable predominate the political climate. 
By viewing the US ineptitude in handling the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and in the 
likelihood that Bosnia will lose the territorial integrity it once had, the idea of trust, the 
basis for any relationship, will not likely be high. By not understanding the Albanians 
security fears the US has demonstrated, to Albanian perceptions, that it may not be as 
committed to democracy as was first thought. 
Democracy promotion entails with it the semblance of equilibrium, that 
minority rights are protected, and the notion of security. None of these factors appears 
firm in the Balkans. 'Western powers are deterred from engaging in more than the 
promotion of basic political order in the region.. '14 This attitude, however, will likely 
bar the prospects for coalition-building in the area. Moreover, by not stating interests 
that have some basis of commonality with the regioWs states, the US will probably 
continue to maintain links with states such as Albania in 'friendly' terms only. The 
interests themselves need sound expression, as do the means to ensure their security. 
The Clinton administration has pledged itself to the promotion of democracy, and 
rightfully so. However, by not outlining its interests, it risks a confrontation between 
the processes of democracy and more traditional balance of power political concerns. 
Democratisation is not some process that the United States has the political blueprints 
for. To imagine that is to fall victim to Wattenberg! s outrageous claim of 'neo-manifest 
destinarianism'. The US is not a nation chosen by God, to 'do good'. 
This should not, however, preclude its responsibility to ensure the task it has 
set out to do, to seek the steady transformation of Eastern Europe and the Balkans to 
democracy. Efforts which fall short of whole-hearted commitment may not result in a 
return of communism, yet may not rule out a return to some form of 
13 Brady (1991), Qp. cit. 
14 This point believes that even 'imposed solutions by external actors, be they states or regional 
organisations, will not solve problems. In fact they may simply delay the need to confront the 
problems'., see, Spyros Economides, qp. cit.: pp. 20-21. 
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authoritarianism. 15 This appears likely in the short term when reform measures meet 
with resistance and the effects of shock therapy hit the populace hard. Leaders, most 
of which are themselves reform communists, find it difficult to avoid a'heavy handed' 
approach to carry out policy. US efforts towards democratisation carry with them 
concerns then which require comprehensive measures. First, economic reconstruction 
will require more than mere co-operation of the states involved. 16 Supranational co- 
operation may be a necessity but should not mean a new Marshall Plan for Europe. 
Current US economic efforts to the Balkans and Albania have been marginal. Scaling 
back military resources, however, should not be the answer. 17 As stated, democracy 
promotion should entail being ready and capable to also ensure the stability required 
for the nurturing process of democracy. Arguments can be made that raising the taxes 
of the American public would provide the funds for more foreign aid. The US 
currently holds the lowest tax rate of the G-7. This would not endear politicians to 
their constituents and would again require sacrifices that can not be easily explained. 
Greater efforts, though, should be towards aiding nations to help themselves. Private 
sector investment can spur on growth, In Albania, however, investment has been 
especially low. The conflict next door certainly is a contributing factor and highlights 
the need for US activism in promoting stability. Aside from limited US aid to the 
Balkans, it appears that economic concerns in the region have been reserved instead 
for economic sanctions. Such deterrent methods, however, do very little except 
mobilise anti-US opinion and hinder future US influence in the area. Foreign economic 
policy in the area needs an objective which recognises goals beyond the hope for a 
market economy. Simply advocating the latter may take a minimum of ten years 
before some'ambiguous success can be declared. '18 Intermediate objectives should be 
outlined yet even these will suffer from a fatal flaw, 'how can they be assessed?, 
The general premise of economic reform in the Balkans has often related to 
past failures due to great power intervention or a% ethnocentric theory of Balkan 
backwardness'. 19 The former premise may hold some truth yet places undue weight 
on the cause of failure. The latter premise is simply racist. Views of aid being thrown 
into a vortex of mismanagement, corruption and endless bureaucracy pervade thoughts 
of those who would not have the US assist in economic reform. They are correct. Yet, 
15 Brzezinski claims that while, political consensus is necessary for a successful democratic process, 
the need for authoritarianism may arise. Such a social sacrifice, however, is not desirable. See, 
Brzezinski (Fall, 1993), gp. cit, p. 6. 
16 Herman J. Rupieper, "After the Cold War: The US, Germany and European Security", in M, 
Hogan, 2R. cit. : pp. 180-181. 
17 'Expanding our diplomatic objectives while cutting back our power [military shrinkage] can only 
be called voodoo national security policy'. See, Peter W. Rodman, "Intervention and its Discontents", 
NafionalRevi (29 March, 1993) p. 29. 
18 JMC Rollo, pg. cit. - p. 129. 
19 Shoup (1990), pp. cit, p. 10. 
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does the alternative of allowing states of conditional interest, such as Albania, to fall 
into the abyss of perpetual economic backwardness and instability contribute to US 
interest in the long term? Such a posture would only cost the United States more in 
the long term. Worse, it would make the task probably more difficult since for 
Albanians, who would believe it was the US which caused their plight. The simple 
premise asks, 'why create enemies when you can create alliesT The more complex 
version of this premise adds that the US can spend far less than it ever did during the 
days of bipolarity to assist in the formation of stable, healthy democracies; of trading 
partners, of allies in regions of strategic interest, with interests themselves in the 
perpetuation of prosperity and stability. Or, America can abandon its role of activism; 
it can seek short term, ad hoc solutions, create adversaries, alienate marginal states, 
risk regional strife and address problems in the medium to long term with military 
solutions, the price of which, would be much higher. 
'America has stood for half a century as the guarantor of the European balance 
of power. It need not abandon that role-120 It should, however, understand that the 
balance it helped to maintain is not secure on Europe's eastern and southern quarter. 
To preserve some semblance of stability and order in the short to intermediate term the 
US should identify its goals in the region as follows; 
..... preservation of the states- system and 
international society; the maintainencc of the sovereignty of 
individual states; peace; and the common goals of all social life, namely life, truth and property- the 
limitation of violence, the keeping of promises, and the stabilisation of possession. [emphasis in 
original]21 
McInnes refers to Grotians and their reliance on power when making the above 
statement. By order, he means that , 'the goals of the actors are predictably 
maintained through shared norms and valuee. 22 The compatibility of democracy with 
short term stability promotion need not be discounted then as not possible. The influx 
of aid is but a preliminary step. By reducing the security concerns of states in the 
region through US guarantees, accounting for the balance of power in the Balkans, 
America can ensure that 'catastrophic scenarios' will not be repeated. 23 Such a US role 
would accomplish several tasks. It would ensure US vital interests by seeing that its 
conditional ones remain stable. It would also maintain the system of states, their 
sovereignty, integrity, and allow for their eventual transition to viable democratic 
nations. As Brzezinski states; 'The first need is still for a long-term and comprehensive 
strategy that integrates geopolitical and economic objectives ... It must deal with the 
post-communist area as a whole, but recognise the significantly different stages of 
20 James Chace, op. cit.: p. 71. 
21 McInnes, 2p. cit. - pp. 7-8. 
22 JBID 
23 McInnes, pp. cit.. - p. 13. 
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change within it. '24 An addendum to this requires recognising the degree of varied 
interest from area to area and state to state vis-a-vis interests. , 
The identification of interests smacks of realist overtones and adds credence to 
Brzezinski's statement. Yet as democracy should remain the long term objective, some 
realists would balk at the infusion of morality to foreign policy. However, as 
Muravchik correctly ponders; 'why can't national policy attempt to combine respect for 
the requisites of self-preservation with adherence to honorable means and with respect 
for the legitimate claims of other nations? '25[SiC] Morality remains part of American 
foreign policymaking because morality is engrained upon the American political 
culture. 26 As such, the prioritasation and identification of interests carries with it 
realist's 'baggage, yet with streaks of Wilsonianism. 
1.2 Yhe Necessary Framework 
From the end of the Second World War up to the demise of communism within 
the Soviet Union, the United States has operated its foreign policy machinery within 
the framework of the Cold War. Negotiationsý, and policy were conducted within 
this framework, one which identified states as either 'allies or adversaries'. 27 Strategies 
were concocted to achieve objectives in accordance with the structure of the Cold 
War. This structure is now obsolete. Creation of a workable framework for analysis 
and policy implementation does not require that the US abandon all its pretexts of the 
past forty-five years. After all, the notion of foreign policymaking still holds firm to 
principles of outcomes, outputs, national interest, strategy, objectives ... etC. 28 Yet 
before it can formulate a new framework the US should consider the more basic task, 
whether it will act directly within the international arena attempting to directly 
influence events or adopt a more passive strategy. 29 Before it can determine the 
structure within which it must operate, the US should define the parameters of this 
framework; will it operate an activist or passive foreign policy in relation to its 
objectives, 
Believers of the passive approach feel that the US has done its bit to secure 
some semblance of European order and has witnessed the proliferation of democracy 
24 Brzezinski (Fall, 1993), op-cit.: p. 12. 
25 MuravChik, 2p. Cit. - . p. 35. 26 'Americans are, after all, most comfortable with a foreign policy imbued with moral purpose. Even 
when the pursuit ofjustice has led to unintended consequences, even when our ideals have concealed 
from ourselves as well as others, motivations of a darker and more complex nature, we have preferred 
a policy that at least rhetorically is based on moral purpose rather than self interesV. James Chace, 
pp. cit, - p. 170. 
27 For definitions see, L. Brady (1991), pp. cit., - p. 3. 
28 For definitions of these see, Smith and Clarke, op. cit.. and, Philip Zelikow, "Foreign Policy 
Engineering", International Secu?! vol 18 #4 (Spring, 1994): pp. 143-171. 
29 William Pfaff, Barbadan Sentiments: How the American Centy! y will End (New York, New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1989): p. 184. 
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and market economies spring up in ample numbers since the end of the Second World 
War. Adoption of a new framework, they argue, should first consider that the end of 
the Cold War should not be analysed by terms of 'victory or defeat'. These concepts, 
in and of themselves, are terms from the Cold War. 30 Their application to present 
circumstances does not provide the proper forum for analysis or policyrnaking. The 
world has indeed become less predictable and therefore the US must allow itself room 
to manoeuvre within the realm of foreign poliCy. 31 By sticking with an outdated 
framework for analysis, however, the US hinders the multiplicity of options in the 
foreign policy domain. Worse, it hinders its own ability in formulating a policy since 
the fundamental base for any such policy is itself obsolete. 
US policy in the Balkans, especially since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
highlights this flaw. Two fatal early mistakes led to failure in grasping the situation at 
hand. First, the US hung onto the notion that the territorial integrity of 'Yugoslavia! 
must be maintained even after it became apparent that such a concept ceased to exiSt. 32 
By sending then Secretary of State, James Baker to Belgrade in 1991, the US hoped to 
convey its express desire that it would not accept the dissolution of the federal 
Yugoslav state into its constituent parts. 33 This hope of keeping Yugoslavia intact 
confused US wishes of keeping stability in the area with the realities of the situation. It 
may have also given Serbia an excuse to justify aggression against the breakaway 
republics by believing the US would back 'federal efforts to preserve federal integrity'. 
Baker's trip to Belgrade was fruitless if only because travelling to the federal capital 
and yet not to the capitals of Slovenia and Croatia might, the US believed, be 
interpreted as implicit recognition of the republics, something the US was not prepared 
to do. Yet this desire to maintain some semblance of stability in the region rested upon 
Cold War premises. By sanctioning the break-up of Yugoslavia, the US would also 
have sanctioned a fundamental shift in the balance of power in the region, for which it 
was not prepared. Clinging to these outdated Cold War notions of stability doomed 
the US to muddled policy in the region, something it has yet to adjust. The second 
failure came after the warfare began. Assumptions that the war still held the character 
of a 'civil conflict', even after recognition of the republics, forced two consequences 
which may likely limit US influence in the region for some time to come. First, the US 
and the West held false beliefs that the violence in the Balkans is endemic to the region. 
Indeed, the aggressors in most cases hoped that the US and the West would feel this 
way, as if to warn them that; 'warfare is part of our primitive, non-Westem culture. 
30 Alexei Filitov, "Victory in the Postwar Era: Despite the Cold War or Because of it? ", in M. Hogan, 
pp. cit.: p. 77. 
31 Alan Tonelson (Summer, 1993), pp. cit., p. 178. 
32 John Gray, pp. cit., p. 30. 
33 Noel Malcolm (1994), pp. cit. - p. 225. 
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You can do very little here. Do not waste your time, money or risk human life for 
something you have minimal, if any-interest ire. This strategy worked. Western and 
US 'acquiescence in aggressive war and their indirect collaboration in Yugoslavia! s 
ethnic cleansing' became rationalised along this very same premise. 34 Second, US and 
Western policy, or lack thereof, established bad precedent with the other states of the 
area and puts relations with them on tenuous ground despite appearances of positive 
progress. Negotiated settlements notwithstanding, the allowance of a minority within 
an already recognised state, [Serbs within Bosnia], to capture through aggression and 
then keep territory in that state does not bode well for the other states of the Balkans. 
The non-homogeneity of states in the area coupled with existing tense regional 
relations and security fears places the US in a poor position to further bilateral 
relations, maintain stability and adopt a comprehensive policy for the region. 
For the US, the Clinton administration has stated that institutions such as 
NATO would allow the US the flexibility it required in the area and perhaps further its 
regional relations. By readapting its role, the US believed NATO could meet the new 
security environment of Europe. What it has failed to understand, however, is that the 
environment, per se, is not new although the circumstances may be. NATO represents 
more than simply US wishes to not be left out of the security decision-making process 
of Europe. 33 The possibility of 'out of area! operations are still representative of the 
same security concerns that dominated US thinking during the Cold War. It is the 
threats which may have changed and the predictability, yet NATO seeks to maintain its 
role as the 'guarantor of collective defense'. 36 If the US seeks to modify the role of 
this vital collective defence organisation, it should realise that Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe still face threats over concepts that have not disappeared with the 
Cold War. Recent Russian tendencies to flex its muscle, especially in its 'near abroad' 
doctrine suggest that it will not easily abandon claims to areas it strongly feels are 
within its sphere of influence. - The maintenance of Nato's collective security pact 
means more in the post Cold War world. 'Concern for Eastern Europe was an 
excellent beginning, ' as Nixon states, yet 'we must go further, putting down a marker 
that no potential aggressor could ignore. 37 Adoption of democracy promotion 
principles enforced by NATO fits well within 'the non-military aspects of 
Mediterranean security. 31 The NATO alliance was instrumental in maintaining the 
balance of power in Europe for nearly five decades. Its framework ought not to be 
discarded in the post Cold War era. The maintenance of balance is still sought. Why 
34 William Pfaff (Summer, 1993), W. cit..., p. 99. 
35Aliboni(l992), qp. cit,: pp. 10-11. 
36 Warren Christopher (May/June, 1993), op. cit.: p. 54. 
37 Nixon (1992), pp. cit. - p. 130. 
38 Aliboni (1992), M. cit., p, 78. 
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else would the states of the former Eastern bloc continue to voice security concerns if 
not because threats to the security and hence balance of Eastern Europe are, and will 
likely be continuously threatened. These states have recognised that their geopolitical 
position has not shifted with the demise of communism. They sit between competing 
blocs of power. As such, NATO offers them the idea of similar security guarantees 
offered to Western Europe after W. W. H. The US cannot offer these guarantees 
unilaterally. 
Hegemonic stability theorists would state that the US is in decline yet claim 
that the necessary condition for stability required in Eastern Europe and the Balkans 
necessitate a 'single dominant state willing and able to use its power to create a set of 
political and economic structures .... that maintain order 
in the system. '39 The US can 
fill the role of this state, yet should operate within organisations such as NATO to 
secure this stability and order. The expansion of democracy, and with it market 
economies, into areas of strategic interest requires from the US a commitment 
minimally equal, if not greater to, the one given to those states of Western Europe it 
sought the equivalent for following the Second World War. 
1.3 AnActiveRole 
Fashioning a foreign policy requires first and foremost that America accept a 
simple premise; it cannot 'stick its head in the sand, shirk responsibility and must 
instead opt for an activist approach to world affairs. Multilateralism should not be 
discounted or discredited. Practicality dictates that America simply does not have the 
resources to tackle every problem alone. However, where its strategic interests are at 
stake, unilateralism should present a first option rather than a last one. No where is 
this more evident than in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. If the world is indeed 
becoming increasingly multipolar, as it appears it is, then areas such as Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans are *up for grabs! as it were. Activism on the part of the US is needed 
to obtain and secure these markets and thereby foster order in the region. US 
influence in the region will continue to increase as more concerted efforts are made, aid 
efforts which demonstrate firm US resolve in seeing democracy succeed. The United 
States should also take advantage of the opportunity at a time when the European 
Union still wrestles with whether or not it will eventually deepen and widen 
eastward. 40 It appears, however, that this possibility is low, particularly in the short 
term. The point is aptly made by Rollo; 
39 Jack S. Levy, "Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transition and the Long Peace", in Charles W. Kegley Jr., 
(ed. ) Ae Long Postwar Peace: Contending 
-EMIanations and 
Projections (New York, New York: 
Harper Collins, 1993): p. 149. 
40 Brzezinski makes this point that the 'scope of US influence in Eastern Europe will be largely 
defined by the degree to which Europe does or does not move toward a widening and deepening'. See, 
Brzezinski(1993), gp--cit-* pp-208-209. 
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To try and absorb the East-Central Europeans [and the Balkans in due course], with their economic 
structures in transition and their lower standards of living, is difficult to contemplate. The prospect of 
managing a community of up to 25 states, at all different levels of economic development, is 
daunting. 41 
While some believe that civic democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans requires 
tying these areas to the democratic institutions of the EU, 42 the latter may not be 
ready or willing for quite some time. By seizing the opportunity in the short term, the 
US can foster stable democratic states for the long term. This is not to suggest some 
adversarial contest between the US and the EU, with the East and South as some prize 
to be won. The Atlantic partnership still represents one of the most sound, cohesive 
relationships on the planet and should not be decreased in its scope or intenSity. 43 
Instead, it should suggest that the US is currently in the position to lead and influence 
the more strategic areas of interest in the East, success of which, will benefit both the 
US and the EU. Indeed, if the US and Europe 'seek to build a common transatlantic 
home, [they] must find ways to include those nations in Eastern Europe. '44 
The Balkan crisis has demonstrated the fragile nature of the balance of power 
in the former communist bloc. During the days of the Cold War the spheres of 
influence were'evidenced by clear lines of demarcation between the superpowers and 
their allies which preserved the balance of power. This also served to limit an active 
Western role in the region. Today, however, these lines are not easily delineated. An 
active role, therefore on the part of the West, led by the US is needed to ensure that 
some balance is achieved. The consequences of failure through poor policy, 
indifference, or inaction may result in widespread regional instability. This should not 
mean, however, that the West, and the US, should seek, as its primary objective, to 
maintain balance by erecting a 'cordon sanitaire' around the current conflict and area so 
as to prevent a larger Balkan war. 45 This may provide stability in the short term, 
something which certainly is necessary. 46 However, without political blueprint for the 
intermediate to long term future of the region, the West risks not being able to create 
41 Rollo, pp. Cit.. - p. 114. 
42 Chace, gpi cit.., p. 5 1. 
43 'The problems of Eastern Europe ... are even more formidable, and can only be overcome if all the 
EC countries as well as the United States are willing to make significant contributions to the region's 
recovery. If the EC and the United States cooperate in rebuilding the East, they will help to prevent 
the development of friction that might otherwise occur between American trade interests and 
European cfforts to create an integrated Western European market .... It is imperative that the EC not become a rival to the United States in relations with Eastern Europe. If a rivalry develops the 
economic recovery of the East will be delayed, to the detriment of the peoples of both the East and the 
West! See, Hermann J. Rupieper, pp. cit., pp. 181-182. 
44 Nixon (1992), pp. cit.;, p. 127. 
45 This policy is recommended by John Gray, 2p. cit. - p. 30. 
46 For a view into the pros and cons of this see, Mark Thompson, The Paper House: The Ending q 
Yugoslavia (London: Vintage, 1992) -f 
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stability and balance which would ensure repetition of the current crisis on some future 
and larger scale. 47 
America's economic agenda should seek to ensure that the aid it distributes 
eastward is not mismanaged. More priority could be given to privatisation projects as 
well as rebuilding most of the area! s infrastructure so that corruption is at least limited. 
Moreover, the US could extend aid more 'on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis'. 
Multilateral organisations will not, in each instance, have the same level of interest 
toward a particular region and/or state as the US. 48 Such a move would only 
strengthen American influence, further relations along a positive track, and 
demonstrate US resolve in acting unilaterally, 'where we MUStI. 49 More importantly, 
the US could finds ways to work towards the 'articulation of more positive, hopeful, 
and constructive' ways of persuading the people of the region that domestic support is 
necessary and that social sacrifices must be made. This would be particularly vital 
during the 'initial phase of transformation'. 50 
Recent US efforts to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian 
Muslims5l may not provide either short or long term answers. Those in favour of this 
approach believe it will 'level the playing field' and perhaps force the Serbs to the 
bargaining table. Advocates also look to the past example of Mghanistan and US 
efforts in arming the muhajedin and their success against Red Army as proof that 
similar progress could be made against the Bosnian Serbs. 52 Stavrou mentions that 
present US efforts to convince the US public that we must assist Bosnian Muslims is 
part of a US press campaign which plays upon the 'innate goodness of the American 
people, to not sit idly by while crimes against the innocent are being committed'. 53 
47 'A punitive military venture, as demanded by some in the West, is hardly a way to peace in the 
Balkans. Without a clear political blueprint, the deployment of American soldiers would be simply 
foolish, a prelude to US involvement justifications for which would have to be manufactured later. ' 
See, Dusko Doder, pp. cit.. p. 21. 
48 Nixon (1992), 9D-. cit. * p. 267. 
49 The case for unilateral action was made vehemently by President Clinton while on the presidential 
campaign trail; 'We will never abandon our prerogative to act alone when our vital interests are at 
stake. Our motto in this era will be: together where we can; on our own where we must! As for his 
belief in an active US role; 'In a world of change, security flows from initiative, not from inertia. ' On 
the former statement see, "Clinton would strcss economic issues in foreign policy", address to world 
affairs council, Los Angeles (13 August, 1992): p. 20., on latter, "Clinton says US should lead alliance 
for democracy", address to foreign policy association, (I April, 1992): p. 38 Text obtained from, the 
(London: Reference Centre, United States Information Service, United States Embassy, ) 
50 Brzezinski (Fall, 1993), 9p. git.; pp. 7-9. 
51 The United States Senate voted 5049 in favour of lifting the embargo. See, 7he International 
Herald Dibune 16 May, 1994 p. 1. 
52 Vin Weber, pp. cit., p. 24. 
53 Stavrou, (1993), M. cit. * p. 41., Stavrou claims that approximately $36 million [US] has been spent 
in seeking to shape US public opinion in myths designed to sway poliqymaking. Among these myths 
the campaign sought to instil; 1) only Serbs commit atrocities, violate truces, destroy historic sites and 
maintain prisoncr/concentration camps. 2) Serbs occupy land belonging to others, Muslims and 
Croats secure land. 3) Serbs have superior weapons, Muslims arc unarmed. 4) Other Muslim military 
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However, lifting the arms embargo is likely not sufficient, in and of itself. This may 
contain some truth. It fails to address, however, the basic notion, that US foreign 
policy has been and is charged with moral purpose, it is part of the American 
democratic tradition and not easily disposed of, nor should it be. Activism along the 
lines of intervention may stop warfare, yet with more damaging results. The area may 
witness violence of 'another sort' as instability would likely reign. Moreover, the 
conflict has already highlighted the divergence between the US, its allies, and more 
importantly, the Russians. 54 An active role with consideration towards military 
solutions should exercise great care in ensuring that it does not perpetuate the conflict. 
Such a policy is not conducive to stability. Realists which imbue their ideals with 
morality are correct in their beliefs on the need to level the playing field. However, as 
Yissinger states; 'the American foreign policy trauma of the sixties and seventies was 
caused by applying valid principles to unsuitable conditions. Care must be taken not to 
repeat the same tragedy in the nineties with a wider set of equally important 
principles. '55 Containment of the conflict may appear a 'valid principle', and seems to 
offer the only present solution for the US and the West. Granted, it does not solve the 
problem and arguments against a 'cordon sanitaire' have been expressed. Yet it must 
be realised that a perfect solution simply does not exist nor is it likely to in the near 
future. Activism should now incorporate a diplomatic mission. The goal now must be 
to strengthen the area's other states and ensure that instability does not spread. 
Regional democracy and market capitalism may not flourish in the short to medium 
term under neighbouring conditions, however, they should at the very least be afforded 
the opportunity to do without overriding concern that instability will spread. More 
importantly, for states such as Albania, they must be made secure in the belief that the 
US recognises their importance to the region in maintaining a balance, security and 
stability. 
2.0 The US, Albania and the Region 
The challenge for the United States involves more than a mere recognition that 
the international climate has changed drastically since 1989. For the US, foreign policy 
towards the Balkans and Albania specifically, requires that the former engage itself to 
groups have disbanded to avoid Serbian domination 5) US should intervene to level the playing field 
or at least open embargo to allow arms to Muslims., at p. 42. 
54 JBID, pp. 26-27. The French and Russians have expressed their objections over the US Senate vote 
to lift the arms embargo. The French have threatened to remove their peacekeeping forces from 
Bosnia if no solution is agreed upon before the end of 1994. Currently, they constitute the largest 
portion of the peacekeeping unit. The Russian assembly has gained consensus over supplying arms to 
Serbs if the US arms the Muslims. International Herald Tribune 16 May, 1994 Following the Senate 
vote the Russians 'at once urged the same for Serbia'. See The Economis (21 May, 1994): p. 42. 
55 quoted in S. Griffiths (1993), pp. cit.. p. 117. 
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long term commitment which aims to strengthen existing relations of a bilateral nature 
where they did not exist before. Diplomacy still should remain the key to positive 
relations and to dealing with crises, however, the US must be willing to back up such 
policy with firmness and military force. In its relations, the US 'must pay more 
attention to understanding the historical, cultural, social, and political dynamics of 
international negotiatiod. 56 
US-Albanian relations have been non-existent for more than fifty years. 
Establishing good relations between the two requires more than simply aid packages. 
Albania has had the 'worst starting-line of any country in systemic transitiolf, 57 in a 
region which is currently manifesting tendencies of violence that in the past led to large 
levels of violence and warfare. Maintaining stability so as to ensure the growth of 
democracy, however, necessitates greater US involvement. Economically, the US has 
announced efforts to assist in the formation of an American-Albanian Enterprise Fund. 
A visit by the US ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright to Albania 
brought US allocation of $2"5m [US] for small business development. 58 As part of the 
1989 SEED Act [Support for East European Democracy], the money is intended to 
spur on the Albanian economy, especially the private sector. Support for this program, 
however, needs a substantial boost. Despite high growth, the Albanian economy still 
requires large levels of foreign investment. Even with the arrival of democracy in 
1992, investment has been low over fears of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 
Even those that may not believe the conflict will spread still feel that the potential for 
destabilisation is high as refugee movements and low intensity conflict, terrorism and 
continued iffedentism remain high thereby dissuading investors. 
The conflagration in the former Yugoslavia has renewed US interest in Albania 
due to both its proximity to the conflict and to the large numbers of ethnic Albanians in 
the region. Keeping tabs on the war has included NATO ships patrolling the Adriatic, 
making use of Albanian ports. The US has also sent CIA spy planes to Albania in 
efforts to gather intelligence and monitor military targets. US Defence officials have 
also stated that plans for a ground satellite transmission station have been approved for 
location inside Albania near the Albanian-Montenegrin border. 59 Albania, however, 
continues to ask for greater security guarantees from the US. Concern over Albanians 
in Macedonia, Greece and Kosova have repeatedly plagued relations with neighbours 
56 Brady (1991), pp-. cit.. p. 11., Brady also maintains that such negotiations are often not 'one-shot 
affhirs but occur in the contexi of a pree: dsting relationship which will be maintained over a long 
period. Thus, negotiations are influenced by the history of interaction between the parties .... 1, at p. 26. 57 Nfichael Kmer, "The Markaization of Eastern Europe", in J. Story, 0,.. cit. - p. 385. 
58 11"a 27-29 January, 1994 
59 R"a 3-5 February, 1994 p. 1. The US initially had asked Italy if they could fly the remote control 
spy plane drones from there. The then Italian Nfinister of Defence, Fabio Fabbri turned down the 
request fearful that the drones may threaten civilian airspace. 
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and continue to threaten area wide destabilisation. For its part, the US is trying to tone 
down recent polemics between Albania and Greece over the Greek minority in 
southern Albania. America should realise, though, that if democracy is to succeed in 
Albania and the Balkans, greater security guarantees are needed to ensure the balance 
of power in the region. Cross border migrations of Albanians seeking work and a 
better life only add tension to the area as they mobilise anti-Albanian sentiment 
wherever they go. The results in most cases are incidents of one type or another which 
only heighten tension and worsen relations. Efforts by the US to move Albania out of 
its state of backwardness require more comprehensive aid packages, higher levels of 
investment, and more importantly, security guarantees for Albania, particularly if 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia leads to mass migrations of ethnic Albanians from 
Kosova and Macedonia. The Albanian economy is not equipped for such an influx of 
refugees. 
The fear of Albanian involvement in the conflict remains a concern for the US. 
Questionable leadership in diffusing trouble spots on the part of Albania increases 
possibilities that they may precipitate violence. Relations are tense and the US should 
make it known that if Albania were to instigate direct military action in the 
neighbouring conflict it should be left to its own devices. President Berisha has 
repeatedly stated that Albania would not stand idly by if ethnic cleansing were to 
spread to Kosova and the large Albanian minority there. He should realise, however, 
that Albania is ill equipped for prolonged conventional warfare. The US should 
consider making it known that it would assist Albania provided the latter assume a 
defensive position should conflict spread southward. By not initiating violence, the US 
would be justified in action which would maintain a state that could serve as a 
stabilising factor in the area. Proactive policy would, however, offer the best solution 
to both parties. The NATO Partnership for Peace plan offers positive first steps, yet 
more should be done to ensure some definite timetable for entry to the Alfiance. 60 The 
United States may want to consider that nations which are a party to PoP include those 
which are currently suffering, and have in the past, poor relations with one another 
such as Albania, and present NATO member, Greece. The Clinton administration has 
sent Robert Schifter, the National Security Advisor for European Aff4irs to Athens and 
Tirana in an effort to ease tensions between the two countries. While this is a positive 
step, more could be done. Specifically, material aid which is disbursed through PoP 
should await constitutional guarantees from both nations over the major cause of 
tensions, their respective minorities within each state. Institutionalising these rights 
makes them slightly more secure, and entry could be attached to specific rights 
,.... the current vacuum creates an 
incentive for adventurism, [therefore], the 60 Nixon (1992), M. cit.., ' 
East European democracies must be brought into NATUs security sphere ...... p. 
129. 
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provisions which are agreed upon by both parties. 61 Steps of a bilateral nature may 
require that the US make overt gestures to provide for preliminary conflict 
management. This is where a nfditary role would be useful. Rather than remove and 
cut the level of military spending, in Europe, the US should take steps to place new 
military installations into potential trouble spots. A military base in Albania with an 
extended lease would pump money into the Albanian economy, demonstrate US 
resolve and activism in the region, and perhaps allay Albanian security concerns. More 
importantly, as the region finds itself increasingly subject to outside powers seeking to 
gain influence in the area, the US could, through such an installation make it known 
that Albania should fall within the West's sphere of influence. Such a move would 
likely allow for positive steps forward on the road to a fully functioning and healthy 
democracy. 
During the Cold War, the US tended to view states as either allies or 
adversarieS. 62 States such as Albania were not trusted due to their neutral status vis-a- 
vis the competing power blocs. Today, however, the opportunity to exert influence in 
the region and states such as Albania should not be passed up by the West and 
especially the US. The Yugoslav conflict has shown that the balance of 'power 
distribution! is greatly impacted upon by war within a particular region. 63 This makes 
the need for US activism in the region more imperative as the leadership role of the US 
would perhaps fill the vacuum created by the current European mismanagement of the 
situation. 64 The crisis in the Balkans has also shown that irredentism will likely remain 
a problem for quite some time even if the possibility for actual conflict remains 
minimal. 
Even if military conflict is unlikely in Southeastern Europe in the coming decade, US policymakers 
must contend with the possibility that the nations of Southeastern Europe will shift their attention 
away from external threats.. towards regional concerns- a change in perceptions that might itself 
aggravate tension. 65 
The US may want to consider the implications for states within the Western 
orbit such as Italy, Greece and Turkey, all of which have a natural concern over 
potential instabilities in the Balkans and all of which are currently vying for influence 
among the states of the region. These competing pockets of power may themselves 
61 Warren Christopher makes mention of NATOrs members which all have a common stake in each 
other's security and President Clinton asked Congress in July, 1994 for a$1 00,0oo million 
appropriation for the PoP members. See, Christopher, "Speech to NATO", 2 December, 1992 in 
Foreign folia Bulletin vol. 4 #4-5 (Januaty/April, 1994): p. 6., and President Clinton's, "Speech to 
Polish Parliament", 7 July, 1994 in Foreign Poligy Bulletin vol. 5 #2 (Septembcr/october, 1994): 
p. 59. 
62 Raymond Garthaff, "Why did the Cold War Arise, and Why did it End? ", inHogan, qp. PL- p. 132. 
63 Goertz and Diehl, pp-. cit. * pp-10-11. 
64 Dodcr, Qp. cit..., p. 21. 
65 Shoup (1990), LDp. cit.. p. 269. 
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cause further deterioration in the political climate of the area as each state becomes 
increasingly wary over revival of old time alliances which in the past were often the 
cause of regional conflict. By pursuing an overriding influence in the region, the US 
may aid in precluding this possibility by using its influence with regional powers such 
as Greece, Turkey and Italy to assist each other through multilateral schemes which 
would benefit the area as a whole. Italy's Pentagonal and Turkey's BECS proposal are 
but two examples. With US assistance and encouragement, these schemes could be 
expanded to include the remaining Balkan states. The eventual tying of these schemes 
with the organisations of Western Europe might also smooth the transition of these 
states to the Western sphere. 
States such as Greece have, since their arrival to the Western alliance, viewed 
regional security concerns as vital and part of historic East-West relations. Western 
failure, as the Greeks see it, over the Cyprus situation of 1974 for example, made 
Greece'reduce its reliance on the USM. 66 It appears that they are witnessing similar 
failure in Yugoslavia. America could take steps to prevent them being alienated from 
the Western orbit. Their current leadership has, however, appeared to distance itself 
from both the US and the EU over policy in the Balkans. Greeks should take notice. 
They have the opportunity to exercise considerable influence in a region desperately in 
need of states which have functioning democracies and market economies. The same 
should be said of Turkey. While relations with Turkey improved significantly during 
the Ozal period, steps should be towards continuing efforts to cajole Turkey into the 
I role of formulating Western policy in the region. 67 This may not appeal to the 
Greeks. They could, however, be afforded the equal opportunity in this task since they 
will feel the effects of either success or failure. As for Albania, it could fill the role of 
moderate player in the region. Success of reform coupled with a large diaspora that is 
contained from initiating violence could help to serve as both example and as a 
stabilising factor in the Balkans. Albania has for quite some time 'remained a footnote 
in US foreign policy, 'subordinated [regionally] to purely US-Soviet considerations. 168 
The geostrategic location of the Balkans was recognised during the Second 
World War as was its place within the post-war considerations regarding the balance of 
power. Nfilitary considerations, however, precluded the possibility of an exerted 
Western effort throughout the area, aside from the successes in Greece and Turkey. 
Today, similar opportunities confront the West, especially the US. America could 
secure influence in the area and maintain a favourable balance of power which will not 
disrupt regional stability any further. The current conflict may require policies of 
66 Yannis G. Valinalds, "Southern Europe between Ddtcnte and New Threats: the view from Greece", 
in Roberto Aliboni (1992), M. cit. - pp. 53-56. 
67 J. F. Brown (1993), M. cit. * p. 180. 
68 Shoup (1990), pp. cit.. p. 253. 
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containment in the short term However, the US must try not to cordon off or engage 
in a process of the 'ghettoization! of the Balkans in the long term. 69 Such a program 
would only alienate the regions states and perhaps promote anti-Western sentiment 
and activity among the area! s four million Muslims, something the West does not 
need. 70 More importantly, failure to 'produce a better life' in the region could lead to a 
return, perhaps not of communism, but of some 'other authoritarian or statist 
systems'. 71 The immediate challenge for the US must be to maintain the pace of 
economic reform, 72yet, quelling conflict by containing it may offer the best solution. 
In due course the US and Western efforts should become more 'adaptive' and long- 
term oriented. 73 Applying strategy to the Balkans entails a US commitment in 
conjunction with its Western allies that takes this point into account. 
.... Eurocentric themes of 
balances of power need to be applied to specific regions where 
Western interests might be vulnerable to challenge; and that this cannot be achieved unless 
there is demonstrable military power, and the will to use it in support of economic and 
political interests ... 
According to this argument, military forces of a global, policing nature 
would have to be able to enforce stability as well as maintain it. Deployments should 
therefore not be solely reactive but be precautionary, thereby serving the purposes of 
deterrence wherever this was deemed desirable or necessary. 74 
This should not imply that the US revert to hard, Cold War thinking in its 
fashioning of a foreign policy. Yet, principles with present day applicability, such as 
containment and balance of power should not simply be discarded for grandiose 
schemes rooted in amorphous methods and backed by rudderless policy. Idealism has 
a place in foreign policy and should continue to do so for the US. But for the sake of 
practicality, 'idealism must express itself with due respect for reality, and that policies 
must be judged by their consequences, not by the nobility of intentione. 75 The Clinton 
administration's goals are workable and within the vital interests of the United States. 
However, due consideration should be given to the premise that great projects require 
not only great thinking, but appropriate investment of military and economic power as 
well. 
69 Christopher Cvic (1991), 9p. cit.: p. 88. 
70 This possibility and the negative consequences that accompany it, such as irredentism, n-dlitant 
Islam and terrorism are well summarised by Graham Fuller; '.. the very one-sided and disproportionate 
suffering of the Bosnian Muslims may be the issue that will guarantee the existence of rich soil for 
Muslim radicalism in the Balkans in the future .... Even moderate Muslims have nagging suspicions 
that the West is determined never to allow real power to emerge anywhere, especially in the heart of 
Europe 
..... 
A settlement seen by Muslims as unjust could well feed a decades long guerrilla struggle 
for rights and land-onc that could even spill over into terrorism in Europe as a means of getting 
attention: a second Palestinian cause' See, "A Bosnian 'Palestine'? Iran Muddies the Waters", 
International Herald Dibune 16 May, 1994 
71 Nixon (1992), pp-. 6-t-, p. 40. 
72Roll%qp. Cit.. - pp, 134-135. 
73 IBD: ), p. 117. 
74 McInnes, Qp. Cit - p. 86. 
75 MUravChik, M. Cit. 1 p. 36. 
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1 Conclusion 
The nations of the Balkans have throughout much of the modem era managed 
to cause a considerable deal of grief for the great powers. 1-fistory has shown that 
despite repeated attempts to correct border disputes, quell ethnic tension, national 
aspirations and the like, Western efforts have been continuously short-sighted, 
inefficient or simply foolish. It appears that the West, the US especially, has not taken 
to heart lessons from history in a region where history continues to matter. 
Circumstances dictated during World War 11 that political considerations be given a 
back seat to the more pressing issues at hand, namely defeating the Axis. After the 
war, without a firm foothold in the region, and with British power both waning and not 
able to exert either the will or power necessary in the Balkans to maintain a sphere of 
influence for the West, the USSR was able to both exert and maintain a foothold of 
influence in the region. The Soviets were correct in assuming that despite their 
'spheres of influence' percentage agreement with Britain, they would be capable of 
reneging on it without much British resistance. The Americans would not likely 
contest Soviet gains since the US had limited if any interest in the region and since 
Soviet troops were firmly entrenched in the zone. Once it became apparent that 
Greece was threatened by communist take-over and that Britain would no longer be 
able to assist, the US became involved. By doing so the US not only halted communist 
expansion in Greece but also delineated the spheres of influence between the West and 
the Soviets in the region for the next fifty years. 
The US, however, failed in its policy approach towards nations such as Albania 
immediately after the war. It failed to recognise that, although in communist hands, 
Albania continued to fear for its integrity, particularly from its communist neighbours, 
The ability to lure it into the Western camp was lost once the US bowed to pro-Greek 
pressure over territorial concessions. Albanian siege mentality coupled with a limited 
US 'black and white'view of communism resulted in a sacrifice of possible US- 
Albanian relations immediately after the war. Without a foundation from which to 
build the US now finds itself trying to establish and strengthen ties with Albania in the 
dawn of a new era in international relations. The post Cold War world has, and is, 
continuously showing both politician and analyst alike that 'traditional assumptions are 
coming under increasing pressure! to re-evaluate. 76 
Traditional spheres of influence created after the war have been undermined by 
communism! s demise. The void that these have produced will likely be filled with 
situations such as those in the former Yugoslavia. Nationalism has demonstrated that 
it can be a force to reckon with in the post Cold War era. Its rejuvenation finds itself 
76 Paul Kennedy (1993), Qp. cit. *. p. 127. 
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side by side with efforts toward democratisation and market capitalism. Since both 
efforts are difficult and produce in their wake disgruntled peoples, nationalism finds 
fertile breeding ground amongst the fiinges throughout the democratising ex- 
communist states. The need for 'order and stability' often become convenient excuses 
for these fringes and even mainstream groups to both search for scapegoats and lean 
toward more authoritarian type democracy. This appears to be the trend in Albania. 
This is where US-Albanian relations stand at the cross-roads. Failure by the US to 
take more concerted and positive steps to preclude the former possibility may lead 
Albania to assume an alternate model toward development. Such a model, patterned 
after perhaps the Chinese, would witness political and social liberalisation take a back 
seat to economic growth. This possibility is not outside the realm of reality. Albania, 
has in its past had a fiuitful and positive relationship with China. The Chinese and 
Albanian similarities in culture; patriarchal societies based upon collective progress, 
may present Albania with options for strong leadership forgoing human rights and true 
democracy, in return for economic growth. On its face, such a possibility does not 
threaten vital US interests. Yet, the US may want to consider that if it is to consensus 
build around democracy, vis-a-vis enlargement, or some variant of it, it must take a 
more activist approach to prevent the possible alternate model approach. Such an 
approach would also not bode well toward regional security as it would continue to 
promote bilateral tensions throughout the Balkans. Such tensions in turn would limit 
potential investment thereby fuelling defence spending, perhaps contributing to mid-to- 
long term low intensity violence and terrorism which eventually would destroy any 
possibility for creating a balance of power in the region. 
It appears, however, that the present US administration still does not grasp the 
nuances of traditional power politics. Recent trends indicate that the US still feels that 
rationality can prevail without credible threats to back up rhetoric. For example, in the 
Bosnian war, the US now is hoping to divide the Bosnian Serbs from their sponsorship 
in Belgrade. By approaching Milosevic, the US hopes that it can use the carrot of lifted 
sanctions against Serbia to isolate Bosnian Serbs resulting in a removal of their 
leadership and perhaps approval by them of the recent peace agreement granting them 
forty-nine percent of Bosnian territory. 77 The US fails to realise, however, that 
Bosnian Serbs have fought hard for nearly two years and have shed much blood in 
their acquisition of approximately seventy percent of Bosnia. They will be hard 
pressed to relinquish such gains by simple negotiations. The US must also understand 
that Milosevic, despite sanctions, came to power in Serbia under the banner of 
'Greater Serbia!. His recent election victory affirmed his staunch belief that Serbia is 
alone and cannot trust the West under any circumstances. More radical elements exist 
77 Robert Cohen, The New York Times 31 August, 1994 p. A3. 
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within Serbia as viable opposition than do moderate elements. Yet, the US continues 
to believe that sincere negotiations can be conducted. It is in this climate that recent 
Greek and Albanian tensions have also arisen over alleged refugee abuse and terrorist 
activity. 78 Increased tensions in Kosova, problems in Macedonia over Albanians there 
and a general breakdown in regional relations all add to the potential for area-wide 
instability which could have severe consequences ranging from border conflict 
spillover, to refugee exodus to Western Europe, to continued terrorist-type activity 
throughout the area and eventually against Western targets. 79 
US-Albanian relations would not solve all these problems, but they would 
demonstrate US resolve in maintaining a balance of sorts in the region and would mark 
the first step toward a proactive coherent policy. Lessons of the Cold War should be 
used by the US in fashioning its bilateral relations with Albania. It is these %core 
beliefs'that were successful, such as containment, balance of power, stability 
promotion etc., that need to be re-evaluated and perhaps modified if constructive 
change is to ensue. 10 It is likely that in the post Cold War era, threats to US interests 
will not be fixed as they once were. Threats will likely float and arise as circumstances 
dictate. To preclude this possibility the US can see to it that in areas of vital interest, or 
of conditional and strategic interest, it would be wise to contain possible threats 
thereby preventing or limiting their capacity to rise in force. The Balkans, given its 
strategic position between both the Middle East and Western Europe needs such an 
activist, proactive approach. David Gompert aptly states that once warfare ends in the 
former Yugoslavia, Serbia would likely offer itself as a disruptive presence in the 
regional balance of power. This the US should prevent. 
The West cannot treat them [the nations of Southeastern Europe: Albania, Macedonia, 
Bulgaria and Romania] as expendable. Instead, the EC and the United States should expand 
and sustain economic support so that these frontline states can survive and succeed as Serbia 
falters. Supporting struggling societies recently liberated from communism is a worthy cause 
in any case. It has done much for the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs. The cost has been 
affordable, and the results are promising. And, of course, the West would not be helping the 
Balkan democracies in the long run by ending Serbia's isolation and letting Milosevic 
emerge as the victorious leader of a menacing local power. 81 
The US may want to consider that recent overtures by Serbian leadership may 
be attempts to consolidate gains and bide time for a later date. The Cold War may be 
78 Illyfia 31 August, 1994 p. 1. 
79 See Chris Kutschcra, (cds. ct. al. ) "'Me Betrayal of Bosnia", and "The Ghost Republic", and Janusz 
Bugaiski, "The Politics of the Former Yugoslavia", in Uncapfive Minds vol. 7 #1 (Wintcr/Spring 
1994) 
80 Brzezinski (1993), pp-. cit. ' p. 228., and John Lewis Gaddis who states that old assumptions such as 
stability'no longer apply'. See Gaddis, "The Cold War and the Long Peace", in M. Hogan, QpMt.; 
p. 38. 
81 David Gompcrt, "How to Defeat Serbia", Foreign Affairs vol. 73 #4 (July/August, 1994): p. 45. 
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over for the US yet regional leadership in the Balkans still has not abandoned the 
traditional notions of power politics. It would be 'wiser for the US if it remembered 
the maxim that it is the capacity of a potential enemy, not his conjectured or professed 
intentions, that mattersMoSt. '82 Since the arrival of democracy to Albania in March, 
1992, the primary concern for Albania has been its fear of regional conflict spreading 
south. Inexperienced leadership has not helped matters as poor diplomacy has led to 
continuous heightened bilateral tensions. US failure to extend security guarantees to 
nations such as Albania will only sour relations and make regional states continue to 
harbour suspicions of their neighbours. With superficial ties with Albania, the US 
implicitly sends a clear message to would be aggressors; territorial claims and ethnic 
violence will not be dealt with on a proactive basis. By not explicitly stating where 
Albania stands within the hierarchy of US interests, the US has abandoned it to its own 
devices. Without a comprehensive policy which delineates its interests, the threats to 
such interests, and the steps it will take, given the proper allocation of resources, to 
protect and nurture those interests, nations such as Albania will be lost. 
The post Cold War era has also demonstrated a new trend within the study of 
international relations which, it is hoped, this study has outlined. Given the crises 
which have and will likely arise in the Balkans, international relations study in the 
region finds itself 'renewing pleas for a new methodology; one which is based upon 
'the investigation of historical processes and changes in the factors affecting 
international life. These past relations should be examined more creatively, in order to 
uncover patterns running even to the present day, which would provide a frame of 
reference for assessing them ... '83 An examination of Albanian history has shown that 
history does matter in a region where ethnic tensions run high. The US can build 
relations with the various Balkan states yet needs to understand the complexities that 
history presents to such relations. For the Balkan nations, economic progress gives 
way to security concerns. The same can be said of Albania. Despite its rhetoric on the 
virtues of democracy and market capitalism even the present democratic leadership 
expresses more concern over possible territorial infringement and general area wide 
instability than over a need for a growing middle class. 
The United States should understand that security concerns and guarantees will 
provide the key to stable and prosperous relations with Albania. Instability, be it 
generated from within or from without, tend to trigger problems which 'feed back, and 
are likely to affect the surrounding system. 84 In the present case, inability to provide 
82 John Gray, pp. cit., p. 31. 
83BrankoJankovic, Qp,.. cit. - p. 13. 
84 Such a possibility is well explained by Paul Shoup; 'Instability, then, is a condition of symbiotic 
relationships among actors at various levels. This interaction, in which activities in one area of the 
system affects the activities of the other areas, other parts of the system.... ' In dcrining instability 
Shoup states; 'Instability.. refers to a situation in which established procedures, processes, behaviour 
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for the security guarantees that Albania and other Balkan nations require will only 
heighten regional tensions, increase animosity toward the West, and deteriorate 
relations in the long term. 'The West, [and the US especially], needs to produce 
bilateral policies with each of the communist states of the area, taking into account 
country- specific conditions, leaders, and development trends. Increased concern will 
help fashion policies that can foster change, reform, and constructive instability, which, 
in turn, will help reduce the likelihood of massive and destructive instability in the 
intermediate run. '85 
Democratisation of Albania in the long run remains the key to promoting 
stability, particularly when nearly four million Albanians live outside Albania proper in 
the surrounding nations. By providing for security guarantees the US would be 
assisting in the furthering of positive ties between Albania and its immediate 
neighbours. The US, however, should consider two points. First, the US cannot 
impose its system upon others regardless of how they may want it. Albania, must be 
allowed to proceed at its own pace. 86 Artificial methods to control the rate of 
economic liberalisation will only lead to economic chaos. As chapter three has 
indicated, the Albanian economy is proceeding forward with shock therapy. Yet, in a 
society which does not have neither the reserves needed for large scale market reforms, 
nor the social buffers in existence to provide for the periods of market lag and 
recession which are likely to occur within the first five to ten years, excessive 
government regulation and control will only lead to economic instability despite 
facades of growth. Second, the US should realise that in the short term, the promotion 
of stability should supersede the promotion of democracy. This should not imply that 
the latter be abandoned. Instead, that democracy will only flourish in an environment 
where it is not threatened by external sources. Recent US measures to withdraw its 
military presence from Europe does not offer nor demonstrate the resolve necessary to 
provide adequate security guarantees of US allies in Europe's forgotten corridors, such 
as the Balkans. More importantly, such measures by the US seem to forget the most 
basic aspects of human nature, that pacifism, unfortunately, has, as history has shown, 
been a sure way of inviting aggression. 87 In its relations with Albania, the US must 
recognise its own limits. It cannot engage upon a crusade aimed at a global vision of a 
Pax Americana. Yet, in Europe, where its interests remain of vital and strategic 
patterns, and formal structures of decision making no longer function in the manncr expected or 
previously experienced, thus upsetting the established ways of doing business politically ... I see, Shoup (1990), qRsiL, pp. 4142. 
85 IBID, pp. 65-66. 
86 point rcaffirmed by Nixon; 'we should not insist that other nations copy our particular form of 
government. Many countries are not ready for it. Each nation must develop its o-Am institutions and 
advance at its own pace. ' See, Nixon (1992), gp. cit,: p. 301. 
87J. MuravchikW. citp3l. 
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importance, the US can involve itself in a; 'more limited engagement than the attempt 
to act as the guarantor of peace and security everywhere, and one which could 
command the support of America! s allies in Europe... "' Such a strategy vis-a-vis 
Albania would recognise that it holds a place of secondary or conditional interest 
within an area of strategic concern to the US. As such, the US should seek to promote 
stability in Albania, externally, by containing potential and actual threats, and internally, 
by increasing the level of assistance which would accelerated the pace of reform and 
provide the atmosphere necessary for democracy and market capitalism to thrive. 
The question in the post Cold War era remains; how would the US embark 
upon such a course? First, the US must comes to grips with itself Through careful 
self-evaluation and self criticism, the US will recognise that for 'the first time in its 
history, America is currently part of an international system in which it is the strongest 
country. However, old notions, despite present similarities, offer the following 
inescapable conclusion: the US cannot impose its will upon others, regardless of its 
overwhelming military superiority. '89 The answer to such a question can never offer 
perfection. Instead, the US must accept the best of possible solutions. In the post Cold 
War era, the US should consider that the best, 'and [most] constructive solution would 
be a partially overlapping alliance systems, some focusing on security, others on 
economic relations. The challenge for America will be to generate objectives growing 
out of American values that can hold together these various groupings. " In its 
relations with Albania, focus should remain upon the security aspects with those 
economic concerns of secondary importance. The key, however, remains that 
regardless of the overlapping alliance systems, US leadership and the willingness to act 
unilaterally to make its threats credible, remains vital in any set of relations. The US 
can still hold a share, most likely the largest share, of power and influence in the 
upcoming century. The possibility that this type of power will be constructive will 
depend upon American willingness to define its interests specifically and act to see that 
these interests are promoted. Albania represents a case study which to date has shown 
that the US is neither willing nor ready to assume the mantle of leadership necessary in 
the post Cold War world. 
89 J. Gray, pp. cit.;, p. 32. 
89 Kissingcr (1994), M. cit. -, p. 
166. 
90 IBD: ), p. 167. 
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